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CONFIDENTIAL.

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424

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

CONFERENCES HELD AT PARIS

FOR THE

SETTLEMENT OF THE DIFFERENCES

BETWEEN

TURKEY AND GREECE.

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ERRATA.

No. 79, p. 47. The Date should be January 4 instead of July 4.
No. 80, p. 48. The Date should be January 5 instead of January 8.
No. 214, p. 148. The Date should be February 8 instead of February 18.

M. Pierre Delyanni was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of M. Bulgaris.
M. Theodore Delyanni was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of M. Zaimis.
M. John Delyanni was Greek Minister at Constantinople before the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece.
In some passages their initials have been transposed.

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. February 1869.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Conferences held at Paris for the Settlement of the Differences between Turkey and Greece: 1869.

No. 1.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 10.)

Foreign Office, January 5, 1869.

My Lord,

THE Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris of 1856 having agreed to meet by their Representatives in Conference at Paris, with a view to a settlement of the existing differences between Turkey and Greece, the Queen has been pleased to approve of your Excellency representing Her Majesty on that occasion; and I am accordingly to convey to you such instructions as may be requisite for your guidance.

Your Excellency is well acquainted with the particulars of the difference which the Powers desire to terminate, and you have in your possession copies of all the correspondence in which Her Majesty's Government have been engaged in this matter.

You are therefore fully informed of the conditions on which Her Majesty's Government have consented to take part in this Conference, and of the limits within which all the Powers have agreed that its deliberations should be confined.

As the Conference will consist of the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris, Greece, not being one of those Powers, could not be represented in it. But at the same time it would be obviously unjust that Greece should not have the opportunity of stating her case before the Conference, and contesting, if she desires to do so, the justice of the Turkish demands, or pleading her inability, from whatever cause, to comply with them.

Beyond this, the Greek Representative would have no right to be heard, particularly if he should seek to advance a claim to the annexation of Crete to the Hellenic Kingdom, or to engage the Powers to impose upon the Porte conditions as the future government of the island. The Powers having for themselves renounced any intention to enter upon either of these questions, any discussion or argument on the part of the Greek Representative applying to them could, of course, not be entertained in the Conference.

The Conference has, indeed, not to deal with theoretical questions, but merely with questions of fact. The Porte alleges that wrong has been done to it by Greece; it is for the Representative of Greece to shew, if he can, to the satistaction of the Conference that those allegations are unfounded or exaggerated.

Having arrived at a conclusion as to the facts, it will be for the Conference then to judge whether they are sufficient to fix the Government of Greece with the charge of having violated or disregarded international law or the comity of nations; and in dealing with this question, the Representatives will probably have to consider a plea on the part of Greece, that the municipal law of the Kingdom prevented her Government from interfering more actively for the repression of persons desiring to assist the Cretan insurgents, either as combatants or as purveyors of supplies of arms, ammunition, and provisions.

Any such plea would have to be very closely scrutinized, especially in the face of the Articles of the Penal Code of Greece applicable to unauthorized enlistments, and of the fact, if it can be established, that military stores were issued from the Greek arsenals, and levies of volunteers encouraged, to support and keep alive the insurrection in Crete.

But assuming it to be the conclusion of the Conference that Greece has either actively or passively neglected to fulfil its international duties towards Turkey, the remaining point which the Conference will then have to deal with, will be satisfaction to be obtained for Turkey for wrongs done to her, and the security which Turkey will have the right to require against the renewal of such wrongs. Happily, the abandonment of the island by the bands of volunteers whose departure from Greece was the immediate cause of the

hostile demonstration of the Porte, and the probability that the insurrection will in a very short time be altogether at an end, remove one of the greatest difficulties with which the Conference might have had to deal; for it might not have been easy to devise means to insure the faithful observance by the Greek Government and people of any engagements entered into by the former to abstain from all future interference in behalf of the insurgents.

Her Majesty's Government certainly could not assent to any combined scheme for upholding the decisions of the Conference, be they what they might, by the intervention of naval force; and probably few, if any, of the Powers, with the exception of Turkey, represented in the Conference, would be inclined to take a different course: and yet, short of the employment of force, the effectual repression of acts reproved by the Conference might not have been easy to effect.

But the Cretan insurrection being at an end, the other demands of Turkey, if found to be warranted by the Conference, may probably be dealt with more easily; and the Porte may possibly be content with engagements on the part of Greece to refrain from giving encouragement or support, or allowing Greek subjects to give them, to the insurrectionary cause in the island.

Your Excellency is well aware that the great desire of Her Majesty's Government is to see the relations between Turkey and Greece maintained on an amicable footing; and they would fain hope that the almost general disapproval of Europe which has been called forth by the late conduct of Greece towards its neighbours will make a due impression on the Greek Government and people, and convince them that, however well-disposed the Powers of Europe may be towards the Greek Kingdom, and however willing they may be to make allowances for the internal difficulties with which it has to contend, they will, nevertheless, not sanction any conduct on its part inconsistent with the law of nations, or calculated to disturb the general peace of Europe.

Her Majesty's Government, anxious to avert the occurrence of events that might threaten the maintenance of peace, and convinced that this feeling is shared by every other Power, think that, by laying down in distinct terms certain principles of public morality and of international law, the Conference may give, though indirectly, a clear and unmistakeable warning to the Governments of the Principalities, of Servia, and of any other Provinces where there is reason to apprehend that insurrectionary movements against the authority of the Porte might find encouragement, that the Great Powers of Europe would view with the strongest disapproval any unwarrantable proceedings on the part of such Provinces inconsistent with the principles so laid down by the Conference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 2.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 11. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 5, 1869.

WITH reference to my preceding despatch, I have to add that in any observations that your Excellency may make in Conference as to the bearing of international law, as compared with municipal law, on the succour drawn from Greece by the Cretan insurgents, you must not lose sight of the construction which may be placed on your language, as affecting the position taken up by Her Majesty's Government in their discussions with the United States on the so-called "Alabama" claims; that position being that Her Majesty's Government having done all that they were able to do to prevent the departure from British ports of vessels designed to be employed in the service of the Confederate States, were not responsible for the proceedings of any such vessels which, notwithstanding the endeavours of the British Government, succeeded in escaping from a British port.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 3.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Lumley.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 7, 1869.

I APPROVE the language used by you in conversation with your Prussian colleague, as reported in your despatch No. 3 of the 2nd instant, respecting the causes which led to the rupture of relations between Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 4.

Consul Holmes to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8, 1869.)

(No. 15.)
My Lord, *Bosna Serai, December* 21, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that the Governor-General has received instructions by telegraph from the Porte that all Hellenic subjects residing in Bosnia are to quit the country within fifteen days.

I believe there is only one Greek subject in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and he resides at Mostar.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. HOLMES.

No. 5.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8, 1869.)

(No. 510.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 24, 1868.

I YESTERDAY informed the Grand Vizier, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Her Majesty's Government strongly recommended the Porte not to resort to the extreme measure of expelling from the Turkish territory the Greeks who conducted themselves peaceably; adding, that it was regarded as unnecessary and impolitic, and likely to be followed by disastrous consequences to Turkey.

The Grand Vizier said, that as a mere rupture of relations with Greece would have been received by the latter with more pleasure than discontent, it had been thought necessary to accompany it with stringent measures.

There was, he said, no intention of carrying the expulsion into execution with unnecessary severity: it would not be enforced against women and children, and the period of grace had been extended, so that there is still a month before it will be in operation.

It is, moreover, certain that few will suffer from it, who had not themselves personally contributed to sustain the insurrection.

His Highness also said, that the persons who, being naturally Turkish subjects, had taken Greek protection, would, if they chose, be allowed to remain under Turkish nationality.

Although the Grand Vizier showed no disposition to give way in the application of the measure of expulsion, I nevertheless believe it will not be indiscriminately carried into effect, and that very many inoffensive Greeks will be allowed to remain undisturbed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 6.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8, 1869.)

(No. 511.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 24, 1868.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith the copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Adrianople reporting the manner in which the news of the rupture of relations with Greece had been received by that important Christian Vilayet.

The recent measure taken by the Porte for the emancipation of the Bulgarian Church has produced the most satisfactory effect upon the population, which now looks to the Sultan's Government to protect them from the domination of the Greek Hierarchy, and their loyal disposition, to say nothing of a certain irritation and jealousy felt towards the Greeks, is not without its importance at this moment.

I therefore inclose to your Lordship a despatch from Mr. Blunt upon this subject, as well as one reporting the satisfaction that has been given by the introduction of a Christian element into the administration of the province through the appointment of several Christian Muavins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Vice-Consul Blunt to Mr. Elliot.

Adrianople, December 20, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that on Thursday evening the Governor-General of the Vilayet of Adrianople officially announced to my Hellenic colleague the suspension of the relations between Turkey and Greece, and requested him, by authority from the Sublime Porte, to leave the country.

His Excellency also informed my colleague that "the Hellenic subjects established within his Consular district were to leave the country within the period of fifteen days, and that all the Ottoman ports were closed to the Hellenic flag."

A similar communication has also been forwarded by his Excellency through his subordinate Governors to the Hellenic Consuls in the Provinces of Philippopoli, Gallipoli, Rodosto, and Slimia.

The news of this rupture with Greece was the very same evening of its receipt publicly published in this city through bulletins of the Local Government paper "Edirneh."

The action of the Porte in this matter is generally approved by the Mahometans and other elements of the population of this place, with the exception of the Greeks.

The latter, while they appear very much discouraged at the serious course the events in Greece are taking, recognize that the conduct of the Hellenic Government has at last forced that of Turkey to do what any other Government in Europe would have done long ago. They, moreover, do not hesitate to blame the Ministry and Chambers of Greece for not having foreseen that public opinion in Europe would not support their offensive policy towards Turkey.

My Hellenic colleague has hauled down his flag, and removed from his residence the arms of Greece. He will leave this on the 22nd instant: and I hear that several Hellenic subjects are endeavouring to obtain papers of Ottoman nationality, in the hope that they will be allowed to remain in the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. G. BLUNT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Vice-Consul Blunt to Mr. Elliot.

Adrianople, December 20, 1868.

Sir,

I RESPECTFULLY beg leave to inclose herewith, for the information of your Excellency, the extracts of a letter which I have very recently received from one of the leading men in Bulgaria, relative to the Church question.

On Friday, the 18th instant, a *Te Deum* was sung in the Church of the Bulgarians in this city, in honour of their Ecclesiastical Independence, and prayers were offered to the Almighty for the preservation and glory of the Sultan.

Similar acts of solemnity were to have been celebrated by the Bulgarians on the same day in Philippopolis, and all the towns in this Vilayet, as well as in the Vilayet of the Danube; and I hear that two loyal Addresses from the Bulgarian towns and villages in both Vilayets are in the course of preparation for presentation to His Majesty the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. G. BLUNT.

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Extract of a Letter relative to the Bulgarian Church.

VOUS avez appris probablement la réponse du Patriarchat à notre Gouvernement. Elle est pleine d'audace. Nous nous occupons avec la réfutation. Quant à nous il a franchement déclaré la guerre.

Il a donné l'ordre par une circulaire adressée à tous les Evêques, sous peine d'excommunication, de ne pas se réunir à Constantinople en Synode Bulgare, et d'attendre la réunion du Concile Œcuménique Orthodoxe. Je ne sais rien à l'égard de ce Concile si le Gouvernement l'ait permis. Notre Gouvernement a le droit de repousser une pareille réunion, car c'est à lui seul d'annuler et d'élever des nations, comme l'Eglise (Grecque) même en 1767 a déclaré par un acte authentique ce droit aux Empereurs Ottomans.

Si notre Gouvernement ne prend pas des mesures pour défendre ce Concile, il aura lieu, et comme il sera en grande partie composé des Métropolitains Grecs et Russes, nous savons de l'avance qu'il se déclarera contre nous.

Par conséquent nous sommes tous préparés à consommer notre œuvre sans lui et malgré lui. C'est dans ce sens que nous parlons au Gouvernement et que nous conseillons notre nation de s'organiser sur les bases de notre autonomie ecclésiastique sans égard aux réclamations du clergé Fanariote.

On attend avec impatience à Constantinople l'arrivée de nos Evêques. Quatre ou cinq doivent déjà être en route.

Deux de ces prélats Grecs occupent des diocèses en Bulgarie; celui de Scopia et d'Achialo refusent de se rendre. Le premier s'excuse en disant que sa présence est nécessaire au pays pour l'organisation du Vilayet; et l'autre a l'audace de dire que l'arrangement de notre question dépend de la Russie et de la Grèce, et non point de la Sublime Porte et de nous-mêmes! Notre tâche est difficile; nous comptons beaucoup sur notre Gouvernement, mais aussi sur ses alliés pour combattre l'influence et les intrigues du Fanar.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

Vice-Consul Blunt to Mr. Elliot.

Adrianople, December 20, 1868.

Sir,

WITH reference to my Report of the 20th October last, on the subject of the appointment of Christian Muavins in this Vilayet, I beg leave to inform your Excellency that the Vali of Adrianople has appointed, with the sanction of the Porte, three of these Muavins for employment in the Provinces of Adrianople, Philippopolis, and Gallipoli.

The Muavin of Philippopolis, Joachim Effendi, is a Bulgarian, was formerly Head Master of the Bulgarian Central School in that Province, and is the author of several Bulgarian and Turkish school books.

The other two Muavins, Zaffiraki Effendi and Fasso Effendi, are both Greeks. Zaffiraki Effendi was formerly Attaché at the Ottoman Embassy in London; and Fasso Effendi held the post of Chief Dragoman of this Vilayet.

The creation of this new office, with a view to import more of the Christian element into the administrative machinery of the provinces, has given general satisfaction, which is very much heightened by the fact that the Vali has not allowed party considerations to influence his selection of the persons he has nominated.

The three new Muavins are persons of intelligence and tact: they have a perfect knowledge of the Turkish language, and considerable administrative experience: and they enjoy the confidence of the authorities, and the esteem and respect of the natives.

Two more Christian Muavins are to be appointed in this Vilayet, one at Slimia, and the other at Rodosto. The Governor-General, who did me the honour to consult me in regard to the appointment of these Muavins, has decided to nominate a Bulgarian at Slimia, and an Armenian at Rodosto.

So that of the five Christian Muavins in the Vilayet of Adrianople, two will be Bulgarian, two Greek, and one Armenian.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. G. BLUNT.

No. 7.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 512.) *Constantinople, December* 24, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of the note of the Greek Minister here, in answer to the communication of the Porte forwarding him his passports.

As in the answer to the ultimatum given at Athens, M. P. Delyanni retorts upon the Porte the charge of aggression that had been made against his own Government, and appeals to the verdict of Europe to decide which party has neglected their international duties.

M. Delyanni concludes by stating that he puts his countrymen under the protection of the Minister of the United States, which protection is not likely to be recognized by the Turkish Government, who have themselves formed a Commission for the purpose.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 7.

M. T. Delyanni to Safvet Pasha.

Péra, le $\frac{11}{23}$ *Décembre*, 1868.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI reçu la note que votre Excellence a cru devoir m'adresser en date de ainsi que les passeports dont elle était accompagnée.

Les cinq conditions mentionnées dans cette note ne m'ayant pas été officiellement communiquées, il ne m'appartient pas de les discuter. Le monde entier aura bientôt à juger sur qui doit peser la responsabilité des circonstances graves qui pourraient surgir de la crise provoquée par la rupture des relations diplomatiques et commerciales entre la Grèce et la Turquie, que la Sublime Porte Ottomane vient de déclarer

Le Gouvernement du Roi mon auguste Souverain n'a rien négligé pour éviter cette crise. Non seulement il s'est tenu sur le pied d'une neutralité légale vis-à-vis de l'insurrection de Candie; non seulement il a fait tout ce que les institutions constitutionnelles du pays lui permettaient de faire pour éloigner autant que possible toute cause de rixe,— mais encore il a supporté pour cela, pendant plus de deux ans avec patience, toute sorte d'actes d'hostilité, de violence, et d'avanies, commises dans les différentes provinces de l'Empire Ottoman, au préjudice de ses nationaux et de leurs intérêts.

Depuis environ six mois, que j'ai eu l'honneur de représenter Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes et son Gouvernement auprès de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, je n'ai cessé d'être témoin d'actes de cette nature. Arrestations arbitraires et illégales, déportations scandaleuses, saisies de navire Hellénique en plein mer par des bâtiments de guerre Ottomans, confiscations illégales de marchandises appartenant à des Hellènes, et enfin un déni de justice constant et systématique, pour toutes les affaires de mes nationaux; tels sont les faits qui se sont déroulés devant moi, tant à Constantinople même que dans d'autres provinces de l'Empire Ottoman. Et cependant en présence de tant d'infractions flagrantes aux Traités existants, le Gouvernement Hellénique a fait preuve de la plus grande modération. Son Représentant à Constantinople se bornant à signaler à la Sublime Porte toutes ces illégalités, et à en demander la réparation, qu'il n'a jamais obtenue, ne lui en a pas adressé une seule protestation, une seule note irritante. Il ne menait cette conduite, dictée par ses instructions, que dans la crainte d'envenimer les relations, déjà assez tendues, entre les deux pays.

La Sublime Porte Ottomane, méconnaissant toute cette modération, toutes ces dispositions conciliantes du Gouvernement Hellénique, a jugé à propos de procéder brusquement et inopinément à une mesure violente en rompant, pour la quatrième fois depuis trente ans, ses relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec la Grèce, sans qu'aucun fait nouveau qui ne se produisit point dans le passé se présentât, justifiant tant soit peu cette rigueur, et sans donner le temps nécessaire pour qu'on ait pu essayer un arrangement. C'est à elle à justifier devant le monde civilisé cette rigueur, et les conséquences qu'elle pourrait entraîner, au préjudice du repos de l'Orient.

Pour moi, regrettant bien vivement que des circonstances aussi pénibles mettent fin à ma mission toute pacifique et conciliante auprès de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que je quitte Constantinople, avec les employés de la Légation Royale, par le premier bateau à vapeur des Messageries Impériales

de France en partance pour Athènes, après avoir confié la protection de mes nationaux et des intérêts Helléniques en général à la Légation des Etats Unis d'Amérique du Nord.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) T. DELYANNI.

No. 8.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 514.) *Constantinople, December* 26, 1868.

My Lord,

THE Ottoman Government believe the suggestion of a Conference on the difference between Turkey and Greece to have been prompted by Russia for the purpose of bringing the whole Cretan question under discussion.

They express themselves determined to protest against a Conference meddling with the internal affairs of Crete, or touching upon the questions of annexation or autonomy.

They look upon the present difficulty as simply one between Turkey and Greece, and regard the insurrection as at an end as far as the population of the island is concerned.

The principle of not recognising the right of foreign Governments to discuss or arrange matters connected with the internal administration of the Empire is considered of such vital importance as to make it impossible for them to give way upon it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 9.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 516. Confidential.) *Constantinople, December* 27, 1868.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 514 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I am positively assured that General Ignatieff, in speaking of the proposed Conference to a person to whom he is in the habit of expressing himself freely, observed that, if the Conference on the present difference between Turkey and Greece is accepted, it will be an easy matter to bring under discussion the question of annexation to Greece of Thessaly and Epirus as well as that of Crete.

From the commencement of the insurrection this has been the object of the Russian Government, and it has been defeated solely by the firmness of Her Majesty's Government; but, apparently, the rupture between Turkey and Greece is considered as likely to offer a favourable opportunity for again bringing it forward.

On the other hand, General Ignatieff must be aware that any proposal of the kind would now be even less likely to be listened to by the Porte than while the insurrection was in its vigour; but he may perhaps calculate that an opinion expressed at Paris in favour of autonomy or annexation might have the effect of embarrassing or weakening the position of the Turkish Government, and possibly of retarding the settlement of the affairs of the island.

Although altogether unacquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to a Conference, I have expressed an individual opinion to the Grand Vizier that there would be nothing dangerous in it for the Porte, provided the limits of its discussions were strictly laid down, so as to exclude everything trenching upon the rights of the Sultan.

His Highness views the suggestion with a distrust, which is not unnatural, since he considers it to have been made by Prussia at the bidding of Russia, of whose steady and uncompromising hostility to the interests of Turkey no reasonable doubt can be entertained; nevertheless, as I have already informed your Lordship, averse as he may be to that proposal, he will probably not object to the discussion by a Conference of the matter at issue with Greece; but he is so thoroughly satisfied with the justice of all the demands contained in the ultimatum, that I greatly doubt whether he would now recede upon the mere expression by the Conference of a wish that he would do so

If the Grand Vizier is not mistaken in assuming the suggestion of a Conference to have been made by those who have little regard for the welfare of this country, his Highness may, perhaps, be excused if he fears lest the wish of the other Powers, to prevent

the embarrassments resulting from a disturbance of the peace, may not, with a view to their own convenience, lead them to advocate a course of proceeding incompatible with the true interests of Turkey.

The accounts received from all parts of European Turkey are highly satisfactory, no disturbances of any kind being apprehended, and the relations with the Vassal States of Servia and Roumania are on a better footing than for some time past.

The Turkish Government believe, and in my opinion beleive truly, that if a Conference allowed itself to be led into a discussion upon the state of the Christian populations under the Sultan's dominions, an encouragement would be given to those who have hitherto failed in getting up any excitement, and that an agitation would be commenced which must before long lead to the most serious complications that have yet been seen in the East.

If on so solemn an occasion as that of a Conference, any one of the Great Powers should let drop an expression in favour of making over to Greece a Province of the Ottoman Empire, more irreparable injury would be done to Turkey by that single word than could be repaired by its repudiation by all the rest.

This danger is regarded as no imaginary one, and can scarcely be too efficiently guarded against.

The same thing may be said, although to a less degree, with regard to the possible advocacy of an autonomic system of Government for Crete, which could not fail to unsettle, to some extent, the populations that have now so generally made their unconditional submission, and to convey a sort of justification of their insurrections.

Being, as I have already stated, entirely uninformed as to the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the subject, I have felt called upon not to conceal from your Lordship my opinion of the probable consequences of a Conference not strictly confined to the question of the rupture between Turkey and Greece, and I trust it may coincide with that which is entertained by your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 10.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8, 1869.)

(No. 518.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, December 28, 1868.

THE Russian Ambassador sent to me yesterday afternoon to say, that he had just received a despatch from Prince Gortchakoff, dated the 25th instant, stating that the Governments of the Powers, parties to the Treaty of 1856, had agreed that a Conference, of which the first meeting was fixed for the 2nd of January, should be held at Paris, upon the difference between Turkey and Greece.

Prince Gortchakoff directed General Ignatieff to concert with his colleagues in recommending the Porte not to carry out measures of coercion pending this attempt at mediation; and the General asked me if I was ready to act with him in this sense.

I replied, that being altogether without information with respect to the Conference, neither knowing whether Her Majesty's Government had acquiesced in it, nor whether it was proposed upon a basis which the Turkish Government were likely to consent to, I could not take any step, or offer any advice to them, founded upon Prince Gortchakoff's telegram.

Independently of it, however, I had strongly urged upon the Porte to carry out the measures they had resolved upon with every moderation; and as the information which had reached me from the provinces lead to the conclusion that very needless and improper rigour was being used in certain districts, I was quite prepared to repeat the remarks I had already made, and also to recommend that instructions should be sent to Admiral Hobart to be careful to avoid doing anything to provoke a conflict which it might still be possible to avoid.

I consequently directed M. Pisani to acquaint the Grand Vizier with the nature of the information that had reached me of the manner in which the expulsion of the Greeks is being carried out; to represent to his Highness that the force of the Porte consists in the moderation it has hitherto shown; but that if the Greeks are thus expelled, it will revolt the feelings of the public in a manner that cannot fail to be injurious to the interests of the Sultan.

M. Pisani reports to-night, that having executed my instructions, he was informed by

the Grand Vizier that he was ready to follow my recommendation of carrying out the measure of expulsion with moderation, but that he could not consent to suspend it, nor would he engage to give fresh instructions to Admiral Hobart.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 11.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8, 1869.)

(No. 520.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, December 29, 1868.

THE first dragoman of the Russian Embassy yesterday communicated to the Grand Vizier a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff dated the 25th instant, stating that the Great Powers had agreed to the assembling of a Conference at Paris, the first meeting to be on the 2nd of January. The Turkish Government show some surprise that this should have been decided on without their being made acquainted with its basis and object.

General Bogowslaski was further instructed by the Ambassador to ask for the suspension of the expulsion of the Greeks, for the repeal of the exclusion of Hellenic vessels from the Ottoman ports, and for instructions to Admiral Hobart to abstain from measures of coercion.

Aali Pasha requested the dragoman to report to General Ignatieff that, in the first place, the Porte will take no part in a Conference without being previously made aware of its programme, and that he must altogether decline to entertain the proposal to suspend the measures which he had been compelled to take against Greece.

The Turkish Government will certainly not now recede from their demands unless an irresistible pressure is put upon them by the Great Powers, and they would regard it as calamitous if they are compelled to do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 12.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8, 1869.)

(No. 521.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, December 29, 1868.

INFORMATION has been received this afternoon that Petropoulaki and his band have given themselves up to the Ottoman Commanders in Crete.

It is also stated that the Provisional Government have resolved upon quitting the island.

Should this all prove to be correct, there may be reason for regarding it as the virtual end of the insurrection.

The Governor-General of Crete had informed Admiral Hobart that if he could stop the conveyance of supplies to the volunteers for three weeks, he would guarantee their being forced to surrender, and the result seems to have borne out his calculation.

The "Crete" and the "Enosis" having been kept shut up by Admiral Hobart in the harbour of Syra, the volunteers are represented as having been nearly starved.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 13.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8, 1869.)

(No. 522.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, December 29, 1868.

IN Mr. Dickson's despatch No. 90 of December 21, he states that certain Hellenic volunteers who had been captured in Crete would be tried and probably condemned to be shot.

I have desired M. Pisani to suggest to the Grand Vizier the bad effect which must be produced by a resort to such an extreme measure at this stage of the insurrection.

I understand that the decree directing foreign volunteers taken with arms in their hands, to be executed if found guilty, was issued some eight months ago, but I am not aware of it having been carried out, and I trust that it will not be in the present instance. Its operation does not apply to such as give themselves up.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 14.

Consul Dickson to Lord Stanley.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 87.) *Canea, Crete, December* 27, 1868.

My Lord,

THE main body of the Hellenic volunteers with their Chiefs, the elder Petropoulakis, Mitza, and Tzika, having been dislodged from the strong positions they held in Ayios-Vassilios and on the slopes of Mount Ida, have made for Kallikrati, with the object of forcing their entry into Sphakia. Their losses during the late encounters with the troops who have been pursuing them, are officially estimated at 400 killed, besides several prisoners; while according to native reports, not more than 100 have been killed.

On the 22nd instant a skirmish occurred at Asomatos, resulting in a few Turkish casualties, and about twenty-five Hellenic volunteers and native insurgents made prisoners.

The volunteers and insurgents are reported to be in great straits, and their actual condition must be all the more desperate owing to the non-arrival of reinforcements and supplies by the blockade-runner.

One of the rebel captains, Nicholas Koskina, having secretly visited his native village of Perivolia on the night of the 22nd instant, a Greek spy betrayed him to the authorities. The house in which he was hidden was soon surrounded by a body of armed irregulars, expressly dispatched from Canea, who killed Koskina, as also one of his followers, as the two were making their escape.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

P.S. *December* 28.—The Hellenic volunteers, with the two Petropoulakis, Tzika, Mitza, besides Khionia, and some other Chiefs, having entered Askypho, were soon after blockaded by columns of troops converging through Selia, Somaropolis, Ampolis, and Krapi, commanded respectively by Mehmet Ali, Redif, Omer, Shevket, and Ahmet Pashas, and Reshid Bey. Seeing that all resistance was hopeless, they surrendered to the number of some 600, with the exception of Leonidas Petropoulakis, Mitza, Khionia, and about 300 of their followers and some native insurgents. Those that so surrendered have been sent to Kalyvas to be embarked on board the "Kossova" Turkish ship, pending their removal to Greece. The band, under the leadership of the three latter Chiefs having made their escape, are stated to be endeavouring to form a junction with the insurgents at Lasethe, headed by Koralas and Sphakianaki.

About 250 other volunteers being at Franco-Castello, have equally laid down their arms, and are to be also conveyed to Suda Bay by a Turkish frigate.

On or about the 21st instant, the French Consul having interceded with the Governor-General on behalf of forty Hellenic volunteers in jail, and who had been sentenced to death by a court-martial, his Excellency consented to spare their lives on condition that the French Consul would exert himself to procure the submission of Petropoulakis and all his followers, besides that of any native insurgent Chiefs. My French colleague accordingly wrote in this sense to Petropoulakis that day, and again on the 23rd.

The reply came from Askypho on Christmas day, to the effect that the contents of M. Champoiseau's letters having been communicated to all concerned, the terms proposed had been accepted; with an additional request that French ships should be sent to the coast of Ayios-Vassilios to take them over to Greece. Before the French Consul's reply in the affirmative could reach Askypho, and just as the "Ville de Marseille," to be escorted by the "Salamdre," were about being dispatched, intelligence of the surrender of the volunteers as specified above came to the Turkish authorities.

Kriaris, K. Voludakis, Hadji Mikhalis, Goghonis, and other Cretan leaders, are still under arms.

C. H. D.

No. 15.

Mr. Green to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 139.) *Bucharest, December* 27, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. Elliot.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. GREEN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Mr. Green to Mr. Elliot.

Bucharest, December 27, 1868.

Sir,

YOUR Excellency's cyphered telegraphic despatch of the 23rd instant, explaining the terms of the Turkish note addressed to the Roumanian Government, on the subject of the expulsion of the Greeks, reached me at 1 o'clock this morning.

I have the honour to inclose a translation of an announcement in this day's "Roumanul" respecting the measures adopted towards the Greek emigrants. It is no doubt official, and will probably appear in the "Monitorul" published later in the day.

The Roumanian middle classes and lower orders are too comfortably off to occupy themselves much with political affairs from which they expect no immediate personal advantage. Messrs. Bratiano and Rosetti, after twenty years' experience, have discovered that the only questions on which they can get up real excitement are those against Jews, Greeks, and all foreigners, who are detested with the malignity of the narrowest-minded prejudice and jealousy. Demonstrations on other subjects can only be organized at 2 francs a-head.

But if the middle and lower orders, unlike the Greeks, are indifferent to politics in general, the upper classes derive their greatest excitement from them; and it is quite improbable that the difficulties created by the Greek question will not be availed of to forward the Roumanian "great idea" of extending their frontiers at the expense of Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. GREEN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Extract from the "Romanul" of December $\frac{15}{27}$, 1868.

(Translation.)

IN consequence of the measures taken by the Sublime Porte for the expulsion of Greek subjects from the Ottoman territories, several Greek families have taken refuge in our country. It is announced from various towns on the Danube, especially Galatz and Ismail, that numerous vessels transport a crowd of Greek exiles.

The Roumanian Government has authorized their disembarkation; but our position of neutrality imposes on us the duty of requiring from them in return for the hospitality afforded the following conditions:

1. On landing they must address themselves to the local Administrative Authorities, who will inscribe in a special register the number included in each family, the sex, age, and profession.

2. They will be considered as temporary emigrants, and in consequence they will not be entitled to the protection of the Hellenic Consuls. As long as they do not abuse the hospitality granted to them they will enjoy the protection of the laws of the country.

3. They are positively forbid all manifestations and intrigues against Turkey. Any one violating these regulations will be immediatly expelled.

No. 16.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 17.) *Athens, December* 25, 1868.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of yesterday's date respecting the reported intention of the Hellenic Government to withdraw a large amount of specie from the National Bank, in defiance of the statutes of that institution, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a further note which I have addressed to M. Delyanni, forwarding the copy of a letter from the General Manager of the Ionian Bank on this subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Mr. Erskine to M. Delyanni.

Athens, December 25, 1868.

Sir,

WITH reference to the note I had the honour of addressing to you yesterday, respecting the reported intention of the Hellenic Government to withdraw a large amount of specie from the National Bank, in defiance of the statutes of this institution, I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by the General Manager of the Ionian Bank, stating that the measure in question, if carried out, would oblige the Ionian Bank to suspend specie payments, and protesting against the Hellenic Government for all losses which may be caused thereby to that establishment.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Mr. Merlin to Mr. Erskine.

Ionian Bank, Athens, December 24, 1868.

Sir,

I HAVE been informed that the Hellenic Government contemplates either the issue of paper money having "cours forcé," or the withdrawal of the specie from the National Bank of Greece, and making the notes of that establishment a legal tender; the effect of which will be entirely to destroy their money value, put an end to all exchange operations between Greece and Foreign countries, and entail a crisis which will be the ruin of all commercial and banking establishments in this country.

As General Manager of the Ionian Bank, I have to request, Sir, you will inform the Hellenic Government that, foreseeing the necessity the Ionian Bank will be reduced to of stopping specie payments, should the proposed measures be carried into effect, I hereby solemnly protest against the Greek Government for all losses, damages, &c., which may be caused thereby to the Ionian Bank.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. L. W. MERLIN,
Inspector and General Manager.

No. 16 A.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 20.) *Athens, December* 29, 1868.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, a copy of a note from M. Delyanni in answer to the remonstrance which was addressed to him by the Representatives of the three Guaranteeing Powers against an alleged attempt, on the part of the Hellenic Government, to force the National Bank to make large pecuniary advances to the State, in violation of its charter.

M. Delyanni does not deny that the Government are seeking to induce the Bank to make the advances in question, which they are prepared, if necessary, to facilitate by constituting the Bank paper a legal tender, and he justifies the determination of the Government to persist in this course by the assertion that it is authorized by a law passed at the close of last session; the terms of which were cited in my despatch to your Lordship, No. 15 of the 24th instant, viz.: "That the Government are empowered to raise a loan of 100,000,000 drachmas, by pledging or mortgaging the real or moveable property of the State, and by seeking also for other resources." It would, therefore, appear that the sole ground on which the Government claim the right to compel the National Bank to infringe its charter, is a loosely-worded clause at the end of an Act relating to a totally different matter, and which it is impossible to believe the Chamber ever intended should apply to so vital a question as that of the abrogation of the rights and privileges of the National Bank.

I have communicated the contents of this document to the Governor of the Bank, M. George Stavros, who informed me that the Government are still urging him by every means in their power to comply with their demands. He declared, however, that nothing less than actual force would induce him to acquiesce in any scheme which was forbidden by the statutes of the establishment under his charge. The Government, he said, already owed the Bank upwards of 13,000,000 drachmas (164,285*l.*) whilst its whole capital amounted to only 15,000,000 drachmas (535,714*l.*). They now demanded a loan of 50,000,000 drachmas (1,785,714*l.*), of which 10,000,000 (357,142*l.*) were to be paid in specie; thus actually absorbing the whole sum on which the paper currency of the kingdom was based, whilst the remaining 40,000,000 drachmas (1,428,571*l.*) would be advanced by the Bank in the shape of notes; a fresh issue to that amount being authorized and made a legal tender by the Government, although they have not legally the power to take any such step.

M. Stavros requested me to entreat Her Majesty's Government to prevent the ruin of an establishment which owed its existence entirely to benevolent foreigners, and which has continued to maintain its credit unimpaired through all the vicissitudes suffered by the Greek nation since the establishment of its independence. I told M. Stavros that I would report what he had said to your Lordship; but that I did not see how Her Majesty's Government could prevent the Greek Government from having recourse to the threatened measure, however disastrous it might appear to the real interests of Greece, except on the ground that a large debt is owing to Great Britain by this country, and that we had, consequently, a right to see that our creditor did not squander the national resources on objects which are not essential to existence. But I advised him to avoid driving the Government to extremities by advancing them a sum sufficient for their immediate wants without seriously endangering the stability of the bank.

M. Stavros did not show much disposition to follow this advice, and he perhaps thinks that, were he to lend the Government 5,000,000 drachmas to-morrow, they would soon come back to him for more, and that, eventually, the result would be the same.

I have already forwarded to your Lordship a copy of a protest addressed to me by the General Manager of the Ionian Bank, to which, I presume, M. Delyanni will reply in some such terms as those he has used to the Representatives of the Three Guaranteeing Powers. Should the Government attempt to circulate paper money, having a forced circulation in the Ionian Islands, it would, I imagine, be a direct infringement of Article VII of the Treaty of March 29, 1864, which specially guarantees the privileges conceded to the Ionian Bank.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 16 A.

M. Delyanni to Mr. Erskine.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le* $\frac{1}{13}$ *Décembre*, 1868.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir l'office que vous m'avez adressé le $\frac{1}{13}$ de ce mois, à la suite de l'information qui vous a été donnée par le Gouverneur de la Banque que des démarches auraient été faites par le Gouvernement auprès du Conseil de cet établissement, de nature à altérer gravement les conditions de son existence.

La prospérité et l'avenir de la Banque Nationale touchent de si près le Gouvernement du Roi que je ne puis que vous remercier de l'intérêt que vous lui portez. Telle a toujours été en effet la sollicitude du Gouvernement pour cette institution de crédit,

fondée par lui, que lorsqu'en 1848, à la suite des crises revolutionnaires qui ont amené une crise financière dans presque toute l'Europe, son crédit se trouva gravement compromis, le Gouvernement n'hésita point à lui venir en aide, en donnant, sans compensation aucune, cours forcé à son papier, bien que cette mesure ne fût pas sans péril pour lui; parceque la Grèce aussi se ressentait à cette époque de cet esprit révolutionnaire qui bouleversait les autres États.

Le Gouvernement du Roi ne pense pas avoir proposé rien de contraire à l'institution de la Banque en lui demandant un emprunt dans les circonstances actuelles de la patrie, d'autant plus qu'il lui a offert en même temps, pour lui faciliter la réalisation de cet emprunt, de lui garantir au besoin le cours forcé de ses billets. Son patriotisme lui commandait, au contraire, de se signaler spontanément dans un moment critique pour le pays, auquel elle doit son existence et sa prospérité, et d'aller au devant des besoins du Gouvernement, en imitant le noble exemple que lui a donné, il y a deux ans, la Banque d'Italie. Son dévouement ne lui aurait causé le moindre préjudice; elle aurait pu retirer même de cet emprunt de nouveaux bénéfices, comme elle a retiré de tous les emprunts qu'elle a jusqu'à présent faits.

Le Gouvernement doit insister sur sa demande, parceque les plus grands intérêts du pays le lui commandent. Il croit d'autant plus y avoir droit, que la Banque a jusqu'à présent fait plusieurs emprunts au Gouvernement, sans que ses bases fussent altérées ou son existence compromise, et qu'une loi dernièrement votée en vue des circonstances actuelles l'autorise à avoir recours à diverses ressources.

Selon mes informations le nombre des actionnaires étrangers de la Banque est très limité, et quant à des créanciers de cet établissement, il n'en existe point. Tous ses bilans représentent créditeurs ses comptes avec l'Europe [*sic*]. Dans celui de 30 Juin, 1867, je vois figurer à son actif la somme importante de 1,911,754 drachmas 9 lepta (69,795*l.* 10*s.*) en effet sur l'Europe.

Mais en supposant même qu'elle eut d'actionnaires et de créanciers étrangers, la Banque, comme Société Anonyme et Etablissement National Hellénique, demeure exclusivement soumise au Gouvernement et aux lois du pays, et aucun étranger qui s'y trouverait intéressé n'a le droit d'invoquer utilement une intervention quelconque de son Gouvernement, surtout lorsqu'il s'agirait d'actes du Gouvernement nullement contraires aux lois du pays.

C'est la déférence que le Gouvernement du Roi doit aux recommandations qui lui sont faites au nom d'une Puissance dont la Grèce a reçu tant de bienfaits, qui m'a engagé à vous donner toutes ces explications, en répondant à la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

No. 17.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 22.) *Athens, December* 29, 1868.

My Lord,

IT has of late become so difficult to see M. Delyanni except on his weekly day of reception, that I could not, until yesterday, succeed in acquainting him with the contents of your Lordship's despatch No. 3 of the 15th instant, stating that Greece would incur a very heavy responsibility if she persisted in a course of policy that might endanger the maintenance of peace.

On the 24th instant, however, I read that despatch to M. Spiliotakis, the first official after M. Delyanni in the Greek Foreign Office, who undertook to report your Lordship's observations to his chief, and to request that he would see me at his earliest convenience.

When I at length had an opportunity of explaining the views of Her Majesty's present Government to M. Delyanni, he did not make any attempt to refute your Lordship's unqualified censure of the course which had been pursued by the Greek Government in their quarrel with Turkey, but turned the conversation and proceeded at once to inform me that the French and Prussian Ministers, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had acquainted him with the intended meeting of a Conference at Paris to settle the differences between Greece and Turkey, and that they had urged the Greek Government to avoid, in the meantime, doing anything to provoke a conflict.

On my observing that I was without instructions upon the subject, M. Delyanni mentioned that he had heard from M. Brailla that Her Majesty's Government had likewise consented to take part in the Conference.

The Greek Government, he continued, had no wish to precipitate hostilities with Turkey, or to show any want of deference to the advice of the Great Powers, but the Porte was making preparations for war on so great a scale that Greece could not remain a passive spectator of what was being done by her neighbour, but must continue to improve her means of defence, and be ready, if necessary, to give expression to the increasing irritation which was felt here at the harsh measures which had been adopted against Greek subjects residing in Turkey.

As M. Delyanni professed to be animated by conciliatory intentions, I called his attention to the menacing language used in the official and semi-official publications of the Greek Government, and I herewith transmit copies of the last number of the Government paper, the "Courrier d'Athènes," which contains various warlike articles and proclamations urging the people to come forward and aid the Government with money and contributions of all kinds.

M. Delyanni affected to have no knowledge of these articles, although I have reason to believe that they are mostly written under his own roof; and I regret to say that it is useless to talk to him on such subjects, as his language varies according to the character of the person with whom he happens to be conversing, whilst his conduct is equally at variance with his language.

It is almost impossible in Greece to say beforehand what the Government or people are likely in a particular emergency to do; their undoubted patriotism is so much distorted by bluster, their natural subtility is apt to be neutralized by their childish ignorance of European politics, and the conduct of their rulers is so much influenced by sordid personal and party motives, that it is difficult to predict whether they will or will not obey the injunctions of the Paris Conference, should those injunctions happen to be altogether destructive of their national aspirations. The Greeks are moreover persuaded that the Powers of Europe will never allow Turkey to proceed to actual hostilities whatever may be the provocation given by Greece; and they are no less persuaded that the Powers themselves will never be sufficiently in earnest or unanimous to occupy Greece; whilst any measure short of actual military occupation would leave the Greeks at liberty to torment and agitate Turkey as they have been doing for some years past.

As curious specimens of impotency, I may mention that news has been received here that two Engineer officers who were out surveying near Hypati, close to the Turkish frontier, were seized by a band of brigands, and carried off until they shall be ransomed by their friends. Another instance occurred at Patras, where it was found that most of the muskets issued on the formation of the National Guard, had been sold. Another, that at Corfu, as I am informed by Mr. Consul-General Saunders, the Treasury had only a sum of 156 drachmas (5*l.* 11*s.*) in hand. And it is a people in this condition of hopeless disorder and bankruptcy, which is seeking to frighten Europe into diplomatic interference, lest it should overrun the Turkish Empire, and disturb the peace of the world.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Extracts from the "Courrier d'Athènes" of December 26, 1868.

No. 18.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 24.) *Athens, December* 30, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE this morning received a private letter from Hobart Pasha, dated Syra yesterday, containing the important intelligence that all the volunteers in Crete, to the number of about 1,000, have surrendered, and are to arrive at Syra this day in a Turkish line-of-battle ship.

Both the Petropoulakis were taken; but the younger one succeeded in effecting his escape, and the father and two or three other Chiefs are kept prisoners until the son can be recaptured.

Admiral Hobart has likewise forwarded to me the inclosed copy of the terms of surrender. He is to use his discretion as to where the prisoners are to be landed, and he

informs me that he shall do everything in his power, with the assistance of the Commander of the "Forbin," to prevent their landing from creating disturbance at Syra.

The Admiral adds that he looks upon the surrender of this body of volunteers as the close of the insurrection.

It has been reported here for the last day or two that crew of the "Enosis" had been transferred to the steamer "Panhellenion," belonging to the same Company, and that the latter vessel had proceeded from the Piræus to Nauplia, whence she would go to Crete in the place of the "Enosis," blockaded at Syra by Admiral Hobart; but this report is strenuously denied by the authorities; and Her Majesty's Consul at the Piræus has been unable to ascertain whether there is any foundation for it or not.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

P.S.—Since this despatch was written, I have ascertained from Admiral Moulac that the volunteers in question were pursued by the Turkish troops, and eventually surrounded on the high plateau of Askyfo, in Sphakia, where they capitulated on the 26th instant.
E. M. E.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Conditions proposed by the Military Commander to Volunteers.

1. TOUS les volontaires sans distinction de nationalité et de métier seraient acceptés; leur vie et leurs effets sont complétement garantis.

2. Les armes serait déposées par tous les volontaires, et on fera des deux côtés un registre pour les armes et ces armes seront rendus après le débarquement.

3. Nous déterminerons l'échelle demandée pour renvoyer tous les volontaires.

4. Jusqu'au débarquement tous les volontaires serait nourris et logés par le Gouvernement Impérial.

5. Les insurgés Crétois qui se trouvent avec les volontaires seraient aussi acceptés, et leur vie est aussi garantie; et ils ne seront pas punis par le Gouvernement Impérial.

Ces conditions sont garanties.

Le Commandant Militaire,
(Signé) MEHEMED ALI.

No. 19.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8, 1869.)

(No. 25.) *Athens, December* 30, 1868.

My Lord,

THE affair at Syra is fortunately in a fair way of being settled without the actual employment of force. Owing to the surrender of the Greek volunteers in Crete, Hobart Pasha, I imagine, will care less what eventually becomes of the accusation of piracy which he has brought against the "Enosis" before the legal authorities at Syra—his principal object, viz., that of preventing the "Enosis" from carrying provisions and ammunition to the insurgents in Crete, having already been completely attained.

It has, however, been agreed that, pending the trial, the "Enosis" shall not be allowed to leave the port of Syra, and that the Turkish witnesses against the "Enosis" shall make their depositions before a Greek Judge on board the French corvette "Forbin" in Syra harbour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 20.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8.)

(No. 26.) *Paris, January* 7, 1868.

My Lord,

ON the 2nd instant I read to the Marquis de Lavalette your Lordship's despatch No. 65 of the 29th ultimo, stating the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that coercive measures ought not in any case to be resorted to in order to enforce the recommendations

No. 19.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 8.)

(No. 7.) *Vienna, January* 5, 1869.

My Lord,

I INQUIRED yesterday of Count Beust if the expected invitation to a Conference at Paris on the Turco-Greek affair had reached him. His Excellency replied that the last accounts from Prince Metternich indicated the 9th instant as the day on which it would probably be opened; and he supposes some difficulty must have arisen at Constantinople which has yet to be overcome, as he has heard nothing further.

I observed that, in England, it was hoped the Conference would be of short duration, and that a few sittings would suffice to effect an understanding as to the course best adapted to put an end to the present conflict. Count Beust replied that, much as he wished it, he could not participate in this expectation. He thought the Powers might pass good resolutions, but it would be no easy matter to bring the litigants to accept them, and he then asked, "How would the Resolutions of the Conference be enforced?" Would the Powers all agree as to the means that should be employed to carry their resolutions into effect?

It appeared to me that Count Beust apprehended continued and unmanageable resistance on the part of Greece, partly owing to the state of public feeling in the kingdom and its traditional and ambitious policy, and partly to the opposition which might arise in the midst of the Conference itself as to the employment of force, if necessary, to carry its resolutions into effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

which might be agreed upon at the proposed Conference on the differences between Turkey and Greece. I also gave M. de Lavalette a copy of that despatch.

After some conversation on the subject, M. de Lavalette observed that he did not think that it would be necessary or advisable that he should make any rejoinder to the despatch. There did not, he said, appear to be any material difference between the views it expressed on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and those which were entertained by the Government of the Emperor. The basis on which the convocation of the Conference was made, was the Protocol of the Conference of Paris of 1856, which contemplated only the employment of good offices for the settlement of disputes, and in no degree sanctioned the use of force. This being the case, he was, he said, willing to accept the despatch.

I proceeded to tell him, in the terms of your Lordship's despatch No. 78 of the 30th ultimo, that upon the conditions therein stated, Her Majesty's Government agreed to be represented in the Conference.

I to-day read this last-mentioned despatch to M. de Lavalette and gave him a copy of it. He said that the contents were quite satisfactory to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 21.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 8, 1869, 1 P.M.

ACCOUNTS have arrived from Crete that young Petropoulaki and all the remaining volunteers have given themselves up.

No. 22.

Consul Calvert to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 9, 1869.)

(No. 29.)

Monastir, December 24, 1868.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that during the night of the 17th instant, M. Antippa, the Greek Consul, received from the Mutesarrif of Monastir a written official notification of the rupture of relations between the Ottoman and Hellenic Governments. In obedience to the orders of the Porte, transmitted to him by the Vali of Salonica, the Mutesarrif has at the same time intimated to the Greek Consul that both he and the Hellenic subjects here are required to quit the Ottoman dominions within a delay of fifteen days, reckoning from the date of his communication.

M. Antippa has accordingly made preparations for departure with his Secretary and a number of Hellenic subjects, who have had time to assemble here from various parts of the country, and will leave for Salonica in the course of a few days. There are, however, many who will proceed to Greece by more direct routes than through this town. Inclusive of the Greek families residing at Monastir, there are in all about 180 souls within M. Antippa's Consular district, whom the decree of expulsion will affect. A large proportion of them are understood to be originally Turkish subjects who have been naturalized in Greece, and are furnished with Greek passports. Of this class, the males alone purpose leaving the country, only a few of them having elected to put themselves under their original Turkish protection.

An application has been made to me by a Greek lady to take her and her unmarried daughter, who has an engagement as schoolmistress in this town, under my official protection, it being their intention to remain here. I have informed these ladies that, as I have not been authorized to extend the protection of Her Majesty's Consulate to Hellenic subjects, I was unable to comply with their request.

The Austrian Vice-Consul has stated to me that, although he has not been specially authorized to that effect, he is nevertheless prepared to afford his protection to any Hellenic subjects who remained here, if they claim it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES J. CALVERT.

No. 23.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 9, 1869, 11·35 A.M.*

HER Majesty's Government think that the Porte would do well to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the present Conference to make, by its Plenipotentiaries, a spontaneous declaration of the principles by which the Sultan is guided in his dealings with his non-Mussulman subjects. This might be done when the deliberations of the Conference on the special matters submitted to it were brought to a close, by which all appearance of interference on the part of the Conference in the internal affairs of Turkey would be obviated. The Turkish Plenipotentiary might refer to the general character of benevolence and conciliation shown of late years by the Porte towards the non-Mussulman subjects of the Sultan, as affording a moral security that as long as they should observe their duties to their suzerain and Sovereign, so long would the Porte not only maintain the concessions and privileges which it had already granted to them, but would also seize every opportunity of developing the local liberty of its subjects of all classes under the shadow of the power and rights of the Sultan.

Your Excellency will state this to the Grand Vizier as advice confidentially given by Her Majesty's Government, who consider that the general feeling of Europe would be enlisted in favour of the Porte by such a spontaneous declaration.

No. 24.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 13. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1869.*

IT appears to Her Majesty's Government, and you will do well to say so confidentially to the Grand Vizier, that the Porte might, with great benefit to itself, take advantage of the present Conference to put forth some general declaration of the principles by which the Sultan is guided in the government of his non-Mussulman subjects. Such a declaration might allude in general terms to the conciliatory and benevolent character by which the conduct of the Porte towards them has of late years been marked, as affording a secure warrant for the future that, so long as they fulfil their duties to their Suzerain and Sovereign, they will be continued in the enjoyment of the privileges and concessions already conferred on them; and that the Porte will, moreover, persevere in developing the policy on which it has acted in regard to them, and take every opportunity of promoting the local liberties of all classes of the Sultan's subjects in harmony with the authority and rights of their Sovereign.

If the Grand Vizier should be disposed to adopt this course, which Her Majesty's Government, you may say, thinks would tend very much to enlist the general feeling of Europe in favour of the Sultan, the proper time for making such a declaration through the Turkish Plenipotentiary at the Conference would be, Her Majesty's Government think, when the Conference, having disposed of the special matters for which it was convened, was about to close its sittings. By seizing this moment for making such a declaration and requesting that it might be recorded in the final Protocol, the Turkish Plenipotentiary would mark in an unmistakeable manner its spontaneous character, and any appearance of its having been the result of interference on the part of the Conference between the Sultan and his subjects would be effectually guarded against.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 25.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 9, 1869, 5 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 9, 1869, 3·10 P.M.*

BARON BEUST has sent two instructions to Prince Metternich for his guidance at the Conference. The first directs him to give general support to the proposals that will be brought in favour of reconciliation between Turkey and Greece. The second authorizes him to enter into a wide discussion of the Eastern Question; but Baron Beust, out of deference to the desire of Her Majesty's Government that Prince Metternich's instructions

should be precise as to the limit of the discussion, informs me that he has cancelled the said instruction, that Prince Metternich will act in general conformity with the views of Her Majesty's Government.

No. 26.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 7, 1869.*

HER Majesty's Consul in Crete reports on the 4th instant that the younger Petropoulaki, and 130 more Greek volunteers have surrendered, and will be sent back in a French vessel.

Three principal Members of the late General Assembly were killed whilst attempting to escape.

No. 27.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 32.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1869.*

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph in my despatch to your Excellency No. 10 of the 5th instant, in which I say that Her Majesty's Government think that by laying down in distinct terms certain principles of public morality and of international law the Conference might give, though indirectly, a clear and unmistakeable warning to the Government of the Principalities, of Servia, and of any other provinces where there was reason to apprehend that insurrectionary movements against the authority of the Porte might find encouragement, that the Great Powers of Europe would view with the strongest disapproval any unwarrantable proceedings on the part of such provinces inconsistent with the principle so laid down by the Conference, I have to state to your Excellency that, although it might lead to inconvenience by opening up a general discussion on the conduct of the Porte towards its Christian subjects which is not only foreign to the immediate object of the Conference, but could hardly fail to elicit, at all events on the part of at least one of the Powers represented in the Conference, observations of a controversial character, if it were attempted to record as the opinion of the Conference any principles in that respect by which the Porte should be guided, Her Majesty's Government think that the Porte would do much to create a favourable impression for itself, and to set itself right in the opinion of Europe, if, referring to the declarations of the Conference as to principles of public morality and international law, the Turkish Plenipotentiary were empowered when the special business of the Conference was brought to a close, to make some declaration on the part of his Government as to the principles on which the Porte is determined to act in regard to the government of its non-Mussulman subjects. Such a declaration ought not to provoke either comment or controversy, and, according as the general feeling of the Conference might be, it would be either recorded in the Protocol with expressions of satisfaction, or inserted without observation. In either case, the practical effect would be the same, and the result satisfactory; for the Conference and its Protocol would thereafter stand forth as having elicited a solemn declaration from the Turkish Government, in the face of Europe, that the Porte recognized its obligations towards its non-Mussulman subjects, and was resolved to promote the development of their local liberties as far as might be consistent with the rights and powers of the Sultan.

Entertaining these opinions, Her Majesty's Government have not hesitated to direct Mr. Elliot by the telegram of which I inclose a copy,* to make them known to the Porte, and to express the hope that they will meet with its concurrence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 28.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Paget.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 7 of the 2nd instant, reporting your communications with Count Menabrea on the present question between Turkey and Greece, and the principles by which the proceedings of the Conference should be governed; and Her Majesty's Government have learnt with much satisfaction that the views of the Italian Government are in accordance with their own on these matters.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 29.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10, 1869.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord, *Athens, January* 2, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from a letter which I have received this morning from Mr. Consul Lloyd, reporting the arrival and landing at Syra of the Greek volunteers under Petropoulaki, who were recently captured by the Turkish troops at Askyfo, in Sphakia.

I also inclose an extract from the "Grèce" newspaper, calling upon the Government to denounce the conduct of some foreign Diplomatic Agent who has, it is alleged, been instrumental in spreading the "false" news of Petropoulaki's surrender. I presume that this paragraph refers either to my French colleague or to myself, as Baron Baude certainly did see the King and M. Delyanni, for the purpose of ascertaining what they wished done with respect to the landing of these volunteers at Syra.

I beg also to call your Lordship's attention to an article in the same paper, announcing, and severely criticizing, the formation of a Royal body-guard, which is to consist of two companies of Infantry and one squadron of Cavalry, under the command of a general officer.

M. Valassopoulos, the Minister of Finance, has, it is said, given in his resignation, which has been accepted by the King; the temporary management of the Department being confided to M. Delyanni. M. Spiridion Valaoritis is spoken of as the successor of M. Valassopoulos, but I can scarcely believe that he will, under present circumstances, undertake so hopeless a task as that of providing funds for the warlike preparations which are still being carried on against Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

(Extract.) *Syra, January* 1, 1869.

ON the receipt of the news here of the early expected return, by Turkish frigate, of the volunteers, with Petropoulaki, no Greek would believe it, or, if he did, he affected not to do so, and dared not repeat it, and no measures were taken for their reception or conveyance elsewhere; and yesterday, after the return of "Maggie Smart" from the Piræus nothing was done.

When the frigate even arrived it was reported she was taking wounded Turks to Constantinople, and that Petropoulaki was doing wonders in Crete. The Turkish frigate has brought 864 in all, of whom 150 are Cretans, and remained outside the harbour till 5 P.M. yesterday, when she began to land them in the little bay south, and just outside the mouth, of the harbour; and then the natives began to be alarmed lest the town should be invaded and pillaged. The 150 Cretans and some others were not landed; and the rest were met outside the town by all the gendarmes and national guards that could be got together, and persuaded to go to the Lazaretto; meantime the "Karteria" was got ready to receive them, and a great number went on board. At 11 P.M., however, they refused to allow the vessel to move, declaring they would stay in Syra some time. At midnight, I believe, "Amphitrite" arrived, and this latter is to take the bulk of them direct to

No. 29*.

Count Beust to Prince Metternich.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Apponyi, January 10.)

Vienne, le 7 Janvier, 1869.

SA Majesté l'Empereur et Roi vous ayant designé pour son Plénipotentiaire à la Conférence qui va se réunir à Paris afin de délibérer sur le conflit Turco-Grec, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-près les pleins-pouvoirs nécessaires.

Les fréquentes communications télégraphiques échangées entre nous dans ces derniers temps rendent superflu l'envoi de nouvelles instructions. Votre Altesse connaît parfaitement les vues du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ainsi que le but qu'il désire atteindre dans la Conférence. Ce que nous devons souhaiter avant tout, c'est une solution qui termine pacifiquement le différend soulevé, qui prévienne le retour de semblables incidents, et qui donne à la Porte la satisfaction qui lui est légitimement due. D'après la communication que M. le Marquis de Lavalette a bien voulu faire à votre Altesse, le Gouvernement Français envisage absolument comme nous les questions en instance, et le programme qu'il a esquissé tant pour les travaux de la Conférence que pour la participation de la Grèce à cette réunion répond entièrement à nos propres sentiments. Aussi n'avons-nous pas hésité à donner à ce programme notre pleine adhésion, et vous voudrez bien, mon Prince, de concert avec M. le Plénipotentiaire de France, vous efforcer à le faire prévaloir. Selon nos informations le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique partage notre manière de voir, et nous avons tout lieu de croire que les trois Gouvernements se présentent à la Conférence dans le plus parfait accord. Cette entente nous paraît d'une heureuse augure pour les résultats des délibérations de la Conférence, et votre Altesse devra appliquer tous ses soins à la maintenir.

Les Cabinets de Berlin et de St. Pétersbourg nous ont tenus moins au courant de leurs appréciations. Cependant nous sommes autorisés à penser qu'ils reconnaissent en principe la légitimité des demandes formulées par le Gouvernement Ottoman. Les Représentants de ces deux Gouvernements ont donné au Gouvernement Hellénique les mêmes conseils que leurs collègues, et aucune divergence notable n'a pu se remarquer dans l'attitude des différentes Puissances. Nous espérons que cette même harmonie de vues règnera au sein de la Conférence et facilitera l'accomplissement de sa tâche.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman tiendra compte, je la suppose, des dispositions bienveillantes de toutes les Puissances à son égard. Fort de leur appui vis-à-vis de la Grèce il pourra borner ses réclamations aux points les plus indispensables, et contribuer ainsi, de son côté, au résultat pacifique que nous désirons atteindre.

Quant au Gouvernement Hellénique nous aimons à croire qu'il écoutera la voix de la raison, et qu'il n'hésitera pas à se conformer aux avis de la Conférence. La dignité du Roi George et de son Gouvernement me paraît entièrement sauvegardée par la voie suivie dans cette circonstance. Du moment où ce n'est plus l'Empire Ottoman seul qui impose ses conditions à la Grèce, mais l'Europe réunie qui l'invite à respecter le droit international et à satisfaire à des demandes légitimes, il ne saurait plus y avoir de motifs valables pour se refuser à un accommodement.

Ces indications, jointes à celles que je vous ai déjà fournies, vous permettront, mon Prince, de régler votre attitude et votre langage dans la Conférence d'après les vues du Gouvernment Impérial et Royal.

Dans l'origine du conflit Turco-Grec, nous nous sommes tenus à l'écart, et nous avons renoncé à toute initiative, afin de ne donner aucune prise aux insinuations malveillantes qui nous représentaient comme fomentant la discorde entre les deux Parties diverses et encourageant la Porte à des mesures provocatives. Nous avons cependant dès le premier moment promis notre concours éventuel à toute mesure que les Puissances adopteraient en commun pour assurer le maintien de la paix. Fidèles à cette promesse nous nous sommes empressés d'adhérer au projet de Conférence, mais en même temps nous avons persévéré dans notre réserve, et sans intervenir par aucune suggestion nouvelle nous avons simplement acquiescé aux arrangements pris à Paris, afin d'assurer la réunion de la Conférence et d'en préparer le programme. Nous ne sommes sortis de cette réserve qu'à une seule occasion, lors que la Porte a semblé hésiter à accepter la Conférence. Alors nous avons spontanément usé de l'influence que nous pouvions avoir auprès du Gouvernement Ottoman, comme ses amis sincères, pour l'engager vivement à ne pas faire naître, par un refus, de nouvelles difficultés. Nous croyons avoir contribué ainsi à la solution qui se prépare, et donné un nouveau élément aux accusations dirigées contre la politique du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.

C'est à votre Altesse qu'il appartient aujourd'hui de confirmer une fois de plus combien nos soins tendent constamment vers un but de paix et de conciliation, en prenant au sein de la Conférence une part active aux efforts qui se feront pour arriver à un arrangement sur les bases convenues.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BEUST.

Gythium, and, when on board, their arms will be given by the Turks to the Greek authorities here.

To-day, though all the shops are shut, the people are not so alarmed as they were. Petropoulaki has paid visits to the Greek Bishop and others, and he is said to lay the whole blame of his surrender on the French Consul in Crete, who, he says, deceived him; the letters of the French Consul to him are being published.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

Extract from "La Grèce" of December 31, 1868.

Athènes, le 31 *Décembre*, 1868.

LE Gouvernement vient de prendre une mesure qu'on ne saurait trop sévèrement critiquer. On se souvient que pendant que la Chambre siégeait en session ordinaire le bruit s'était répandu dans le public que le Ministère, cédant aux instances de la camarilla, se proposait de soumettre à la Chambre un projet de loi autorisant la formation d'une Garde Royale. L'opinion fut alors tellement unanime à réprouver cette mesure que le Ministère n'osa pas y donner suite, et ne dédaigna même pas d'opposer un démenti à ceux qui lui en avaient attribué la pensée. Libre aujourd'hui du contrôle Parlementaire et tenant en mains une loi qui lui confère des pouvoirs extraordinaires, le Gouvernement se croit autorisé à profiter de ces pouvoirs pour retirer des limbes ce projet de loi et lui donner force légale par une simple Ordonnance Royale. Les réserves que nous faisions lors de la votation de la loi conférant au Gouvernement les pouvoirs extraordinaires ont été justifiées plus vite que nous ne le pensions. Dans un moment où toutes les forces du pays devraient être appliquées à garantir les intérêts majeurs de la nation qui sont en jeu, les hommes qui nous gouvernent gaspillent les fonds publics à des hochets et jettent dans l'armée le brandon de la discorde.

Voici, d'après les informations que nous avons lieu de croire exactes, quelle sera la constitution de ce corps privilégié auquel on a donné la dénomination "d'agéma."

"L'agema" sera composé de deux compagnies d'infanterie, d'un escadron de cavallerie et d'un état major; la force totale du corps devant consister en 1 Général, 1 Adjutant-major, 17 officiers subalternes, 52 sous-officiers et 276 soldats.

Les sous-officiers et soldats de "l'agéma" prendront respectivement, par rapport aux autres corps, le rang du grade immédiatement supérieur à celui qu'ils posséderont dans "l'agéma." Ils seront recrutés respectivement parmi les adjutants sous-officiers, sous-officiers et caporaux des autres corps pour occuper dans "l'agéma" le rang immédiatement inférieur.

"L'agéma" prendra toujours la droite des autres corps dans les revues.

La solde des hommes de "l'agéma" sera portée sur le budget du Ministère de la Guerre. Une paye additionnelle pour frais de représentation et une indemnisation pour l'acquisition et l'entretien de l'uniforme, et pour supplément de nourriture, seront defrayées sur la cassette particulière du Roi.

Le Gouvernement fait poursuivre avec une sévérité que nous ne saurions approuver le délit de propagation de fausses nouvelles. Si on bornait cette sévérité aux seuls cas où les accusés sont soupçonnés d'avoir agi avec intention malveillante nous n'aurions rien à y objecter; mais tel n'est pas le cas. Il y a eu ces jours-ci des enquêtes qui ont vivement scandalisé le public. L'opinion n'est nullement disposée à tolérer des procédés si peu en harmonie avec les mœurs et les institutions de ce pays. Mais il y a un autre point qui préoccupe vivement l'opinion. Les fausses nouvelles répandues hier avec une intention dont la malveillance ne peut être mise en doute, n'ont point donné lieu à des poursuites. C'est avec peine que le public a appris que le délit a dû rester impuni à cause de la qualité du coupable, qui est protégé par le droit des gens. Nous espérons que le Gouvernement, qui a dû arrêter son action en Grèce devant les immunités diplomatiques de la personne qui s'est fait un plaisir de répandre dans notre capitale des bruits sinistres au sujet du corps de Petropoulaki, dénoncera par la voie diplomatique cette conduite inqualifiable au Gouvernement étranger qui répond des actes de la dite personne.

No. 30.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1869, 2 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction the reason which has induced Count Beust not to depart from the basis upon which by common agreement the Conference was convoked.

No. 31.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January* 10, 1869, 2·25 A.M.

CONFERENCE met at 4 P.M. yesterday. Greek Minister was introduced. He declared that he had just received orders not to take any part unless on a perfect equality with the Turkish Plenipotentiary. He then withdrew.

The Conference has decided unanimously that the Plenipotentiaries shall express their surprise and regret at this unexpected Resolution of the Greek Government; that the French Plenipotentiary shall, in the name of the Conference, despatch a telegram to the French Minister at Athens, inviting the Greek Government to reconsider a resolution which throws upon it a very serious responsibility; that the respective Cabinets shall be requested to support this telegram.

Conference is adjourned to Tuesday.

No. 32.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January* 10, 1869, 12·55 A.M.

IT is hoped that Her Majesty's Government will direct Her Majesty's Representatives to support the following telegram, which is sent by the French Plenipotentiary in the name of the Conference to Athens and Constantinople:—

"Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours signataires du Traité de Paris, réunis pour rechercher les moyens d'apaiser le différend qui s'est élevé entre la Turquie et la Grèce, accomplissent un premier devoir en faisant connaître aux deux Parties intéressées que la Conférence s'est constituée aujourd'hui.

"Les réclamations formulées dans l'ultimatum remis par le Ministre de Turquie à Athènes au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce se trouvant dès à présent soumises à leur examen, les Puissances ont la persuasion que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan et celui de Sa Majesté Hellénique s'interdiront scrupuleusement tout ce qui serait de nature, en modifiant le *statu quo*, à rendre plus difficile la tâche qu'elles ont acceptée. Elles n'hésitent donc pas à faire appel à la modération de la Sublime Porte et à lui demander de suspendre jusqu'à la clôture des travaux de la Conférence l'exécution des mesures comminatoires annoncées dans l'ultimatum du 11 Décembre, 1868. Elles croient devoir en même temps inviter le Gouvernement Hellénique à prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour empêcher sur son territoire toute manifestation hostile ou toute expédition armée par terre ou par mer qui pourrait faire naître un conflit avec les forces Ottomanes."

No. 33.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.[a]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1869, 10·45 P.M.

YOU will earnestly support telegram sent by M. de Lavalette to the French Representative in the name of the Conference.

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[a] Identic telegram sent to Mr. Erskine.

No. 30*.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1869.

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram of yesterday, in which it is stated that Count Beust had informally authorized Prince Metternich, in his character of Austrian Representative at the Conference on the Turco-Greek question, to enter into a wide discussion upon the Eastern question generally, should such a discussion be raised; but that, out of deference to the wish expressed by Her Majesty's Government that the Prince should not be authorized to join in any discussion not bearing on the precise points to consider which the Conference had been summoned, those instructions had been cancelled.

Her Majesty's Government have received this information with much satisfaction, and they are glad to learn the motive that has induced Count Beust to revoke instructions which would have authorised the Austrian Representative to dissent from the basis upon which, by the common agreement of the European Powers, the Conference had been summoned to deliberate.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 34.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1869, 11 P.M.

SUPPORT French Minister in his representation to the Greek Government against the withdrawal of the Greek Minister at Paris from any intercourse with Conference on the ground that Greece is not admitted to take part in it on the same footing with Turkey. Such a course must in every respect be disadvantageous to Greece.

No. 35.

Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Musurus Pasha, January 11, 1869.)

M. le Ministre, *Le 30 Décembre,* 1868.

MES télégrammes successifs vous ont tenu au courant des circonstances qui ont précédé, et des motifs qui ont rendu indispensable la rupture de nos relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec la Grèce.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial n'a eu, pendant ces deux dernières années, pour effet que d'enhardir le peuple et le Gouvernement Helléniques dans leurs menées ; la répression de la rébellion qu'ils ont fomentée en Crète à tant de frais, les a tellement exaspéré que, mettant de côté tout scrupule et toute mesure, ils crurent pouvoir impunément recourir à des actes d'une hostilité ouverte envers nous. Il n'en fallait pas moins pour convaincre enfin l'Europe du parti pris de la Grèce de nous arracher l'Ile de Crète, sans s'arrêter devant le choix de moyens.

Une partie de ce peuple et son Gouvernement à la tête ont cru et croient encore qu'envoyer des bandes recrutées jusque dans ses bagnes et ses prisons pour porter le meurtre et le pillage sur le territoire d'un pays voisin, armer des corsaires pour forcer un blocus, retenir par la force de malheureux réfugiés qu'on a attirés chez soi par la ruse et leur faire endurer toutes les souffrances de la misère et de la faim, maltraiter et même assassiner les sujets de son voisin traversant paisiblement un territoire neutre, ne tenir aucun de ses engagements, et, en un mot, fouler aux pieds les Traités, le droit international, et la morale universelle, sont des moyens parfaitement légitimes, et qu'après les avoir largement employés on peut encore se représenter aux yeux du monde comme un peuple jeune, vivace, généreux et victimé.

Devant une pareille absence de toute notion du juste et de l'injuste, du bien et du mal, est-il étonnant que tous les efforts conciliants de la Sublime Porte aient échoué, et que même les conseils réitérés des Grandes Puissances soient demeurés sans résultats ?

La dignité du Gouvernement Impérial et ses intérêts les plus chers, aussi bien que l'opinion publique du pays, lui faisaient un devoir impérieux de chercher une solution propre à faire cesser cet état de choses. Deux moyens s'offraient à lui : Déclarer immédiatement la guerre à la Grèce, ou rompre seulement ses relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec elle. La Grèce nous avait certes fourni assez de griefs pour légitimer amplement une déclaration de guerre de notre part. Elle n'avait plus dans ces derniers temps à faire valoir même le futile prétexte de venir au secours d'une insurrection qui avait cessé depuis plusieurs mois. Tous ses efforts se dirigeaient vers le but de rallumer un feu qu'elle se désespérait de voir éteint. La supériorité de nos forces de terre et de mer nous assurait d'un succès prompt et complet. Mais nous avons pensé que, dans l'état actuel de l'Europe, toute étincelle lancée quelque part pourrait mettre le feu à une véritable traînée de poudre. Ne voulant pas assumer sur nous la responsabilité de pareils malheurs, nous préférâmes nous arrêter au second parti, qui peut encore nous mener à notre but de pacification, sans effusion de sang.

En effet, la Grèce tire ses principales ressources de son commerce avec nos ports, et ce n'est qu'en Turquie que les Hellènes trouvent un champ assez grand à exploiter. Nous croyons donc que cette obstination, fruit d'une ambition effrénée et inassouvie, qui n'a pas voulu fléchir devant la raison, la justice, le respect du droit et des stipulations internationales, et la déférence due surtout par la Grèce aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, cette obstination, dis-je, cèdera devant le cri des intérêts matériels.

Une dernière tentative d'arrangement, la seule que les circonstances pouvaient autoriser, fut encore essayée. Résumant nos griefs en cinq points, nous mîmes la Grèce en demeure de les réparer, et nous lui donnâmes un délai de cinq jours pour s'y décider. Cette tentative échoua également, et je vous envoie, ci-joint, une copie de l'incroyable

réponse de M. Delyanni à l'ultimatum remis par Photiades Bey,* ainsi que la réfutation de cette réponse.

Le Gouvernement Impérial aurait-il pu, comme on a voulu le lui demander, se borner à la rupture de ses relations diplomatiques avec la Grèce? Mais cette mesure n'eût servi qu'à assurer à ce pays, déjà si peu scrupuleux, une liberté d'action complète, en lui enlevant jusqu'aux apparences de la gêne. Néanmoins, nous nous serions certainement contentés d'y ajouter la rupture des relations commerciales, en permettant aux sujets Hellènes de continuer à résider paisiblement parmi nous, sans les graves inconvénients développés dans le document responsif ci-haut mentionné.

Cependant, on peut être certain que les autorités Impériales portent et porteront jusqu'au bout, dans l'exécution de cette dernière mesure, tous les ménagements et tous les adoucissements compatibles avec la mesure en elle même.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a la conscience d'avoir agi avec la plus grande modération. Ce n'est qu'après avoir bien étudié l'étendue de ses droits et de ses devoirs envers ses peuples, aussi bien que des exigences des intérêts et de la sûreté du pays, qu'il s'est arrêté aux résolutions dont il s'agit. Une plus grande longanimité eût été une faiblesse et un danger; et nous sommes heureux de constater que l'opinion publique, dans notre pays, comme dans le reste de l'Europe, a pleinement approuvé notre conduite.

La sagesse des grandes Puissances Européennes et leur sollicitude pour la paix de l'Orient peuvent précipiter la solution pacifique du différend. Mais nous n'hésitons pas à le déclarer—le moyen qui semble avoir prévalu dans leurs délibérations comme pouvant atteindre le but désiré ne nous paraît nullement de nature à amener un résultat pratique.

Ainsi que je me suis empressé de vous en informer par le télégraphe, il nous sera impossible d'accepter le principe d'une Conférence sans que le programme de ses délibérations soit connu d'avance. Nous avons en même temps déclaré que nous ne pourrions faire aucune concession relativement aux cinq conditions posées par nous à la Grèce, et qui ont été calculées de façon à ne représenter que le minimum de ce qu'il faut pour mettre nos relations avec la Grèce sur le pied du droit commun, et pour faire cesser une hostilité injuste et anormale. La moindre concession sous ce rapport impliquerait l'autorisation donnée par l'Europe de continuer cette hostilité. Elles sont tellement légitimes, et si universellement admises dans les relations de toutes les nations entre elles, que leur acceptation ne peut en rien porter atteinte ni à la dignité ni aux intérêts légitimes de la Grèce.

De plus, notre Plénipotentiaire ne pourra, dans aucun cas, consacrer par sa présence toute délibération ou discussion qui, sortant de la question pendante, s'engagerait sur l'Ile de Crète, ou tenterait d'aborder toute autre question territoriale ou administrative de l'Empire.

Nous espérons que nos communications à cet égard seront prises en sérieuse considération; et je vous autorise, M. l'Ambassadeur, à donner lecture et à laisser copie à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Britannique de la présente dépêche, ainsi que de la réfutation sus-mentionnée de la réponse du Gouvernement Hellénique.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) SAFVET.

Inclôsure in No. 35.

Memorandum containing Turkish Remarks on the Greek Reply to the Ultimatum.

PAR l'ultimatum adressé au Gouvernement Hellénique en date du 11 Décembre, la Sublime Porte s'est vue dans la nécessité de mettre, comme condition au maintien de ses relations avec la Grèce, la cessation d'un état de choses incompatible avec les rapports de bon voisinage nécessaires aux deux pays et contraire à tous les principes de la morale politique.

Il n'est assurément aucun Etat de l'Europe qui aurait supporté de la part d'un Etat limitrophe des actes tels que ceux qui ont enfin épuisé la patience du Gouvernement Impérial, comme il n'est personne qui n'eût jugé que plus de modération fût devenue faiblesse.

L'honneur du Gouvernement Impérial n'aurait pas pu lui permettre de rester spectateur résigné des flagrantes hostilités ouvertement ourdies en Grèce, avec le concours public des autorités Helléniques, en vue de renouveler en Crète l'insurrection apaisée avec des précautions d'humanité, de temporisation et de douceur, dont tout Etat

* See "Correspondence respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations between Turkey and Greece; 1867-68," [before] No. 122.

civilisé aurait droit de se glorifier et qui devaient contraster si fâcheusement avec les actes commis par les volontaires Hellènes recrutés en partie, ainsi que l'ont constaté toutes les correspondances diplomatiques, dans les bagnes de Chalcis, de Nauplie, et de Samie, et parmi les brigands dont l'envoi en Crète a pu seul délivrer l'Acarnanie, la Phthiotide, l'Attique, et les faubourgs mêmes d'Athènes.

Des rapports honorables devenaient impossibles, et le Gouvernement Impérial a dû rompre des relations pour lesquelles le droit des gens n'a pas cherché jusqu'à ce jour de dénomination. Il l'a fait pour ramener la Grèce à une plus saine appréciation de ce que se doivent les unes aux autres les nations entrées dans le concert Européen.

La note responsive du Cabinet d'Athènes, en date du 15 Décembre, nous a paru affligeante à tous égards, moins encore par le refus de satisfaire aux justes réclamations de la Sublime Porte que par les accusations qui la remplissent et qui témoignent de la résolution du Gouvernement Hellénique de persister à représenter les entraînements passionnés qu'un parti turbulent et sans frein a le triste privilège de populariser et de perpétuer en Grèce.

L'opinion publique a été éclairée sur les véritables motifs et le caractère des regrettables événements dont la Crète a été le théâtre par le rapport que son Altesse le Grand Vizir a soumis à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, le 1 Mars, 1868.

Nous renverrons à la lecture de cet important document tous les amis de la justice et de la vérité.

On ne saurait s'expliquer comment le Gouvernement Hellénique peut dire que ce ne sont pas les menées des Comités qui ont produit et entretenu l'insurrection de Crète, lorsqu'il est de notoriété publique que les principaux membres de ces Comités ont rédigé tout le dossier révolutionnaire, y compris le fameux décret d'annexion, et que ce sont eux qui ont pu persuader aux Crétois égarés que la Grèce leur donnerait des travaux publics, des routes, des établissements de crédit, et les autres bienfaits de la civilisation, toutes choses que ce pays n'avait qu'à un bien moindre degré que la Turquie. Mais c'est surtout en rallumant des haines de religion entre les Chrétiens de rite Orthodoxe et les Musulmans, les uns et les autres fils de la Crète, n'ayant qu'une même patrie et des intérêts identiques, qu'ils sont parvenus à envenimer la situation, et au fond, tous les appels faits à l'humanité de l'Europe ne firent que la convier à s'associer, comme les Hellènes, à une guerre de religion.

On connaît aujourd'hui les circonstances qui ont contraint une partie notable de la population Crétoise à quitter ses foyers pour aller traîner sur la terre étrangère une existence remplie d'angoisses et de privations.

On sait que l'appât de pillage fut un des stimulants offerts aux bandes de mercénaires pour raffermir leur courage et les conduire en Crète; on sait que des excès barbares, et rendus encore plus odieux par la connivence des officiers Hellènes qui les commandaient, furent commis par ces bandes venues de la Grèce, et qu'on a employé le plus implacable terrorisme en vue de forcer les paisibles insulaires à participer à la rébellion ou à s'expatrier en masse. Le Gouvernement Hellénique n'ignore pas ces tristes réalités; mais il a trouvé plus commode et plus profitable à la cause dont il s'est rendu la complice, d'accumuler dans sa note du 15 Décembre des accusations diffamatoires contre les autorités de l'île et les troupes Ottomanes, et d'insinuer que le refus de la Sublime Porte d'adhérer à la proposition tendante à faire constater les vœux des Crétois au moyen d'une enquête internationale témoigne de la méfiance que lui inspiraient les dispositions de ses sujets. Est-il besoin de faire observer que si le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas jugé à propos d'accepter le principe de l'enquête internationale, bien qu'il n'ait jamais douté de l'esprit d'ordre et des sentiments de fidélité de la grande majorité des Crétois, c'est qu'il a pensé que son application pourrait impliquer de graves inconvénients, en créant un précédent de nature à porter atteinte aux droits de la souveraineté? C'est donc le principe d'une enquête internationale qui a été rejetée par la Sublime Porte, comme la Grèce le ferait si les Puissances venaient lui demander la même chose pour rechercher les causes du brigandage qui infeste presque tout le Royaume Hellénique, ou pour s'enquérir des vœux des habitants des Iles Ioniennes.

L'argument tiré de l'embarquement précipité des Crétois sur les bâtiments étrangers a eu du succès, il faut en convenir, et les allégations des Hellènes, multipliées par les cent cinquante journaux qui se publient en Grèce ont réussi à tromper l'opinion publique, dans un moment où les faits n'étaient pas éclaircis, tandis que la dignité silencieuse de la Sublime Porte n'a pas toujours été comprise. Mais qu'on se souvienne que le rapport de l'Amiral Slade a démontré que si un ensemble de calomnies peut, pour un temps très limité, suspendre la bonne foi de l'Europe, la vérité ne tarde pas à se faire jour. Tout le monde se rappellera que 5,000 Crétois, contraints à s'embarquer par des dangers

imaginaires, déclarèrent aux officiers Français qui les ont interrogés, qu'ils n'avaient été jamais, ou un des leurs, offensé par les soldats Ottomans.

Il serait oiseux de discuter longuement les considérations développées par le Cabinet d'Athènes dans sa note précitée, pour justifier son refus formel de satisfaire à l'ultimatum par lequel la Sublime Porte a réclamé qu'il prit l'engagement: 1, de disperser les bandes de volontaires dernièrement organisées dans différentes parties du Royaume et d'empêcher la formation de nouvelles bandes; 2, de désarmer les corsaires "Enosis," "Crête," et "Panhellénion," ou en tout cas de leur fermer l'accès des ports Helléniques; 3, d'accorder aux émigrés Crétois non seulement l'autorisation de retourner dans leurs foyers, mais encore une aide et une protection efficace; 4, de punir, conformément aux lois, ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'agression contre les militaires et les sujets Ottomans, et d'accorder aux familles des victimes de ces attentats une juste indemnité; 5, de suivre désormais une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités existants et au droit des gens. Il suffit d'énoncer les considérations émises à cet égard par le Cabinet d'Athènes pour convaincre tout juge impartial et de la légitimité les réclamations en question et des sentiments qui ont dicté leur rejet.

En ce qui concerne les deux premières demandes, à savoir, la dispersion des bandes de volontaires et le désarmement des navires armés en course, il est formellement déclaré que les institutions du pays ne permettent pas au Gouvernement d'enchaîner la liberté individuelle, quels qu'en soient les écarts, et qu'il ne saurait d'aucune manière empêcher des actes contre lesquels les lois se trouveraient désarmées.

Il serait donc permis en Grèce à tous les meneurs, à tous les ennemis de l'ordre, de recruter et d'enrôler les volontaires, d'organiser des bandes, de les équiper et de les armer au vu et au su de tout le monde, sous les yeux mêmes des autorités, dans le but avoué de fomenter le désordre et la rébellion dans les provinces d'un Etat voisin en paix avec le Royaume! Il serait également permis aux navires sous pavillon Hellénique de s'armer en guerre dans les ports de ce pays, de se livrer régulièrement au transport de bandes armées, toujours dans le même but, et d'attaquer à coup de canon—l'incident récent de Syra en offre un exemple nouveau—les bâtiments de guerre de l'Empire Ottoman.

Si le Gouvernement Hellénique était fondé à tenir ce langage, l'on devrait en conclure que le droit des gens n'existe pas pour la Grèce, qui pourtant, vivant parmi les Etats de l'Europe civilisée, l'invoque elle-même sans cesse, agissant ainsi comme le ferait un particulier qui, se déclarant indépendant des lois de son pays toutes les fois qu'il serait agresseur, recourrait aux Tribunaux dès qu'il se verrait attaqué. Si de pareilles théories étaient admissibles, 2,000 Albanais pourraient aller en Acarnanie et jusqu'aux portes d'Athènes faire ce que les volontaires Hellènes vont faire en Crète, et la Sublime Porte serait aussi fondée que la Grèce à répondre que ses institutions ne lui permettent pas de s'opposer à la formation et à l'invasion de bandes qui auraient porté sur le sol Hellénique le pillage et l'incendie. La Sublime Porte, en pareil cas, aurait sévi contre les coupables, persuadée qu'il y a quelque chose de supérieur aux lois intérieures d'un pays; c'est le droit des gens et la morale universelle.

Le Gouvernement Impérial se refuse à admettre qu'un tel état de barbarie constitue un ordre de choses légal en Grèce. Il y a effectivement des dispositions formelles dans la législation du Royaume contre les rassemblements et les recrutements de corps armés effectués sans l'ordre du Gouvernement. Nous citerons textuellement l'Article 127 du Code Pénal de Grèce, conçu dans les termes suivants:—

"Sont punis de mort ceux qui sans ordre ou permission du Gouvernement rassemblent ou enrôlent seuls ou au moyen d'autres des corps de troupes ou des soldats, de même que ceux qui, en connaissance de cause et de leur propre mouvement, se rassemblent de cette façon pour une expédition."

L'inexécution de cette disposition est due au mauvais vouloir ainsi qu'aux entraînements des passions qui dominent ce pays. Mais, à moins que le droit des gens ne soit pas une fiction dérisoire, la Sublime Porte devrait-elle tolérer des actes aussi subversifs de l'ordre public Européen, commis à son détriment, et qui constitue une menace perpétuelle contre la tranquillité de ses provinces situées à proximité de la Grèce? Pourrait-elle enfin souffrir plus longtemps des expéditions dirigées contre l'Empire, lorsqu'elle sait, comme tout le monde, qu'elles sont organisées et effectuées avec le concours des autorités Helléniques et au moyen des fonds fournis par le Gouvernement, qui préfère mettre ses ressources au service d'entreprises inavouables au lieu de les employer à faire honneur à ses dettes envers les trois Puissances Garantes et de développer le bien-être du pays.

Le Gouvernement Hellénique n'hésite pas à déclarer que sa protection a toujours été donnée aux familles Crétoises qui ont exprimée le désir de rentrer dans leurs foyers;

Etrange assertion! Tout le monde en Grèce a été témoins des cruautés infligées aux Crétois qui osent parler de retourner dans leur pays; on a vu, en maintes occasions, en présence de la force publique immobile, une populace furieux assaillir des vieillards et des femmes, les attaquer, piller leurs effets, et s'opposer à leur départ par le meurtre. Les représentations réitérées de la Légation Impériale à Athènes n'ont jamais pu obtenir du Gouvernement Hellénique que des garanties de sécurité fussent accordées à ces malheureux. Tout récemment encore des pères de familles arrivés de Crète ont en vain cherché à communiquer avec leurs femmes et leurs enfants se trouvant dans différentes localités; des sicaires stipendiés par les Comités s'y sont opposés, en leur faisant subir les plus cruels traitements. Nous nous en référons pour confirmer la vérité de cette assertion à la correspondance échangé à ce sujet avec le Gouvernement Hellénique et aux rapports adressées à leurs Gouvernements par les Représentants des Puissances étrangères à Athènes. Tout le monde sait en Grèce que si quelques Crétois ont pu partir de Pirée et de Syra, leur départ n'a pu s'effectuer que furtivement et d'une manière furtive.

Quant à la demande relative à la punition de ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'agression contre les militaires et les sujets Ottomans, et à l'indemnité due aux victimes de ces attentats, il convient au Gouvernement Hellénique d'ignorer les circonstances qui l'ont motivée. Pourtant il est de notoriété publique en Grèce que des militaires et des sujets Ottomans ont été attaqués, pillés, blessés, assassinés en mainte occasion, souvent même sous les yeux des autorités chargées de maintenir l'ordre et de faire respecter les lois. Les représentations faites en plus d'une circonstance par la Légation Impériale à Athènes en font foi. Ces méfaits ne furent jamais sérieusement reprimés, et aucune indemnité n'a été accordée aux victimes, parceque les assassiner c'était faire acte de patriotisme. Le seul attentat que le Gouvernement Hellénique a jugé à propos de citer dans sa note du 15 Décembre, pour témoigner de la sollicitude de ces autorités à le reprimer, est lui-même demeuré impuni de l'aveu même de ce Gouvernement.

Le Cabinet d'Athènes, conséquent avec les principes dont il s'est inspiré jusqu'à présent, déclare n'avoir pas même saisi le sens de la dernière demande formulée dans l'ultimatum du 11 Décembre, et qui consistait à l'engager à suivre dorénavant une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités existants et du droit des gens. On a vu par ce qui précède de quelle manière il a toujours rempli ses obligations à cet égard. Au surplus, intervertissant les rôles de la façon la plus étrange, il prétend avoir à se plaindre de l'inexécution par la Sublime Porte de la Convention pour la répression du brigandage par suite de l'entretien de troupes irrégulières à proximité de la frontière. Le Gouvernement Impériale a déjà déclaré à plusieurs reprises que les agressions dont sa frontière était le théâtre du côte de la Grèce lui imposaient la nécessité d'employer tous ses moyens de défense pour les repousser; mais qu'elle était prête à remplacer ces détachements, d'ailleurs peu nombreux, par des soldats réguliers aussitôt qu'un ordre de choses offrant des garanties de paix s'établirait en Grèce. Il convient de faire observer que si le Gouvernement Hellénique a insisté pour qu'il n'y eût plus sur la frontière que des troupes régulières, c'est qu'il les juge moins aptes que les autres à réprimer les coupables entreprises des envahisseurs Hellènes. Quoiqu'il en soit, ce n'est pas de la faute de la Sublime Porte si le Gouvernement Hellénique n'a pas voulu jusqu'à présent la mettre en mesure de traduire en fait ses loyales intentions. Quant aux causes du brigandage qui infeste les provinces limitrophes, il est à peine nécessaire de faire observer que ce qui se passait en Grèce, au sein même de l'Attique, est très propre à expliquer les proportions si inquiétantes que ce fléau a pris depuis quelques années.

Le Gouvernement Hellénique a jugé à propos de blâmer la décision prise par la Sublime Porte de renvoyer de son territoire les sujets Helléniques, et de fermer ses ports aux navires sous pavillon Hellénique. La Sublime Porte regrette elle-même de se voir dans la pénible nécessité d'adopter cette mesure, mais elle ne pourrait que prendre en considération les circonstances impérieuses et les exigences de l'ordre public qui le lui commandaient. On sait de quelle manière les sujets Hellènes qui n'ont pour la plupart d'autre titre à la protection Hellénique que des passeports délivrés à des conditions inavouables par des agents peu scrupuleux, ont répondus à la large et généreuse hospitalité dont ils jouissent dans l'Empire Ottoman, ce qui leur a permis de prospérer et de s'enrichir sous la protection des lois. C'est par des procédés malveillants, des sourdes intrigues, et des menées hostiles qu'ils ont toujours payé la sollicitude dont ils sont l'objet; trop souvent ces Hellènes ont profité de la sécurité dont on jouit, et de plus de la position exceptionnelle assurée aux étrangers par les Capitulations, pour conspirer contre le Gouvernement Impérial, et il est notoire que leurs souscriptions ouvertes ont puissamment contribué à ravitailler l'insurrection. Leur séjour ultérieur sur le territoire Ottoman, dans les circonstances actuelles, ne manquerait pas d'occasionner de regrettables

conflits et de graves désordres, et de constituer un danger permanent contre la tranquillité publique.

Il n'est pas inutile de dire ici que pendant que deux cent mille Hellènes veulent rester en Turquie et vivre sous la prétendue tyrannie du Gouvernement Ottoman plutôt que de se rendre en Grèce, où un million d'habitants est clairsemé sur un sol capable d'en contenir quatre; on pourrait à peine citer deux cent sujets Ottomans qui auraient quitté la Turquie pour aller habiter la Grèce, où ils vivent paisiblement sous les lois du pays, sans invoquer le bénéfice d'aucune espèce de Capitulations. On s'explique, dès lors, que le Gouvernement Hellénique parle de sa décision de ne pas expulser le petit nombre de sujets Ottomans inoffensifs qui se trouvent sur son territoire; mais il est difficile de concevoir qu'il ait un devoir appeler sur ce grand acte l'admiration de l'Europe. D'ailleurs, nous le demandons, ce langage convenait-il à ceux qui retiennent les réfugiés Crétois malgré eux?

Quant à la critique sévère que la note Hellénique contient sur notre administration intérieure, nous ne jugeons pas nécessaire de chercher à nous justifier à ce sujet. Nous n'avons jamais prétendu être parvenu à la perfection; mais nous ne croyons pas que la Grèce possède l'administration modèle qui l'eût mise en position de nous donner des leçons utiles.

La Sublime Porte a répondu à la note Hellénique, parcequ'elle le considère comme destinée à l'Europe, où la Grèce a été si longtemps en possession du regrettable privilège de propager des erreurs fâcheuses pour la renommée du Gouvernement Impérial. Si ce travail n'avait été écrit que pour des lecteurs plus rapprochés des faits, la Sublime Porte ait laissé à la conscience publique le soin de se prononcer entre la note Hellénique et son silence.

No. 36.

Lord Lyons to Lord Stanley.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 42. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 10, 1869.

IN virtue of the understanding come to with the several Governments, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs invited the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris to meet in Conference at the Foreign Office here at 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon, to consider the differences between Turkey and Greece. The Plenipotentiaries who assembled in pursuance of this invitation were: for Austria, Hungary, the Prince Metternich, Ambassador at Paris; for France, M. de Lavalette, Minister for Foreign Affairs; for Great Britain, myself; for Italy, Chevalier Nigra; for Prussia, the Count de Solms Sonnenwalde, Chargé d'Affaires at Paris; for Russia, General Count Stackelberg, Ambassador at Paris; for Turkey, Djemil Pasha, Ambassador at Paris.

M. de Lavalette was unanimously requested to take the office of President. His Excellency having consented, proposed that M. d'Espray, Directeur des Affaires Politiques in the French Foreign Office, should act as Secretary to the Conference, which was unanimously agreed to.

The Conference having been thus established, M. de Lavalette informed the Plenipotentiaries that to his very great surprise and very great regret, he had received at the very moment at which they had met, a telegram from the French Minister at Athens, dated 6:30 A.M. the same day, which stated that he had been informed that morning by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Greek Representative at Paris would be ordered not to take any part in the Conference unless he was placed on a perfect equality with the Ottoman Plenipotentiary.

M. de Lavalette commented in severe terms on the conduct of the Greek Government in coming thus, at the last moment, to disturb the arrangement to which, in common with the other Powers, it had previously assented. After some discussion it was agreed that the Greek Representative should still be invited to be present at the Conference, in order that the Plenipotentiaries might learn from his own mouth what orders he had received. M. Rizo Rangabis, His Hellenic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary at Paris, was accordingly introduced, and invited to take part in the proceedings, "à titre consultatif." In answer, M. Rizo Rangabis read a declaration, stating that he was ordered by his Government to retire at once from the Conference unless he was placed on a footing of perfect equality with the Ottoman Plenipotentiary. He then withdrew.

M. de Lavalette proposed that the Plenipotentiaries should take a short time to consider what should be done with regard to a proceeding on the part of the Greek Government which was as unexpected as it was deplorable.

The Conference accordingly adjourned about 6 o'clock, and re-assembled at half-past 9. It was agreed that the Protocol of the meeting of the Conference should express the surprise and regret of the Plenipotentiaries, should point out the heavy responsibility assumed by the Greek Government, should state distinctly that it was not from any disregard of the rights and dignity of Greece, nor from any intention of placing her in an inferior position, but simply because she was not a party to the Treaty of Paris, that it had been decided that only a consultative voice could be given to her; it was, moreover, determined that the President should at once send a telegram to the French Minister at Athens desiring him to urge the Greek Government to reconsider a resolution throwing upon it so great a responsibility. The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Prussia, and Russia, promised to lose no time in requesting their respective Governments to take steps to give their support at Athens to this telegram. The Russian Plenipotentiary desired that it should be recorded in the Protocol that, while sharing the regret of his colleagues at the unseasonableness of the step taken by Greece, he had reminded them that Russia had from the first desired that Greece should be admitted on equal terms with Turkey, and had yielded on the point with reluctance.

The Turkish Plenipotentiary requested that it should be stated in the Protocol that he had pointed out that the admission of the Greek Representatives otherwise than "à titre consultatif" would entirely change the basis and the character of the Conference.

The discussion on the refusal of Greece having been concluded, it was resolved that the President should address, in the name of the Conference, an identic telegram to the French Representatives at Constantinople and Athens, to be communicated to the Ottoman and Greek Governments and to the Representatives of Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Prussia, and Russia. A telegram was accordingly drawn up announcing to the Porte and to the Greek Government that the Plenipotentiaries had assembled, and earnestly requesting that the *status quo* should be maintained, and no hostile measures taken on either side during the sitting of the Conference.

It was decided that each of the Plenipotentiaries should request his Government to support this telegram. It was settled that it might be transmitted *en clair*.

It was settled that the proceedings of the Conference should be considered as confidential.

The Secretary was requested to draw up a Protocol in the terms agreed upon, which should be signed at the next meeting.

The Conference adjourned at midnight till Tuesday the 12th instant.

On my return home I addressed to your Lordship a telegram requesting you to support the request to the Greek Government to reconsider its decision. I sent, moreover, to your Lordship a telegraphic despatch *en clair*, reciting *in extenso* the telegram requesting Greece and Turkey to abstain from hostile measures during the sitting of the Conference.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 37.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 11.)

(Very Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January* 11, 1869, 2:30 P.M.

M. DE LAVALETTE will probably suggest to the Conference to-morrow that if Greece declines to join us with a consultative voice only, we should go on without her. A decision would probably be deferred, to give Greece one or two days more to answer. M. de Lavalette supposes that if the suggestion were adopted, Russia would retire, and the Conference be broken up; but he would prefer this to its being protracted indefinitely by altercations with Russia and Greece. He says that the Emperor's opinion is that if Greece will not come, the Conference should proceed to business without her.

Please send me instructions as soon as possible.

No. 38.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 11, 1869.*

I BELIEVE that Russian Ambassador at Conference will ask for assurances from the Porte as to the future system of the administration in Crete with reference to return of the refugees, though I have urged impolicy of raising such a question. It has been suggested to me by a third party that he may perhaps be satisfied with recording this demand in the Protocol. Prince Gortchakoff objects to the terms in which the institutions of Greece are alluded to in the draft of Declaration proposed by M. de Lavalette, and apparently hopes that a modification of constitution may be recommended.

No. 39.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 11.)

(Telegpaphic.) *Constantinople, January 11, 1869, 5·15 P.M.*

THE Grand Vizier does not quite understand what the measures are of which M. Lavalette, in the name of the Conference, invites the suspension.

The expulsion of Greek subjects was already revoked, whilst the steps adopted with regard to Turks under Greek protection was being carried out very slowly, no term for its full execution being fixed. It will, however, now be conducted with still greater deliberation; but the Porte intends to persist in it irrespectively of the questions at issue between the two Governments.

His Highness says that it is quite impossible for him to consent to reopen the ports to the Greek flag without having received satisfaction.

I have very strongly recommended that Admiral Hobart should be directed to leave Syra, where his presence has the appearance of menace, without being any longer necessary.

His Highness is not indisposed to do so, and has promised to consult his colleagues.

No. 40.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 11, 1869.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I have lost no time in instructing Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and Her Majesty's Minister at Athens earnestly to support the French Representatives at their respective residences in the execution of the instructions sent to them yesterday afternoon by M. de Lavalette, in the name of the Conference.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 41.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 11, 1869.*

HER Majesty's Ambassador at Paris has informed me that at the meeting of the Conference on the 9th instant, the Greek Representative declined to attend except on an equal footing with the Turkish Plenipotentiary; that thereupon the Marquis de Lavalette, in the name of the Conference, desired your French colleague to invite the Greek Government to reconsider its resolution, and to point out the serious responsibility which Greece would incur by persisting in such refusal.

I have to instruct you to support the French Minister in carrying out this instruction; and to point out, if necessary, to M. Delyanni that such a course on the part of Greece must, in every respect, be disadvantageous to her.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 42.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 11, 1869.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that I approve Mr. Consul Lloyd's proceedings in regard to the "Enosis," as reported in the despatch of which an extract is inclosed in your despatch No. 15 of the 24th ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 43.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 11, 1869.*

I APPROVE the notes which you addressed to M. Delyanni on the 24th and 25th ultimo, of which copies are inclosed in your despatch Nos. 15 and 17 of the same dates, respecting the reported intention of the Hellenic Government to withdraw a large amount of specie from the National Bank, contrary to the statutes of that institution.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 44.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 49. Very Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 11, 1869.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette told me this morning that he was anxious to speak to me very confidentially on the present state of affairs with regard to the Conference.

The conduct of the Greek Minister in coming at the last moment to the Conference with a peremptory refusal to take part in the proceedings was most uncourteous and unsatisfactory. An account of what had passed, and a summary of the letter which the Minister had read, had since been published in the newspaper "Liberté." The information must have been given to the paper by the Minister himself.

The Russian Ambassador, Count de Stackelberg, was acting in a still more disquieting manner. I must myself have observed the difficulties he had raised at every step in the Conference. He was now making objections to the Protocol which had been agreed upon, even to parts of it which he had drawn up himself, and of which the drafts were in his own handwriting. It was plain that if the Russian Plenipotentiary continued to act in the same spirit, it would be impossible to prevent the Conference degenerating into a series of altercations, or to bring it to anything like a satisfactory close. It appeared therefore to be absolutely necessary to take steps to ascertain what the real views and intentions of the Russian Government were.

M. de Lavalette confessed that the admission of Greece on the same footing as Turkey was in his eyes quite out of the question. It had been absolutely impossible to induce Turkey to take part in the Conference, except as one of the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris. She had absolutely refused to be represented in any Conference except one composed of those Powers, and restricted to them. Adopting a suggestion made by M. de Stackelberg himself, he had settled that Greece should be admitted with a *voix consultative*. He had, with great difficulty, obtained the consent of both Russia and Turkey to this arrangement. Greece also had, in fact, accepted it. He felt that he could not now, without a breach of faith to Turkey, consent to the admission of Greece on any other footing. Neither could he, without extreme unfairness, ask Turkey to postpone indefinitely the adoption of the measures she had threatened. It would, moreover, be vain to do so. If the Conference were not brought to an end in a short time, Turkey would, with reason, refuse to wait for the close of its labours. It was, too, inconsistent with the dignity and the interest of France and the other Powers to continue to sit in a Conference, the proceedings of which were continually arrested by manœuvres on the part of Russia and Greece. Under all the circumstances, he thought that if Greece

persisted in refusing the terms offered, the best course would be to propose that the Conference should go on without her. Count de Stackelberg would probably refuse to proceed without Greece. If so, the Conference must, he presumed, be broken up at once; but this would be preferable to keeping it together, with a prospect of constant altercation, and no prospect of final agreement. At all events it would be well to put Russia to the test. If she did not really wish that the Conference should succeed in re-establishing tranquillity in the Levant, the sooner this was made evident the better.

M. de Lavalette said, moreover, that the Emperor was of opinion that if Greece refused the position offered her, the proper course would be for the Conference to "passer outre," and go on without her.

M. de Lavalette went on to say that this was not a moment in which we ought to disarm Turkey. He received very alarming accounts of the proceedings of the Revolutionary Committees in Bulgaria and Roumania, and of the formation of insurrectionary bands on the banks of the Danube. The Russian emissaries had, it was reported to him, redoubled their activity throughout European Turkey. I mentioned to him that intelligence had reached Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Agent at Belgrade was pressing the Servian Regency in the strongest manner to take part in the hostile preparations made against the Porte. M. de Lavalette said that he had not any recent intelligence from Servia, but that what I had just told him confirmed his opinion of the dangers of prolonging the present crisis.

In answer to an observation from me M. de Lavalette said, that if no answer came from Greece to-morrow, the Conference might wait a reasonable time, perhaps forty-eight hours, for one. It might, nevertheless, be desirable to moot, to-morrow, the question of going on without Greece, although in the absence of the Greek answer it might not be pressed to a decision. He was to see several of the Plenipotentiaries, and among them Count Stackelberg in the course of the day, and should of course take what he heard from them into consideration in settling his plans for the Conference of to-morrow.

Under these circumstances I thought it right to apply at once to your Lordship by telegraph for instructions for my own guidance in case the proposal to proceed without Greece should be brought forward at the sitting of the Conference to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 45.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 11, 1869.*

IN reply to a request from the Russian Ambassador to recall Admiral Hobart from Crete, the Grand Vizier has said he was ready to do so if the Greek Government engaged that the "Enosis" should not leave till charge of piracy against her had been regularly investigated.

No. 46.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 11, 1869.*

THE Grand Vizier considers that if the Turkish Representative were to make at the Conference the declaration suggested in your Lordship's telegram of the 9th, it would inevitably provoke a discussion upon the points he is most anxious to avoid.

He believes the Russian Ambassador would certainly seize the opportunity of contradicting any such statement of the Turkish Plenipotentiary, and he hopes that in the Protocols of the Conference there shall not be even the record of any question connected with the internal administration of the Empire.

When the Conference is closed he will be ready to make to the different Governments the declaration recommended by your Lordship.

Upon my urging him to do this before the close of the Conference, he said that he was ready to make it at once to Her Majesty's Government, but not to all the others.

No. 47.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 51.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 12, 1869.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 49 of the 11th instant.

Her Majesty's Government would much regret that the Greek Representative should not be present during the deliberations of the Conference, when he would have the opportunity to give explanations in regard to any points as to which the conduct of his Government was impugned, and so enable the Conference to determine on the questions before it, with full knowledge of what either Turkey or Greece might allege in support of their respective cases. But if the Greek Plenipotentiary will not attend as proposed, it seems that the only course open to the Conference is to proceed with such information as may be laid before it, or that it can attain, to examine into the complaints made by the Porte. But Her Majesty's Government think that when that examination is completed, and the Conference has, so far as it may be enabled by the means at its command, formed an opinion on the merits of the case, it would be right that the nature of that opinion and the grounds upon which it is formed, should be stated on behalf of the Conference to the Greek Representative, or directly to the Greek Government if he refuses to take charge of the communication. In either case, that communication should be accompanied by an assurance that the Conference will be ready to receive and consider any observations upon it that the Greek Government may desire to offer in any form that it should think proper to adopt.

Her Majesty's Government would much deplore that the Conference should be broken up on this point of form, and they think that, as regards the other Powers are concerned, they might, without any material sacrifice of dignity, so far depart from their original understanding among themselves as to consent to waive it. Turkey, however, is understood to object to do so; but if she persisted in objecting, notwithstanding the concession made by the other Powers, she would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, incur great responsibility before Europe, and the distinction might not be admitted as exonerating her from that responsibility between the refusal of Greece to appear in the Conference except on an equal footing with the other Powers including, had the refusal of Turkey to continue to take part in the Conference because the other Powers were so far as themselves were concerned, not prepared to risk the consequences of the rupture of the Conference by pertinaciously adhering to a point of very small importance as compared with that of effecting a settlement of the differences between the two countries.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 48.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 12, 1869.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by your Excellency to the Grand Vizier with reference to the Conference at Paris, on the questions at issue between the Governments of Turkey and Greece, as reported in your despatch No. 516 of the 27th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 49.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1869.

HER Majesty's Government approve the communications which your Excellency addressed to the Russian Ambassador and to the Grand Vizier respecting the Conference at Paris, as reported in your despatch No. 518 of the 28th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 50.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1869.

HER Majesty's Government approve the steps which your Excellency has taken to induce the Porte to treat with leniency, Hellenic volunteers who had been captured in Crete, as reported in your despatch No. 522 of the 29th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 51.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January* 12, 1869, 7·15 P.M.

THE Conference, without discussion, adjourned till Thursday, to wait for answers from Constantinople and Athens. Plenipotentiaries agreed to obtain from their Governments instructions for the cases of a negative answer from Greece; of a dilatory answer; or of no answer at all.

No. 52.

Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Musurus Pasha, January 13.)

(Confidentielle.)
(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le* 12 *Janvier*, 1869.

COMMUNICATION Confidentielle a été donnée au Grand Vizir par l'Ambassadeur Anglais du télégramme suivant que ce dernier venait de recevoir de la part de Lord Clarendon :—

"Nous pensons que la Sublime Porte ferait bien de profiter de l'occasion offerte par la Conférence pour faire par son Plénipotentiaire une déclaration spontanée des principes par lesquels le Sultan est guidé vis-à-vis de ses sujets non-Musulmans. Ceci pourrait être fait quand la Conférence sur les affaires spéciales qui lui seront soumises, touche à sa fin; et toute apparence serait ainsi évitée d'une ingérence par la Conférence dans les affaires intérieures de la Turquie. Le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman pourrait référer un caractère général de conciliation et de bienveillance montré dans ces dernières années par la Porte à l'égard des sujets non-Mussulmans du Sultan, comme offrant une sécurité morale que tant qu'ils observent leurs devoirs à leur Souverain, la Porte continuerait non-seulement à maintenir les concessions et priviléges déjà accordés, mais qu'elle prendrait chaque occasion pour développer la liberté locale de toutes les classes sous l'égide du pouvoir et des droits du Sultan. En exprimant cette opinion, confidentiellement offerte par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, vous direz que le sentiment général de l'Europe serait gagné en faveur de la Porte par une pareille déclaration spontanée."

Le Grand Vizir, a répondu à Mr. Elliot, que la Conférence est réunie pour un objet spécial; que c'est à cette condition seule que la Sublime Porte a pu y adhérer; qu'une déclaration de notre part relative aux sujets Chrétiens en changera complètement la nature et ouvrira la porte à toutes sortes de controverses, dont nos adversaires ne manqueront pas de profiter, et ils arriveront à tout ce que nous avons voulu éviter à tout

prix; qu'il regrette infiniment de ne pas pouvoir suivre le conseil de Sa Seigneurie; qu'il ne répugne nullement à la Sublime Porte de parler aux Puissances amies des intentions de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à l'égard de ses sujets, mais que ce n'est pas dans le sein de la Conférence, ni dans la forme d'une déclaration.

Veuillez vous énoncer de votre côté auprès de Lord Clarendon dans le même sens.

No. 53.

Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Musurus Pasha, January 13.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le* 12 *Janvier*, 1869.

VOICI les dernières nouvelles reçues de Crète :

Tous les volontaires restants, y compris Pétropoulaki fils et plusieurs chefs indigènes, ont fait leur soumission et doivent quitter, sur un bateau Français, la Crète pour se rendre en Grèce.

L'insurrection est considérée comme morte.

No. 54.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 57 Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, January* 12, 1869.

THE Conference held its second sitting at 4 o'clock P.M.

The French Plenipotentiary announced that he had not yet received any answer to the telegrams which he had sent to Constantinople and Athens, in the name of the Conference.

He proceeded to say that the Russian Plenipotentiary had written to him to ask him, as President of the Conference, to postpone its meeting. He had not thought that he possessed the right of doing this on his own authority; but he now submitted to the Plenipotentiaries the suggestion that they should adjourn till the day after to-morrow, Thursday the 14th instant.

He added that he thought it essential that on Thursday the Conference should come to a decision on its future proceedings, and expressed a hope that the Plenipotentiaries would be prepared to settle what course should be taken in the absence of any answer from Greece, or in case the Greek answer should be negative.

It was suggested as a possible case that an answer asking for more time for consideration might be made by the Greek Government. There seemed to be a general impression that it would be very inexpedient to admit of any further delay; but the Plenipotentiaries engaged to do their best to obtain by Thursday instructions from their Governments on the three hypotheses, of no answer, of a negative answer, or of a dilatory answer from Greece. The case of an affirmative answer, for which all expressed their earnest wishes, was provided for by the instructions already received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 55.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1869.

BARON BRUNNOW has read to me a telegram he received this morning from Prince Gortchakoff, saying, that as the maintenance of peace was the object earnestly desired by all the Powers, his Excellency saw no reason why the "Greek incident" should prevent the Conference from proceeding with its labours. Greece will not accept a position of inequality, and Turkey has declared that she will accept no modification of her ultimatum, and that if any such should be proposed her Representative would be instructed to withdraw, and take no further part in the deliberations of the Conference. Under these circumstances, Prince Gortchakoff asks, why should not the six Powers

examine into the facts of the dispute, receiving from the Representatives of Turkey and Greece all the information that they thought proper to give, and then make a final award.

I remarked to Baron Brunnow that, although it might be quite true that Turkey intended to adhere to her ultimatum, yet I did not understand that she insisted upon the actual words of the ultimatum being adopted, or that she would not be satisfied with the guarantees she demanded from Greece even if given in a somewhat different form, and that I believed, with respect to the withdrawal of her Representative from the Conference, it was only meditated in the event of the Conference departing from the basis on which it was convoked and entering upon questions of internal administration.

I added that, as Turkey had with reluctance agreed to the Conference, but had consented to attend upon the conditions proposed, and had, in fact, conformed to the wishes expressed by the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, I thought it would be improper and unjust now to ask her to withdraw from the Conference, and simply to furnish information, because the Greek Government, though well acquainted with the position offered to its Representative, had at the last moment thought fit to forbid his attendance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 56.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 52. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1869.

IF the Russian Plenipotentiary should announce that he cannot any longer take part in the Conference unless Greece is represented on the same footing as Turkey, and if the other members of the Conference continue to abide by their refusal to admit Greece on that footing, it might probably induce him to modify his intention, if M. de Lavalette, as President, were to say that, in that case, he should insist on its being recorded in the Protocol that Russia had, previously to the convention of the Conference, concurred in a distinction being made between the position of Turkey and of Greece; that the other Powers, having no doubt that Russia would faithfully abide by her concurrence, had agreed to meet in Conference on that among other bases, and that they deeply lamented that, in consequence of the retractation of the consent given by Russia, the Conference would either have to break up or to continue its labours without the assistance of the Russian Plenipotentiary in a matter respecting which, as party to the Treaty of 1856, the co-operation of Russia was earnestly desired.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 57.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 58.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1869.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 57 of yesterday's date, respecting that the Conference had adjourned till the 15th instant, and that the Plenipotentiaries had agreed to refer to their respective Courts for instructions as to the course they should pursue in the event of no answer, or of a negative answer, or of a dilatory answer being received from Greece, respecting the presence of a Greek Plenipotentiary at the Conference.

My despatch No. 51 of yesterday's date, which crossed your despatch, will have shown to your Excellency the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the refusal of the Greek Minister to attend the Conference as reported in your despatch No. 49 of the 11th instant.

I have now further to state to you that Her Majesty's Government would much regret any delay in the proceedings of the Conference, and that they are willing to go forward, as explained in my despatch No. 51, without Greece. Her Majesty's Government would, however, be unwilling that the Conference should proceed without the presence of the Turkish Plenipotentiary, or without that of the Russian; but they would

not hesitate to condemn whichever of those parties might incur the responsibility of putting a stop to the progress of the Conference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 58.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January* 13, 1869.

RUSSIAN Ambassador has informed French Minister for Foreign Affairs that he will himself remain in the Conference although Greece should persist in standing aloof.

No. 59.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1869.

BARON BRUNNOW has read to me a telegram he received this morning from Prince Gortchakoff, saying that as the maintenance of peace was the object earnestly desired by all the Powers, his Excellency saw no reason why the "Greek incident" should prevent the Conference from proceeding with its labours. Greece will not accept a position of inequality; and Turkey has declared that she will accept no modification of her ultimatum, and that if any such should be proposed her Representative would be instructed to withdraw and take no further part in the deliberations of the Conference. Under these circumstances Prince Gortchakoff asks why should not the six Powers examine into the facts of the dispute, receiving from the Representatives of Turkey and Greece all the information that they thought proper to give, and then make a final award.

I remarked to Baron Brunnow that although it might be quite true that Turkey intended to adhere to her ultimatum, yet I did not understand that she insisted upon the actual words of the ultimatum being adopted, or that she would not be satisfied with the guarantees she demanded from Greece, even if given in a somewhat different form; and that I believed with respect to the withdrawal of her Representative from the Conference, it was only meditated in the event of the Conference departing from the basis on which it was convoked, and entering upon questions of internal administration. I added that as Turkey had with reluctance agreed to the Conference, but had consented to attend upon the conditions proposed, and had, in fact, conformed to the wishes expressed by the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, I thought it would be improper and unjust now to ask her to withdraw from the Conference, and simply to furnish information because the Greek Government, though well acquainted with the position offered to its Representative, had at the last moment thought fit to forbid his attendance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 60.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 62. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, January* 13, 1869.

THE Marquis de Lavalette will not improbably propose to the Conference (if it be not prematurely broken up) resolutions very much to the following effect:—

"La Conférence est obligée de reconnaître que sur les deux premiers points" (of the Turkish ultimatum) "la Grèce s'est écartée des devoirs de la neutralité. Sans rechercher en effet si la législation Hellénique renferme à cet égard des prescriptions formelles, *il est constant que les principes du droit des gens obligent le Gouvernement Grec à ne pas permettre que des bandes armées se recrutent sur son territoire pour attaquer un Etat voisin.* IL N'EST PAS MOINS CERTAIN QUE LA GRÈCE NE PEUT AUTORISER DANS SES PORTS DES ARMEMENTS D'UN CARACTERE ESSENTIELLEMENT HOSTILE, TELS QUE CEUX QUI SE SONT NOTOIREMENT EFFECTUES DES L'ORIGINE DES TROUBLES DE LA CRETE.

"La Conférence déclare qu'il est du devoir du Gouvernement Grec:—

"1. De s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer la formation sur son territoire de toute bande armée en vue d'une agression contre la Turquie.

"2. De prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour empêcher l'armement dans ses ports de bâtiments destinés à secourir, sous quelque forme que ce soit, toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

"3. De se prêter enfin de tout son pouvoir aux opérations des bâtiments employés pour effectuer le rapatriement des sujets Ottomans refugiés sur le sol Hellénique qui désirent rentrer dans la patrie."

It is very desirable that I should be furnished as soon as possible with authoritative instructions as to whether I may support these resolutions as conformable to the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the law of nations.

I ask for such instructions with especial reference to the caution conveyed to me by your Lordship's secret and confidential despatch No. 11 of the 5th instant, to be mindful of the construction which may be placed on my language as affecting the position taken up by Her Majesty's Government in their discussions with the United States on the "Alabama" claims.

I think M. de Lavalette would not be unwilling to put the two first resolutions (those which I have underlined with red ink*) into the form of abstract propositions. This course would render them less distasteful to Greece, and would also give them more weight, if it should be desirable to appeal to them hereafter in discussions respecting other countries or provinces.

It would therefore be advisable that I should be furnished with a statement of the terms in which both, and especially the latter (which is marked with double red lines†), may be properly and safely stated as a sound exposition of international law.

The instructions for which I venture to apply will, in order to be of practical use, be needed in a very few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 61.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 13, 1869.*

AFTER the Conference broke up yesterday, M. de Lavalette received from M. Bourée, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, a telegram, in answer to that of 9th instant, conveying the request of the Conference that the measures threatened against Greece might be suspended. This telegram contained in substance the same information as was conveyed to your Lordship by Mr. Elliot's telegram dated yesterday, 11·30 P.M.

I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram which M. de Lavalette addressed yesterday in reply, and which he communicated to me confidentially this afternoon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 61.

M. de Lavalette to M. Bourée.

(Télégraphique.) *Paris, le 12 Janvier, 1869.*

VOTRE télégramme d'hier soir entre dans les détails, qui ne me permettent guère d'en préciser la portée. La règle constante appliquée dans toutes les Conférences ou les Congrès est le maintien du *statu quo*, c'est-à-dire, l'abstention de tout acte d'exécution pendant les délibérations.

J'insiste au nom de tous les membres de la Conférence pour obtenir l'assentiment pur et simple au maintien du *statu quo*, et à ce qu'aucune expulsion de sujets Grecs ne soit exécutée.

Nous allons télégraphier à Athènes pour obtenir un engagement à l'égard de "Grèce."

Répondez-moi de suite.

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* Printed in italics. † Printed in small capitals.

No. 62.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 14, 1869.*

THE Turkish Ambassador has stated to me, as the Grand Vizier did to you, the objections of the Porte to the suggested declaration. I told him that, of course, Her Majesty's Government would not press the matter against the wish of the Porte, but that I still thought such a statement of the benevolent policy of the Sultan towards his Christian subjects, made after the business of the Conference was concluded, and when therefore no discussion could arise upon it, would have a good effect as regards the interests of the Porte.

No. 63.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 14, 1869.*

THE Turkish Ambassador communicated to me yesterday a telegram that he had received from his Government respecting the suggestion which I instructed you, by telegraph, on the 9th instant, to make to the Porte, as to the expediency of the Turkish Plenipotentiary being authorized, when the business of the Conference was brought to a close, to make a declaration as to the good intentions of the Sultan towards his non-Mussulman subjects.

The Turkish telegram sets forth the answer which is substantially in conformity with the reply of the Grand Vizier to yourself as reported in your telegram of the 12th instant.

I said to Musurus Pasha that the suggestion had been made confidentially and solely in what appeared to Her Majesty's Government to be for the interest of Turkey, but if the Porte thought otherwise, the matter would of course not be pressed.

I said also that the declaration in question was not recommended to be made until after the business of the Conference had been concluded, when therefore no discussion upon it could arise; and I still thought that a statement of the benevolent policy of the Sultan towards his Christian subjects would have a good effect if made to the Plenipotentiaries before they finally separated.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 64.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 14, 1869, 4·47 P.M.*

COUNT BISMARCK expressed to me last night his opinion that should Greek and Turkish Plenipotentiaries retire from Conference the other Powers should continue their deliberations and pronounce their verdict. He was further of opinion that if all the Powers were unanimous they should enforce their verdict on litigants, and thus prevent a struggle which may possibly assume large proportions. If France or England should propose such a course Prussia would support it; but Prussia will not take the initiative, nor will she support it if proposed by Russia, unless with the concurrence of all the Powers, in order not to be suspected of complicity with Russia.

I told his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government did not contemplate the employment of coercive measures to enforce recommendations of the Conference. Count Bismarck said that Russia was desirous of peace, and that Prince Gortchakoff seemed unwilling that a European Conference should again prove its impotence by not enforcing its verdict.

No. 65.

Consul Dickson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(Separate.)
Canea, Crete, January 4, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Chiefs, Leonidas Petropoulakis, Mitza, Tzakona, Tziko, Khionia, and the rest of the Hellenic volunteers, numbering some 130 in all, have just tendered their submission to Sawas Pasha, on condition that a foreign ship should be sent to take them back to Greece.

The above intelligence having been transmitted by a special messenger from Sawas Pasha to the Governor-General, his Excellency at once acceded to the petition, and has signified his intention of dispatching the "Phocéen" (one of the French steamers lately chartered by the Porte for the conveyance of both Cretan refugees and Hellenic volunteers) to the Port of Sphakia, as soon as that ship shall have arrived from Prevesa.

The volunteers in question were all at Askyfo when they made their proposal to surrender.

On the morning of the 2nd instant, Shevket Pasha, having learnt that some twenty armed insurgents were at the village of Asygonia, near Argyropolis, in Retimo district, he ordered his troops to surround the place, calling upon the insurgents to surrender. These, having instead attempted to make their escape, were fired upon by the troops. Three of the number, viz., Mpoumpoulaki, Tzeralidi, and Skouloudi, late members of the "General Cretan Assembly," were killed; the rest escaped. A bag, containing the correspondence of this body, the official seal, &c., has fallen into the hands of the Turkish authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

No. 66.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 15.)
Vienna, January 9, 1869.

My Lord,

AT an interview I have just had with Count Beust I endeavoured to learn the nature of the instructions he had sent to Prince Metternich for his guidance at the Conference, which was to be opened to-day at Paris. His Excellency said that the Austrian Ambassador was instructed to give his general support to the object for which the Conference had been summoned, and was to use all his influence to effect a reconciliation of the differences which had arisen between Turkey and Greece, and he gave me further to understand that he hoped the Ambassadors of Austria and England would be found acting cordially together during the approaching discussion. I replied that Her Majesty's Government would learn this intelligence with satisfaction: they earnestly hoped that concord would prevail amongst the Powers, and that the discussions would soon be brought to a close by the early removal of the present cause of disturbance in the relations of Turkey and Greece.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 67.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 16. Most Confidential.)
Vienna, January 9, 1869.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch of this day, No. 15, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that on my stating to Count Beust that Russia sought to have the labours of the Conference extended much beyond the limits desired by Her Majesty's Government, I expressed the hope that the instructions to Prince Metternich would not authorize him to go into any general discussion of Eastern affairs, but restrict him to the examination of the question for which the Conference had been summoned.

Count Beust then explained confidentially that he had sent two instructions to Prince Metternich, one directed him to support generally all proposals tending to effect a

reconciliation of the differences between Turkey and Greece, the other authorized him to enter into a wider discussion of the Eastern question, but he had since learnt the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on this point, and had directed Prince Metternich not to act on this second instruction, and he requested me to convey this information to your Lordship by telegraph, and hoped it would be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. His words were: "J'ai déjà fait ce que vous demandez, j'ai retiré une instruction au Prince Metternich où je parle de la nécessité d'aborder la question intérieure de la Crète de concert avec la Turquie," and he then sent for this reserved despatch, and read it rapidly to me. Its object was to prepare Prince Metternich for the course he was to pursue in the event of a general discussion of the Eastern question arising in the Conference. Count Beust alludes to his despatch of 1867, and the necessity some day of opening the whole question; he directs Prince Metternich to support generally any reasonable pretensions put forward by Turkey, and does not object to joint action amongst the Powers to enforce whatever resolution might be taken by the Conference.

This instruction would seem to have been suggested by the intelligence received here that Russia was preparing to give unjustifiable support to the pretensions of Greece, and by the desire of Count Beust to see Austria playing an important part in the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 68.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 18. Most Confidential.)
Vienna, January 11, 1869.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6 of the 5th instant, marked Most Confidential, I have again spoken to Count Beust on the Press warfare between Prussia and Austria, and urged his Excellency to consider whether he could not devise some means of calming down the violence of the Press, and if it would not be possible for some friendly Power to act as mediator in this matter, for, I said, the quarrel had assumed considerable importance, and was deeply to be regretted, particularly at a moment when the Powers were about to meet in Conference at Paris.

Count Beust replied that he had no concession to make, neither was it possible for him to think of a mediation. If he had been the aggressor in this Press warfare, the case would be different; but he was only defending himself, and in reality the answers in the Austrian newspapers were milk and water compared to the vehemence of those of Prussia.

The semi-official journals at Vienna, he said, had ceased to answer, and he certainly could not prevent the others, who were perfectly free and independent of Government control, from writing what they chose; and he thought it hard to ask him to do anything more than he had done.

The blame of this warfare lay with Count Bismarck, not with him; and he would tell me, confidentially, that some time before Count Bismarck's return to Berlin from leave of absence in the country, Count Wimpffen, the Austrian Minister at the Prussian Court, reported that he had learnt from an undoubted source that preparations were being made, and materials collected, with the purpose of commencing, as soon as Count Bismarck came back, a systematic attack in the Press against Austrian policy in general, and himself in particular.

This intelligence had proved to be too true, and Count Bismarck's agents were, moreover, actively engaged everywhere endeavouring to damage his character generally, and especially to injure him in the opinion of his Imperial and Royal Master.

I asked Count Beust, though he declined all question of mediation at Berlin, whether it might not be advisable to give some denial to the accusation which had been brought against him of having fomented the Turco-Greek quarrel. He replied by declaring the accusation to be groundless, and added that Mr. Elliot was well acquainted with the proceedings of the Austrian Embassy at Constantinople; and his Excellency would, he felt assured, bear out the truth of his assertions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 69.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 10.)
My Lord,

Vienna, January 11, 1869.

IN the course of a conversation I have just had with Baron Orczy, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he told me intelligence had reached the Austrian Consul at Odessa that an order had been given by the Russian Government to M. Novikoff, one of the most important sail-cloth manufacturers on the coast of the Black Sea, for an unusually large supply of that article. It was to be ready in the spring of 1870, and to be delivered partly in Russian, partly in Greek ports. So large was this order, according to the intelligence received here, that M. Novikoff could not supply it in the time prescribed without sending to France for fresh machinery, which he has done.

Baron Orczy told me also that a statement of the number and size of the Russian steam-vessels in the Black Sea had been called for by the Governor of Odessa, with injunctions to have it prepared at once and presented to him within three weeks.

In connection with this apparent activity of Russia in preparing for coming events, Baron Orczy said that a new map of the railway communication in South Russia had been lately received in his Department, from which it would seem that next year the great net of railways will be completed, uniting St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa with the South, which will render the position of Russia stronger and more formidable than ever, and afford her great facilities for the transport of troops.

I have, &c
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 70.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Paris, January 14, 1869.

THE Marquis de Lavalette has authorized me to place, confidentially, before your Lordship, a copy of a draft of a Declaration, which he thinks of laying before the Conference this afternoon.

It is not improbable that this draft will be discussed by the Conference to-morrow; and it would therefore be advisable that I should, if possible, be furnished to-morrow by telegraph with any instructions your Excellency may deem it right to give me respecting it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 70.

Project of Declaration.

1. JUSTEMENT préoccupées des dangers qui peuvent naître de la rupture des relations entre la Turquie et la Grèce, les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856 se sont entendues pour apaiser le différend survenu entre les deux Etats, et ont autorisé à cet effet leurs Représentant auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français à se constituer en Conférence.

2. Après une étude attentive des documents échangés entre les deux Gouvernements, les Plénipotentiaires sont tombés d'accord pour regretter que, cédant à des entraînements sur lesquels son patriotisme a pu l'égarer, la Grèce ait donné lieu aux griefs articulés par la Porte Ottomane dans l'ultimatum remis le 11 Décembre, 1868, au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes. Il est constant, en effet, que les principes du droit des gens obligent la Grèce, comme toutes les autres nations, à ne pas permettre que des bandes se recrutent sur son territoire, ni que des bâtiments s'arment dans ses ports pour attaquer un Etat voisin.

3. Persuadée d'ailleurs que le Cabinet d'Athènes ne saurait méconnaître la pensée qui inspire cette appréciation aux trois Cours protectrices de la Grèce, comme à toutes les

autres Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856, la Conférence déclare qu'il est du devoir du Gouvernement Hellénique d'observer désormais dans ses rapports avec la Turquie les règles de conduite communes à tous les Gouvernements, et de satisfaire ainsi aux réclamations formulées par la Sublime Porte pour le passé, en la rassurant en même temps pour l'avenir.

4. La Grèce devra donc s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer la formation sur son territoire de toute bande armée en vue d'une agression contre la Turquie, et prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour empêcher l'armement dans ses ports de bâtiments destinés à secourir, sous quelque forme que se soit, toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan. En ce qui concerne les dommages privés encourus par des sujets Ottomans, le Cabinet d'Athènes ne contestant nullement à la Turquie le droit de poursuivre par la voie judiciaire les réparations qui pourraient être dues, et la Turquie acceptant de son côté la juridiction des Tribunaux Grecs, les Plénipotentiaires ne croient pas devoir entrer dans l'examen des faits et n'ont plus à s'occuper des griefs élevés sur ce point.

Quant à celle des demandes de la Porte qui concerne le rapatriement des sujets Turcs réfugiés sur le territoire Hellénique, la Conférence prend acte des déclarations faites par le Cabinet d'Athènes dans sa note du 13 Décembre, et demeure convaincue qu'il se prêtera à faciliter, autant qu'il dépend de lui, le départ des familles Candiotes qui désireraient rentrer dans leur patrie.

La Conférence ne saurait douter que, devant l'expression unanime de l'opinion des Plénipotentiaires sur les questions soumises à leur examen, le Gouvernement Hellénique ne s'empresse de conformer ses actes aux principes qui viennent d'être rappelés, et que les griefs exposés dans l'ultimatum de la Porte ne se trouvent par le fait même définitivement écartés.

Cette déclaration sera portée sans délai à la connaissance du Cabinet d'Athènes, et les Plénipotentiaires ont la conviction que la Sublime Porte renoncera à donner suite aux mesures annoncées par elle comme devant être la conséquence de la rupture des relations diplomatiques, si, dans une communication notifiée aux Cabinets, la Grèce défère à l'opinion émise par la Conférence.

Les Plénipotentiaires, faisant dès lors appel aux mêmes sentiments de conciliation et de paix qui animent les Cours dont ils sont les Représentants, expriment l'espoir que les deux Gouvernements n'hésiteront pas à renouer leurs rapports, et à effacer ainsi, dans l'intérêt commun de leurs sujets, toute trace du dissentiment qui a motivé la réunion de la Conférence.

No. 71.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 69. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord,

Paris, January 14, 1869.

THE propositions respecting international law laid down in the draft of a declaration which is inclosed in my immediately preceding despatch No. 68 of to-day, differ considerably from those stated in my secret and confidential despatch of yesterday.

This circumstance does not do away with the necessity for the instructions for which I applied in that despatch, as it is still not unlikely that the discussion may take a turn which will bring the original propositions before the Conference.

The thing, however, which is most pressing at the moment is, that I should be informed as soon as possible of the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the propositions in the draft inclosed in my despatch of to day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 72.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 70.)
My Lord,

Paris, January 14, 1869.

M. RIZA RANGABÉ, the Greek Minister at Paris, called upon me this morning and said that he came to beg me to go on with the Conference, although he himself might not be authorized to take part in it. He had not, he said, yet received any

instructions from his Government in answer to the request made to it by the Conference to reconsider its decision, and, therefore, could only express his personal opinion. It seemed, however, to him that the presence of a Greek Representative was not indispensably necessary. The Conference was not a Tribunal, nor a Commission of Inquiry. Its object was simply conciliation. He should suggest that allusion to the past should, as much as possible, be avoided, and that the Conference should rather lay down general principles of international law to which both parties should be recommended to conform their conduct.

Greece could not hesitate to obey the voice of Europe expressed on such a subject and in such a form. He must again say that he was speaking without instructions—indeed he would confess that the last instructions he had received were not very conciliatory. They enjoined him to demand compensation from the Porte for the losses sustained by Greek subjects in consequence of their threatened expulsion from Turkey and of the exclusion of their ships from Ottoman ports. He was, however, himself of opinion that the premature breaking-up of the Conference would be a great misfortune, and he therefore hoped that I should not object to proceed in the absence of a Greek Representative.

I asked him if I was to understand that, personally, he was distinctly of opinion that, in the interest of Greece, as well as in that of the general peace and tranquillity, it was advisable that the Conference should go on and come to a decision, even though Greece should definitively refuse to be represented.

He said that certainly such was his personal opinion.

I confined myself to observing that I would still hope that before 4 o'clock, the hour at which the Conference was to meet, he would receive instructions which would enable him to join us.

I am obliged to conclude this despatch before I go to the Conference, as it is doubtful whether I shall get back before the departure of the messenger this evening.

I have, &c
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 73.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 67.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 15, 1869.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 62, Secret and Confidential, of the 13th instant, respecting a declaration on the subject of the differences between Turkey and Greece which you consider that M. de Lavalette may propose for adoption to the Conference.

I have consulted the Law Officers of the Crown as to whether those resolutions are conformable to the view taken by Her Majesty's Government as to the bearing of the law of nations on the points set forth in them, and I have now to acquaint your Excellency that I am advised that, speaking on grounds strictly juridical, there is no objection to the propositions of international law as stated in the passages that you have underlined, and which for greater certainty I transcribe, viz.:—

"Il est constant que les principes du droit des gens obligent le Gouvernement Grec à ne pas permettre que des bandes armées se recrutent sur son territoire pour attaquer un État voisin. Il n'est pas moins certain que la Grèce ne peut autoriser dans ses ports des armements d'un caractère essentiellement hostile, tels que ceux qui sont notoirement effectués dès l'origine des troubles de la Crète."

The Law Officers say, however, that with regard to the second of the resolutions which follow the passage that I have cited, it would be desirable, if possible, to induce the French Plenipotentiary to substitute for the words "to make the necessary dispositions," such words as "to use her best endeavours," or "to do all that is possible."

The grounds on which this suggestion is made are, that the words as they stand in your despatch No. 62, might be construed to imply a duty on the part of the Greek Government absolutely to ensure that no armed vessel hostile to Turkey shall issue from her ports.

Her Majesty's Government, in their controversy with the United States on the "Alabama" claims, have declined to accept the position of insurers against the departure from British ports of hostile cruizers; and they have contended that they had discharged their duty by doing all that they reasonably could do to prevent the departure of such vessels, though they had failed in doing so. It is true that the "Alabama," and other

vessels of the like description, left British ports unarmed, and that the proposed resolution is directed against the armament of such vessels. Nevertheless, it would be preferable not to admit that a neutral Government is an absolute insurer against even the armament of hostile cruizers in its ports.

I was on the point of addressing to you the foregoing observations on your despatch No. 62, when I received your despatch No. 68 of yesterday inclosing the draft of a declaration which M. de Lavalette proposed to submit to the Conference at its next meeting.

On comparing the passage of that draft, respecting the armament of ships, with the passage of your despatch No. 62, to which the former part of this despatch refers, as being unobjectionable in international law, there does not appear to be any very material difference between them. Nevertheless, we should much prefer the passage in your despatch No. 62, of which the Law Officers approve, to the one now proposed by M. de Lavalette in his draft declaration inclosed in your despatch No. 68.

Her Majesty's Government also strongly recommend the adoption of the Law Officers' suggested substitution of another form of expression for the words "prendre les dispositions necessaires."

Her Majesty's Government do not, however, absolutely insist upon the adoption of the versions which they prefer of either of the passages to which I have specifically alluded, if the Representatives of the other Powers should be of a different opinion; and in either case your Excellency is authorized to agree to the declaration.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 74.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 15, 1869, 11·25 P.M.*

WITH reference to your telegrams of to-day, are the Law Officers aware that in French the word "armement," as applied to a ship, means not "arming," but simply "fitting-out," and is applicable to the fitting-out of any ordinary merchant-vessel? The declaration inclosed in my despatch No. 68 has not yet been definitively adopted and signed. The Conference meets again to-morrow.

No. 75.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16, 1869.)

(No. 524.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 30, 1868.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Grand Vizier your Lordship's instruction on the subject of the Conference.

As the Conference is to be confined to the points contained in the ultimatum of the Porte, Aali Pasha is of opinion that the Porte should assent to it; but before pronouncing positively his Highness says that he must consult his colleagues.

As Russia and perhaps other Powers are inclined to introduce on that occasion discussions foreign to the five points and connected with the territorial and administrative rights of the Ottoman Government, the Grand Vizier intimates that, if England and France were to give assurances to the Porte of their support and countenance on such an emergency, he would not hesitate to accept the Conference on the ground laid down in your Lordship's instruction.

His Highness, however, added that in the event of any discussion arising unconnected with the above basis, the Ottoman Plenipotentiary would at once withdraw from the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT

No. 76.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 2.) *Constantinople, January 1, 1869.*

My Lord,

AT a meeting held last night at the house of the Grand Vizier, the Turkish Government decided to consent to the Conference upon the express condition that its discussion shall be limited to the five demands contained in the ultimatum, and that no questions relative to territorial or administrative changes shall be broached.

Before giving a formal adhesion to the proposal, the Porte has considered it expedient to instruct the Ottoman Ambassador at Paris to ascertain officially from the Marquis de Lavalette whether there is any intention of making any reference to the identic declaration of the four Powers to the Porte of the 29th of October, 1867.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 77.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 4.) *Constantinople, January 2, 1869.*

My Lord,

GENERAL IGNATIEFF has latterly insisted that the measures adopted by the Porte towards Greece have been chiefly prompted by the Austrian Ambassador.

I have no hesitation in recording my conviction that there is not the slightest foundation for this suspicion, and that the Austrian Ambassador learnt the resolution of the Porte from the note of Safvet Pasha to the three Powers, which was communicated to him after it had been drawn up.

A little while ago General Ignatieff insisted with equal confidence that the whole thing had been brought on by the French Ambassador, and I am told he has likewise accused me of being the instigator of it.

The explanation of the resolution come to by the Porte is to be found simply in the fact that, when its patience was fairly exhausted, the Greeks had adopted a more than usually aggressive attitude with the view of rekindling the flames of the nearly extinct revolution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 78.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 5.) *Constantinople, January 2, 1869.*

My Lord,

I CALLED this morning upon the Grand Vizier, for the purpose of seeing whether it would be possible to obtain the revocation or the suspension of the order for the expulsion of the Hellenic subjects.

From the previous communications I had received from him I was aware that I had no great prospect of success; but upon the capitulation of the Greek volunteers in Crete being spoken of as equivalent to the end of the insurrection, I urged that this was a sufficient reason for no longer carrying into execution a measure so contrary to modern practice even in time of war, and so much calculated to alienate those who were the most willing to recognize the right of the Porte to insist upon the Greek Government abstaining from aggressive or hostile acts.

The success which had been obtained in Crete being due to the Porte's own unaided energy, they had an admirable opportunity of at once and voluntarily giving public evidence of the moderation which guided them, and of showing that they had only been driven to adopt extreme measures when they deemed them indispensably called for; and I pointed out that in supporting in the coming Congress the just demands of the Porte, the hands of Her Majesty's Government would be greatly strengthened by the abandonment of a measure which they regarded as unnecessary and impolitic.

I did not succeed in obtaining from Aali Pasha anything that led me to expect that he would give way upon the point in question.

The measure so generally disapproved of in Europe was, he said, exactly the one

that had given the greatest satisfaction in Turkey, where the public had long seen, with ill-suppressed indignation, the unconcealed support given to the insurrection by those whose expulsion they now viewed with universal approval.

The different manner in which it was appreciated here and in Europe arose probably, he thought, from the European public not being fully aware of the position of Turkey in regard to foreigners.

In every other country foreigners live subject to its jurisdiction, whereas in Turkey the Capitulations give them exceptional privileges over the Sultan's subjects; and with regard to the Greeks especially this had led to much abuse.

The nominal Greek subjects in different parts of the Empire exceed 200,000; but Aali Pasha assured me that not one-third of that number are *bond fide* of Hellenic nationality, the others being in reality Ottoman subjects, to whom Greek passports had been given in order to give them the benefit of the Capitulations: and the Porte is not inclined to allow these people to remain here after the rupture of relations between the Governments, and to continue to treat them with the exceptional favour to which they were never really entitled.

I have no means of verifying the accuracy of the comparative numbers given by the Grand Vizier, but there cannot, I imagine, be any doubt that by far the larger proportion of the nominal Hellenic subjects belong to the class he had named; for the traffic in Greek passports has long been a matter of notoriety, and of no small emolument to the Agents of that Government.

Seeing little prospect of obtaining the complete suspension of the measure of expulsion, I availed myself of Aali Pasha's argument respecting the fictitious Greek subjects to suggest a modification of it, which would do away with a great part of its harshness.

I proposed to him freely to permit all the *bond fide* Greeks to remain under the temporary protection of the Turkish Government, with the understanding that they returned as a matter of course to that of their own Legation on the re-establishment of relations between the two countries.

With regard to Ottoman subjects with fictitious Greek nationalities, he might pursue the system which I understood already to have been adopted, of allowing such of them as chose to remain to do so, upon the condition of permanently reassuming their original and proper Turkish nationality.

I should have preferred the complete suspension of the measure, but this modification would at least take much of the sting out of it; and as Aali Pasha did not at once refuse to entertain it, but promised to take the suggestion into his serious consideration, I am not without some hope that it may be adopted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 79.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 7.) *Constantinople, July 4, 1869.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Porte has in great part adopted the suggestions I had made, and has introduced into the order for the expulsion of the Greeks a modification which will do away with much of the hardship it was calculated to inflict.

All *bond fide* Greek subjects residing in Turkey, and conducting themselves peaceably, who wish to remain, are to be free to do so, under the protection of the laws of the country during the interruption of relations, and will afterwards return to the protection of their Legation.

The Ottoman subjects, on the other hand, who have so extensively obtained a fictitious Hellenic protection, if they desire to remain, must return to their original and proper nationality.

If they decline to do so, they will be required to leave the country, and will not be again received until they present themselves as Ottoman subjects.

The exclusion of the Greek vessels from the Turkish ports is maintained.

This concession has been consented to by the Porte entirely out of deference to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 80.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 8.)
Constantinople, January 8, 1869.

My Lord,

I INFORMED your Lordship that M. Delyanni, on leaving Constantinople, announced that he put the Greek subjects under the protection of the Minister of the United States of America.

Mr. Morris accepted the trust, subject to the approval of his Government, and without making any communication to the Porte upon the subject, who, however, telegraphed to their Minister at Washington to endeavour to prevent the American Government from sanctioning the arrangement.

A telegram reached the Porte yesterday from Blaque Bey, informing them, in reply, that the American Government had promised to instruct their Minister here not to interfere in the matter, either officially or unofficially.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 81.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 9.)
Constantinople, January 5, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a telegram from Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, stating that he had been requested by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to protect the Greek subjects there till their departure.

I have informed Mr. Cumberbatch that he is not authorized to comply with M. Delyanni's request, which must have been made after I had declined to take them under the protection of Her Majesty's Embassy.

I have informed Mr. Erskine of the instruction I have given to Mr. Cumberbatch by the despatch of which a copy is herewith transmitted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 81.

Consul Cumberbatch to Mr. Elliot.

Smyrna, January 2, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to annex herewith copy of a telegram which I had the honour to address your Excellency on the 29th ultimo.

"Being requested by the Hellenic Minister for Foreign Affairs to protect Hellenic subjects until their departure from Smyrna, I have the honour to request your Excellency's instructions whether I am to accept or refuse this service."

And to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's reply on the 30th of December, 1868.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. W. CUMBERBATCH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 81.

Mr. Elliot to Mr. Erskine.

Constantinople, January 5, 1869.

Sir,

I INCLOSE the copy of a telegram which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, stating that he had been requested by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to protect the Greek subjects there till their departure.

Having already declined to receive the Greeks under the protection of Her Majesty's Embassy, I have informed Mr. Cumberbatch that he is not authorized to comply with M. Delyanni's request.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 82.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 10.)
Constantinople, January 5, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of the telegraphic order of the Porte notifying to the provincial authorities the new decision with respect to the Greeks residing in Turkey.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Ottoman Government, in stating their intention of expelling the turbulent Greeks, do not authorize the local authorities to do so without reference to the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 82.

Orders addressed to Turkish Provincial Authorities respecting the Expulsion of Greek Subjects.

Le 5 Janvier, 1869.

(Télégraphique.)

PAR suite des difficultés démontrées dans l'application de la mesure d'expulsion des sujets Hellènes, la Sublime Porte vient de décréter quelques dispositions destinées à sauvegarder tant les intérêts du commerce que la sûreté générale de l'Empire.

Ces dispositions sont :—

1. Les Traités de la Sublime Porte avec la Grèce se trouvant suspendus par suite de la rupture des relations entre elles, tous les Hellènes établis en Turquie sont placés sous la protection des lois du pays pour toutes leurs affaires, soit commerciales, soit du ressort de la police, soit de toute autre nature.

2. Sont considérés de vrais sujets Hellènes ceux qui sont issus de parents sujets Hellènes, ou ceux qui ont acquis cette nationalité en vertu du Protocole de Londres. Pour les individus de cette catégorie, le Gouvernement Impérial avisera à l'expulsion de ceux dont il ne voudrait plus permettre le séjour dans l'Empire. En conséquence, les autorités Impériales auront partout à s'enquérir dument sur le compte des sujets Hellènes de la catégorie en question afin de discerner les gens honnêtes des gens turbulents, et de les faire connaître au Gouvernement Impérial. Quant aux individus qui, étant sujets Ottomans, sont parvenus à se faire délivrer, soit par l'entremise des Consuls Hellènes, ou d'une autre manière, des passeports Helléniques, devront ou abandonner leurs passeports pour se faire réintégrer dans leur nationalité primitive, ou bien quitter l'Empire pour ne plus y retourner, sauf à être considérés comme sujets Ottomans, s'ils y retournaient plus tard. Les individus de cette catégorie seront invités à quitter le territoire Ottoman pour aller où ils voudront, et s'ils ne partent pas dans le délai fixé, ils seront contraints à se soumettre à cet ordre dans les formes requises.

3. Ces dispositions ne modifient en rien la décision prise antérieurement à l'égard de la marine marchande Hellénique.

No. 83.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 11.)
Constantinople, January 5, 1869.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship has learnt from Her Majesty's Agents in Servia and the Principalities the unfortunate impression that was produced by the terms in which the decision of the Porte with respect to the Greeks was notified, and which seemed to convey the expectation of the Suzerain Powers that the same course would be followed in the Principalities.

This having been represented to the Porte, no difficulty was made by them in amending their first note by omitting the last two lines, which alone were found objectionable.

I have the honour to transmit a copy of the note in the original and in the amended form.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 83.

Saïvet Pasha to the Agents of Servia and the United Principalities.

Le 17 Décembre, 1868.

LA conduite du Gouvernement Hellénique depuis bientôt trois ans à l'égard du Gouvernement Impérial s'étant dans ces derniers temps accentuée de plus en plus dans un sens ouvertement hostile et attentatoire au droit international et aux Traités existants entre les deux pays, Photiades Bey, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte à Athènes avait été chargé de notifier au Gouvernement Hellénique cinq conditions, en déclarant qu'il a ordre de quitter Athènes avec tout le personnel de la Légation et des Consulats placés sous ses ordres, dans le cas où ces conditions ne seraient pas acceptées dans le délai de cinq jours.

En vous transmettant ci-joint copie de la note remise à cet effet par Photiades Bey au Gouvernement Hellénique, je me fais un devoir de vous informer, Monsieur, que le Cabinet d'Athènes ayant répondu par un refus aux conditions proposées, les relations diplomatiques et commerciales viennent d'être interrompus entre les deux pays.

Je vous prie, Monsieur, de communiquer cette décision au Gouvernement Princier, ainsi que les dispositions prises en conséquence, conformément à la note susmentionnée, afin qu'elles soient conformément appliquées dans tout l'Empire.

As Amended.

Je vous prie, Monsieur, de communiquer cette décision au Gouvernement Princier, ainsi que les dispositions prises en conséquence, conformément à la note susmentionnée.

No. 84.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 3)

Athens, January 6, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith an extract from a letter which has been addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Syra, respecting the arrival and landing of the body of volunteers under the elder Petropoulaki, which recently capitulated to the Turkish troops at Askyfo in Crete.

The surrender of these volunteers is now attributed by the Greeks to the misrepresentations of M. Champoiseau, the French Consul at Canea, who certainly does appear to have somewhat officiously sought to persuade the volunteers to lay down their arms in order to save the lives of another party of forty volunteers, who had been captured some time previously by the Turks. By the inclosed correspondence between Petropoulaki and M. Champoiseau, your Lordship will perceive that the state of affairs is represented as even more hopeless for the volunteers than it really was. The Prince of Wales and the King of Denmark are most unnecessarily quoted as having urged King George to accede to the just demands of Turkey; and the "Enosis" is described as dismantled and under the charge of foreign vessels of war, and as incapacitated from conveying relief to the insurgents.

This injudicious interference on the part of M. Champoiseau is the more to be regretted, as I can scarcely doubt that, if the Turks had been left to deal with the Greek volunteers in their own way, the latter would equally have been compelled to surrender, whereas they now not unnaturally assert that they have been grossly deceived by a foreign Agent but for whose intervention they would have continued to resist.

Mr. Consul Lloyd mentions incidentally that the French Consul at Syra has undertaken the protection of Turkish interests at that port, and Mr. Consul-General Saunders has likewise reported to me that his French colleague will protect Turkish subjects at Corfu. The question was alluded to more than once in my presence by the Turkish Minister before his departure, but neither he nor the French Minister at this Court ever informed me that any arrangement had been definitively come to in this sense.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Athens, January 7, 1869.

P.S.—I inclose copies of the semi-official paper, the "Messager d'Athènes," which has appeared since this despatch was written, and which reflects in the most violent terms upon the conduct of M. Champoiseau, the French Consul at Canea.

I beg likewise to call your Lordship's attention to the leading article in this paper which declares very openly that the Conference at Paris will be unable to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Greece and Turkey.

I have further the honour to transmit a copy of a letter and of its inclosures which I have received this morning from Her Majesty's Consul at Syra.

E. M. E.

Inclosure 1 in No. 84.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

(Extract.)

Syra, January 2, 1869, 10 P.M.

YESTERDAY, after a great deal of trouble, the Nomarch succeeded in getting rid of the ex-volunteers by "Amphitrite" gone to Gythium, though Petropaulaki is still here. According to conditions, the arms of these people were to be, or might have been delivered to them on their landing on Greek territory, but Admiral Hobart had the consideration not to give the arms into their hands, but into the hands of the local authorities; had he given the arms to the men, there is no saying what disorders might not have occurred.

Up to to-day, only Admiral Hobart and one Turkish officer had been examined by the "Juge d'Instruction" on board the "Forbin;" both of these signed the questions put and the answers they gave, and each took notes of them. To-day the Captain of the "Izzedin" was examined, who can neither read nor write, and speaks only Turkish. His examination being finished before putting his finger or mark or seal to his answers, he requested copy of what he was required to sign; this was refused as being illegal, so Admiral Hobart objected to his signing at all, and the case is to be referred to Athens; had the man been able to write, he would himself have done as Admiral Hobart and the other, namely, take notes at the time; and as this was allowed to the others, Admiral Hobart thinks it hard that simply because the man cannot write, he should not have the same advantage as the others.

Admiral Hobart told me yesterday that some 250 more ex-volunteers would be coming here shortly from Crete; some 100 have remained here from the last batch (Petropoulaki's), but their arms have not been given to them. According to the reports of the Turkish officers, large sums in gold English sovereigns and French napoleons were divided among the Chiefs of those who last came with Petropoulaki; some of which has been spent here in the town.

January 3, 3·30 P.M.

While still on board, the Austrian Consul came and expressed his personal obligation as well as those of his countrymen, for the consideration shown by Admiral Hobart in not delivering the arms to the ex-volunteers when he landed them; he stayed some half-hour or more, and on landing was saluted with flag and guns by a frigate close to the flag-ship. Shortly after, the French Consul arrived, and expressed himself in a similar manner, and on leaving was also saluted in a similar way. On taking my leave, I begged to be excused the salute, but Admiral Hobart would hear of nothing of the kind, and I was saluted accordingly. It was on board that I learnt that the French Consul was charged with Ottoman interest here, by instruction from French Minister at Athens.

General opinion here is that the preliminary examination *in re* "Enosis" will find there is no case to send to trial. The piracy will be ignored altogether, the firing found to be in self-defence, under the alleged idea, too, that war might have been then already declared.

Inclosure 2 in No. 84.

Extracts from "L'Indépendance Hellénique" of January 7, 1869.

Inclosure 3 in No. 84.

Extracts from "Le Messager d'Athènes" of January 6, 1869.

Inclosure 5 in No. 84.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Syra, January 5, 1869, 5 P.M.

Sir,

At 5 P.M. yesterday the French Consul gave notice to the Nomarch that, according to the complaint Captain Meyer of the "Forbin" had received from Admiral Hobart, several bullets had been fired in the direction of the Turkish vessel "Ismalier" from a house which was subsequently indicated to the police-master; and the Nomarch promised to take the necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of the same.

At 7 P.M. I received a note from the Nomarch of 23rd December O.S., translation annexed, complaining of the Turkish boats circulating in the harbour, and at 8·30 P.M., a meeting was held in consequence at the French Consulate, where a note was drawn up and signed—copy inclosed, the Russian Consul refusing to sign it, as he considered it useless unless Admiral Hobart's attention was drawn as well to other subjects which we considered quite foreign to the purpose, and only calculated to do rather harm than good. The Belgian Consul, who is very old, and whom the present conjuncture has quite unnerved, also declined to sign it; and I was requested to take it on board the Turkish flag-ship, and give other verbal explanations.

At 10·30 A.M. this day I took the note on board, delivered the note and gave the explanations, and from what was elicited at the meeting yesterday evening, and from what Admiral Hobart told me, it would seem that the occasion complained of was the night of Sunday the 3rd, when the "Crete" left at 11 P.M. for Piræus, and whose departure the "Izzedin" had been ordered to watch. Both I and the Austrian Consul had repeatedly, since the formal accusation made by Admiral Hobart against the "Enosis" to the King's Attorney, urged the Nomarch to give an explicit declaration that "Enosis" is arrested and would not be allowed to leave Syra till the end of the legal proceedings, and this in order to enable Admiral Hobart to do away with, or relax this boat watch in the harbour, and thus do away with a cause of collision; but the Nomarch had always declined, as he said it was illegal, unnecessary, &c., and so late as yesterday afternoon he promised the Austrian Consul to do as requested, but in the above-mentioned note he is far from being as explicit on the subject as we wished; so at 3 P.M. to-day a meeting was held in my house, where a reply to the Nomarch, copy inclosed, was drawn up and signed, and taken by us to the Nomarch, calling upon him for an explicit declaration on the subject, which was more than ever to be desired now as the fêtes were approaching, when the danger would be greater from the abominable custom of the Greeks of discharging fire-arms. The Nomarch said he would take further information, reflect upon the matter, and reply later.

I should mention that early this morning, Admiral Hobart changed the position of some of his vessels, moving them further out from the shore, and I have no doubt if he can but obtain the declaration he wants, he will do everything he can to avoid a provocation from the Greeks.

Herewith is a copy of petition of the steam agents relative to the project of fortifying Syra.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. VINCENT LLOYD.

Inclosure 4 in No. 84.

M. Dracopoulo to the Consuls of the Friendly Powers.

Syra, December 23, 1868, O.S.

(Translation.)

AFTER my circular protest of $\frac{1}{13}$th instant addressed to you, I hoped, Mr. Consuls, at least, that the Turkish boats which are cruizing in the harbour, which I considered,

and still consider, most dangerous for the consequences, would, by your mediation, cease (to circulate), but unfortunately my hopes have been vain, as the evil continues; and that, too, after the judicial authority has received the accusation against the "Enosis," and ordered that the vessel do not go away.

As by this act of provocation I see a danger which I cannot prevent, as I explained by my said circular to you, and wishing to exhaust all the means in my power, I come again to say to you, Mr. Consuls, that the responsibility of what may happen does not certainly devolve upon the Greek authorities, which have done everything in their power to prevent it.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) G. R. DRACOPOULO.

Inclosure 6 in No. 84.

The Consuls at Syra to M. Dracopoulo.

Syra, le 4 Janvier, 1869.

NOUS, Soussignés, avons l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence pour les fins que de droit une note en date du $\frac{23 \text{ December, 1868}}{4 \text{ January, 1869}}$, que M. le Nomarque des Cyclades a bien voulu adresser à MM. les Consuls des Puissances amies de la Grèce.

Veuillez, &c
(Signé) HAHN.
CH. MEYSONNIER.
ST. VINCENT LLOYD.
CH. J. A. KLOEBE.
G. VACONDIO.
EMMANUEL SAPIENZACHI.
A. SALACHA.

Inclosure 7 in No. 84.

The Consuls at Syra to M. Dracopoulo.

Syra, le 5 Janvier, 1869.

M. le Nomarque,

LES Soussignés, vu l'urgence, se sont empressés de faire parvenir à son Excellence Hobart Pacha la circulaire que vous avez bien voulu leur adresser en date d'hier. Ils vous seraient très reconnaissants, M. le Nomarque, d'être assez bon pour répondre aux trois demandes suivantes, qui compléteraient votre communication, et leur permettraient de répondre aux questions qui leur ont été faites:—

1. Dans ce moment "l'Enosis" se trouve-t-il sous le séquestre judiciaire à la suite du procès intenté contre lui par son Excellence M. l'Amiral Hobart?

2. Ce séquestre sera-t-il maintenu jusqu'à la fin du procès?

3. Enfin "l'Enosis" est-il gardé par un détachement de la force publique? et son ancien équipage est-il licencié?

Les Soussignés, &c.

(Signé) HAHN.
CH. MEYSONNIER.
ST. VINCENT LLOYD.
CH. J. A. KLOEBE.
A. SALACHA.
G. VACONDIO.
EMMANUEL SAPIENZACHI.

Inclosure 8 in No. 84.

Declaration of Merchants at Syra against proposed Fortifications.

LES Soussignés, Représentants des intérêts considérables du commerce et de la navigation de l'étranger sur cette place, ayant appris qu'il existe un projet d'élever des

fortifications pour la protection du port, considèrent comme leur devoir d'exprimer leur opinion sur l'opportunité de cette mesure.

A première vue on reconnait que par suite de la position de la ville et de ses alentours il faudrait, pour les protéger efficacement contre une attaque du dehors, établir un système de fortifications extrêmement étendu dont l'exécution exigerait des sommes immenses et une longue suite d'années.

Il est donc hors de toute possibilité de mettre la place dans un état de défense suffisant, et tel que l'exigent les conjonctures qui semblent avoir donné naissance à l'idée précitée.

Par contre, des fortifications provisoires insuffisantes ne serviraient, dans le cas d'une guerre, qu'à exposer encore plus Syra, car la ville perdrait par là les avantages dont jouit, d'après le droit de guerre actuel, toute ville maritime ouverte, et enlèverait aux représentants des intérêts étrangers le droit de protester contre les dégâts qu'y causeraient un bombardement ou toute autre entreprise militaire, parce qu'on leur répondrait qu'ils n'ont qu'à s'en prendre à eux-mêmes, ayant placé leurs intérêts dans une place préparée spécialement pour une défense militaire, et devant par conséquent prévoir une attaque, et qu'ils auraient dû s'attendre à y rencontrer ce danger.

Il ne peut donc subsister aucun doute que Syra en sa qualité de ville ouverte est infiniment moins exposée aux dangers de guerre que si elle était garnie de fortifications insuffisantes, qui seraient les seules exécutables dans le moment.

On peut admettre avec certitude que tous les États qui ont des relations commerciales avec cette place y enverront dans le cas d'une guerre des bâtiments pour y protéger leurs intérêts, lesquels bâtiments garantiront bien mieux la place contre les dangers de la guerre si elle reste ouverte que les fortifications sans importance qu'on pourrait lui donner.

Les Soussignés saisissent cette occasion pour ajouter à leur opinion sur l'opportunité de fortifications autour de Syra l'idée que cette ville étant une des échelles principales de toutes les lignes de navigation à vapeur dans le Levant, il serait dans l'intérêt du commerce Européen que les Puissances qui y sont spécialement intéressées, comme l'Autriche, la Grande Bretagne, et la France, cherchassent à obtenir la complète neutralité de Syra dans le cas d'une guerre Turco-Hellénique, et qu'il ne serait pas difficile d'établir sous quelles conditions cette neutralité serait reconnue de la part des Puissances belligerantes.

Cette déclaration sera remise à MM. le Nomarque des Cyclades, le Démarque d'Hermopolis, le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, et à MM. les Consuls résidant ici, avec prière de bien vouloir s'intéresser pour l'exécution tant que ces conditions auraient trouvé leur approbation.

Syra, le $\frac{5}{17}$, Décembre, 1868.

(Signé) G. MARIAKICH, *Agent du Lloyd Autrichien, et des Chambres d'Assurance de Trieste, Genève, Napoli et Marseille.*

EMMANUEL SAPIENZACHI, *Agent for the British Steamers of Messrs. Seymour, Capper, and Co., of London; and Agent for the British Steamers of Mr. W. H. Dixon, of Liverpool.*

Z. P. NEGROPONTE, *Agent des Bateaux Anglais de MM. Dudels et Cie., Amsterdam.*

CH. KLOEBE AND Co., *Agents for Lloyds of London; and for British Steamers of Messrs. Smith, Sandius, and Co., of London; and for the British Steamers of Messrs. Kandipido and Theodum, of Glasgow; and Agent for the Belgian Steamers of Messrs. David, Verheit, and Co., at Antwerp; Agents della Società d'Assicurazioni Generali di Trieste.*

A. FALON, *Agent des Services Maritimes des Messageries Impériales de France.*

No. 85.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Athens, January 7*, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation of a Royal Ordinance promulgated yesterday authorizing the issue of Treasury notes to the amount

of 15,000,000 drachmas (535,714*l.*), which are made a legal tender throughout the kingdom in all monetary transactions, whether past or future.

This measure has created universal consternation amongst all persons in this country who have anything to lose, and the general manager of the Ionian Bank informs me that he cannot doubt that it will lead to an immediate run upon the Ionian Bank, the exhaustion of its stock of specie, and the consequent ruin of that establishment.

I have therefore the honour to request that your Lordship will inform me whether it may not be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to protest against the application to the Ionian Islands of a scheme which would appear to be a violation of Article VII of the Treaty of the 29th of March, 1864, between the three guaranteeing Powers and Greece.

I need scarcely add that the effects of this measure will be no less disastrous in this part of the kingdom than in the Ionian Islands, and the only hope of its being even temporarily defeated is that the National Bank may be terrified into the acceptance of some arrangement by which the Royal Ordinance in question may be withdrawn, and the bank may consent to a large additional issue of notes, on condition that the whole of its paper circulation shall be made a legal tender.

The Government, I understand, have proposed to the bank that it shall at once advance the sum of 4,000,000 drachmas in specie (142,857*l.*) and 6,000,000 in paper (214,285*l.*), in return for which assistance the bank would be allowed to issue 10,000,000 drachmas (357,142*l.*) worth of additional notes; whilst the whole paper circulation of the bank, which would thus be raised to about 33,000,000*l.* drachmas (1,178,571*l.*), would be made a legal tender.

Up to this moment the bank has declined to listen to this proposal, as it foresees, truly enough, that this would be merely a first step towards a far larger issue of paper, and that eventually the bank and the country will equally be involved in the financial ruin with which they are menaced by the scheme, of which a translation is herewith inclosed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 85.

Decree for the Issuing of Treasury Notes.

(Translation.)

GEORGE I, King of the Hellenes.

In accordance with Article 2 of the Law, No. 268, of the $\frac{12}{24}$ December, 1868, and on the advice of our Ministerial Council we have determined, and hereby decree:

Article 1. The Government shall issue throughout the kingdom public Treasury notes having forced circulation to the amount of 15,000,000 drachmas. The notes shall be issued as may be required by the Public Treasury in notes of 1,000, 100, 20, and 10 drachmas each.

Art. 2. The notes are issued with the signature of the Minister of Finance, countersigned by the Presidents of the Areopagus, of the Court of Accounts, of the Court of Appeal, and by the Director of the Audit Office.

The signature of the Minister may be affixed by a seal.

At the end of each month the above mentioned Commission shall publish in three different unofficial newspapers at least, a short statement of the notes in circulation.

Art. 3. Besides the other distinguishing signs each note shall bear the white seal affixed to the stamp paper in the National Stamp Office.

The colour of the paper for the aforesaid notes shall for the present be as follows:—

For the 1,000 drachmas, purple; for the 100 drachmas, blue; for the 20 drachmas, pale yellow; for the 10 drachmas, green.

The paper required shall provisionally be taken from that appropriated to the service of postage stamps, in accordance with the enactments of the Royal Decree of August 16, 1861.

Art. 4. From the publication of the present Decree the notes issued in accordance with its provisions shall be given and received compulsorily as cash to their full nominal value by all the public Treasuries without exception, whether in payment or in receipt, likewise by private persons, banks, societies, and bodies of every description, and without reference to any agreement whatever, past, present, or future.

Art. 5. As security to the holders of the notes that shall be issued in conformity with the present Decree, all the fisheries and salt-pans of the kingdom are considered as mortgaged.

Art. 6. A special Royal Decree shall regulate the execution of the present.

Our Minister of Finance is charged with the publication and execution of the present Decree.

Athens, December 28, 1868 / January 9, 1869.

(Signed) GEORGE.

(Signed) D. Bulgaris.
P. Delyanni.
M. Kanaris.
S. Milios.
A. Mavromichali.
G. Antonopoulos.

No. 87.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 7.)

Athens, January 7, 1869.

My Lord,

ON the receipt of Mr. Elliot's telegram to your Lordship of the 4th instant, stating the conditions on which the Porte is prepared to modify its original decision with reference to the expulsion of all Hellenic subjects from Turkey, I thought it advisable to acquaint M. Delyanni with the substance of that communication, in the hope that it might have a conciliatory effect upon the Greek Government, and induce them to acquiesce more readily in the pacific course advised by Her Majesty's Government pending the result of the approaching Conference at Paris, but I regret to say that M. Delyanni is far from considering that the Porte has made any concession in this matter which would be acceptable to Greece; and I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a private note which he has addressed to me, indignantly repudiating any such arrangement as that which appears to be contemplated by the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 87.

M. Delyanni to Mr. Erskine.

(Particulière.)

Athènes, le 25 Décembre / 6 Janvier, 1868.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI reçu hier au soir la lettre particulière que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire pour m'annoncer qu'un télégramme de M. l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople vous notifie les nouvelles conditions auxquelles la Porte Ottomane a assujetti les sujets Hellènes dans ses Etats pendant l'interruption de ses relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec la Grèce.

Permettez-moi de vous dire franchement, moi qui suis resté plus de trois ans à Constantinople en qualité de Représentant de mon Souverain, que ces nouvelles conditions si elles ont quelque importance c'est pour leur mauvais côté pour nous. En permettant aux sujets Hellènes dont la nationalité est incontestée de rester dans ses Etats sous la sauvegarde des lois Ottomanes et aussi longtemps qu'ils se conduiront paisiblement, et en disant que ceux qu'elle qualifie de sujets Ottomans ayant obtenu la protection Hellénique ne seront pas inquiétés au cas où ils consentiraient à reprendre leur nationalité primitive, la Porte, au lieu d'apporter un adoucissement, comme vous dites et le croyez évidemment, M. le Ministre, met ainsi le comble à cet esprit d'hostilité qui s'est emparé si soudainement et si étrangement d'elle envers les Hellènes. Qui jugera si la nationalité de tel ou tel sujet Hellène est incontestée? La Porte évidemment à Constantinople et ses autorités dans les provinces. Elle sera donc juge et partie dans cette cause d'une extrême importance. Elle est si sérieuse et si difficile cette affaire que Aali Pacha a reconnu avec moi qu'il n'appartenait pas à la Porte seule de la terminer, et, pour cette raison, en sa qualité de Grand Vizir, il a envoyé en 1865, sur ma demande, une circulaire à tous les Gouvernements de l'Empire, les enjoignant de ne pas se mêler de cette question et d'admettre provisoirement les passeports et autres titres Helléniques attestant la nationalité des individus se présentant en Turquie comme sujets Hellènes, en attendant que les deux Gouvernements trouvent le moyen de régler cette question par une Convention.

Il n'y a pas en Turquie de sujets Ottomans ayant obtenu la protection Hellénique. Il y a longtemps que de pareilles protections étrangères de sujets Ottomans n'ont plus lieu. Mais la Porte avait soulevé à notre égard la prétention de considérer comme ses sujets, des sujets ayant l'indigénat Hellénique par cela seulement qu'ils avaient vu le jour dans son Empire. Mais nous n'avons jamais reconnu une pareille prétention, contraire à nos lois et à l'exemple patent d'une foule d'individus nés en Turquie, et pourtant reconnus par la Porte elle-même comme sujets Français, Russes, Autrichiens, Italiens, &c. &c. Ainsi la Porte croie que le moment est favorable pour elle n'ayant aucun contradicteur et les sujets Hellènes restant sans protection étrangère, la seule efficace contre les lois ou plutôt contre l'arbitraire Ottoman, pour forcer les milliers de sujets Hellènes en Turquie de devenir ses rayas.

Mais elle se trompe à cet égard, comme en plusieurs autres. Nous ne reconnaîtrons jamais ces conversions imposées par les mauvais traitements, par la crainte ou toute autre pression morale. S'il y a reprise de relations entre les deux Etats, une des premières choses que nous demanderons, ce sera l'annulation de tout acte pareil affectant un Hellène quelconque en Turquie, des indemnités pour tous mauvais traitements, et la garantie des Puissances pour chaque cas à l'avenir arbitraire de la Porte et de ses autorités tendant à traiter dans la pratique un sujet Hellène autrement que tout autre sujet étranger.

(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

No. 89.

Mr. Thornton to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No 3. Confidential.)

Washington, January 4, 1869.

My Lord,

MY Turkish colleague, Blacque Bey, received a telegram on the morning of the 20th ultimo from his Government, informing him that they had learnt that the Greek Minister at Constantinople, before leaving that capital, had requested the American Minister, Mr. Morris, to take under his protection all the Greek subjects residing in Turkey, and instructing him to express to the United States' Government their hope that such instructions would be sent to Mr. Morris as would prevent him from undertaking the charge in question; for if not, the Government of the Porte would be obliged to refuse in the most peremptory manner to recognize such a proceeding.

Mr. Seward being at the time absent at his country place of Auburn, Blacque Bey gave a copy of the telegram to Mr. Frederic Seward, Assistant Secretary of State, requesting him to telegraph it to his father to Auburn, and pointing out to him the expediency of sending out to Mr. Joy Morris instructions of the nature suggested by the Government of the Porte.

The message was sent to Auburn, and Mr. Seward replied that he would return to Washington on the 29th ultimo. On his arrival here, Mr. Seward found a telegram from Mr. Joy Morris, stating that the Greek Minister had requested him to grant his protection to the interests of Greek subjects in Turkey, and asking for instructions on the subject.

A Cabinet meeting was held here on the 30th ultimo, at which the question was discussed, and it was decided that a telegram should be sent to Mr. Morris, instructing him to be guided by previous instructions with regard to the protection of Greek subjects residing in Turkey, and, with regard to their interests, his Government had no objection that Mr. Morris should use his good offices in their favour, but on no account without the consent of both the Greek and Turkish Governments. Further, he was in no way to commit his Government as to their policy in the East.

The previous instructions alluded to in the proposed telegram were sent to Mr. Morris from eight to ten months ago, when it had happened that a Greek subject in Crete, who was United States' Vice-Consul under Mr. Stillman, had been expelled from the island on a charge of having aided and encouraged the insurgents. His part was taken up warmly by Mr. Morris: he returned to Crete, and was protected by Mr. Morris; on that occasion the United States' Government instructed him to be cautious not to commit his Government upon such a subject, and to beware of granting protection to anyone for the future except American citizens.

Mr. Seward was unwilling to see Blacque Bey at the time, lest the public should imagine that the telegram about to be sent to Mr. Morris had been decided upon under pressure from the Turkish Government: he felt, however, that he ought to communicate the substance of the message to Blacque Bey: he therefore sent for my French colleague, M. Berthemy, and begged him to acquaint the Turkish Minister with what had been

done. M. Berthemy having heard the nature of the message which was about to be sent to Mr. Morris, submitted to Mr. Seward that it was of great importance that it should reach its destination without becoming known; and as it was supposed that a Conference was about to be held upon the Eastern question, there would be no harm if the instruction should not reach Mr. Morris until that Conference should have concluded its labours, and that it might therefore be more desirable that the instruction should be sent in a despatch by the regular mail. Mr. Seward agreed to this suggestion, and sent off his despatch on the 1st instant.

Blacque Bey communicated the substance of it to his Government, by telegraph, on the afternoon of the 31st ultimo.

On my return to Washington from New York, on the morning of the same day, Mr. Seward, M. Berthemy, and Blacque Bey informed me of what had taken place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

No. 90.

Mr. Thornton to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)
Washington, January 4, 1869.

My Lord,

MY Turkish colleague, Blacque Bey, has informed me confidentially that he received a few days ago a telegram from his Government stating that they had learnt that the Greek Government were negotiating the purchase from that of the United States of two monitors, and instructing him to express the hope of the Porte that the United States' Government would observe the rules of neutrality in this case.

Blacque Bey, knowing that the United States' Government would not have entered upon such a transaction directly with another Government, but would do it through a third person, in complying with the instruction, spoke of the purchase as being negotiated in the United States. Mr. Seward has, however, assured him that there is no truth in the report.

Blacque Bey has also been convinced, from information obtained from other persons, that the only two monitors of those which the Government were empowered to sell, and which were at all in a seaworthy state, were those which were lately sold to the Peruvian Government; it is doubted whether even these will ever reach their destination.

My Turkish colleague has also telegraphed to the Consuls at the different ports of this country, instructing them to inquire whether two such vessels may be in course of construction at any private ship-building yards, and has promised to inform me of the result of these inquiries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

No. 91.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16, 3:15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)
Athens, January 11, 1869, 6·20 P.M.

M. VALAORITIS has accepted office of Finance Minister. Under great pressure, loan of 21,000,000 drachmas has been extorted from National and Ionian Banks on condition that Ordinance authorizing issue of 15,000,000 of inconvertible paper shall be withdrawn, and the notes of both banks declared a legal tender. Pray inform Ionian Bank, whose share will be 2,000,000 in cash and 5,000,000 in paper.

No. 92.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 75. Confidential.)
Paris, January 15, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, the Protocol of the first sitting of the Conference on the differences between Turkey and Greece, which was held at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 9th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 92.

Protocol (No. 1) of Conference held at Paris, January 9, 1869.

Présents:

M. le Prince de Metternich, Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie;
M. le Marquis de Lavalette, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, Membre du Conseil Privé, Sénateur de l'Empire;
Lord Lyons, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire du Royaume-Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande;
M. le Chevalier Nigra, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire d'Italie;
M. le Comte de Solms, Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la Prusse et de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord;
M. l'Aide-de-Camp Général Comte de Stackelberg, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Russie;
Mehemet Djemil Pacha, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de Turquie;
M. Desprez, Directeur des Affaires Politiques au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Secrétaire de la Conférence.

LES Puissances Signataires du Traité du 30 Mars, 1856, après s'être entendues pour rechercher en commun, et conformément au Protocole du 14 Avril suivant, les moyens d'aplanir le différend survenu entre la Turquie et la Grèce, ont autorisé leur Représentants à Paris à se réunir en Conférence.

Les Plénipotentiaires se sont assemblés aujourd'hui à l'Hôtel du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, et ont confié la Présidence de leur travaux à M. le Marquis de Lavalette, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, Membre de son Conseil Privé, Sénateur de l'Empire. Sur sa proposition, la Conférence a désigné pour Secrétaire M. Desprez, Conseiller d'Etat, Directeur au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

Les pleins pouvoirs ont été vérifiés et trouvés en bonne et due forme.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France a ouvert la délibération en constatant l'esprit de conciliation dont tous les Cabinets se sont montrés animés dans les pourparlers qui ont préparé la réunion de la Conférence. Il a rappelé qu'i, d'après l'entente établie le but unique et précis tracé aux Plénipotentiaires était d'examiner dans quelle mesure il y avait lieu de faire droit aux réclamations formulées dans l'ultimatum adressé par la Turquie au Gouvernement Hellénique.

L'on avait jugé équitable que la Grèce fût entendue, et, par le même accord qui avait circonscrit la mission de la Conférence, il avait été convenu que le Représentant du Gouvernement Hellénique y serait appelé avec voix consultative.

La discussion s'est engagée sur une difficulté née à ce sujet au moment même où la séance allait s'ouvrir. M. le Ministre de Grèce, averti de l'heure de la réunion au sein de laquelle il devait siéger aussitôt qu'elle serait constituée, venait d'annoncer à M. le Marquis de Lavalette que, d'après des instructions reçues dans la matinée, il n'était pas autorisé à assister aux délibérations, s'il n'y était admis sur un pied d'égalité complète avec M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie.

M. Rangabé ayant été introduit, sur la demande de M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie, pour présenter lui-même ses explications, a donné lecture d'une note conçue en ce sens et déclarant qu'il avait ordre de se retirer s'il n'était pas fait droit à sa réclamation.

Les Plénipotentiaires n'ont pas cru devoir accepter la participation de M. le Ministre de Grèce dans les conditions qu'il avait pour instructions d'y mettre, et ils ont été

unanimes pour exprimer la surprise et les regrets que la communication qu'ils venaient d'entendre était de nature à leur causer.

En effet, le Gouvernement Hellénique aurait eu tout le temps nécessaire pour formuler ses objections avant le moment présent s'il avait jugé à propos d'en produire.

La Conférence a été instituée entre les Puissances signataires du Traité de Paris et suivant l'esprit du Protocole du 14 Avril, 1856. La Grèce n'a pas été partie contractante dans les grandes transactions de cette époque. C'est par cette unique raison, a dit M. le Plénipotentiaire de France, et non dans la pensée de méconnaître sa situation, sa dignité, ou ses droits, qu'elle n'a pas été invitée au même titre que la Turquie.

Reconnissant la grave responsabilité que le Gouvernement Hellénique assumerait s'il persistait dans la résolution inattendue de s'abstenir, la Conférence a décidé que le Président, au nom de tous et avec l'appui des autres Cours, ferait une démarche auprès du Cabinet d'Athènes pour l'engager instamment à revenir sur une détermination de nature à compromettre l'œuvre conciliatrice proposée à leurs efforts. Il a été également entendu que M. le Ministre de Grèce à Paris serait instruit de cette décision.

Tout en blâmant la forme dans laquelle a été introduite la réclamation du Gouvernement Hellénique, M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie a cru devoir établir que, pour le fond, elle lui semblait conforme à la justice, et il a rappelé qu'elle coïncidait avec le point de vue qu'il avait été chargé de faire prévaloir à l'origine.

M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie a fait observer que ce serait altérer le caractère et les bases de la délibération acceptée par toutes les Puissances que de modifier une des conditions expressément stipulées et sans lesquelles la Sublime Porte signataire du Traité du 30 Mars, 1856, n'aurait pas pu adhérer à la convocation de la Conférence.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France a reconnu que l'accord ne s'était pas établi immédiatement sur le rôle qui serait attribué au Gouvernement Hellénique, et que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg avait, dans le principe, exprimé le désir de voir la position de la Grèce assimilée entièrement à celle de la Turquie. Mais il n'en était pas moins vrai que le dissentiment sur ce point avait été écarté, et que les Cabinets, dans un intérêt de conciliation, avaient unanimement consenti à ce que la Grèce fût admise, à titre consultatif.

La discussion étant close sur cet incident, les Plénipotentiaires ont pensé qu'il y avait lieu d'informer immédiatement la Turquie et la Grèce de la constitution de la Conférence. Ils ont été en même temps d'avis, en raison de l'urgence, d'inviter sans retard les deux Gouvernements à ne rien changer au *statu quo* actuel, et à s'abstenir de toute mesure pouvant avoir pour effet d'entraver la mission des Puissances par la pression des événements extérieurs.

M. le Président de la Conférence a proposé, pour réaliser cette pensée, de faire parvenir à la Sublime Porte et au Cabinet Hellénique la dépêche télégraphique suivante dont la rédaction a été adoptée :—

"Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours signataires du Traité de Paris réunis pour rechercher les moyens d'apaiser le différend qui s'est élevé entre la Turquie et la Grèce, accomplissent un premier devoir en faisant connaître aux deux parties intéressées que la Conférence s'est constituée aujourd'hui."

Les réclamations formulées dans l'ultimatum remis par le Ministre de Turquie à Athènes au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce se trouvant dès à présent soumises à leur examen, les Puissances ont la persuasion que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan et celui de Sa Majesté Hellénique s'interdiront scrupuleusement tout ce qui serait de nature, en modifiant le *statu quo*, à rendre plus difficile la tâche qu'elles ont acceptée. Elles n'hésitent donc pas à faire appel à la modération de la Sublime Porte, et à lui demander de suspendre jusqu'à la clôture des travaux de la Conférence l'exécution des mesures comminatoires annoncées dans son ultimatum du 11 Décembre, 1868. Elles croient devoir inviter en même temps le Gouvernement Hellénique à prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour empêcher sur son territoire toute manifestation hostile ou toute expédition armée, par terre ou par mer, qui pourrait faire naître un conflit avec les forces ottomanes.

Selon le vœu qui lui a été exprimé, M. le Marquis de Lavalette s'est chargé de porter cette Déclaration collective à la connaissance de la Turquie et de la Grèce par l'entremise de l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français à Constantinople, et de son Ministre à Athènes. Les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche, Hongrie, de la Grande Bretagne, de l'Italie, de la Prusse, et de la Russie, se sont engagés à demander par le télégraphe à leurs Cours d'appuyer la démarche de la France ; et, après avoir pourvu ainsi aux mesures conservatoires qu'il lui appartenait de prendre pour prévenir, autant qu'il

dépend d'elle, toute chance de complication jusqu'à l'accomplissement de sa tâche, la Conférence s'est ajournée au 12 Janvier.

Fait à Paris, le neuf Janvier, mil huit cent soixante-neuf.

(Suivent les signatures.)

No. 93.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 76.) *Paris, January 15, 1869.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of four papers relating to the Turco-Greek question. These papers are :—

1. M. Riza Rangabé's letter to the President of the Conference, stating that he can only take part in its deliberations on a footing of entire equality with the Turkish Plenipotentiary.

2. The telegram addressed by the French Ambassador at Constantinople to M. de Lavalette in reply to that dispatched to him by the latter, embodying the Resolutions arrived at in the first sitting of the Conference.

3. A telegram of the 12th instant addressed by M. de Lavalette to the French Ambassador at Constantinople insisting in the name of the Conference on the maintenance of the *status quo*, &c., during the continuance of its deliberations.

4. Telegram of the 13th instant from the French Ambassador at Constantinople, in reply to the above, stating that the Grand Vizier engages for the present to maintain the *status quo*.

All these papers have been at different times alluded to in the Conference ; and, as mention of them will no doubt appear in the Protocols, I think it advisable to furnish your Lordship with copies of them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 93.

M. Rangabé to the President of the Conference.

M. le Président,

JE regrette infiniment de ne pouvoir me rendre à l'invitation que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser d'assister aux séances de la Conférence avec voix consultative.

L'objet de la Conférence étant de traiter d'un différend qui s'est élevé entre la Grèce et la Turquie, la Grèce ne peut y participer si elle n'y figure à titre de parité avec la partie adverse. Elle ne peut accepter une position d'infériorité.

Si des deux Puissances en litige, l'une est appelée à siéger dans la Conférence à titre de Grande Puissance, la Grèce, sans vouloir s'appesantir sur cette appréciation, ne peut pas admettre que les Grandes Puissances aient seules le droit d'avoir dans leurs propres causes une voix qui serait refusée à leurs adversaires.

Si c'est à titre de signataire du Traité de 1856 que la Turquie est admise à la Conférence et que la Grèce en est exclue, je dois faire observer que l'incident spécial auquel la Conférence se propose de borner ses travaux est entièrement étranger aux stipulations de ce Traité, qui, étant pris pour base de la composition de la Conférence, a le grand inconvénient de faire une part inégale aux deux Parties également intéressées qui mettent en avant des griefs mutuels.

Que la Conférence ait en vue une œuvre d'arbitrage ou de conciliation, la Grèce ne doit, dans l'un ou l'autre cas, y assister qu'à titre égal avec la Turquie.

C'est avec confiance dans les sentiments d'équité des Membres de la Conférence que j'ai l'honneur de leur soumettre cette réclamation. Dans le cas où la Conférence ne croirait point devoir y faire droit, j'ai l'ordre de me retirer et de ne pas participer à ses délibérations.

(Signé) RANGABE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 93.

M. Bourée to M. de Lavalette.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 11 Janvier*, 1869.

J'AI remis à la Porte ainsi qu'aux Représentants des Puissances votre télégramme du 9. Il résulte de la réponse que m'a fait Aali Pacha que les modifications récentes dont les mesures decrétées à la suite de l'ultimatum ont été l'objet prouvaient assez la modération du Gouvernement Ottoman; il m'a en outre renouvelé l'assurance que ce dernier éviterait soigneusement tout ce qui serait de nature à embarrasser les travaux de la Conférence. D'après le Grand Vizir, les mesures d'expulsion s'appliquaient uniquement aux Grecs en petit nombre dont la présence sur le territoire Turc offre un danger pour la tranquillité publique; quant aux Grecs nés en Turquie et soi-disant naturalisés par des passeports obtenus à prix d'argent, la mesure qui les concerne a coincidé avec la rupture, mais elle n'en est pas la conséquence: l'intention de la Porte était de la maintenir même après la reprise des relations et de ne reconnaître à ses sujets pendant leur séjour en Turquie que la nationalité Ottomane. Il a ajouté que, d'ailleurs, même pour les individus de cette catégorie, les autorités Ottomanes ont reçu d'ordre de ne pas procéder par expulsion immédiate, mais au moyen de listes qu'elles devront soumettre à l'examen de la Porte, ce qui entraine un délai de plusieurs mois. Pour ce qui est de l'interdiction des ports Ottomans au pavillon Grec, cette mesure, d'après la déclaration du Grand Vizir, ne saurait être rapportée par la Porte avant que celle-ci ne connût le résultat des travaux de la Conférence. Aali Pasha m'a dit encore qu'il avait répondu au Général Ignatieff, qui lui demandait l'éloignement d'Hobart Pacha, que ce dernier ne bloquait pas réellement Syra, dont l'entrée et la sortie restaient libres, mais seulement un pirate refugié dans ce port; si le Gouvernement Grec s'engageait formellement vis-à-vis des Puissances à empêcher la sortie de "l'Enosis" jusqu'à jugement de la Conférence, la Porte enverrait immédiatement à l'Amiral Turc l'ordre de s'éloigner des eaux de la Grèce.

Inclosure 3 in No. 93.

M. de Lavalette to M. Bourée.

(Télégraphique.) *Paris, le 12 Janvier*, 1869.

VOTRE telegramme d'hier soir entre dans des détails qui ne me permettent guère d'en préciser la portée. La règle constante appliquée dans toutes les Conférences ou les Congrès est le maintien du *statu quo*, c'est-à-dire, l'abstention de tout acte d'exécution pendant les délibérations. J'insiste au nom de tous les membres de la Conférence pour obtenir l'assentiment pur et simple au maintien du *statu quo*, et à ce qu'aucune expulsion de sujets Grecs ne soit exécutée.

Nous allons télégraphier à Athènes pour obtenir un engagement à l'égard de "l'Enosis."

Repondez-moi de suite.

Inclosure 4 in No. 93.

M. Bourée to M. de Lavalette.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 13 Janvier*, 1869.

JE me suis acquitté vis-à-vis d'Aali Pacha de la démarche prescrite par votre dépêche télégraphique en date d'hier. Le Grand Vizir s'engage à maintenir le *statu quo*, en ce sens qu'aucun sujet Grec ne sera expulsé jusqu'à la fin de la Conférence; le droit d'expulsion que la Porte s'est réservé s'applique uniquement dans sa pensée aux gens dangereux, et n'est que la conséquence du droit qu'a tout Gouvernement de maintenir la tranquillité publique. Aali Pacha ne pense pas qu'il y ait lieu en ce moment à procéder à aucune expulsion; mais on ne peut empêcher les Hellènes de quitter volontairement le territoire de l'Empire. La Porte est prête d'ailleurs à s'interdire tout acte qui serait de nature à embarrasser les travaux de la Conférence.

No. 94.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 77.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 15*, 1869.

I SAW the Marquis de Lavalette yesterday, and had some further conversation with him on the subject on which we had so often spoken, the admission of Greece to the Conference.

I observed that, as his Excellency was well aware, Her Majesty's Government had all along been of opinion that the best plan would be, if possible, to admit a Greek Representative on the same terms as the Plenipotentiaries of the other Powers. I added, that even now, at the last hour, and after all that had occurred, Her Majesty's Government would gladly see this plan adopted.

M. de Lavalette replied that the Government of the Emperor had also been of opinion that to admit Greece with a "voix délibérative" would abstractedly be the most desirable arrangement. But it was not a question of what was desirable, but of what was possible. Now, it would have been perfectly impossible to induce the Porte to take part if a Greek Representative had been made a member of the body. I knew how distasteful the whole question of a Conference had been to Turkey—how arduous had been the task of overcoming her objections, even to the present arrangement. He had carried a great point when he brought Turkey on the one hand, and Russia on the other, to agree to the admission of Greece "à titre consultatif." No compromise more favourable to Greece could possibly have been effected, and she herself had allowed it to be believed that she accepted it. She had, indeed, at the last moment positively rejected it; but this had certainly made no change favourable to her in the determination of the Porte. I was acquainted with the decided language of the Turkish Plenipotentiary before the Conference. I had heard him declare in the Conference that he must withdraw at once, if the Greek Plenipotentiary were admitted on any other terms than those on the faith of which the Porte had agreed to take part in the proceedings.

After much consultation with M. de Lavalette, I was obliged to admit that there was, in fact, no reasonable hope of prevailing upon the Porte to yield, and that the effect of insisting upon the admission of Greece, "à titre délibératif," would be the withdrawal of the Turkish Plenipotentiary and consequent breaking up of the Conference.

It became evident, therefore, that the only way to prevent a total failure was to agree to go on without a Greek Representative. I pointed out to M. de Lavalette that in this case we ought still to give Greece every means in our power to communicate to us any statements she desired to put forward, and should even give her an opportunity of making observations on our decisions.

M. de Lavalette said he would go as far as he could in agreeing to any proposals which I might make in the Conference for this purpose. He sincerely regretted that it was impossible, without breaking up the Conference altogether, to agree to the recommendation to admit a Greek Plenipotentiary "à titre délibératif."

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 95.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

(Telegraphic) *Paris, January 16*, 1869, 12·30 P.M.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 11th, and to your despatch No. 67, do you (taking "armements" to mean not "arming," but simply "fitting-out"), object to the passage in the second paragraph, which runs as follows:—"nor that vessels shall be fitted-out in its ports to attack a neighbouring State?"

The passage in the fourth paragraph, as amended by the Conference yesterday, runs as follows:—"Shall abstain from favouring or tolerating, first, the formation on its territory of any band, with view to an aggression against Turkey; secondly, the fitting-out in its ports of vessels destined to succour, in whatever form, any attempt at insurrection in the possessions of the Sultan."

Would you approve this passage if I could obtain the substitution of a phrase signifying "arming" for the expression "fitting-out?"

No. 96.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 16.)

Paris, January 16, 1869, 12·38 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

WOULD you approve the fourth paragraph, as recited in my telegram of noon to-day, if the phrase "equipment of armed vessels" were substituted for "fitting-out of vessels?"

I am sure that the words "s'armer" in the paragraph can only mean "to arm themselves."

Pray answer by telegram as soon as possible.

No. 97.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 72.)

Foreign Office, January 16, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your telegram of last night, calling my attention to the precise meaning attached to the word "armement" in the French language, as signifying, when applied to a ship, not "arming," but simply "fitting-out," and being in that sense applicable to the fitting-out of any ordinary merchant-vessel.

I immediately called the attention of the Attorney-General, the only one of the Law Officers with whom there was time for me to communicate, to the point to which you alluded; and I was enabled by him to inform you, by telegraph—I trust in sufficient time for your information before the meeting of the Conference—that the Law Officers understood the word "armements," as used in your despatch No. 62 of the instant, to include "arming," though not to be confined to it.

The opinion of the Law Officers does not, however, appear to have turned on that point, and therefore it is not necessary to dwell upon it. But the Attorney-General has informed me that, in his opinion, if the word "armement" means "equipment" only, it would still be the duty of a neutral not to "permit" it, and that, consequently, there was no reason to object to the words which the Marquis de Lavalette proposed to employ.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 98.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 73.)

Foreign Office, January 16, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your two telegrams of to-day, one dated noon, the other 12·38 P.M.

You inquired in the first whether Her Majesty's Government had any objection to the passage in the second paragraph of M. de Lavalette's proposed Declaration, which states, "ni que des bâtiments s'arment dans ses ports pour attaquer un Etat voisin."

I informed you in my despatch No. 67 of yesterday, that although Her Majesty's Government considered the original version of that passage given in your despatch No. 62 of the 13th instant to be much preferable, they would not insist upon it, if the other Powers agreed to M. de Lavalette's new version.

I now state to you, in specific terms, in answer to your telegram, that Her Majesty's Government agree to the passage as therein set forth being adopted in the second paragraph.

The latter part of the second paragraph in your first telegram, I consider to be superseded by your second telegram, in which you request to be informed whether Her Majesty's Government would approve of the fourth paragraph, if the words "equipment of armed vessels" were substituted for "the fitting-out of vessels."

I acquainted you, in my despatch No. 67 of yesterday above referred to, that you might agree to the Declaration inclosed in your despatch No. 63, even if you could not obtain the alteration in it to which I alluded.

I have, therefore, only now to state to you, that Her Majesty's Government approve

of the substitution in the passage of the fourth paragraph of the words "equipment of armed vessels," for "the fitting-out of vessels."

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 99.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 75.)

Foreign Office, January 16, 1869.

My Lord,

BARON BRUNNOW called upon me this afternoon, to say that the Emperor had authorized Count Stackelberg to sign the Declaration of the Conference; and that the Russian Ministers at Constantinople and at Athens would be instructed to support it.

I asked Baron Brunnow if the Declaration had been finally agreed to by the Conference, and whether its precise terms were known at St. Petersburgh.

His Excellency said, he had no further information on the subject, and had only been instructed to make known to me that the Declaration would be signed by the Russian Plenipotentiary at the Conference.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 100.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 82.)

Paris, January 16, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship a copy of Protocol No. II of the sitting of the Conference on the differences between Turkey and Greece, which was held on the 12th instant, at the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Protocol (No. 2) of Conference held at Paris, January 12, 1869.

Présents:

MM. les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche-Hongrie;
" " de la France;
" " de la Grande Bretagne;
" " de l'Italie;
" " de la Prusse et de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord;
" " de la Russie;
" " de la Turquie;
Le Secrétaire de la Conférence.

LE Protocole de la précédente séance est lu et approuvé.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France annonce que, suivant le vœu exprimé dans la première réunion, la Déclaration collective adoptée à l'effet de demander à la Turquie et à la Grèce le maintien du *statu quo*, a été immédiatement expédiée par le télégraphe à l'issue des délibérations.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette donne ensuite communication de la dépêche télégraphique adressée par lui à Athènes, conformément au Protocole dont elle reproduit les termes essentiels, afin d'inviter la Grèce, au nom de la Conférence, à revenir sur la détermination annoncé par son Ministre à Paris.

Sur la demande de M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie, il est convenu que cette dépêche sera annexée au Protocole de la présente séance.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette constate qu'il n'a encore reçu aucune réponse ni de Constantinople ni d'Athènes, et que rien jusqu'ici ne fait prévoir la détermination du Gouvernement Hellénique. Chargé de l'exécution des résolutions communes, le

Président de la Conférence n'avait pas cru pouvoir prendre sur lui de différer la réunion fixée pour aujourd'hui; mais, dans l'état des choses, il est disposé à ne pas insister pour que la discussion s'ouvre dès à présent sur les questions que la Conférence est appelée à examiner, et il pense que la délibération pourrait être ajournée au 14 Janvier.

M. le Comte de Stackelberg remercie M. le Plénipotentiaire de France de cette proposition, en ajoutant que l'absence d'un Représentant de la Grèce modifierait le caractère de la Conférence et ne pourrait être considérée par lui comme indifférente pour la suite des délibérations.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France déclare qu'il est prêt à faire tout ce qui sera d'accord avec son devoir; mais qu'il croirait difficile de subordonner entièrement l'œuvre commune à la réponse du Gouvernement Hellénique. Il pris donc ses collègues d'envisager l'hypothèse d'un refus de la part du Cabinet d'Athènes, et de consulter leurs Cours sur la question de savoir quel parti la Conférence aurait à prendre dans cette éventualité.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Angleterre exprime l'espoir que la détermination de la Grèce sera conforme au vœu qui lui a été transmis.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette désire vivement que cet espoir se réalise; mais il juge essentiel que, dans le cas contraire, chacun des Plénipotentiaires puisse faire connaître l'opinion de son Gouvernement sur la situation et décider de la suite à donner aux travaux de la Conférence.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie déclare qu'il regarde également comme nécessaire que tous les Représentants des Puissances prennent sans retard les ordres de leurs Cours.

Cet avis est unanimement adopté, et la prochaine séance demeure fixée au 14 Janvier, suivant la proposition de M. le Président de la Conférence.

Fait à Paris, le 12 Janvier, 1869.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Annex to Protocol of January 12, 1869.

M. de Lavalette to Baron Baude.

(Télégraphique.) *Paris, le 10 Janvier, 1869.*

CONTRAIREMENT à l'attente de tous les Plénipotentiaires, M. Rangabé est venu me faire savoir, au moment même où allait avoir lieu la première réunion de la Conférence, qu'il n'était pas autorisé à assister aux délibérations s'il n'y était appelé sur un pied d'égalité avec l'Ambassadeur de Turquie. Admis à présenter lui-mêmes es explications, il a confirmé la communication verbale qu'il venait de me faire, en donnant lecture d'une note signé de lui.

Ainsi que le déclare le procès-verbal de la première séance, la Conférence a été instituée entre les Cours signataires du Traité de Paris, et en vertu du Protocole du 14 Avril, 1856. C'est par cette unique raison, et non dans la pensée de méconnaitre la situation, la dignité ou les droits de la Grèce, que son Représentant a été appelé à y figurer à titre consultatif. Les Plénipotentiaires sont tombés d'accord pour reconnaitre la grave responsabilité qui incomberait au Gouvernement Hellénique s'il persistait dans la résolution inattendu de s'abstenir; et ils ont décidé que le Président, au nom de la Conférence, inviterait le Cabinet d'Athènes à revenir sur une détermination de nature à compromettre l'œuvre de conciliation proposée à leurs efforts. Il a été convenu que les autres Cabinets appuieriient cette démarche. Transmettez-moi, dans le plus bref délai possible, la réponse du Gouvernement Grec.

(Signé) LAVALETTE

No. 101.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1869, 10 P.M.*

ADVISE Aali Pasha on no account to reject Declaration of Conference, without hearing from Her Majesty's Government.

No. 102.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 5.) *St. Petersburgh, January 11, 1869.*

My Lord,

I RECEIVED this morning your Lordship's telegram of yesterday's date, relative to alleged attempts of Russian agents in Servia to induce the Regency to take part in a general insurrection of the Christians in Turkey; and I lost no time in acquainting Prince Gortchakoff with the information which had reached Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and with their hope that his Excellency would send instructions to the Russian Consul at Belgrade to put a stop to such proceedings.

Prince Gortchakoff listened to me with some impatience, and interrupted me by declarations that there could be no foundation for reports of the kind, as Russia has no agents in Servia except her Consuls, who faithfully fulfilled their instructions.

I answered, that Her Majesty's Government did not for a moment imagine his Excellency was aware of the practices to which I was instructed to call his attention; but as it was not impossible that intriguers in Servia might pretend to represent the Government of the Emperor, he surely would not object to mention to the Consul-General the nature of the reports which Her Majesty's Government had received, and to instruct him to inquire into them, with a view to protecting the Regency against revolutionary manœuvres. His Excellency, however, refused to do so, asserting that the Consul-General required no instructions, as he was fully acquainted with the sentiments of the Imperial Government, and always held language in conformity with them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 103.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 6 Confidential.) *St. Petersburgh, January 11, 1869.*

My Lord,

HAVING had the honour to receive last night your Lordship's despatches No. 15 of the 29th, and No. 16 of the 31st ultimo, and No. 3 of the 6th instant, I called on Prince Gortchakoff this morning to have some conversation with his Excellency on the subject to which they refer. I said, that in order to leave no doubt as to the opinion and intentions with which Her Majesty's Government have agreed to take part in the Conference now sitting at Paris, I would communicate to him the observations which you had made when Baron Brunnow read to you, on the 29th ultimo, two of his Excellency's despatches on the measures which Turkey had adopted to obtain satisfaction from Greece; and your account of a subsequent conversation which you had with Baron Brunnow on the subject. I then quoted the paragraphs in your Lordship's despatch No. 15, reporting the language you held on these occasions, and Prince Gortchakoff said that Baron Brunnow had already acquainted him with the dissatisfaction which you had expressed with the second of the despatches in question; but that he did not believe you would have designated it "a mere bill of indictment against Turkey," if Baron Brunnow had also communicated to you a passage of a letter which accompanied it, and which his Excellency read to me, explaining that the Greeks were not mentioned in his despatch, because when it was written he was not acquainted with the terms of the Turkish ultimatum, or the grounds on which Greece had rejected it; and that he could, therefore, only express his opinions upon the violent measures which he had learnt from General Ignatieff had been adopted by the Porte.

I then read to him the paragraphs in your Lordship's despatch No. 16, which record the assurances you had received from Baron Brunnow as to the impartiality which will be observed by Russia in the Conference, and as to her intention not to enlarge the discussion beyond the mode of bringing the existing dispute to a termination, and which also mention Baron Brunnow's hope that three sittings may be sufficient for that purpose. Prince Gortchakoff observed that he still maintained these assurances, but incidents might occur to prolong the deliberations of the Conference, as, for instance, on Saturday the Greek Plenipotentiary declined to attend it unless he was received on equal terms with the Plenipotentiary of the Porte. I answered that I had believed M. Rangabé's position had been already settled, but that some misconception had arisen as to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon it, Baron Brunnow having informed

his Excellency that your Lordship was favourable to the pretensions of the Greek Minister, an error which you had found it necessary to rectify. Prince Gortchakoff answered that Baron Brunnow had not reported in exact terms that your Lordship had expressed such an opinion, but he had understood him to convey that impression by a telegram stating that you shared his Excellency's opinion as to the expediency of settling the question in a conciliatory manner. His Excellency said that he considered the concession of the parity claimed by the Greek Minister would only be an act of justice, but he had nevertheless urged the Greek Government to accept the decision of the other Powers, and he would reiterate that advice.

After this explanation he read a telegram reporting the opening of the Conference, and the draft of the Declaration submitted to it by M. de Lavalette, and he expressed dissatisfaction with the terms in which the proposed Declaration alludes to the institutions of Greece, observing that the conduct of the Greek Government cannot be fairly judged if the limits to their authority imposed by the Constitution are not taken into consideration.

I answered that it appeared to me foreign Powers had nothing to do with the Constitution and the municipal laws of Greece; but if Europe found it necessary to declare that acts affecting the interests and rights of other States which the Constitution is said to sanction are contrary to international law, the Constitution would be indirectly condemned, and it would then be for the Greek nation to consider whether it would not be expedient to amend it. It was far from certain, however, I said, that the Constitution granted impunity to the acts complained of by the Porte, and his Excellency answered that the penal law had been referred to in support of that view, but there could be no doubt that the Constitution had restricted the action of the Government; and it would be unjust not to give some consideration to the position or circumstances of the King; for it would be impossible for His Majesty, as a foreign Prince married to a Russian Grand Duchess, to recommend the nation to increase the power of the Crown, by amendments of the Constitution, which would be represented as intended to introduce the despotism of Russia into free Greece.

How Prince Gortchakoff thinks the Constitution should be referred to in the Declaration of the Conference, he did not say; but if he thinks an opinion ought to be expressed that the Greek Government were prevented by it from fulfilling their international obligations, he may perhaps also consider that the Conference should recommend it to be amended.

His Excellency afterwards read to me the telegram which M. de Lavalette has addressed in the name of the Conference to the Governments of Turkey and Greece, informing them of the commencement of its sittings, and urging the maintenance of the *status quo* until their termination; and he said that this telegram having met with his entire approval, he had instructed the Russian Representatives at Constantinople and Athens to give it their warmest support.

Before concluding our conversation I said, Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to act with Russia in the Conference, and hope if the discussion is strictly confined to the means of bringing about an arrangement of the existing dispute, that the Conference may secure the preservation of peace; but, on the other hand, they fear if that condition is not scrupulously observed, the Conference may only prove a source of danger. His Excellency answered that it might, however, be impossible to prevent incidental questions coming under discussion: for when the repatriation of the refugees is brought forward, all the Plenipotentiaries cannot be expected to recommend the adoption of measures for encouraging it, unless they receive from the Turkish Plenipotentiary satisfactory assurances as to the position which these persons will occupy on their return to Crete, and as to the treatment which they will receive there.

I said that I was not aware of there being any question before the Conference as to giving encouragement to refugees to return to Crete, and that the Greek Government was merely required not to oppose their departure, and to protect them, on their way to a place of embarkation, from the violence of ill-disposed persons. If, therefore, such irrelevant questions were thus to be introduced into the discussion, which possibly might be extended to the institutions under which Crete is to be governed, your Lordship's fears might be realized, that the Conference would compromise instead of promoting the maintenance of peace, by placing on record in its Protocols the differences of opinion existing among the Great Powers, and giving a dangerous publicity to their dissensions. Whatever could be properly done to protect the dignity and diminish the embarrassments of the King, I was sure Her Majesty's Government would be ready to do; but I believed they would consider that they could not render His Majesty a greater service than by supporting a declaration on the part of the Conference as to the rules of action by which

he should be guided, and to which he could appeal against the unscrupulous proceedings of the persons by whom he is surrounded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 101.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 17, 1869.

MY confidential despatch No. 42 of the 10th instant contained a report from memory of the proceedings of the Conference on the Turco-Greek difference at its first sitting on the previous day; and in my despatch No. 75 of the 15th instant I inclosed a copy of the Protocol of that sitting.

In my confidential despatch No. 57 of the 12th I gave your Lordship an account of the second sitting which took place on that day; and in my despatch No. 82 of the 16th instant I inclosed a copy of the Protocol of that sitting.

The third sitting took place on the 14th instant.

The French Plenipotentiary communicated to the Conference a telegraphic correspondence which he had held with the French Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of maintaining the *statu quo* during the sitting of the Conference. Copies of this correspondence were transmitted to your Lordship with my despatch No. 76 of the 15th instant. The Plenipotentiaries were satisfied with the assurance as to the *statu quo* recorded in the telegram from the French Ambassador of the 13th instant, which closed the correspondence. The French Plenipotentiary proceeded to inform the Conference that no answer whatever had been received from Greece. The contingency had thus occurred, in contemplation of which the Plenipotentiaries had agreed at their last sitting to apply for instructions to their respective governments. He would therefore ask each Plenipotentiary to state his views as to the course to be taken.

The Austrian Plenipotentiary stated that his Government would very much regret the absence of a Greek Representative, but that, rather than break up the Conference, he would be willing to proceed without one.

I said that the arrangement which would have been most acceptable to Her Majesty's Government would be that which would have given to Greece the largest share in the discussion and in the labours of the Conference. If, however, the Greek Government persisted in its refusal to allow its Representative to appear I was ready to proceed without him, but I should propose that we should declare our readiness to receive any written communication from him or his Government, and that we should invite observations from him upon our proceedings.

The Italian, Prussian, and Russian Plenipotentiaries declared that they were authorized, in case of need, to proceed in the absence of the Greek Reprepresentive.

The Ottoman Plenipotentiary stated that he had not yet received the instructions for which he had asked; but, after some consideration, he agreed to go on with the business of the Conference.

The French Plenipotentiary was of opinion that we had no choice left, however we might regret it, but to proceed in the absence of a Representative from Greece; and he expressed his entire concurrence in my proposal that we should declare our readiness to receive written communications from the Greek Minister at Paris or his Government.

Some objections were started to my further suggestion that we should invite observations from the Greek Representative, and after some discussion it was decided that the President should be authorized to inform the Greek Minister that we were ready to receive communications from him; and it was agreed, moreover, that the President should give him cognizance of any documents which the Conference might point out.

These preliminary questions having been decided, the French Plenipotentiary, as President, read to the Conference an address. It stated the objects for which the Conference had been called together, and the limits within which its discussions were to be confined, and gave a lucid summary of the Turkish ultimatum and the Greek reply.

The French Plenipotentiary then proposed that we should confine our observations as much as possible to the papers before us; that we should not go into a minute examination of individual facts; that we should rather endeavour to lay down general principles, upon which future relations between Turkey and Greece should be conducted;

that we should abstain as far as possible from pronouncing upon past events a detailed judgment, which might have the effect of increasing irritation on one side or the other.

This mode of proceeding having met with general concurrence, the French Plenipotentiary laid before the Conference a draft of a Declaration framed in conformity with it. A copy of this document was transmitted to your Lordship with my despatch No. 68 of the 14th instant.

A somewhat desultory conversation ensued, which, however, sufficed to show that the draft met with general approbation. It was finally agreed that each Plenipotentiary should take a copy home, and prepare himself to discuss it in detail the next day.

The fourth sitting was accordingly held on the following day, the 15th instant; and the draft was gone through, paragraph by paragraph. Various verbal alterations were made, and the order in which the paragraphs stood was in some cases changed.

The only amendment of any importance was one made in the fourth paragraph, from which the words "prendre les dispositions nécessaires" were struck out, lest they should be construed as imposing upon Greece a greater responsibility than was intended, or, at all events, a greater obligation to prevent ships being armed in her ports than to prevent bands being formed on shore.

Towards the close of the sitting a letter from the Greek Minister at Paris was delivered to the President, and was found to inclose a Memorandum of some length. Time did not admit of this document's being read immediately *in extenso*, and it was settled that it should be sent round to each Plenipotentiary at his own house.

Finally, it was agreed that the Plenipotentiaries should meet again on the following day, and that each should in the meantime examine attentively the amended draft and the Greek Memorandum.

In conformity with this arrangement, the fifth session of the Conference was held yesterday. A further written Memorandum, which had been sent to the President since the last sitting by the Greek Minister, was read, and the President called upon the several Plenipotentiaries to give their opinions.

The Austrian Plenipotentiary said that he had given his attention to the Greek Memoranda, but that he had not seen any reason to modify his approval of the draft of a declaration, as amended by the Conference the day before.

I stated that I had gone through the first Memorandum with very great care, that I had compared it with other documents, and that I had considered it with especial reference to the proposed Declaration. I had, indeed, prepared myself to discuss the Memorandum in detail, if such should be the desire of my colleagues. I had, moreover, given my best attention to the further Memorandum which had been read to us. The general conclusion which I had come to was that neither document contained anything to render a change in the proposed Declaration proper or desirable.

The Italian and Prussian Plenipotentiaries spoke very much in the same sense.

The Russian Plenipotentiary said that he had read the Greek Memorandum with very great interest, and considered its contents to be of very great importance. He concluded, however, by saying that he was ready to adopt the proposed Declaration at once.

The Ottoman Plenipotentiary said that he was quite prepared to dispute many of the statements in the Memorandum, and was, indeed, anxious to draw up, for the information of the Conference, a formal refutation of it. As for the the draft of Declaration, he must, in the absence of special instructions from his Government, maintain the reserve which had regulated his conduct throughout the discussion of it.

A conversation ensued on the question whether, supposing the Declaration to be adopted, it should or should not bear the signature of the Ottoman Plenipotentiary. The general opinion appeared to be that a feeling of dignity and delicacy would lead the Turkish Representative to abstain from signing it.

On the President's proposing that the other Plenipotentiaries should at once affix their initials to the draft, I suggested a further amendment of the fourth paragraph. I observed that the word "armement" in French, as applied to ships, had a double signification, and our meaning would be more unmistakeably expressed if we substituted for it the expression "équipement de bâtiments armés." This amendment was immediately adopted.

The French Plenipotentiary pointed out another passage which was not quite clear. It was, he observed, stated that the notification of the acceptance of the Declaration should be addressed "aux Cabinets,"—what Cabinets were meant? After some discussion, it was suggested by the Italian Minister that the word "Conference" should be substituted for "Cabinets." This suggestion was adopted, and the Plenipotentiaries of

Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy, Prussia, and Russia, affixed their initials to the draft of the Declaration.

The Ottoman Plenipotentiary stated his general approval of the principles of international law laid down, but said that he must reserve any further expression of opinion until he had received instructions from his Government.

The French Plenipotentiary then proposed that, on the declaration's being accepted (as it was to be hoped it would be) by the Porte, it should be sent to Athens with a letter requesting the Greek Government to notify to the Conference within a fixed time, its acceptance by Greece.

This proposal was agreed to, and it was settled that the letter should be addressed by the President, in the name of the Conference to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Drafts of the letter to be written were read by the Russian Plenipotentiary, and by the President, and the Secretary was requested to combine the principal points in both, and submit a draft for the approbation of the Conference at its next meeting. It was observed that no time would be lost by postponing to the next meeting the settlement of the draft, as the letter could not in any case be dispatched until the acceptance of the Declaration by the Porte was received.

The Ottoman Plenipotentiary expressed his hope that he should receive almost immediately instructions respecting the Declaration from his Government, to whom he had already communicated by telegraph the first draft in *extenso*. It was agreed that, on the arrival of these instructions, the Plenipotentiaries should be immediately called together.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the Declaration as finally adopted, and signed with the initials of the six Plenipotentiaries.

I inclose also a copy of the fourth paragraph as it appeared in the first draft. I have marked on this copy, in red ink, the amendments finally adopted.*

My reports of the proceedings of the Conference being necessarily written entirely from memory, are perhaps not correct in all their details. I hope in a few days to be able to send your Lordship the authentic Protocols drawn up by the Secretary from notes taken at the time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 104.

Draft of Declaration agreed to by the Conference.

JUSTEMENT préoccupées des dangers qui peuvent naître de la rupture des relations entre la Turquie et la Grèce, les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856 se sont entendues pour apaiser le différend survenu entre les deux Etats, et ont autorisé à cet effet leurs Représentants auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français à se constituer en Conference.

Après une étude attentive des documents échangés entre les deux Gouvernements, les Plénipotentiaires sont tombés d'accord pour regretter que, cédant à des entraînements sur lesquels son patriotisme a pu l'égarer, la Grèce ait donné lieu aux griefs articulés par la Porte Ottomane dans l'ultimatum remis le 11 Décembre, 1858, au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes. Il est constant, en effet, que les principes du droit des gens obligent la Grèce, comme toutes les autres nations, à ne pas permettre que des bandes se recrutent sur son territoire, ni que des bâtiments s'arment dans ses ports pour attaquer un Etat voisin.

Persuadée d'ailleurs que le Cabinet d'Athènes ne saurait méconnaître la pensée qui inspire cette appréciation aux trois Cours Protectrices de la Grèce, comme à toutes les autres Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856, la Conférence déclare que le Gouvernement Hellénique est tenu d'observer dans ses rapports avec la Turquie les règles de conduite communes à tous les Gouvernements, et de satisfaire ainsi aux réclamations formulées par la Sublime Porte pour le passé, en la rassurant en même tems pour l'avenir.

La Grèce devra donc s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer :—

1. La formation sur son territoire de toute bande recrutée en vue d'une agression contre la Turquie ;

2. L'équipement dans ses ports de bâtiments armés destinés à secourir, sous quelque

* The amendments are printed in

forme que ce soit, toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

En ce qui regarde les demandes de la Porte relatives au rapatriement des Crétois émigrés sur le territoire Hellénique, la Conférence prend acte des déclarations faites par le Cabinet d'Athènes, et demeure convaincue qu'il se prêtera à faciliter, autant qu'il dépend de lui, le départ des familles Candiotes qui désireraient rentrer dans leur patrie.

Quant aux dommages privés encourus par des sujets Ottomans, le Gouvernement Hellénique ne contestant nullement à la Turquie le droit de faire poursuivre par la voir judiciaire les réparations qui pourraient être dues, et la Turquie acceptant, de son côté la juridiction des Tribunaux Grecs, les Plénipotentiaires ne croient pas devoir entrer, dans l'examen des faits, et sont d'avis que le Cabinet d'Athènes ne doit négliger aucune des voies légales pour que l'œuvre de la justice suive son cours régulier.

La Conférence ne saurait douter que, devant l'expression unanime de l'opinion des Plénipotentiaires sur les questions soumises à leur examen, le Gouvernement Hellénique ne s'empresse de conformer ses actes aux principes qui viennent d'être rappelés, et que les griefs exposés dans l'ultimatum de la Porte ne se trouvent par le fait même définitivement écartés.

Cette Déclaration sera portée sans délai à la connaissance du Cabinet d'Athènes, et les Plénipotentiaires ont la conviction que la Sublime Porte renoncera à donner suite aux mesures annoncés comme devant être la conséquence de la rupture des relations diplomatiques, si dans une communication notifié à la Conférence le Gouvernement Hellénique défère à l'opinion émise par elle.

Les Plénipotentiaires faisant dès lors appel aux mêmes sentiments de conciliation et de paix qui animent les Cours dont ils sont les Représentants, expriment l'espoir que les deux Gouvernements n'hésiteront pas à renouer leurs rapports, et à effacer ainsi, dans l'intérêt commun de leurs sujets, toute trace du dissentiment qui a motivé la réunion de la Conférence.

Inclosure 2 in No. 104.

Fourth Paragraph of Declaration as it appeared in the first Draft, with the Amendments finally adopted.

LA Grèce devra donc s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer, *1°*, la *recrutée*
formation sur son territoire de toute bande ~~armée~~ en vue d'une agression contre la
2°, l'équipement
Turquie, ~~et prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour empêcher l'armement~~ dans
armés
ses ports de bâtiments destinés à secourir sous quelque forme que ce soit toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

No. 105.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Berlin, January 16, 1869.

My Lord,

I TOOK occasion at my interview with Count Bismarck on Wednesday evening to inquire from his Excellency what intelligence he had received from Paris on the proceedings of the Turco-Greek Conference.

His Excellency said that, although the discussions of the Conference were supposed to be secret, yet, as the public press had referred to them, there was no occasion for him to maintain silence.

His Excellency referred to the withdrawal of the Greek Plenipotentiary. He observed that the Porte might also fulfil the threat of retiring from the Conference unless all the points of her ultimatum were accepted. In the event of either or both taking this course, his Excellency was of opinion that the other European Powers should continue their deliberations and come to a verdict. If the Powers were unanimous in the decision taken, his Excellency was of opinion that they should enforce their verdict on both litigants and prevent a conflict arising between them; or, as his Excellency termed it, that the Powers should collectively act as the European police.

If such a proposal should be made by England or France in the Conference, Prussia, he said, would support it; on the other hand, Prussia, not being so directly interested in Eastern affairs as the other Powers, would not take the initiative in such a proposal, nor would she support it if proposed by Russia alone without the concurrence of the other Powers, in order that it might not be supposed that she was acting in complicity with Russia, or that there was any more intimate understanding between the two Governments than in fact really existed. He should, therefore, wish the proposal to come from England or France.

I stated to his Excellency that, on accepting the Conference, Her Majesty's Government had clearly made it known that they did not contemplate the adoption of any coercive measures to enforce the decision of the Conference; and I was therefore confident that Her Majesty's Government would not be disposed to support any proposal of this nature.

Count Bismarck observed that, if it came to a conflict between the two parties, the Turks appeared confident of success; but he was not so sanguine. A war of this nature would arouse the religious enthusiasm of the Christian populations, and might give rise to some serious complication.

His Excellency further stated that, although Russia was obliged to appear demonstrative in favour of Greece on account of her own population, yet he was convinced that Russia was most desirous for peace; and he seemed to think that if the other Powers were unanimous, Russia likewise would join in enforcing on both litigants the verdict of Europe. He further remarked, and apparently on authority, that Prince Gortchakoff would see with dissatisfaction and regret that an European Conference should for a second time prove itself impotent to carry out its own decision, as was the case with the Principalities.

In referring to the rumoured expulsion of the Greeks from the Turkish Empire, his Excellency observed that it was a measure which would enable the Turkish Government to make large exactions from those Greeks who were able to pay for permission to continue their residence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 106.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1869.

HER Majesty's Government have now before them the declaration of the Conference, as agreed upon in the sitting of the 16th instant, and you will strongly urge the Porte to agree to it, and to authorize the Turkish Plenipotentiary to announce that the Porte will renew relations with the Greek Government if the latter notifies to the Conference that Greece accepts the declaration. You will point out to Aali Pasha that no better arrangement could be made for the Porte in the Conference, and the declaration is not confined to Crete, but applies to all the possessions of the Porte, and that the dignity of the Porte is saved by the notification being made to the Turkish Government in conjunction with all the Great Powers. M. de Lavalette telegraphs to M. Bourrée in the same sense.

I understand from Lord Lyons that it is proposed, if the Porte consents to the declaration, that it should thereupon be sent by the Conference to Athens, with a letter to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, telling him in civil terms that he must send his notification to the Conference within a week.

It seems to be the feeling of the Conference that it would be more dignified that the Turkish Plenipotentiary should not sign the declaration which condemns the acts of Greece. We did not attach his initial to the draft when agreed upon by the other Plenipotentiaries.

No. 107

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 18, 1868, 5·15 P.M.*

M. DE LAVALETTE has telegrams from French Ambassador at Constantinople, which make him confident that the Turkish Ambassador will be instructed immediately to announce the acceptance by the Porte of the declaration of the Conference.

No. 108.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 83.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 18, 1869.*

REFERRING to the terms of M. de Lavalette's proposed declaration, of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch No. 68 of the 14th instant, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the term "patriotisme" in the second paragraph might be advantageously replaced by that of "sympathies," even if it were considered desirable to retain the rest of the clause in which it appears, viz., "cédant à des entraînements sur lesquels son patriotisme a pu l'égarer."

The employment of the word "patriotisme" in this clause might, perhaps, be inconveniently referred to hereafter as implying an admission on the part of the Conference that a disregard for international law and duty was excusable if proceeding from so-called patriotic motives.

Your Excellency might, therefore, suggest the use of the word "sympathies" instead of "patriotisme" if it is still open to you to do so.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 109.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 18, 1869.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by your Excellency to Prince Gortchakoff, as reported in your despatch No. 6 of the 11th instant, respecting the course which it was advisable to adopt with regard to the deliberations of the Conference held for the settlement of the differences between Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 110.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 18, 1869.*

SINCE my instruction to dissuade Aali Pasha from a premature rejection of the declaration upon which the Conference had agreed, and which had received the initials of all the Plenipotentiaries, with the exception of Djemil Pasha, was dispatched, I have received from Lord Lyons the text of that declaration as agreed upon in the Conference of the 16th instant.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that your Excellency should strongly advise the Porte to agree to the Declaration, and at the same time to empower its Representative at Paris to announce to the Conference that if the Greek Government, on being made acquainted with the terms of the Declaration, should notify to the Conference that it accepts it, the Porte, on its side, will be ready to renew relations with Greece.

Your Excellency will say that no better arrangement could be made in the Conference for the Porte, and you will point out to Aali Pasha that the Declaration applies to all the possessions of the Sultan and not to Crete alone; and that the fact that the notification as to her acceptance of the Declaration will be made by Greece to Turkey in common

with the other Powers represented in the Conference will satisfy the dignity of the Porte.

Instructions to the same effect will be sent by M. de Lavalette to the French Ambassador at Constantinople.

If the Porte agrees to the Declaration, it is proposed, I understand, that the Conference should send it to Athens, accompanied with a letter to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, acquainting him in civil terms that the Conference expect that within a week the required notification shall be made to it.

I have only to add that I understand from Lord Lyons that the Conference considered that the dignity of the Sultan would be best consulted if the signature of the Turkish Plenipotentiary, whose initials were not, as I have said, affixed to the draft of Declaration, should also not be affixed to it when finally adopted by the Conference, inasmuch as the purport of it is to condemn the acts of Greece.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 111.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 18, 1869.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by your Excellency to obtain either the suspension or modification of the order for the expulsion of Greek subjects from Turkey, as reported in your despatch No. 5 of the 2nd instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 112.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 18, 1869.*

I APPROVE the course which your Excellency pursued, as reported in your despatch No. 9 of the 5th instant, in regard to the application made by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Consul at Smyrna, to take Greek subjects resident at that place under British protection.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 113.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 18, 1869.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has formally promised that Greece will not, while Conference is sitting, commit any act of aggression against Turkey; but he declines to allow Greek Representative to be present, unless he is placed on the same footing as the Turkish Plenipotentiary. He will, however, be authorized to give necessary explanations to the French Foreign Minister.

No. 114.

Consul Ongley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Patras, January 11, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the Turkish Consul,* who is unable, from illness, to move from his room, sent and requested me to call on him this morning.

* Ouchi-in Musurus, the Ambassador.

On my arrival, he told me as follows:—That Mrs. Roulfos having sent 700 drachmas (25*l.*) to the Cretan Committee, and a number of Cretan women having gone to receive their portion of it, Mr. Tsatzos, a member of the Committee, had locked up one of the girls, and had ill-treated her; that the Cretans, on learning this, had complained to the Nomarch, by whose orders the girl had been set at liberty. In consequence of this affair, five Cretans had called last evening on the Consul to talk and consult with him; that the police had surrounded the house, and that three of the Cretans managed to get away, but the other two remained in the Consul's house until the morning. At the same time the Consul's servant was arrested by the police, as well as a Cretan named Delongaky; the former was threatened with being put in irons, but after having been interrogated, was set at liberty. The latter's house was searched, and in it was found a petition to the Consul, praying that a vessel might be sent to take the refugees back to Crete: he is still under arrest.

The Turkish Consul went on to say that it was mooted to send him away, and he seemed rather alarmed at the possibility of being ill-treated. He considered the conduct of the police as an insult to himself, and requested me to mention it to the Consular Body. On doing so to M. Clauss, the French Vice-Consul, he replied, that the Turkish Consul, having ceased from his functions, and being now only a private individual, any insult to him could not be looked upon as an official one. Being desirous to ascertain the truth of the above statements, I called on the Nomarch and found that he was absent from Patras; but his secretary, as Acting Nomarch, gave the following explanation:—That some Cretans complained to the Nomarch that Mr. Tsatzos had locked up a Cretan girl, and they requested the Nomarch to interfere; upon which the secretary proceeded at once to the office of the Committee, where he found a crowd of some hundreds of Cretans, and, having with difficulty made his way in, he found Mr. Tsatzos, the girl, her aunt, and a priest; and on asking why the girl had been locked up, Mr. Tsatzos replied that he had done so to make her confess who had got her with child. On hearing this the secretary pointed out to Mr. Tsatzos the irregularity of his conduct, and took the girl and her aunt to the Fiscal Advocate to be interrogated, in order that the person who had deceived her might be proceeded against according to law. That, as regards the Turkish Consul, he had been endeavouring to induce the Cretans to return to their homes, and that the Cretan, Delongaky, had been aiding and abetting him; and that, now those friendly relations between Greece and Turkey had been broken off, the Consul had no business to meddle with it. That the Consul, many weeks ago, let the Cretans know that those who wished to return must put down their names on paper; and that Delongaky was engaged in this work is perfectly true; but that Delongaky is to be put into prison for getting this petition signed either before or after the rupture of diplomatic relations, simply proves that the Greek authorities wish by every means to prevent the return of the Cretans to their own country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. ONGLEY.

P.S.—Your Lordship is no doubt aware that the statements made by the Cretans in their petition dated Canea, $\frac{24}{10}$th May, 1866, are, in some respects, totally untrue; in fact, I should say that the petition does the Cretans no credit. H. S. O.

No. 115.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Athens, January 9, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a translation of a curious intercepted letter from Colonel Zimbrakaki to a person in Crete, which has appeared in the semi-official paper published at Canea.

Colonel Zimbrakaki, as your Lordship may recollect, was for many months in command of one of the military districts into which the Island of Crete is divided, and he asserts in this letter that the Greek Government were trifling with the insurgents by pretending at one time that they were about to dispatch Colonel Zimbrakaki to take the command in Crete, and at another time other persons. I fully believe that such was the case, as Colonel Zimbrakaki's brother mentioned to me at the time that the writer of this letter would shortly return to Crete to take the command of the insurgents; and the other persons spoken of are doubtless Colonel Coroneos and Colonel Scalzas, the officer commanding in North-Western Greece.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 115*.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 19.)

(No. 10.)
My Lord, *Athens, January* 9, 1869.

M. SPIRIDION VALAORITES, the gentleman to whom it is the King's wish to entrust the vacant post of Finance Minister, arrived here from Corfu the day before yesterday; but I understand that he has not yet accepted office, and that he is still engaged in warm discussion with M. Bulgaris as to the withdrawal of the Royal Decree of which a translation was inclosed in my despatch No. 5 of the 7th instant.

Before he will consent to undertake the very difficult task which has been imposed upon him, M. Valaorites insists upon pledging his colleagues to the abandonment of the absurd military preparations which are now making, and upon the adoption of some arrangement with the National and Ionian Banks which would obviate the necessity for having recourse to the disastrous measure in question.

What he proposes is, that the National Bank shall advance to the Government a sum of 1,000,000 drachmas (142,857*l.*) in cash, and 8,000,000 drachmas (285,714*l.*) in notes, and that the Ionian Bank shall also advance a sum of 2,000,000 drachmas (71,428*l.*) in cash, and 4,000,000 drachmas (142,857*l.*) in notes; both establishments being empowered to suspend specie payments, whilst their paper circulation would be declared a legal tender.

I need scarcely add, that even this arrangement is viewed with the greatest repugnance by both establishments; but they consider they have no option in the matter, and that, ruinous as it is to their interests, it would be unwise to compel the Government to persist in a course which will entail immediate and hopeless ruin both on the banks and upon the kingdom generally.

But, strange to say, M. Bulgaris is so obstinate in his hostility to the National Bank (which he considers the mere tool of his political opponents), that he seems bent upon carrying into execution the Ordinance of the 4th instant, under the pretence that the Government have not the power of authorizing the Banks to suspend cash payments, although he did not hesitate to use the extraordinary powers entrusted to him by the Chamber for a purpose far more illegal and revolutionary than that contemplated by M. Valaorites.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 115.

M. Zimbrakakis to M. Kurkuvatzo.

(Translation.)
My dear Gossip, *November* $\frac{1}{13}$, 1868.

I HAVE received your letter in which you wrote to me about your sister at the Piræus, and that it was said that no assistance was afforded her, on the plea that her husband had surrendered; this is not true: the truth is that Government have no money and not only do not provide regularly for the Cretan families, but do not even pay the salaries of their civil employés, nevertheless to the Cretan families they always give something; indeed I have been told that to-morrow they will pay the allowance due to them for so many days.

Meanwhile, it is my duty to state to you, as my gossip, that Government know that Europe despairs of the Cretan question, and therefore takes no thought and makes no mention of these families; consequently, the Government consider that they spend in vain, and that the unfortunate Cretans are being uselessly ruined: however, Government dare not say so openly, because they are afraid of the Greek people, and for this reason they are anxious that the insurrection should come to an end without delay; but they seek to make it appear that the failure of the insurrection is not attributable to them, but to the Cretans. At one moment, therefore, they give out that they will send me with ample means, and at another that they will send some one else; meanwhile they deceive us all and are seeking to gain time because they know that the Cretans are hard pressed and consequently must quickly fall. Meantime, I consider that the Cretans, being already ruined, inasmuch as they have lost everything they possessed, their best course will be to continue the insurrection as long as they can, so that by this means the Sultan may perhaps be compelled to grant your last request; otherwise, I consider the Cretans lost for ever. It is true, dear Gossip, that the Greeks have deceived us, and had we known it when Aali Pasha came to Crete, it would have been a good opportunity to improve our condition. Under the circumstances, nothing is left for you but to persist in the insurrection until some other favourable opportunity presents itself; because, if the Cretans continue to surrender, and the whole of Crete submits unconditionally, then woe to the Cretans.

My compliments to all friends.

I salute you,
(Signed) JOHN ZIMBRAKAKIS.

No. 116.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January* 19, 1869, 10·5 P.M.

TURKISH Ambassador has announced to M. Lavalette the adhesion of the Porte to the Declaration.

The Conference is to meet at 3 P.M. to-morrow.

No. 117.

Sir C. Wyke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Copenhagen, January* 19, 1869.

BRUNNOW has informed Bulow that the Emperor of Russia had himself telegraphed to King of Greece that Russia could not support present Greek pretensions; and King had better conform to decisions of Conference.

I am told this confidentially by Danish Minister.

No. 118.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 19, 1869, 2·45 P.M.*

THE Porte is greatly pleased with the result of the Conference, but will consider itself free to act as seems best if Greece does not signify its acceptance within a fixed time. I am strongly urging the Turkish Government, even in this case, to confine themselves to the measures already adopted, and carefully to abstain from actual hostilities.

No. 119.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 19, 1869, 5 P.M.*

UPON the receipt of your telegram of the 14th, I repeated to the Grand Vizier your opinion in favour of a declaration by the Porte to the Conference of the Sultan's favourable sentiments towards his Christian subjects.

In spite of his wish to adopt any suggestion coming from Her Majesty's Government, his Highness still continued to regard the suggestion as unadvisable.

As soon as the Conference pronounced upon the questions submitted to it, I again pointed out that the time seemed come for making the declaration, and the Grand Vizier assures me that it shall be made, but he still prefers doing it to the Cabinets rather than to the Conference.

No. 120.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons

(No. 84.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office January 19, 1869.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch No. 87 of the 17th instant, giving a report of the proceedings of the Conference; and I have great pleasure in informing you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your conduct in the Conference, as reported in this despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 121.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 87.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 19, 1869.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that, on further consideration, Her Majesty's Government do not think it necessary that you should suggest the substitution of some other word for "patriotisme" in the second paragraph of the proposed Declaration of the Conference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 122.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 19, 1869.*

I APPROVE the language used by your Excellency, as reported in your despatch No. 32 of the 16th instant, in reply to the observations of Count Bismarck as to the expediency of the Great Powers enforcing the decision of the Conference on the relations between Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 123.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 19, 1869.*

BARON BRUNNOW called on me this morning, in order, as he said, to discuss the means by which the position of the Kingdom of Greece might be strengthened and rendered more independent.

His Excellency made no specific proposition, but indicated, or rather hinted at, the courses that might be pursued: upon which, in their order, I answered that any interference with the institutions of Greece by the Conference was out of the question—it would be an unjustifiable proceeding on the part of foreign Powers, and would be deeply resented by the Greek nation; that at present I saw no probability of British ships of war being sent for any purpose to Greek waters; and that however much Her Majesty's Government might sympathize with the King in his present position, which certainly was a painful one, and however much they might be disposed to condemn the recent acts of the Greek Government, yet I thought they would not take upon themselves the responsibility of advising His Majesty to change his Minister, as they could not know by whom he would be succeeded, or whether a Government professing a more moderate and pacific policy would command a majority in the Chamber.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 124.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 18, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose two copies of the Memorandum which was received from the Greek Minister at the fourth sitting of the Conference, and sent round to the several Plenipotentiaries for their consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 124.

Memorandum respecting the Turco-Greek Difference.

I.—*Causes du Conflit.*

LES Puissances qui se sont réunies en Conférence, ayant décidé qu'elles se borneraient à traiter du conflit seul, sans remonter à sa source première, il est évident que la seule cause immédiate à laquelle on puisse attribuer la rupture, est à chercher dans les notes très-vives et dans l'ultimatum adressés en dernier lieu par le Gouvernement Ottoman à la Grèce. Il n'y a eu de la part de celle-ci nul fait qui pût être interprété comme une provocation. Cette attitude n'est pas un fait nouveau propre à justifier une résolution soudaine. Elle a du reste été à plusieurs reprises de la part du Ministère Grec le sujet d'explications franches, dont le Gouvernement Turc a paru comprendre la valeur et s'en contenter. Enfin remonter à cette cause éloignée, ce serait sortir des limites que la Conférence s'est tracée, et la Grèce serait alors en droit de réclamer aussi l'examen des causes qui ont déterminé sa conduite, et de chercher à justifier la vivacité de ses sympathies pour les Crétois.

Mais, a-t-on dit, c'est justement parce que les griefs étaient anciens que la coupe en était pleine; il ne fallait qu'une goutte pour la faire déborder; cette goutte a été l'insulte faite au Ministre de Turquie par les volontaires qui, allant en Crète, ont passé sous ses fenêtres, en plein jour, drapeau déployé, sans que le Gouvernement Grec osât ou voulût s'y opposer. Ce fait, tout déplorable qu'il serait même dans le cas où les auteurs n'eussent eu en vue que de braver ou de compromettre le Gouvernement, n'en serait pas moins de l'ordre de ceux qui, entre Gouvernements soucieux du repos du monde, s'arrangent par des explications ou des réparations demandées et reçues dans un esprit de conciliation. Mais l'incident n'a pas eu lieu; M. Delyanni, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce, dans une de ses réponses à M. Photiades Bey, le lui dit expressé-

ment. Cette dénégation, qui eut été impossible si elle n'était pas vraie, est restè sans réponse. On a donc agi à Constantinople avec une précipitation regrettable sur une nouvelle sans fondement, trop légèrement accueillie et communiquée. Le conflit a été provoqué par un ultimatum qu'aucune cause immédiate et nouvelle ne motivait.

II.—*Ultimatum.*

Passons à l'ultimatum lui-même, examinons-en les conditions, pour voir ce qu'elles ont de pratique et de juste, et jusqu'à quel point la Grèce se doit à elle-même de les repousser, ou peut s'y conformer pour servir les intérêts de la paix. Ces conditions sont au nombre de cinq. Nous les citons dans l'ordre invers de leur importance.

1*er Point.*—Que la Grèce assume l'obligation expresse de se conformer à l'avenir aux Traités existants entre elle et la Turquie, et en général aux lois internationales. Par sa généralité même ce point est sans portée pratique. Tout Etat constitué est tenu d'observer les obligations auxquelles la Turquie veut soumettre la Grèce. C'est le Gouvernement Grec au contraire qui a dû rappeler souvent à la Turquie l'observation des Traités existants, particulièrement de ceux qui concernent la poursuite du brigandage aux frontières; sa sécurité et son repos y étaient intéressés. Ses réclamations sont restées impuissantes; plus d'une fois elle a dû en appeler aux Puissances Protectrices.

2*ème Point.*—Punir, conformément aux lois, ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'attaques contre des soldats et des citoyens Ottomans, et indemniser les victimes de ces crimes.

Tel qu'il est formulé ce point ne saurait avoir trait aux Grecs qui se battent en Crète. Les notions les plus élémentaires du droit des gens s'opposent à une supposition pareille. Il s'applique probablement à un grief inconnu jusqu'ici, dont on ignorerait la cause, si M. Delyanni ne la signalait à M. Photiades Bey lui-même, dans sa note restée sur ce point sans réponse. D'après le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce, un Albanais, sujet Ottoman, s'est pris à Syra de querelle avec un autre Albanais, également sujet Ottoman, et lui a donné un coup de poignard. La police se livra à des poursuites contre le coupable, il réussit à s'évader et à quitter la Grèce. Est-ce là un incident de nature à justifier des réclamations et une rupture?

3*ème Point.*—Que les familles Crétois puissent s'embarquer librement pour rentrer dans leurs foyers, et que le Gouvernement Grec protège efficacement leur rapatriement.

La Grèce n'aura rien à objecter à ce point. De tout temps le Gouvernement Grec a déclaré que les Crétois, qui avaient pleine liberté de chercher un refuge sur son territoire, y étaient accueillis avec sympathie, et entretenus par les dons particuliers et par de grands sacrifices de l'Etat, n'étaient pas moins libres, conformément aux lois du pays, d'en partir quand bon leur semblerait. A deux ou trois reprises quelques Candiotes, mécontents de voir un certain nombre des leurs s'en aller, et déserter, comme ils pensaient, leur cause, ont tenté de les empêcher par des voies de fait. Ils leurs adressèrent des injures, les attaquèrent même en s'emparant de leurs effets. La police intervint, dispersa les perturbateurs, rétablit l'ordre, et permit à ceux qui voulaient partir de s'embarquer. Le Gouvernement Grec agit dans cette circonstance avec une sévérité qui alla jusqu'à compromettre gravement sa popularité; car sur des indices assez plausibles, on croyait généralement que c'était la Légation de Turquie, qui, par des efforts de tout genre et au moyen d'argent, déterminait plusieurs familles à rentrer en Crète, afin de donner créance à ce qui a été souvent et trop prématurément affirmé, que la Crète était soumise, et heureuse de l'être. Après que les autorités Grecques eurent réprimé une ou deux fois ces désordres, ils ne se reproduisirent plus; quarante embarquements eurent lieu sans entrave, avant que l'ultimatum Turc n'en eût fait un sujet sérieux de rupture. Le jour même où il était présenté à Athènes, 200 Crétois s'embarquaient, sans aucun empêchement. La Turquie a frété des bâtiments Autrichiens ou Français pour le transport des Crétois; elle a paru croire qu'il était nécessaire de les faire escorter par des bâtiments de guerre des Puissances. La Grèce n'y fit pas d'opposition; elle gagnait à avoir des témoins de sa conduite à l'égard du départ des Crétois, et à faire constater que si sur 60,000 réfugiés, il n'y a que 1,000 qui soient retournés en Crète, ce n'était nullement de sa faute. Aucun mesure pour faciliter le transport des familles qui voudraient spontanément quitter le pays, ne sera entravée par le Gouvernement Grec.

4*ème Point.*—Que les Ilotes "l'Enosis," la "Crète," et le "Panhellénion," soient désarmés, ou qu'au moins les ports Grecs leur soient fermés.

Ce point, et le suivant, sont les seuls qui aient une importance réelle, bien qu'il soit naturel de croire qu'une ou deux petites croisières, et quelques centaines de volontaires, ne peuvent pas faire un tort sérieux aux efforts de l'Empire Ottoman pour soumettre l'île insurgée.

D'abord il importe d'observer que ces bateaux n'appartiennent pas à l'Etat, comme quelques journaux l'ont dit. Ils sont la propriété privée d'une Compagnie de Navigation. L'un ou l'autre ont fait autrefois partie de la marine Royale; ils ont été vendus depuis plusieurs années à la Compagnie.

Ce ne sont pas non plus des bâtiments pirates. On ne désigne de ce nom sinistre que ceux qui pillent et assassinent en haute mer pour s'emparer du bien d'autrui. On n'a jamais considéré comme pirates des hommes qui, avec un entier désintéressement, et à travers mille dangers, vont porter l'obole des souscriptions volontaires et de la nourriture à des populations affamées.

Ils sont tout aussi peu des corsaires, comme on l'a prétendu parfois. Un corsaire est celui qui, muni de lettres de marque, attaque des navires sous pavillon ennemi, et s'en empare pour nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de la nation avec laquelle la sienne est en guerre. La course a été abolie pour les Puissances Contractantes de 1856, auxquelles la Grèce s'est jointe par un acte officiel.

Les bâtiments dont il s'agit appartiennent donc à des particuliers. Que ce soit l'amour du gain ou un sentiment plus désintéressé qui les stimule, ils vont forcer le blocus pour porter des provisions aux Crétois, de temps à autre aussi des munitions et des armes. Ils sont de la nature de ceux que les Anglais désignent sous le nom de "blockade-runners." Leurs opérations sont familières aux marins Grecs. Pendant la grande Révolution Française et sous le régime du système Continental, les bâtiments Hydriotes, chargés de blé, allaient, bravant tous les dangers, en approvisionner les ports bloqués d'Espagne. C'est ainsi que Hydra s'enrichit. L'Angleterre n'en rendit pas alors la Porte responsable, bien que les principes les plus éclairés du droit des gens n'eussent pas encore généralement pénétrés dans les constitutions de tous les pays civilisés. Le principe généralement admis aujourd'hui, c'est que lorsqu'une côte est déclaré en état de blocus, les bâtiments de commerce neutres n'ont pas la permission d'y aborder. Ils peuvent le tenter, mais à leurs risques et périls; et la Puissance qui a déclaré le blocus est en droit de tirer sur eux pour les en empêcher, ou, les ayant capturés, de disposer de la cargaison selon ses propres lois. Voilà comment s'exprime à ce sujet Pinheiro Ferreira, l'éditeur et commentateur de Martens: "Lorsque une Puissance belligérante déclare une partie quelconque de la côte ennemie en état de blocus vis-à-vis des autres nations dont elle est cependant dans l'intention de reconnaître la neutralité, sa déclaration se borne à avertir les vaisseaux de ces nations que ce ne sera qu'à leurs périls et dangers qu'ils pourront hasarder de forcer le blocus, sans que cette déclaration entraîne ni le devoir d'y obtempérer, ni par conséquence le droit de punir ceux qui n'en auraient point tenu compte."

Même au sujet du traitement de la cargaison, le droit positif n'est pas le même chez toutes les nations; il a été diversement réglé par divers Traités. Ordinairement "les objets qui servent directement à la guerre, et dont l'usage n'est pas douteux, tels que les armes, les boulets, bombes, la poudre à canon, les soldats, les chevaux, &c.," sont considérés comme contrebande de guerre; mais les autres marchandises, et nommément les vivres, sont libres (Martens, ii, § 318); et Martens rappelle qu'il existe deux Traités qui permettent aux bateaux de commerce neutres de porter même des armes à l'ennemi: "Aujourd'hui," ajoute le même publiciste, "presque tous les Traités de Commerce portent que dans la règle on ne confisquera que les marchandises de contrebande, en permettant au vaisseau de continuer son voyage avec le reste de sa cargaison, et que le navire neutre ne sera jamais confisqué." Le Traité entre la Prusse et l'Amérique de 1785 va encore plus loin, et règle (Article 13) que "même la contrebande ne sera pas confisquée, mais seulement détenue."—(Martens, Recueil, c. ii; p. 506.)

Tels sont les principes du droit des gens à l'égard des navires appartenant à des neutres, et telle est leur application la plus générale dans le droit positif. Rien ne justifie un belligérant, s'il ne réussit pas à arrêter un navire qui rompt son blocus, à s'en prendre à l'Etat neutre auquel ce navire appartient, et à en exiger de le prendre pour lui.

Quant aux nations elles-mêmes, on ne peut faire remonter à elles la responsabilité de la conduite des navires qui portent leur pavillon, ou de leurs sujets en général, que si, par des dispositions légales, elles autorisent l'envoi des objets de guerre à l'un des belligérants en le défendant pour l'autre. Voici les termes dans lesquels Martens s'exprime à ce sujet (ii, § 315): —"La nation neutre blesse les devoirs naturels de la neutralité dont le caractère essentiel est l'impartialité: 1. Si elle permet à ses sujets le transport de munitions de guerre vers l'une des Puissances belligérantes en le leur défendant vers l'autre. . . . . 3. Si, sans se borner à permettre le commerce à ses sujets, elle-même envoie des munitions de guerre à l'une des Puissances belligérantes," &c. Or, le Gouvernement Grec n'a pris nulle disposition de la nature de celles prévues

dans l'Article 1, et il ne met ni n'a le droit de mettre aucun empêchement à ceux de ses sujets, s'il s'en trouvait, qui voudraient transporter des munitions de guerre aux Turcs. Lui-même il n'en envoie point aux Crétois.

On ne dira pas que ces principes du droit des gens s'appliquent aux belligérants, tandis que les Crétois sont des sujets du Sultan, et que la Crète fait partie intégrante de la Turquie. Dans ce cas les navires dont il est question ne seraient que des contrebandiers, passibles des lois applicables à la simple contrebande.

Quant au droit de visite, que le Vice-Amiral Turc, Hobart Pacha, a probablement voulu appliquer en vue du port de Syra, sans parler du lieu où il a cru devoir l'exercer et de la manière dont il s'y est pris, voici ce qu'en dit le publiciste Portugais déjà cité (Pinheiro Ferreira, note 92 à Martens, ii, p. 273): "Ce droit de notre part n'entraîne pas à la charge du neutre le devoir de se laisser visiter. . . . Les vaisseaux que nous sommons d'amener . . . . . auraient le droit d'y résister s'ils croyaient notre sommation indue, et qu'ils eussent le moyen de repousser la force par la force. . . . . Il est donc faux que les vaisseaux rencontrés par les vaisseaux des Puissances belligérantes soient tenus de se laisser visiter sous peine d'être traités comme coupables envers celui qui leur en aurait fait l'injonction."

Si un navire neutre n'est pas en devoir de se soumettre à la visite, et a le droit d'y résister même par la force, lorsqu'il le peut, à plus forte raison on ne peut faire peser la responsabilité de la conduite et de la résistance de ce navire à la Puissance dont il porte le pavillon.

5ème Point.—Que les bandes de volontaires existantes soient dispersées, et que la formation de nouvelles bandes soit prévenue.

La première partie de ce point ne peut trouver son application. En effet, au moment où l'ultimatum a été présentée, et depuis, aucune bande de volontaires n'a existé en Grèce.

Pour ce qui est de l'avenir, le droit des gens n'impose aucun devoir et ne donne aucun droit au Gouvernement Grec pour empêcher ses sujets d'aller se battre en Crète ou ailleurs pour tel parti qu'il leur plairait. "Ce principe," dit Pinheiro Ferreira (Martens ii, Note 86), "ne saurait être admis que dans le code des nations où les hommes ne sont que des serfs attachés à la glèbe. Mais partout ailleurs où l'on saura que la liberté individuelle est un des droits de l'homme dont aucune loi positive ne peut le dépouiller, chacun pourra prendre le parti de telle nation actuellement en guerre qu'il croira à propos, sans que celle dont il fait partie, et qui reste neutre entre les deux belligérantes, ait droit de l'en empêcher, et par conséquent sans qu'elle en demeure responsable envers l'autre nation belligérante." Or, en Grèce, les hommes ne sont pas des serfs, et ce principe n'est pas admis dans le code. Des Grecs ont pris part à titre de volontaires à toutes les guerres récentes; des Européens de toutes nations se battaient aux Etats Unis, dans les rangs des armées du Nord ou du Sud; des Français en grand nombre ont souvent combattu pour les Polonais; la Grèce, pendant la Guerre de l'Indépendance, comptait parmi ses défenseurs des Français, des Anglais, des Allemands, compagnons d'armes de Fabrier, de Cochrane. Pendant les guerres civiles en Grèce, Tafilhisi, un Turc, qui occupe maintenant un poste important à Constantinople, venait avec une bande nombreuse s'enrôler dans les rangs de l'un des partis contendants, et dans la dernière insurrection contre le Roi Othon, des Turcs volontaires ont pris fait et cause pour les insurgés, sans que la Grèce songeât jamais à rendre la Porte responsable de la conduite de ses sujets. En Crète même, des volontaires des différentes parties de l'Europe soutiennent, par les armes, la cause des insurgés; et de l'autre côté, l'Anglais Hobart Pacha commande la flotte Turque. L'Angleterre n'y a pas mis d'empêchement; elle n'en avait pas le droit: mais dans son désir de garder une stricte neutralité, elle a refusé à ses officiers supérieurs l'autorisation de servir dans la flotte de l'un des belligérants: là se bornait son autorité. Il en est de même en Grèce. Son Gouvernement ne pouvait pas défendre à Petropoulaki d'aller, comme Hobart Pacha, courir les risques de la guerre en Crète; la Constitution et les lois du pays ne l'y autorisent point: mais il pouvait interdire à ses officiers et à ses soldats d'y participer; c'est ce qu'il a fait. Quelques soldats ayant déserté leurs corps pour suivre Pétropoulaki, le Ministre de la Guerre publia, antérieurement à l'ultimatum, des ordres sévères, fit arrêter plusieurs d'entre eux et les punit comme déserteurs. Les Annexes *sub lit.* A et B en font foi. Il remplit par là ce que lui imposaient les obligations internationales, en se prévalant du droit que lui accorde la législation du pays.

Mais en admettant que rien n'oblige ni n'autorise le Gouvernement Grec d'entraver la liberté des volontaires isolés qui veulent aller en Crète à leurs risques et périls, peut-être prétendra-t-on que c'est au départ de bandes armées qu'il peut et doit s'opposer. Il pourrait, pour le faire, profiter de l'Article 10 de la Constitution, lequel autorisant les

réunions sans armes, interdit implicitement les réunions armées; et aussi de l'Article 127 du Code Pénal Grec, qui punit de mort ceux qui, sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement, recrutent, ou se laissent recruter, ou qui s'arrogent un commandement sur terre ou sur mer; de même de l'Article 136, qui punit de deux années d'emprisonnement les recrutements non autorisés pour le service d'une Puissance étrangère. Enfin, on pourrait dire, si la Constitution et les lois du pays sont en désaccord avec les principes les plus sains du droit des gens, on doit changer ces lois et cette Constitution.

Ces observations ne peuvent être sérieusement défendues.

Pour appliquer au cas actuel l'Article de la Constitution et ceux du Code Pénal, il faut leur faire violence, et les interpréter d'une manière que leur sens comporte à peine, et qui est énergiquement repoussée par l'esprit public en Grèce. Des Articles du Code, le premier n'a trait qu'au recrutement pour le pays même qui est puni de mort: l'autre se rapporte seul à l'enrôlement pour l'étranger; il est beaucoup plus légèrement puni. Tous les deux sont des dispositions d'ordre purement intérieur, traitant non d'un devoir que le Gouvernement aurait de défendre la sécurité d'autres pays, mais des droits dont il est revêtu pour sauvegarder sa propre sécurité. Cela devient de toute évidence aussi par le titre aussi conçu du chapitre auquel ces Articles appartiennent: "Des crimes de haute trahison, de trahison à la patrie, et d'autres actes attentatoires à la sécurité et à l'indépendance de l'Etat."

On ne donnera sans doute jamais au Gouvernement Grec l'avis de faire bon marché de ses lois et de sa constitution; qu'il se fait un honneur et un devoir d'appliquer religieusement. Dans cette circonstance il serait même dans l'impossibilité de céder à un pareil avis; il se heurterait contre le sentiment de toute la nation. S'il se trouve un Ministère pour donner à la loi un sens qui lui permette de restreindre la liberté individuelle, s'il essaye de s'en servir pour couper les vivres aux Crétois et les prendre par la faim pour les forcer à la soumission, s'il veut, s'appuyant sur ce sens équivoque, empêcher le départ des volontaires, il est plus que probable qu'il soulèvera une opposition violente qui pourrait dégénérer en une anarchie dangereuse à la Grèce, à tous les pays limitrophes, et en général au repos du monde.

Enfin, il n'y a rien dans la constitution et les lois Grecques qui doive être changé comme contrevenant au principe du droit des gens ci-dessus énoncé, la liberté pour les citoyens d'aller à leurs risques et périls se battre pour qui ils veulent; et cette liberté étant admise les autres prohibitions demandées sont sans nulle portée, car les volontaires qui voudraient partir pourraient avec la plus grande facilité échapper à toute poursuite, en évitant de se recruter régulièrement, ce qu'ils n'ont du reste jamais fait, ou même de se réunir en armes ou désarmés jusqu'au dernier moment lorsqu'ils seraient hors de portée du Gouvernement Grec.

Il est peut-être opportun de rappeler également que des bandes armées de brigands, recrutées en Turquie, envahissent périodiquement le territoire Grec. La Grèce, qui en souffre dans ses intérêts les plus réels, n'en a jamais rendu la Turquie responsable. Elle s'en est seulement plainte, parce que la Porte a toujours négligé d'exécuter un Traité en vigueur, lequel serait la meilleure sauvegarde de la Grèce contre ces invasions. Les brigands sont cependant des ennemis communs que tout Gouvernement se doit à lui-même de réprimer et de punir.

Conséquences de l'Ultimatum.

Mais la Porte ne s'est pas bornée à envoyer à la Grèce un ultimatum si peu motivé. Elle l'a aussi accompagné et fait suivre de mesures violentes, qui ont de beaucoup aggravé les difficultés de la situation. Un de ses officiers de marine à poursuivi avec des intentions hostiles, dans l'Archipel Grec, un navire marchand sous pavillon Hellénique, a menacé de voies de fait et a tenu bloqué un des ports du pays. Les sujets Grecs ont reçu l'intimation de quitter la Turquie dans un très bref délai, au grand détriment de leurs intérêts matériels, et les ports Turcs ont été fermés aux bâtiments de Grèce, causant à son commerce des pertes incalculables. Celle-ci n'a point usé de représailles. Elle considère comme un devoir qui lui est fait par la justice et l'humanité, de limiter le plus possible les effets désastreux d'une rixe, et de ne pas les faire peser sur des innocents. Elle a déclaré que les sujets Ottomans établis sur son territoire continueraient à jouir de la protection de ses lois. Au Contre-Amiral Turc elle a, conformément à un avis de jurisconsultes, dont copie annexée *sub lit.* C, reconnu le droit de citer devant les Tribunaux compétents le Capitaine de "l'Enosis," de la conduite duquel il prétend avoir à se plaindre.

Ayant montré un tel esprit de modération, la Grèce est en droit d'exiger, avant de reprendre ses anciens rapports d'amitié avec la Turquie, que la Turquie autorise de son

côté la mise en jugement du Contre-Amiral Turc pour les plaintes portées contre lui par le capitaine de "l'Enosis," qu'elle donne réparation pour le traitement qu'elle a fait subir à la Grèce, et qu'elle indemnise celle-ci de toutes les pertes très-considérables que lui ont occasionnées les mesures ordonnées par la Porte. Enfin, qu'elle offre des garanties réelles qu'elle traiterait à l'avenir les Grecs de même que les nationaux des autres Puissances Européennes.

Résumé.

Pour résumer ces considérations, nous dirons que la Grèce décline la responsabilité des causes immédiates de la présente rupture, se réservant de revenir sur les causes plus reculées, si la question en était soulevée; que des cinq points de l'ultimatum les deux premiers, dans l'ordre dans lequel ils sont énumérés dans ce mémoire, sont de nulle importance; que le troisième est entièrement et sans restriction admis par la Grèce; que les deux autres sont repoussés par les principes du droit des gens, aussi bien que par la législation du pays; que par conséquent la Grèce ne pourrait s'y soumettre sans renoncer à ses droits, et sans fouler aux pieds les libertés de ses citoyens, sans s'exposer enfin à des conséquences qui pourraient être grosses de dangers pour elle et non moins pour les autres.

L'ultimatum devrait être entièrement retiré en partie comme inopportun, en partie comme injuste, et la Turquie devrait examiner par les Tribunaux compétents la conduite du Contre-Amiral, et accorder à la Grèce des réparations et des indemnités qu'un examen équitable prouverait lui être dues, de même que des garanties de traiter réellement ses nationaux, à l'avenir, comme ceux des nations les plus favorisées, ainsi qu'elle s'y est engagée par des Traités.

Le Gouvernement Grec de son côté promettrait de la manière la plus formelle :—

1. De ne mettre aucun obstacle au départ des Crétois qui désireraient se rapatrier; de ne permettre à aucune autorité et à aucun de ses sujets de s'y opposer; de punir enfin sévèrement tous ceux qui le tenteraient;

2. De ne permettre à aucun officier, sous-officier, soldat ou employé civil de l'État de prendre les armes pour les insurgés;

3. De ne pas permettre que des bâtiments de l'État, armés en guerre ou autrement, aillent porter des munitions et des secours aux Crétois.

4. D'autoriser la mise en accusation du capitaine de "l'Enosis," sur une dénonciation en règle du Contre-Amiral Turc.

Annex A.

General Milios to M. Delyanni.

(Traduction.)

M. le Ministre et cher Collègue, *Athènes, le* $\frac{21 \text{ Novembre}}{3 \text{ Décembre}}$ 1868.

A LA suite de notre conversation relative aux désertions qui ont lieu dans les rangs de l'armée pour le recrutement opéré par le Chef Petropoulaki, j'ai également l'honneur de vous communiquer par la présente, les mesures déjà prises par mon Département pour l'arrestation des déserteurs, et pour prévenir le renouvellement des désertions.

Le Commandant militaire d'Athènes ayant conçu des soupçons sur la désertion d'hommes de différents corps de la garnison de la capitale, a pris des mesures pour les prévenir, ainsi que pour l'arrestation de ceux qui quitteraient leurs rangs. En effet, le Commandant de Place du Pirée a arrêté d'abord 15 soldats, puis hier 4 autres ayant quitté leurs rangs. Quelques déserteurs ont pu s'échapper en se revêtant d'habits bourgeois.

Les soldats arrêtés ont été punis disciplinairement; ils avaient été arrêtés avant l'expiration du délai légal accordé en pareil cas par le Code Pénal; une enquête judiciaire a été ouverte contre ceux qui ont déserté à l'étranger.

Informé le $\frac{13}{25}$ de ce mois, par un rapport du Commandant de Place de Nauplie, et par un autre rapport de celui de Tripolitza, de la désertion de 24 soldats de la garnison dans la première ville, et de 17 dans l'autre, j'ai donné l'ordre par le télégraphe au Commandant de la Gendarmerie de la Laconie, d'après la direction prise par les déserteurs, indiquée par les rapports des autorités militaires, de les faire arrêter et de les renvoyer à leurs corps respectifs. J'ai en même temps donné l'ordre aux chefs de ces corps de faire interroger les déserteurs et de leur appliquer des peines disciplinaires.

Je ne me suis pas borné là; j'ai adressé une circulaire aux autorités militaires. Vous en trouverez, ci-joint, copie. Elle a pour but, ainsi que vous voudrez bien l'observer,

d'éclairer les soldats sur les graves conséquences de la désertion et d'en prévenir le retour.

Informé enfin aujourd'hui que le détachement du bataillon qui se trouve à Gythion faisait craindre des désertions, j'ai donné l'ordre, par le télégraphe, d'y envoyer un officier avec mission spéciale de prévenir une pareille éventualité et de diriger ailleurs ce détachement.

En un mot, M. le Ministre et cher Collègue, je persisterai, en ce qui concerne les désertions, à l'application des mesures prescrites par ma circulaire. J'userai de la plus grande sévérité. Les soldats de l'armée Royale ne doivent, en aucun cas, abandonner leurs rangs. De promptes et vigoureuses mesures ont été prises contre les déserteurs, en vertu de ma circulaire.

Le Ministre,
(Signé) S. MILIOS.

Annex B.

General Milios to the Military Authorities of Greece.

(Traduction.) *Athènes, le* $\frac{18}{30}$ *Novembre*, 1868.

NOUS observons, avec regret, des rapports qui nous parviennent des diverses autorités militaires, que depuis quelque temps les cas de désertions se sont accrus dans les différents corps de l'armée et principalement dans les régiments de ligne.

Nos précédentes instructions qui prescrivent l'application de peines contre les déserteurs peuvent, croyons-nous, servir à les prévenir. En apprenant en effet, qu'ils sont passibles de poursuites, après une condamnation par défaut, même après leur quarante-cinquième année, les déserteurs comprendront qu'ils ne peuvent pas être déchargés des conséquences de leur désertion, par un repentir et un retour tardifs.

Nous vous invitons donc à observer, d'un côté, cette instruction en dénonçant, en temps opportun, chaque cas de désertion ressortissant de votre commandement, en rappelant, de l'autre, aux militaires placés sous vos ordres, qu'en abandonnant leurs rangs et en n'y rentrant point avant le temps déterminé, pour prévenir des poursuites, ils seront passibles des peines de la désertion.

Le Ministre,
(Signé) S. MILIOS.

Annex C.

Opinion of Greek Lawyers respecting the "Enosis."

SUR la question ci-après posée par le Gouvernement :—

"Le Gouvernement Hellénique est-il tenu, d'après le droit des gens, d'accepter d'une manière absolue la demande du Contre-Amiral de Turquie tendante à faire mettre en jugement le Capitaine du bâteau-à-vapeur "l'Enosis?"

Nous opinons unanimement ce qui suit :—

Selon les lois Helléniques et le droit des gens chacun peut, soit par dénonciation directe, soit par la voie diplomatique, porter plainte contre toute personne pour un méfait quelconque, en se conformant aux prescriptions de l'Article 149 du Code d'Instruction Criminelle en vigueur.

Mais, comme les dépêches du Contre-Amiral de Turquie n'ont pas cette forme, elle ne sauraient être considérées comme une dénonciation. Nous ajoutons, d'ailleurs, que ses griefs contre le steamer "Enosis" ne sauraient donner lieu à une poursuite, attendu que selon l'aveu même du Contre-Amiral, c'est lui qui attaqua le premier "l'Enosis" dans les eaux Grecques, plutôt dans le but de s'en emparer que de le visiter; tandis que d'après le droit des gens, il n'avait dans aucun cas ce droit, en cas même qu'il se serait trouvé dans une distance de six milles de Syra. Il a été d'ailleurs constaté que l'attaque eut lieu à une distance d'un demi-mille et non à celle de six milles. L'attitude, en outre, du susdit Contre-Amiral, telle qu'elle apparait dans tous ses actes, pourrait plutôt être considérée comme un commencement d'hostilités. En conséquence, le Gouvernement Hellénique, non seulement n'est pas tenu d'après le droit des gens de donner l'ordre au Procureur du Roi de poursuivre contre le Capitaine de "l'Enosis" par devant les Tribunaux compétents, mais au contraire il est dans son droit de demander une réparation à la Turquie par la raison que, en pleine paix et pendant que les relation

outre elle et la Grèce subsistaient encore, des bâtiments de guerre Turcs se sont permis de donner la chasse, contrairement au droit des gens, à un navire sous pavillon Hellénique dans les eaux de la Grèce, et jusque dans la mer territoriale de la Grèce.

Mais outre la poursuite d'office de la part du Procureur du Roi, nos lois, Article 278 du Code d'Instruction Criminelle, ordonnent que quiconque se croit lésé par quelque Hellène, soit dans le Royaume Hellénique soit à étranger, peut en porter plainte par une dénonciation devant le Procureur du Roi compétent. Or, le Contre-Amiral de la Turquie pouvait conformément à notre législation déposer sa plainte en se conformant aux formalités voulues par notre législation, et, en ce cas, le Procureur du Roi compétent devait et doit, si la dénonciation est faite, la prendre en considération et y donner suite dans les limites de sa compétence et conformément aux lois.

Le Conseil,

(Signé) B. V. NICOLOPOULOS.
DIAMANTOPOULOS.
SARIPOLOS.
PROVILEGIOS.

No. 125.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 99. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 19, 1869.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette told me confidentially this afternoon that the Count de Solms de Sonnenwalde, the Prussian Minister, had come to him yesterday and put three questions to him.

After observing that Count Bismarck thought that the great Powers ought not to allow their decisions to be treated with contempt, M. de Solms had put his first question, and asked what steps should, in M. de Lavalette's opinion, be taken if either Turkey or Greece, or both of them, rejected the terms proposed by the Conference, or set them practically at nought after having adopted them.

To this question M. de Lavalette has, he said, replied that the Conference had been assembled on the distinct understanding that its mission was simply to reconcile Greece and Turkey by friendly counsel and mediation; that its advice was to be offered to the Contracting Powers, but not enforced by any coercive measures. He had gone on to say to M. de Solms that Prussia herself had suggested this course by proposing the Protocol of the Congress of Paris as the basis of the Conference. He had added that certainly when the Conference was dissolved, each Power would stand in the same position as before it met, and be at liberty to make such proposals to the others, and to follow such a policy, as its honour or its interests required; but that he would declare at once that France, and he might say England also, had no inclination to resort to force.

M. de Solms' second question was whether, in the opinion of M. de Lavalette, the connection between the Porte and Servia, and between the Porte and Roumania, or the Treaties upon which that connection was founded, entitled the Ottoman Government to call upon those Principalities to expel Hellenic subjects.

In answer to this question M. de Lavalette had, he told me, said that as the Porte had, by withdrawing the summons to expel the Hellenes, shown that it was not disposed to put the right to the test, he thought that no practical object would be attained by discussing it.

Thirdly, M. de Solms asked M. de Lavalette whether he considered that a rupture of diplomatic relations warranted a breach of Treaty engagements.

M. de Lavalette had, he said, answered that if M. de Solms put this to him as an abstract question of international law, he must confess himself to be unable and unwilling to take upon himself to lay down the rule; that, in fact, he could only refer M. de Solms to the accredited authors on public law. If, however, the question was asked as bearing upon the present dispute between Turkey and Greece, he must observe that it was not until after having endured for nearly three years a continual violation by Greece of her engagements and her international duties that the Porte had resorted to measures which were, of course, not such as were sanctioned by Treaties contemplating a state of amity and good neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 126.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 19, 1869.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette asked me confidentially yesterday whether I thought it would be advisable or not that he should read the declaration upon which the Conference had agreed to M. Rezo Rangabé, the Greek Minister.

I said that I was decidedly of opinion that he would do well to make M. Rangabé acquainted, as soon as possible, with the contents of this paper, and of any other documents, which would give him an exact idea of the decision of the Conference, and the mode in which it proposed to proceed towards Greece. I added that I should be glad if he should determine to invite M. Rangabé to make observations freely, and if he should communicate those observations to the Conference at its next sitting.

M. de Lavalette told me this afternoon that he had accordingly sent for M. Rangabé yesterday, and read to him not only the declaration, but a draft of a letter to accompany its transmission to Athens, which had been prepared, in conformity with the wish of the Conference, to be submitted to it at its next meeting. He had, he said, particularly begged M. Rezo to suggest any alterations which would render the letter more acceptible at Athens.

M. Rangabé appears to have expressed in general terms satisfaction both with the declarations and the proposed letter, but not to have discussed either in detail.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 127.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 20, 1862, 7·15 P.M.*

A SATISFACTORY announcement of the adhesion of the Porte to the declaration was made to-day to the Conference by the Turkish Plenipotentiary, and his initials and those of the other Plenipotentiaries were affixed to it.

The letter to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs inclosing the declaration will be sent to Athens by the packet which leaves Marseilles on Saturday

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No. 128.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 100. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 20, 1869.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 99 of the 19th instant, marked Confidential, containing an account given to you by M. de Lavalette of a conversation which he had with the Prussian Minister on the previous day.

The answer returned by M. de Lavalette to the first question put to him by the Count de Solms, the object of which was to elicit an opinion from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the course which should be pursued in the event of Turkey or Greece, or both of them, either rejecting the terms proposed by the Conference or neglecting, if they accepted, to comply with them, is consistent with the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the employment of force in support of the decisions of the Conference, as expressed in my despatch No. 65 of the 29th of December. The principle on which the Conference has been held is persuasion, not coercion; and, as I stated to you in my above-mentioned despatch, Her Majesty's Government could not at that time, neither can they now, contemplate the employment of coercive measures to enforce against either Party the recommendations of the Conference.

The Prussian Minister seems to have followed up his first question by a second question, the purport of which was to raise a doubt as to the right of the Porte to invoke the co-operation of the Governments of Servia and of the Principalities in

carrying out the measures which it had ordained against subjects of the Kingdom of Greece.

M. de Lavalette very justly declined to enter upon that question. There could, indeed, be no occasion for him to discuss it with the Prussian Minister; it did not come within the attributes of the Conference, and there was the less reason for entering upon it, inasmuch as neither the Servian nor the Roumanian Government would appear to have taken any exception against the course adopted by the Porte, and the Turkish Government had not invited any expression of opinion on the part of the Powers on the subject.

The last question put by the Prussian Minister would seem to have been even less called for than the preceding ones; and M. de Lavalette appears to have given a very appropriate reply when he declined to enter upon an abstract point of international law, which had no immediate bearing on the present state of affairs. The drift of the question, indeed, is not very evident, unless the object of the Prussian Minister was to suggest that a rupture of diplomatic relations without a declaration of war or commencement of hostilities is equivalent to war, and that, consequently, Turkey is at war with Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 129.

Consul Dickson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(Separate.)
My Lord, *Canea, Crete, January* 2, 1869.

IN continuation of my Report dated the 27th and 28th ultimo, I have the honour to state that the "Kossova," Turkish line of battleship, has just returned to Suda Bay, having conveyed to Syra on the night of the 30th ultimo, the elder Petropoulakis and other Hellenic volunteers, to the number of 864. These have all been treated with leniency and with consideration by the Turkish authorities ever since their surrender at Askyfo; the elder Petropoulakis being even allowed to carry his sword. The other volunteers have necessarily been all disarmed.

The Governor-General intended at first to retain Petropoulakis and about twenty other volunteers, as hostages, until his son Leonidas Petropoulakis, Mitza, Khionis, and other volunteers still on the island, being upwards of 100, should make their submission. On further consideration, however, his Excellency generously allowed them all to depart.

I may also remark that after the defeat of the volunteers at Kissos in Ayios Vassilios on the 24th ultimo, when, as has since transpired, their killed and wounded amounted to nearly 300, with but trifling casualties on the Turkish side, the elder Petropoulakis succeeded in rallying his followers at Kerami. Profiting by a thick fog, the shattered volunteer band made a forced march during the whole of that night through a cordon of Turkish pickets as far as Kallikrati, a distance of over twenty miles. On the latter plain they were further repulsed the following morning by Omer Naïli Pasha's column into Askyfo, with an additional loss of fifteen killed. On being summoned to surrender unconditionally by the Turkish commander at Askyfo, Petropoulakis at first insisted on negotiating for a formal capitulation on the plea of the French Consul's mediation, which having been offered too late could not, therefore, be entertained. Besides, Petropoulakis must have anticipated his inevitable fate as he was being driven towards Sphakia; such having been the course planned by the Turkish Generals. The total number of troops forming the various columns engaged in this last operation amounted to some 10,000.

There has been a raid made this week by Captain Goghonis in Apokorona, not far from Tzitzifo; and another on the submitted village of Therisso by Captain Hadgi Mikhali. Three Greeks were killed in the latter encounter. Hadgi Mikhali had also a narrow escape this morning near Lakos; and a bag containing his letters and official seal, &c., have been seized by the troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

No. 130.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 13.)
My Lord, *Athens, January* 13, 1869.

AS I am aware that Her Majesty's Government are earnestly endeavouring to persuade both the Turkish and Hellenic Governments to desist from all acts of aggression whilst the Conference is sitting, I have desired Her Majesty's Consul at Syra to omit no opportunity of urging Hobart Pasha to content himself with an assurance on the part of the Greek authorities that the "Enosis" will not be allowed to quit the port of Syra until the close of the judicial proceedings now pending against that vessel.

I requested Mr. Lloyd to point out to Hobart Pasha the inexpediency of injuring a good cause by enabling the Greek Government to accuse the Porte of having recourse to measures of coercion at the very time it had consented to submit its differences with Greece to the mediation of the Great Powers; but your Lordship will perceive by the inclosed extracts from Mr. Lloyd's recent correspondence, that the Nomarch of Syra continues to evade making any such declaration as that required by Hobart Pasha, although it had already been given by M. Delyanni in a private letter to the French Minister.

Both Baron Baude and I have repeatedly urged M. Delyanni to carry out his promise by authorizing the Nomarch of Syra to acquiesce in Hobart Pasha's demand; and he has invariably expressed astonishment that the Nomarch should hesitate to do so. No later than the day before yesterday he held this language both to my French colleague and myself, and he even assured Baron Baude that the Nomarch of Syra should be instructed immediately in this sense; but I am quite prepared to hear a few days hence, that the Nomarch still professes to be awaiting instructions from Athens to take officially an engagement which has already been taken informally by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is not, under these circumstances, surprising that Hobart Pasha should object to lose sight of the "Enosis;" and if the Conference is asked by the Greek Representative to require the immediate departure of Hobart Pasha from Greek waters, it is but fair that it should also be told why Hobart Pasha has hitherto persisted in occupying his present menacing position.

I transmit herewith an article extracted from a semi-official paper, called the "Messager d'Athènes," taking a very high—not to say menacing—tone with respect to the deliberations of the Paris Conference. M. Delyanni does not, when speaking officially, venture to raise pretensions so absurd as those advanced in this article; but every effort will doubtless be made by the Greek Plenipotentiary at Paris to compel the Conference to discuss the whole question of Greek aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey; and, should he fail in the attempt, the Greek Government will, I imagine, defy the Great Powers to have recourse to measures of coercion, or to acquiesce in a contest between Greece and Turkey, which must, in their opinion, ultimately bring on an European war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 130.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Sir, *Syra, January* 9, 1869.

HEREWITH I beg to forward translation of the reply of the Nomarch to the Consular note to him, forwarded in copy in my letter of the 5th of January, from which you will perceive that the Nomarch declines to reply to our questions relative to the "Enosis." I am told that all the lawyers at Syra were employed several hours in framing the reply, from which even the name of the vessel "Enosis" is carefully excluded, so anxious are they not to give Admiral Hobart any latitude for doing away with what the Greeks call occasions of provocation. All the witnesses for the prosecution named by Admiral Hobart have been examined; and it is said the list of those for the defence will soon be got through, and a decision come to that there is no case for trial. M. Hahn, the Austrian Consul-General, who is learned in Greek law, says that Hobart Pasha, not having constituted himself "partie civile" in the matter, the decision will

not necessarily be communicated at all to him; and that the moment the decision is made the "Enosis" will be free from arrest. I expect, however, that it may be communicated to him, if only for the purpose of depriving him of the pretext of remaining here for the purpose of the prosecution, unless, indeed, wishing to leave him in ignorance, the Greeks think he may thus be induced to commit an act of violence, and for that purpose, without giving him notice of the result of the examination, "Enosis" may be sent on a voyage to Piræus for instance, as the "Crete" was, as if nothing at all had happened to liberate her from arrest. I do not know what Admiral Hobart may do; he and his Turkish officers have had their patience severely tried; but I shall continue to say and do all I can to dissuade him from any act of violence here in Syra harbour at all all events. It has been blowing hard for the last three or four days, and I only saw Admiral Hobart yesterday for a few minutes when I gave him your last message. Just the weather now; there is no means for "Enosis" to run out, and I believe she is all ready, if only for the purpose of bravado. Should, however, the Greeks do so without giving Admiral Hobart notice of the result of no case for trial, it will be heartlessly and needlessly exposing the crew of "Enosis" to certain death.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. VINCENT LLOYD.

P.S.—3 P.M.—It is blowing so hard from north-east that the Turkish frigate outside the harbour has backed into it; and the iron-clad flag-ship, notwithstanding her two anchors down, seems to be driving unless she is slacking off her chain. "Crete" is supposed to be at Poros getting cleaned, as "Panhellenion" is doing here.

It was Tzaroloki, the Secretary of the General Assembly, who was killed at Asygonia; and Hadji Michali barely escaped elsewhere with the clothes he had on.

ST. V. L.

Inclosure 2 in No. 130.

The Nomarch of Syra to the Foreign Consuls.

(Translation.) *Syra, December* 25, 1868, o.s.

I HAVE received the note which you did me the honour o address to me yesterday, and I much regret not being able to answer categorically to the questions which you put to me in it, as the law does not allow to me any interference. In the judicial acts I cannot officially know what you desire to learn from me.

What I know on the subject, and is allowed to me officially to say, is already known to all; and certainly you, Messrs. Consuls, are not ignorant of it, as both verbally and in writing I have explained to you, and because it is for a matter which has been done, and which every one sees.

Receive, &c.
The Nomarch,
(Signed) G. P. DRACOPOULO.

Inclosure 3 in No. 130.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

(Extract.) *Syra, January* 11, 1869.

I HAD previously tried to induce Admiral Hobart not to wait here the result of his legal proceedings against the "Enosis," and again went to see him on the subject yesterday, as the examination of all his witnesses had terminated on Thursday last, I believe; but it would seem that his instructions enjoin him not to lose sight of the "Enosis," "Crete," and "Panhellenion." He, however, begged me to tell the Nomarch that he, Admiral Hobart was still waiting here for the result of the examinations, and that should the "Enosis" attempt to move before he was made acquainted with that result he would assuredly sink her there and then. I told the Nomarch what Admiral Hobart had commissioned me to say; he replied that he was fully aware of Admiral Hobart's intention: later, however, he asked me if Admiral Hobart was only waiting for

the purpose of learning the result of the investigations. I replied I did not know, nor what the Admiral would do afterwards.

This forenoon I received your letter of the 9th, and I again went to see Admiral Hobart. I informed him of the question of the Nomarch, and again urged all I could say to induce him to retire from Syra; and he begged me to see the Nomarch, and tell him that his (Admiral Hobart's) sole object in staying here now is to learn the result of the investigations; and further that if the Nomarch will give him a certificate in writing that the "Enosis" will not leave the port of Syra till the end of the investigation, he, Admiral Hobart, will not even wait for the result, but at once go away, and return in a day or two to learn the result, but not wait here at all.

I have just seen the Nomarch, who said that he could make no reply without referring to Athens, and which he would do this day.

Inclosure 4 in No. 130.

Extract from "Le Messager d'Athènes" of January 9, 1869.

Athènes, le 8 *Janvier*, 1869.

La Conférence.—Nous avons déjà annoncé que la Grèce avait été officiellement invitée à prendre part à la Conférence qui a été chargée de la mission délicate de régler le différend Turco-Hellénique.

Nous ne doutons pas des bonnes intentions des Puissances, ni de leur désir de prévenir la guerre entre la Grèce et la Turquie, mais nous ne pouvons qu'exprimer notre inquiétude en ce qui concerne les dispositions de certaines Puissances à notre égard.

La Grèce ne peut prendre part à la Conférence que dans le cas où elle s'y trouverait sur le même pied que la Turquie, et on ne peut, sans injustice, exiger qu'elle se soumette aux décisions de l'Aréopage Européen si l'on ne prend en sérieuse considération sa position politique et le sort fait aux populations Helléniques de la Turquie par le Traité de 1830.

Ce Traité, qui a séparé de la Grèce des populations Helléniques qui avaient combattu avec nous durant tout le cours de la guerre de l'indépendance, ce Traité qui n'a été qu'une injustice, que l'Europe expie depuis longtemps par les inquiétudes poignantes que lui causent à tout moment l'attitude de ces populations,—ce Traité, disons-nous, devrait être soigneusement révisé si l'on tient à fonder en Orient quelque chose de stable et à le dégager des exigences des diverses Chancelleries Européennes qui l'ont choisi pour champ de bataille de leurs intrigues diplomatiques.

La Conférence ne saurait donc aboutir qu'en se conformant au droit naturel, qu'en écoutant la voix de la justice et de l'humanité, en un mot en faisant bon marché des prétentions plus ou moins avouées de chacune des Puissances pour s'occuper exclusivement de l'intérêt des populations Orientales.

La Grèce ne saurait adhérer autrement à la Conférence ni admettre en principe que la Turquie y soit plus favorisée. A une paix honteuse elle doit préférer la guerre et toutes ses horreurs, et avoir l'air de céder sous la pression réelle ou apparente de l'Europe ce serait reculer et laisser détruire notre prestige chez les populations Chrétiennes de l'Orient.

Ce prestige est aussi nécessaire au repos de l'Orient et de l'Europe qu'à la dignité de la Grèce. Tout ce qui l'amoindrit doit être regardé comme une calamité nationale, comme un pas que la civilisation fait en arrière; car les plus aveugles même reconnaissent que la race Hellène est aujourd'hui l'intermédiaire naturel de la civilisation entre l'Occident et l'Orient comme elle l'a été autrefois entre l'Orient et l'Occident.

Nous pouvons, d'ailleurs, affirmer sans crainte d'être démentis, que le Gouvernement du Roi ne se soumettra à aucune condition qui serait de nature à porter atteinte à ce prestige, cette condition-là fût-elle imposée par toutes les Puissances, et que l'égalité pleine et entière avec la Turquie devant la Conférence sera une condition *sine qua non* de son adhésion.

No. 131.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 8, 1869.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Grand Vizier the expression of the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the Porte would not press for the postponement of the meeting of the Conference, and that they would abstain from all acts of hostility. His Highness, at the invitation of the French Ambassador, had already consented to the immediate assembling of the Conference, the delay having been desired to give time for the arrival of the instructions forwarded to the Ambassador at Paris the day before; and he authorized me to give your Lordship the most positive assurances that the Porte has no intention whatever of commencing hostilities; but, if Greek bands cross the frontier into Turkey, they will not only be repulsed, but, as a matter of legitimate defence, will be pursued into the Hellenic territory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 132.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 12, 1869.*

I YESTERDAY communicated to the Grand Vizier the substance of your Lordship's instructions, which had reached me the night before, stating that Her Majesty's Government considered that the Porte would do well to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Conference to make by its Plenipotentiary a spontaneous declaration of the principles by which the Sultan is guided with reference to his non-Mussulman subjects.

Notwithstanding the marked desire which Aali Pasha constantly exhibits of showing his deference to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, he, on this occasion, at once expressed his regret that it did not seem to him desirable to act in the manner suggested.

He considers that a Declaration, such as that proposed by your Lordship, would infallibly provoke the discussion which he is most anxious to avoid; for that the Russian Ambassador would gladly seize the opportunity of contradicting the statement, and of raising a discussion upon the condition of the Christians.

His Highness greatly hopes that the Protocols of the Conference may contain no record of anything whatever being touched upon, apart from the questions it was called upon to deal with; but when the Conference is closed, he will be ready to make to the different Governments a Declaration in the sense advocated by your Lordship.

I said, that it seemed to me that it would, on the contrary, be more advantageous to make such a Declaration before the closing of the Conference; but his Highness repeated that although he would willingly make it to Her Majesty's Government, he could not do it to all.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 133.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 11, 1868.*

WHEN I saw Aali Pasha this morning I had not yet received your Lordship's telegraphic instructions, which have just reached me, directing me to support the Marquis de Lavalette's telegram to M. Bourée, expressing the unanimous desire of the Conference that the Porte would suspend, till its close, the execution of the measures threatened in the ultimatum to Greece.

I nevertheless told his Highness that I was satisfied M. de Lavalette correctly represented the wishes of Her Majesty's Government; and I begged him to consider the communication as coming equally from your Lordship.

No. 130*.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *Athens, January 14, 1869.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 25th December last, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a note which has been addressed to me by M. Delyanni denying the right of the Ionian Bank to protest against the intended issue of 15,000,000 drachmas in inconvertible Treasury notes.

I likewise inclose a copy of letter and of its inclosures from the General Manager of the Ionian Bank, describing the circumstances under which he has been compelled to join the National Bank in promising to advance a sum of 21,000,000 drachmas to the Hellenic Government, in order to avert the inevitable ruin which would have been entailed on both establishments if the Government had carried into execution the Ordinance of the 4th instant.

I further inclose an article extracted from the semi-official newspaper, the "Messager d'Athènes," threatening the National Bank with popular vengeance in the event of its continuing to refuse the pecuniary assistance demanded by the Government; and I may add that this threat is equally applicable to the Ionian Bank, which occupies precisely the same position in the Ionian Islands as that of the National Bank here.

Under the pressure thus exercised a loan of 21,000,000 drachmas has been literally extorted from the two banks—the share of the National Bank being 10,000,000 in paper and 4,000,000 in cash, whilst that of the Ionian Bank is 5,000,000 in paper and 4,000,000 in cash.

I am anxiously awaiting your Lordship's instructions to know whether Her Majesty's Government would feel justified in invoking the VIIth Article of the Treaty of March 29, 1864, as a ground of interference in behalf of the Ionian Bank. Should Her Majesty's Government be unable to exert their influence in this matter, I feel confident that the Greek Government will shortly again have recourse to the means by which it has now succeeded in procuring funds, which are no less out of all proportion with the natural resources of this country than of the two Banks.

Should Her Majesty's Government not see fit to invoke Article VII of the Treaty of 1864, they might possibly be disposed to seek the co-operation of France and Russia in putting a stop to these extravagant financial schemes, on the ground that they are a violation of the rights secured to the three Guaranteeing Powers of the Greek loan of 1832.

I have, &c

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 130*.

M. Delyanni to Mr. Erskine.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le* [illegible]

J'AI reçu la lettre que vous m'avez adressée le 25 Décembre, ainsi que la protestation y annexée, en copie, de M. C. L. W. Merlin, agissant au nom de la Banque Ionienne, contre le projet qu'aurait le Gouvernement du Roi d'émettre du papier-monnaie ayant cours forcé, ou de retirer le numéraire de la Banque Nationale de Grèce, en rendant obligatoire la circulation de ses billets.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire observer, en réponse, M. le Ministre, que dans l'opinion du Gouvernement du Roi, opinion corroborée par l'avis des jurisconsultes qu'il a consultés, cette protestation ne reposant sur aucune violation des Traités, ou des principes du droit des gens, ou de la législation du pays, ne saurait être justifiée ni avoir aucun effet.

En ce qui concerne le premier point, il est évident que la Banque Ionienne a pour but d'empêcher le Gouvernement Royal d'exercer un droit inhérent aux attributs de souveraineté, et que tous les Etats indépendants, dans ces circonstances analogues aux nôtres, ont exercé sans souffrir le contrôle d'aucun autre Gouvernement, ni d'aucune société indigène ou étrangère. La prétention de la Banque Ionienne est d'autant plus singulière à ce sujet que l'exercice d'un semblable droit ne porte aucune atteinte aux droits et privilèges acquis par cette Banque, ainsi que cela ressort de la loi du ci-devant Etat Ionien sur l'établissement de Banques.

En ce qui concerne le second point, si le Gouvernement du Roi se voyait en effet obligé de se mettre en possession du numéraire de la Banque Nationale, en décidant que les billets de la Banque auraient cours forcé, il ne ferait que prendre une mesure que

d'autres Etats, dans des circonstances plus ou moins exceptionnelles, tels que la Grande Bretagne pendant ses longues guerres avec la France, l'Autriche, et l'Italie, de nos jours n'ont pas hésité à prendre. Notre droit donc de prendre cette mesure est incontestable, et la Banque Nationale de Grèce elle-même ne saurait y opposer aucune objection valable. Il s'ensuit que des tiers, comme la Banque Ionienne, seraient d'autant moins en droit d'en faire le sujet de plaintes ou de protestations que d'après la Loi du $\frac{10}{22}$ Décembre, le Gouvernement du Roi peut imposer un emprunt forcé.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 130*.

Mr. Merlin to Mr. Erskine.

Ionian Bank, Athens, January 12, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a Royal Decree respecting a loan of 21,000,000 drachmas (756,000*l.* sterling) made by the National and Ionian Banks to the Hellenic Government, on the condition that it should withdraw the Royal Ordinance of [December 23, 1868 / January 4, 1869], authorising the State to issue 15,000,000 of inconvertible paper money.

The only option I had in this matter, as General Manager of the Ionian Bank, was to accede to this arrangement, in concert with the National Bank of Greece, or see the Ionian Bank irretrievably ruined in the course of a few days.

Had the paper money of the Government been ready and appeared at the same time as the Royal Decree authorizing its issue, the Banks could not have met their engagements in it, and their ruin would have been deferred; but the mere announcement that the Executive was going to issue paper money, unaccompanied by the appearance of the paper itself, naturally caused a run upon the banks which no similar establishment in any part of the world could withstand; not even the Banks of England and France.

I have not had time to communicate with the Directors of the Ionian Bank in London, and am consequently ignorant if they will accept my arrangement with the Hellenic Government or not. It therefore rests with them either to hold the Government of His Hellenic Majesty responsible for this act of the Executive or not, as they may consider most advisable for the interests of the Ionian Bank; otherwise, I do not see the value of the VIIth Article of the Treaty between Great Britain and the Hellenic Government, ceding the Ionian Islands to Greece.

It is earnestly to be desired that the three Protecting Powers, who are directly interested in the financial prosperity of Greece, should insist that the Hellenic Government shall keep faith with the Banks, and that no further accommodation shall be extorted from them on any protest whatever.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. L. W. MERLIN, *General Manager*.

Inclosure 3 in No. 130*.

Royal Decree respecting a Loan of 21,000,000 *drachmas.*

GEORGE I, Roi des Hellènes—

Vu l'Article 2 de la Loi du 10 Décembre de cette année, sub No. 298, et le contrat sous la date d'aujourd'hui passé entre notre Ministre des Finances, d'un côté, et MM. George Stavros, en qualité de Gouverneur de la Banque Nationale de Grèce, et C. L. W. Merlin, en qualité d'Inspecteur et Gouverneur-Général des établissements de la Banque Ionienne en Grèce, de l'autre côté, notre Conseil des Ministres entendu, nous avons décidé et ordonnons :—

Article 1. Nous révoquons notre Ordonnance du 23 Décembre de cette année concernant l'émission de papier monnaie.

Art. 2. La Banque Nationale prête au Gouvernement 14,000,000 drachmes, dont 4,000,000 drachmes en espèces sonnantes, d'après le Tarif en vigueur, et 10,000,000 drachmes en ses billets de banque. La Banque Ionienne, de son côté, prête au Gouvernement 7,000,000 drachmes, dont 2,000,000 drachmes en espèces sonnantes, également d'après le Tarif, et 5,000,000 drachmes en ses billets de banque.

Art. 3. Le Gouvernement payera aux deux Banques, contre la somme empruntée en

métallique, un intérêt annuel de 6 pour cent, qui sera versé chaque sémestre en espèces sonnantes, et contre la somme empruntée en billets de banque une commission annuelle de 1½ pour cent uniquement, qui sera remise chaque sémestre en billets de banque.

Art. 4. A partir de la présente Ordonnance la conversion des billets des dites Banques en espèces est suspendue; ces billets seront donnés et reçus dans tout l'Etat obligatoirement comme monnaie légale, à leur valeur nominale, dans tous les paiements et toutes les perceptions du Trésor public sans exception, ainsi qu'entre particuliers, banques, sociétés, et corporations de toute nature, à quelque titre que ce soit, nonobstant toute stipulation contraire préexistante.

Art. 5. Sont exceptés des dispositions de l'Article précédent les paiements du prix de l'émeri public et de l'impôt sur les scories et sur le plomb de Laurium, qui seront effectués en espèces sonnantes, d'après le Tarif R en vigueur.

Art. 6. La valeur nominale des billets de la Banque Ionienne, énoncée en piastres d'Espagne, correspond à 6 drachmes à chaque piastre.

Art. 7. Tant que dure la suspension de la convertibilité en espèces des billets des dites Banques, et leur cours forcé, la Banque Nationale ne peut avoir en circulation des billets de banque au-delà de la somme de 36,000,000 drachmes, non-obstant toute disposition contraire de ses statuts, ni la Banque Ionienne au-delà de 12,000,000 drachmes, non-obstant également toute disposition contraire de sa loi constitutive.

Sont compris dans les dites sommes les billets de chaque Banque actuellement en circulation. Ces Banques sont tenues de publier mensuellement par quelques journaux l'état de la circulation de leurs billets de banque.

Art. 8. Dans les limites de l'Article précédent il est permis à la Banque Nationale d'avoir en circulation des billets de banque de dix drachmes jusqu'à concurrence de 6,000,000 de drachmes, y compris ceux qui sont actuellement en circulation; il est également permis à la Banque Ionienne d'avoir en circulation des billets de banque de 2 piastres, soit 12 drachmes, jusqu'à concurrence de 2,000,000 de drachmes.

Art. 9. La suspension de la convertibilité en espèces des billets de banque et leur cours forcé, d'après les dispositions de l'Article 4, dureront jusqu'à ce que le Gouvernement acquitte envers les dites Banques entièrement les emprunts respectifs que chacune d'elles a fait au fisc, à savoir, 14,000,000 de la Banque Nationale et 7,000,000 de la Banque Ionienne, avec leurs intérêts. Le paiement aura lieu à la Banque Nationale, pour les 10,000,000 et la commission y afférente, en ses billets de banque; et pour les 4,000,000 et leurs intérêts, en espèces sonnantes, d'après le Tarif R en vigueur, à la Banque Ionienne, pour les 5,000,000 et la commission y afférente, en ses billets de banque; et pour les 2,000,000 et leurs intérêts, en espèces sonnantes, également d'après l'Ordonnance Royale en vigueur.

Art. 10. Toutes les fois que le Gouvernement remettra aux Banques, en acquittement de cette dette, leurs propres billets de banque, la somme des billets que chaque Banque peut émettre en vertu de la présente Ordonnance sera réduite d'une somme égale.

Toutes les fois que le fisc comptera à ces Banques des espèces en acquittement du capital du dit emprunt, les Banques sont obligées à garder ces espèces dans les caisses sans pouvoir en faire usage.

Art. 11. Les revenus des salines et des viviers sont donnés en nantissement aux deux Banques, afin que les intérêts et la commission des dits emprunts soient perçus par ces Banques sur ces revenus.

Art. 12. Nous nous réservons de régler prochainement par une Ordonnance spéciale tout ce qui concerne la garantie et l'amortissement de l'emprunt contracté en conformité des dispositions ci-dessus.

Notre Ministre des Finances est chargé de la publication et de l'exécution de la présente Ordonnance.

Athènes, le 30 Décembre, 1868.

(Signé) GEORGE.

(Signé) D. G. BULGARIS.
P. DELYANNI.
M. C. KANARIS.
S. MILIOS.
A. MAVROMICHALIS.
S. C. ANTONOPOULOS.
S. VALAORITIS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 130*.

Extract from "Le Messager d'Athènes" of January 9, 1869.

ENCORE LA BANQUE NATIONALE.—Ce n'est pas sans un sentiment de légitime indignation que nous avons flétri, comme elle le méritait, la conduite de la Banque Nationale dans ses rapports et ses négociations avec le Gouvernement.

Aucune justification ne nous paraît admisible dans les circonstances critiques où nous sommes, et nous ne serons pas les derniers à qualifier sévèrement cette conduite injustifiable de la Banque dans le cas où elle persisterait dans sa coupable obstination à faire de l'opposition quand même au moment où il faut le concours de tous pour conjurer les dangers qui menacent l'Hellénisme.

La position de la Banque est toujours critique ; on nous affirme que les pourparlers qu'elle a de nouveau entamés avec le Gouvernement ne sont que pour jeter de la poudre aux yeux et pour tromper le public sur les véritables dispositions de la Banque.

Nous souhaitons être dans l'erreur et voir ces nouvelles négociations aboutir à un résultat satisfaisant, mais nous ne l'espérons pas.

L'espace nous manque pour développer aujourd'hui cette question, dans laquelle le mauvais vouloir de la Banque peut causer au pays d'irréparables désastres. Mais si cela arrive le pays jugera la Banque sans aucune indulgence, et le Gouverneur et ses Sous-Gouverneurs assument devant lui une lourde responsabilité.

Que la Banque y prenne garde, les peuples n'ont pas d'habitudes diplomatiques et ont une manière sommaire de juger qui, pour être plus expéditive, n'en est pas moins terrible et moins formidable que celle du jury.

Dans notre prochain numéro nous donnerons tous les details de cette scandaleuse affaire qui peut amener la ruine de la Banque, et causer, dans un autre sens, des pertes sensibles au pays.

I shall now inform his Highness that I have since been instructed warmly to support it.

The Grand Vizier said, he was at some loss to gather exactly the nature of the invitation thus addressed to him.

The different Governments were aware that the expulsion of the Greek subjects had already been entirely suspended, with the exception of the cases of a few turbulent individuals. The Turkish subjects, improperly furnished with Greek passports, were being dealt with with the greatest moderation, and no particular time was fixed within which they must reassume their original nationality.

His Highness said, he was ready to engage that there should now be even less precipitancy than before in carrying out this measure, which was one that the Porte meant to adhere to, independently of the questions at present under the consideration of the Conference.

I remarked, that the abuse that had taken place with regard to Greek passports was one which the Porte would be quite right to remedy, but which need not be so summarily dealt with.

The Grand Vizier repeated, that the measure should not be abruptly carried out, but that it would be necessary to adhere to its principle.

He then asked, whether he were to understand that the Porte was invited to suspend the prohibition against Greek vessels from entering the Turkish waters.

If this was meant, he must answer without equivocation that he could not possibly consent to it.

The Porte did not know what the issue of the Conference might be, and, without having obtained the smallest satisfaction from Greece, they could not temporarily suspend a prohibition which they might have to reimpose at the end of eight or ten days.

The Turkish Government would do all that depended upon them to avoid commencing or provoking hostilities, and orders in this sense were sent to their authorities; but they will not submit to be attacked by the Greeks without retaliation, and the Greek Government will be held responsible for anything that may occur, if armed bands should penetrate into the Turkish provinces.

As long as the Greeks respect the Turkish territory, that of Greece shall be equally respected, but more than this he will not promise.

I said that there was one evidence of moderation which it was now in the power of the Porte to offer without injury to themselves. The presence of Admiral Hobart at Syra was a source of irritation to Greece, and might lead to fresh difficulties; and as the Greek authorities seemed to have consented that the case of the "Enosis" should be regularly investigated, the object of his remaining there had ceased to exist.

I hoped, therefore, his Highness would consent to instruct the Admiral now to abandon the attitude he had assumed in that port.

Aali Pasha did not take any engagement to act as I suggested, but he showed himself favourably disposed, and promised to consult his colleagues.

A few hours later I learnt that, on being subsequently appealed to by the Russian Ambassador in the same sense he had replied that he was willing to recall Admiral Hobart from Syra if the Greek Government gave an assurance that the "Enosis" should not be allowed to escape till the investigation of the charge against her had been completed, or till the Powers assembled in Conference had come to some decision with regard to her.

General Ignatieff informs me that he at once telegraphed to Athens this decision of the Porte, which appears to meet the requirements of the case.

In speaking on this subject to the Grand Vizier, I reminded him how necessary it was to keep the complaints made against the Greek Government in respect of the "Enosis" distinct from the charge against that vessel of having been a regular blockade-runner. If he required the Greek Government to prevent private vessels from trying, at their own risk and peril, to evade the Turkish cruisers, he would be asking more than could be demanded of a free Government, and I hoped the Porte would therefore be careful not to go beyond the more legitimate grounds of complaint which they might have with regard to the proceedings of these vessels, or to the encouragement afforded to them by the Greek Government.

I have, &c
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT

No. 134.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 12, 1869.

THE feeling produced upon the Porte by the request of the Conference for the suspension of the measures adopted in conformity with the declaration contained in the ultimatum is evidently of an uncomfortable description.

The Conference itself, as your Lordship is aware, has from the first been viewed with misgiving and distrust, and is still regarded as a device proceeding from a hostile source, to prevent the Porte from obtaining through her own unaided means, and in the manner that would have been adopted by any one of the Powers of which the Conference is composed, the satisfaction to which she conceives herself entitled.

The appeal made to her yesterday is looked upon as justifying the apprehension lest the Porte should be obliged to choose between a line of conduct which she regards as injurious or one which, at the outset, might place her in opposition to the wishes of the Powers, and the impression it was calculated to create was not diminished by the fact of the Porte having been first made acquainted with it through an uncyphered telegram to the Russian Ambassador, of which a copy, as is usual in all Continental Governments, was sent by the telegraph office to the Porte.

M. de Lavalette's telegram to the French Ambassador was, on the contrary, sent in cypher, as such communications commonly are.

Aali Pasha, on reading the appeal made to the Porte "not to render more difficult the task the Powers had accepted," exclaimed, "Accepted! why do they not say, 'have taken upon themselves?' Certainly the Porte never asked them to accept it." And I have heard a similar remark made by many besides his Highness.

In fact, by the Turks the Conference is regarded as having been convoked by the European Governments solely and entirely for their own interests and for their own convenience.

They say that, even if they obtain through it complete satisfaction to all their demands, they will be in a less advantageous position than if they had shown that they had the means of obtaining it for themselves.

They treat as chimerical the danger which some European Governments profess to feel of a movement in the Christian provinces of the Empire, and in the vexation, which they feel at being impeded in their perfect independence of action, they are disposed to underrate the evils that must result from an entire rupture with Greece, and the dangers to which the Empire must be exposed from the complications which might spring out of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 135.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 12, 1869.

I AM assured upon all sides that the Greeks resident here are perfectly contented to remain under the protection of the Turkish law.

They seem under no apprehension of being annoyed, and the respectable portion are far from displeased at the departure of a certain number of turbulent and ill-conducted individuals.

The greater part admit frankly enough that their Government had given sufficient provocation to the Porte to account for the measures that had been adopted; but some of them endeavour to find excuses for it, by alleging the instigation of false friends, who encouraged them to persist in the persuasion that they could do so with impunity.

Seeing themselves likely to be abandoned to the natural consequences of their proceedings, they now exhibit a good deal of bitterness against those whom they accuse of misleading them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 136.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 26.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 13, 1869.

A BLUE Book has been issued at Athens containing despatches from M. P. Delyanni, the late Greek Minister here; and, although it will not be possible for me to forward translations of these documents by the present messenger, as your Lordship may perhaps have received them from Athens or from some other quarter, I feel called upon at once to contest the accuracy of much of the reports given by M. Delyanni of the conversations in which I am represented to have taken a part.

M. Bourée also informs me that, as far as he is concerned, they are likewise, in great part, imaginary.

The language which M. Delyanni asserts the Russian Ambassador to have held to M. Bourée and myself differs so greatly from that which was actually used, that I must confine myself to stating, without attempting to explain, the fact.

To us he freely admitted that the Porte had right upon its side, and that its demands were warranted, although he greatly blamed the precipitancy of the measures by which it was proposed to enforce them; and he never argued, as asserted by M. Delyanni, that they were such as the Greek Government could not accept.

In my previous reports to Her Majesty's Government, I have already observed that neither General Ignatieff nor M. Delyanni could be induced to point out one of the demands of the Porte which might be regarded as inadmissible, and that they both persistently confined themselves to objecting to the "form" in which they had been made, without attacking their substance.

When I am enabled to transmit copies of these papers, your Lordship will be struck by the state of complete delusion in which M. Delyanni, inspired, as he intimates, by the Russian Ambassador, was himself living, and in which he confirmed his Government.

It will be within your Lordship's recollection that when the aggressive policy of the Greek Government was daily becoming more apparent, I informed Her Majesty's Government that I was convinced that the patience of the Porte was exhausted and that a rupture would be the inevitable consequence.

I expressed this opinion freely, both to M. Delyanni and to those whom I had reason to believe to be sent by him to learn my views, in the hope that he might exert himself, while it was yet time, in persuading his Government to give way before they forced matters to the extremities which I saw to be approaching.

I thought that in so speaking I was acting a friendly part towards Greece as well as towards Turkey, and it would have been better for both if M. Delyanni had believed me rather than those in whom he had pinned his faith.

But on the 27th of November he wrote to his Government, "Quoi qu'il en soit, M. le Ministre, je pense, quant à moi, je suis même convaincu, que la Porte Ottomane ne prendra pas sans l'assentiment des Puissances Occidentales, une mesure aussi importante, qui pourrait avoir les plus graves conséquences, et que les Représentants de ces Puissances n'oseront jamais assumer la grande responsibilité d'un pareil conseil avant d'avoir préalablement reçu de leurs Gouvernements respectifs des instructions formelles et précises, ce qui n'a pas pu avoir lieu jusqu'à présent."

On the 1st of December, M. Delyanni wrote: "Dimanche dernier le Général Ignatieff m'a assuré que d'après sa conviction il n'y avait pas lieu de craindre la rupture des rélations officielles entre la Grèce et la Turquie."

With whatever object this assurance may have been given, the effect of it could only be to encourage the Greek Government in denying the satisfaction demanded by the Porte, and a very few days sufficed to show how thoroughly the Russian Ambassador and the Greek Minister had deceived themselves, and probably their Governments as to the real state of affairs.

The correspondence is not wanting in insinuations that the measures taken by the Porte had been instigated by the Ambassadors of the Western Powers.

As far as I am myself concerned, I feel satisfied that I need not pause to notice the accusation; and with respect to my colleagues, I will only again repeat my thorough conviction that it is equally groundless.

We have each been accused in turn, although the blame is now principally thrown upon Baron Prokesch; but all who have watched the events as they occurred must be aware that no prompter was required to urge the Porte to action, and that, least of all,

are those who are responsible for the crisis to be found in the Embassies of the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 137.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 13, 1869.

I HAVE reason to know that the publication of the despatches of M. Delyanni in the Greek Blue Book so greatly disconcerted the Russian Ambassador, that he telegraphed to Prince Gagarin, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to endeavour to get it stopped, or at least to have the French copy of it made in a purified form.

Very few copies have reached Constantinople, and a request has been made by General Ignatieff to the newspapers in the Russian or Greek interest to abstain from publishing them.

A copy, however, which has been received by the Porte is at this moment being translated, and will be published in a few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 138.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 82.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January* 19, 1869.

THE hopeful state of the negotiations at Paris, and the probability of an early termination of the labours of the Conference on the Turco-Greek quarrel, is very satisfactory to Count Beust.

On Saturday he was informed of the acceptance by Russia of the proposed Declaration; and early yesterday morning similar intelligence reached him from Constantinople.

A curious incident occurred in regard to the draft Declaration agreed to by the Plenipotentiaries; that Prince Metternich's telegram reporting its substance miscarried, and has never been received here. Count Beust, however, though without any official account of it from the Austrian Ambassador, did not hesitate, on learning that it was accepted at St. Petersburgh, to authorize Prince Metternich to agree to it.

The despatch from Paris arrived yesterday, when I was with his Excellency, and he had the goodness to read the Declaration to me.

He seemed to approve of it entirely.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 139.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 107.)
My Lord, *Paris, January* 21, 1869.

THE sixth sitting of the Conference took place yesterday at 3 o'clock P.M.

The Marquis de Lavalette, as President, informed the other Plenipotentiaries that he had read to the Greek Minister, M. Rangabé, the Declaration which had been adopted by the Conference, and also a draft, which had been prepared, of a letter with which that document was to be transmitted to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had stated to M. Rangabé that the draft had been drawn up by direction of the Plenipotentiaries, but that it had not yet been submitted to them. It was, therefore, quite open to amendment; and M. Rangabé would, he had said, confer a favour upon him by suggesting any alterations calculated to render it acceptable at Athens. M. Rangabé had, M. de Lavalette informed us, expressed great satisfaction with the draft, and had not suggested any change in it.

M. de Lavalette proceeded to read to the Plenipotentiaries a document which

M. Rangabé had requested him to communicate to them. It appeared, he said, to be an extract from a despatch addressed to M. Rangabé by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. On hearing it read, the Plenipotentiaries found that it was in substance a demand that the whole Hellenic race should be united under one Government; or, if this were not possible at the moment, that at least Crete should be annexed to Greece, and the frontiers of the kingdom towards Epirus and Thessaly be rectified. These being subjects altogether beyond the limits within which the Conference was bound to confine the deliberations, it was decided that the document must be set aside.

The Ottoman Plenipotentiary then stated that he was authorized to announce that if Greece notified to the Conference her adhesion to the Declaration which had been adopted, the Porte would, on its part, give up the measures set forth in its ultimatum of the 11th of December last.

This announcement of the Ottoman Plenipotentiary was reduced to writing, and his initials, and those of the other Plenipotentiaries, were affixed to it.

The Ottoman Plenipotentiary proceeded to observe that the Grand Vizier considered it desirable that there should be no risk of misunderstanding as to the form in which diplomatic relations should be resumed, and that his Highness thought that a note expressing the desire to resume them ought, in the first instance, to be addressed by the Greek Government to the Porte.

After some discussion, the Conference came to the conclusion that the best plan would be that the Conference should decide that the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two Powers should be considered as taking place *ipso facto* on the receipt by the Conference of the adhesion of the Greek Government to the Declaration. It was agreed that a paragraph to this effect should be inserted in the letter to be addressed to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The draft of the letter was then considered, the new paragraph was inserted, and some verbal alterations made, and the French Plenipotentiary, as President, was requested to sign the letter in the name of the Conference, and despatch it without delay.

The French Plenipotentiary engaged to send one of the Secretaries employed in the French Foreign Office, to convey the letter to its destination by the packet leaving Marseilles for the Piræus on the 23rd instant.

It was agreed that the President should at once make the Greek Minister at Paris acquainted with the measures which the Conference had decided upon.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the draft of the letter, as finally settled. The copy, to be inclosed in it, of the Declaration was signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy, Prussia, and Russia. The Ottoman Plenipotentiary abstained from signing it.

As your Lordship's messenger for Athens will leave London before this despatch can reach you, I purpose giving to him, on his way through Paris to-morrow, a despatch from myself to Mr. Erskine, inclosing copies of the Declaration and the letter, and expressing the earnest hope of the Plenipotentiaries that the Representatives of their respective Governments at Athens will strongly recommend the Greek Government to agree to the Declaration.

I shall point out to Mr. Erskine that in order to attain the object, the Greek Government must give its answer within a week from the receipt of the Declaration, and that its adhesion must be "pure et simple."

Your Lordship may, perhaps, think it advisable to send instructions on the subject to Mr. Erskine by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 139.

M. de Lavalette to M. Delyanni.

M. le Ministre, *Paris, le* 20 *Janvier*, 1869.

LES Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856, réunies en Conférence à Paris, afin d'examiner dans un esprit de conciliation le différend survenu entre la Grèce et la Turquie, ont profondément regretté que le Gouvernement Hellénique n'ait point cru pouvoir permettre à son Représentant d'assister à leurs travaux et n'ait pas choisi cette voie pour faire entendre ses explications au sein de la Conférence.

Elles ont jugé néanmoins de leur devoir de poursuivre l'œuvre de médiation

bienveillante qu'elles avaient entreprise dans l'intérêt de la paix, en me chargeant, en ma qualité de Président de la Conférence, de faire savoir à M. le Ministre de Grèce à Paris qu'il pouvait entrer en communication avec elle par mon entremise. Je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter que je me suis empressé, ainsi que les procès-verbaux de la délibération en font foi, de porter les documents qui m'ont été adressés par M. Rangabé à la connaissance des Plénipotentiaires, et les résolutions que la Conférence était appelée à prendre n'ont été définitivement adoptée qu'après un examen attentif de toutes les pièces qui pouvaient éclairer leur conscience.

Cet examen impartial et approfondi a conduit les Puissances à la conviction unanime qu'il y avait lieu de dégager les débats des questions de fait, et de s'attacher bien moins à prononcer sur le passé qu'à rechercher les règles de conduite qui doivent dans l'avenir présider aux rapports entre la Turquie et la Grèce. La Conférence, en un mot, a pensé que le meilleur moyen de prévenir le retour des difficultés actuelles et d'en effacer les traces, était de préciser les principes généraux de droit international sur lesquels les deux Gouvernements étaient en dissentiment, et qui sont ou doivent être la loi commune de toutes les nations.

Je suis chargé par la Conférence de faire connaître à votre Excellence la Déclaration ci-jointe, dans laquelles les Plénipotentiaires ont consigné le résultat de leurs appréciations de leurs vœux.

La Conférence est persuadée que le Gouvernement Hellénique ne saurait méconnaître la pensée bienveillante qui l'a constamment dirigée dans ses travaux, et qu'il ne se refusera pas à accéder à des principes universels, qui, je le répète, sont également obligatoires pour tous les Etats, et que la Grèce certainement peut s'approprier sans qu'il en résulte aucune atteinte pour son indépendance et sa dignité.

Pour que sa détermination toutefois ait la valeur immédiate que les Cabinets désirent pouvoir y attacher, il est nécessaire que dans la semaine qui suivra la remise de la présente Déclaration, le Gouvernement Hellénique réponde en notifiant à la Conférence son adhésion pure et simple aux décisions exposées dans cet acte, et sa résolution d'y conformer dorénavant son attitude.

Ainsi que le constate l'adhésion que, de son côté, M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie a déjà donnée à la Déclaration, et qui est consignée dans les Protocoles, la Porte Ottomane s'engage, à cette condition, à renoncer aux mesures énoncées dans l'ultimatum du 11 Décembre. Par le fait de l'acquiescement du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Hellénique à la Déclaration, la reprise des rapports diplomatiques entre la Grèce et la Turquie sera considérée comme avenue de plein droit au moment même où cet acquiescement aura été notifié à la Conférence.

Passé le délai indiqué, la Conférence devrait, à son vif et profond regret, regarder comme un refus le silence du Cabinet d'Athènes, et ses propres efforts de conciliation comme épuisés.

Il ne lui resterait plus dès lors qu'à abandonner le Gouvernement Hellénique aux conséquences d'une détermination qui serait en opposition avec les vœux de toutes les Puissances en faveur du maintien de la paix.

No. 140.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 108. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 21, 1869.*

COUNT DE SOLMS-SONNENWALDE, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, called upon me yesterday, a short time before the meeting of the Conference, and told me that Count Bismarck was anxious to know the views of the different Governments as to the course to be pursued if the Greek Government should refuse to abide by the decisions of the Conference. Count Bismarck was, M. de Solms went on to say, of opinion that it was extremely undesirable that the Powers of Europe should allow their decisions in Conference to be treated with contempt and ridicule.

I observed to M. de Solms that it had been distinctly laid down that the basis of the Conference was conciliation, not coercion, and that the use of force to support the decisions was certainly not contemplated by Her Majesty's Government. I also reminded Count Solms that Her Majesty's Government had undeviatingly maintained its neutrality with regard to the struggle in Crete.

M. de Solms said that Count Bismarck thought that perhaps the naval forces of the Powers might for a time act as a sort of police in the Archipelago, and prevent infractions

of the law of nations. I answered, that I had certainly no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government would be willing that Her Majesty's ships should undertake such police duties.

M. de Solms said that of course he had not been instructed to make any official communication on the subject. He had merely sought in a friendly unofficial way to exchange ideas on a question which was not unlikely to be raised.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 141.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 22, 1869.*

THE Turkish Ambassador at Paris has been authorized not to insist upon signing the Declaration of the Conference if the other Members continue to think it undesirable.

He must, however, sign the Protocol, as well as the letter forwarding the Declaration to Athens.

No. 142.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 22, 4 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 21, 1869, 4·15 P.M.*

IN a letter dated the 17th instant to Her Majesty's Consul, the Prefect of Syra, has formally promised that the "Enosis" shall not leave the port until close of the pending judicial proceedings.

The Turkish Admiral was to leave as soon as the weather would permit.

No. 143.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 22, 1869.*

YOU will receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris by the messenger who left London last night, a copy of the letter addressed from the Conference to the Greek Government, inviting it to agree with the Declaration of the Conference also sent to you. You will strongly recommend the Greek Government to agree to that Declaration within the time specified in M. de Lavalette's letter.

No. 145.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 112.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 22, 1869.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 107 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. Erskine, and with which I have sent to him copies of the letter from the President of the Conference to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the Declaration signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy, Prussia, and Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 145.

Lord Lyons to Mr. Erskine.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, January* 22, 1869.

THE same packet which conveys the Queen's messenger, by whom I send this despatch, takes also to Athens a Secretary from the French Foreign Office, charged with a letter and Declaration, to be delivered, in the name of the Conference, to His Hellenic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The letter is signed by the French Plenipotentiary, as President of the Conference; and the Declaration bears the signatures of the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Prussia, and Russia. I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, copies of both documents.

Although the Greek Government declined, on a point of form, to allow its Representative to be present at the Conferences, he has been from time to time made acquainted by the President with the proceedings, and he has sent in written communications, which have received attentive consideration. I may add that every endeavour has been made by myself and other Plenipotentiaries to supply, as far as possible, the place of the Greek Representative.

The letter and the Declaration bear upon the face of them abundant evidence of the solicitude with which the Plenipotentiaries have endeavoured to combine with impartiality an anxious regard for the feelings of both parties, and for those of Greece in particular.

The declaration has been drawn up in the earnest hope that it may lead to an immediate renewal of friendly relations between Greece and Turkey. It has already been accepted by Turkey, and the Plenipotentiaries who have signed it are very anxious that the Representatives of their respective Governments at Athens should exert all their influence to obtain the assent to it of the Government of Greece.

You will perceive by the terms of the letter that it is essential that the acceptance of the declaration by the Greek Government should be "pure et simple," and that it should not be delayed beyond a week from the delivery of the letter to His Hellenic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs. The engagement of the Turkish Government to give up the measures announced in its ultimatum is, in fact, dependent on these conditions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 145.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1869.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency addressed to Aali Pasha, in regard to the measures adopted by the Porte against Greece and the case of the "Enosis," as reported in your despatch No. 23 of the 11th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 146.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1869.

I HAVE considered, in communication with the Law Advisers of the Crown, your despatch No. 5 of the 7th instant and the Royal Decree, of which a copy is therein inclosed, authorizing the issue of Treasury notes to the amount of 15,000,000 drachmas, in regard to the bearing of this Decree on the stipulations of the Treaty of the 29th of March, 1864. It does not, however, appear from your despatch in what respect the privileges guaranteed to the Ionian Bank by Article VII of this Treaty are infringed by the Decree in question, and I am consequently unable to form a decided opinion whether it amounts to a breach of the Treaty or warrant more than a friendly representation to the Greek Government.

I can therefore, as at present informed, only state, for your guidance, that if the Decree distinctly and in terms infringes any of such privileges, it would clearly be a breach of the Treaty; but if the injury which it may cause to the Ionian Bank is only the injury which must necessarily result to any financial company from a measure so ill-judged as you represent it to be, I am opinion that, however disastrous such consequences may be, it would be no breach of the Treaty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 147.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1869.

I APPROVE your proceedings with the view to prevent any acts of hostility at Syra during the sittings of the Conference, as reported in your despatch No. 13 of the 13th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 148.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1869.

I HAD yesterday a serious conversation with the Greek Minister upon the proceedings of his Government, which were leading to ruin and anarchy, and were deplored by every well-wisher of Greece. I commented upon the Declaration of the Conference, and said that the Greek Government, by rejecting it, would announce that Greece was not to be bound by any of those simple rules of international law upon which a good understanding between nations depended; and I expressed my fear that by persevering in the present course Greece would soon find herself without friends or credit, and would be reduced to deplorable straits.

M. Braila this evening informed me that he had written in strong terms to his Government, advising a policy of moderation and the acceptance of the Declaration.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 149.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1869.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatch No. 112 of the 22nd instant, and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approves the despatch inclosed therein which you addressed to Mr. Erskine with copies of the letter and Declaration of the Conference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 150.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1869.

COUNT BERNSTORFF has read to me a despatch from Count Bismarck strongly renewing his recommendation that some ships of the allied Powers should be sent to the Greek waters in order to enforce the decision of the Conference, and to prevent collision between the forces of Turkey and Greece.

I told his Excellency that the more I considered the proposed measure, the more inexpedient it appeared to me. What was the object of the Conference, I asked, but that the Greek Government should observe certain well-established rules of international law; and if they refused to do so on the advice offered unanimously by the Great Powers of Europe, they certainly would not be driven to it by the presence of a few ships of war, which would do little or nothing to prevent the acts against which the Conference had protested: on the contrary, they would say that the ships were sent to protect them against the Turks, and that having nothing to apprehend from the naval forces of Turkey, they might direct all their energies to the invasion of Turkish territory by land. The ships would not be necessary to prevent the sending of supplies to Crete, as the Turkish Admiral was now quite equal to that task; and supposing, I said, that the Greeks were to announce that their operations against Turkey by sea would be suspended so long as the allied ships were there, but that immediately on their departure those operations would be resumed, this ignoble work of police might be indefinitely prolonged.

From the same despatch Count Bernstorff read to me a severe expression of opinion upon the Porte for having required the expulsion of Hellenic subjects from Roumania and Servia, and I gathered that Count Bismarck was desirous that some remonstrances on the subject should proceed from the Conference. I said it was well-known that no such orders had been sent to the Governments of Roumania and Servia, but that the measures which the Porte thought necessary to adopt were simply communicated to them; and that as no complaint had been made by the Principalities, that I was aware of, and no desire manifested that their relations with the Porte should be brought before the Conference, it seemed unnecessary to create for them a grievance which they did not appear to feel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 151.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons

(No. 116.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 25, 1869.*

I APPROVE the language which you held to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires with regard to the course to be pursued by the Powers in case the Greek Government should refuse to abide by the decisions of the Conference, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 108 of the 21st instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 152.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 121. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 25, 1869.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette told me confidentially this afternoon that he had received a telegram from the Baron de Talleyrand, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, stating that he had been informed by Prince Gortchakoff that the Russian Government had, in terms so strong that France would have hesitated to employ them, exhorted the Government of Greece to accept the Declaration of the Conference.

The telegram added that the Emperor Alexander had himself expressed to Baron de Talleyrand the hope that the Greeks would not be "assez fous pour courir à leur perte."

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 153.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 127. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 27, 1869.*

IN my despatch No. 75 of the 15th instant I inclosed a certified copy of Protocol No. 1 of the Conference, and in my despatch No. 82 of the 16th instant I inclosed a certified copy of Protocol No. 2.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith certified copies of Protocols Nos. 3, 4, and 5.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 153.

Protocol (No. 3) of Conference held at Paris, January 14, 1869.

Présents:

Les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche-Hongrie;
" " de la France;
" " de la Grande Bretagne;
" " de l'Italie;
" " de la Prusse et de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord;
" " de la Russie;
" " de la Turquie;

Le Secrétaire de la Conférence.

M. LE PLENIPOTENTIAIRE DE FRANCE donne connaissance des dépêches télégraphiques qu'il a échangées avec l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français à Constantinople, et d'où il résulte que la Porte adhère au maintien du *statu quo* qui lui a été demandé, en ce sens, qu'aucun sujet Grec ne sera comme tel expulsé de la Turquie jusqu'à la clôture de la délibération actuelle. Quant à la décision relative à la fermeture des ports Ottomans aux bâtiments Grecs, elle a été appliquée à l'expiration du délai fixé, et la Porte déclare ne pouvoir la révoquer avant de connaître le résultat des travaux de la Conférence. Sous cette réserve, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan s'abstiendra avec soin de tout ce qui pourrait entraver la tâche des Puissances.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette constate que la Conférence, en se réunissant à la date d'aujourd'hui, avait l'espoir de connaître également la réponse du Cabinet d'Athènes aux deux démarches faites auprès de lui, suivant la résolution prise en commun. Mais après avoir adressé, depuis le 10 au matin, trois dépêches successives au Ministre de France en Grèce, M. le Marquis de Lavalette n'a encore reçu au moment présent aucun avis à ce sujet, et ce silence est considéré par lui comme l'indice de la résolution du Gouvernement Hellénique de ne pas occuper la place qui lui a été réservée au sein de la Conférence. Chacun des Plénipotentiaires s'étant engagé à prendre les ordres de sa Cour en prévision de cette éventualité, M. le Plénipotentiaire de France demande à ses collègues s'ils sont munis des instructions qu'ils ont sollicitées.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche-Hongrie déclare que son Gouvernement verrait avec regret que les délibérations fussent suspendues, et qu'il est autorisé à y prendre part même sans le concours d'un Représentant de la Grèce.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Angleterre fait une déclaration semblable. Il aurait néanmoins préféré à toute autre combinaison celle qui eut assigné au Cabinet d'Athènes la part la plus large dans les discussions et les travaux de la Conférence. Il voudrait donc, dans le cas où la Grèce ne reviendrait pas sur sa détermination, que l'on pût donner au Gouvernement Hellénique les facilités les plus larges pour faire entendre sa voix.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche-Hongrie s'associe à la manière de voir de Lord Lyons, et partage le vœu qu'il vient d'exprimer.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie dit que son Gouvernement, tout en témoignant le désir que la Grèce ne persiste pas dans son abstention, est d'avis que la Conférence poursuive son œuvre pacifique, quelle que soit la résolution définitive du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Prusse est autorisé, dans les deux hypothèses, à continuer à s'associer aux délibérations.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russe a reçu de St. Pétersbourg une dépêche télégraphique qui l'empêche de renoncer à tout espoir au sujet de la décision du Gouvernement Hellénique. Dans le cas où cette décision serait négative, il donnera néanmoins son assentiment à ce que les Puissances achèvent leur mission; mais son attitude se trouvera modifiée à certains égards par l'absence d'un Représentant de la Cour d'Athènes, et il pourra se croire obligé de prendre la défense de la Grèce dans des cas où il eut gardé le silence si le Gouvernement Hellénique eût été représenté.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie dit que les instructions qu'il a demandées, comme ses collègues, sur le point en discussion, ne lui sont pas parvenues jusqu'ici; mais il déclare qu'il n'a pas de doute sur le sens de la réponse qu'il attend d'heure en heure, et que, dans l'état des choses, il se croit autorisé à participer aux travaux de la Conférence.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette, se reportant au vœu exprimé par Lord Lyons relativement à la forme dans laquelle la Conférence pourrait entrer en communication avec M. le Ministre de Grèce, témoigne le désir que la manière de procéder soit réglée de façon à assurer le secret des délibérations et à ne pas en compromettre la marche.

Après une discussion à laquelle prennent part MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Angleterre, d'Italie, et de Russe, il demeure convenu que M. le Plénipotentiaire de France, agissant en sa qualité de Président, sera autorisé à recevoir les communications que M. le Ministre de Grèce pourrait avoir à faire dans les limites tracées à la mission de la Conférence, et que les documents dont la Conférence, de son côté, jugerait utile de donner connaissance à M. Rangabé pourront lui être transmis par M. le Marquis de Lavalette, sous les réserves qui seraient jugées convenables.

M. le Chevalier Nigra demande quelques explications sur la portée que M. le Comte de Stackelberg attache aux observations qu'il a présentées quant aux devoirs particuliers résultant pour lui de l'absence d'un Représentant Hellénique.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie répond que son intention n'est nullement de se substituer à M. le Ministre de Grèce; mais qu'il pourrait, dans une pensée d'équité, se trouver appelé à prendre la parole plus souvent qu'il ne l'aurait fait dans d'autres conditions.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Angleterre fait observer que la Grèce n'ayant point d'organe au sein de la Conférence, tous les Plénipotentiaires se croiront tenus à plus de modération encore, s'il est possible, à l'égard du Gouvernement Hellénique, et dans la discussion chacun se fera certainement un devoir de suppléer, autant qu'il serait nécessaire, à l'absence d'un Représentant du Cabinet d'Athènes.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France confirme cette assurance pour ce qui le concerne, et ajoute que les sentiments de justice dont tous les Membres de la Conférence se montrent animés constituent sous ce rapport une garantie de nature à inspirer à la Grèce la plus entière confiance dans l'impartialité de leurs appréciations.

Les Plénipotentiaires étant d'accord sur toutes les questions préliminaires, la Conférence juge que le moment est venu d'entrer dans l'examen des réclamations de la Turquie sur lesquelles elle est appelée à manifester son opinion.

M. le Ministre de Lavalette établit que la Conférence est dans l'impossibilité de former une Commission d'Enquête pour rechercher les faits, et qu'une pareille manière de procéder serait d'ailleurs contraire à l'indépendance des deux parties, car elle impliquerait une véritable intervention dans leur administration intérieure. La Conférence est donc tenue de se renfermer dans l'étude des documents officiels échangés entre la Porte Ottoman et le Cabinet d'Athènes. M. le Plénipotentiaire de France croit que, par cette raison même, il est du devoir de tous d'examiner avec la plus scrupuleuse attention les pièces produites par les deux Gouvernements, et il demande à les résumer préalablement afin de bien déterminer le terrain du débat.

La Conférence ayant donné son assentiment à cette proposition, M. le Plénipotentiaire de France s'exprime dans les termes suivants:—

"Les notes qui ont constitué la Conférence ont en même temps précisé les limites dans lesquelles devront se renfermer ses délibérations. Ainsi que je l'ai déjà rappelé dans notre première séance, le but unique et précis assigné à nos travaux est d'examiner dans quelle mesure il y a lieu de faire droit aux réclamations formulées dans l'ultimatum du Gouvernement Ottoman. Notre premier soin doit être d'exposer les faits tels que les indiquent les communications échangées entre les deux Cours à la veille de la rupture.

"Les griefs de la Turquie se résument dans les secours directs de toute nature que la Grèce aurait fournis à une province insurgée de l'Empire Ottoman; dans l'assistance indirecte que le Gouvernement Hellénique aurait prêtée lui-même à l'insurrection; dans l'opposition qu'aurait rencontrée en Grèce le rapatriement des familles Candiotes; dans

les actes de violence dont les sujets Ottomans auraient été victimes sur le territoire Hellénique; enfin dans le refus du Cabinet d'Athènes de donner satisfaction, sur ces différents points, aux plaintes réitérées du Gouvernement Ottoman.

Les notes adressées par le Représentant de la Porte au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce rappellent les faits suivants à l'appui de ces réclamations:—

D'après les explications mêmes fournies aux Chambres Helléniques par un ancien Ministre des Finances, une partie du dernier emprunt Grec aurait été consacrée à l'achat du navire la "Crète," destinée, comme "l'Enosis" et le "Panhellenion," à porter à l'insurrection Candiote des secours de toute espèce.

Une nouvelle bande de volontaires, levée dans le but avoué de passer en Crète, se serait organisée sur le territoire Hellénique sans rencontrer d'opposition de la part des autorités Grecques. Le chef de ce corps, Petropoulaki, aurait au contraire reçu des armes, des effets d'équipement, et même des canons tirés de l'arsénal de Nauplie. Des officiers appartenant à l'armée Hellénique auraient été designés pour prendre des commandements dans les bandes de Petropoulaki. Ces bandes elles-mêmes, au moment de leur départ, auraient fait à Athènes une démonstration publique.

La population Grecque se serait opposée par la force, à plusieurs reprises, et notamment le 11 Septembre dernier, au départ des réfugiés Candiotes qui avaient exprimé l'intention de retourner en Crète. Les autorités Helléniques se seraient abstenues d'intervenir. Plus récemment encore, vingt délégués Crétois venus à Egine avec la mission d'opérer le rapatriement d'un certain nombre de leurs compatriotes, auraient été victimes d'actes de violence que l'autorité Grecque aurait laissés impunis.

La même impunité aurait été assurée, enfin, aux auteurs d'actes analogues commis sur des sujets Ottomans, officiers ou soldats, assassinés ou maltraités sur le territoire du Royaume.

Le Gouvernement Turc, par son ultimatum du 11 Décembre, 1868, a mis dès lors le Cabinet Hellénique en demeure:—

1. De dispenser immédiatement des bandes de volontaires organisées dans les différentes parties du Royaume et empêcher la formation de nouvelles bandes;

2. De désarmer les corsaires "l'Enosis," "la Crète," et le "Panhellénion," ou, en tout cas, de leur fermer l'accès des ports Helléniques;

3. D'accorder aux émigrés Crétois non seulement l'autorisation de retourner dans leurs foyers, mais encore une aide et une protection efficace;

4. De punir conformément aux lois ceux qui se sont rendus coupables d'agressions contre les militaires et les sujets Ottomans, et accorder aux familles des victimes de ces attentats une juste indemnité;

5. De suivre désormais une ligne de conduite conforme aux Traités existants et au droit des gens.

Le Cabinet d'Athènes objecte, en ce qui concerne les trois bâtiments signalés par le Gouvernement Ottoman comme servant à des actes contraires à la neutralité—

Que deux de ces navires, le "Panhellénion" et "l'Enosis," n'ont pas été armés dans des ports Grecs;

Que les institutions du Royaume ne lui permettent pas, et que les règles du droit des gens ne lui font point une obligation d'empêcher des navires appartenant à des particuliers ou à des compagnies commerciales d'aller porter des secours aux insurgés d'une province Ottomane armés contre leur Gouvernement.

Il reconnaît d'ailleurs que "l'Enosis," la "Crète," et le "Panhellénion," qu'il représente comme appartenant à la Compagnie Hellénique, ont porté des vivres aux insurgés Candiotes, tout en se livrant en même temps à d'autres opérations de commerce.

Le Cabinet d'Athènes ne conteste pas davantage la formation de bandes armées sur le territoire Grec. Mais il ne pense pas que ce fait soit contraire au droit international, et ajoute qu'aucune disposition des lois du Royaume ne permet d'empêcher des sujets Helléniques de porter les armes à l'étranger et d'y guerroyer à leurs risques et périls.

Il croit inexact que des officiers appartenant à l'armée Hellénique aient été désignés pour prendre le commandement de la bande de Petropoulaki, et affirme que les autorités militaires ont été invitées par le Ministre de la Guerre à arrêter et à punir les soldats qui auraient déserté pour rejoindre cette même bande.

Le Gouverneur de la forteresse de Nauplie n'avait pas reçu l'ordre de livrer des armes ou des effets d'équipement. M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce fait observer, d'ailleurs, qu'il existe plusieurs fonderies de canons dans le Royaume; celle de Syra, notamment, a été établie par la compagnie à laquelle appartiennent "l'Enosis," la "Crète," et le "Panhellénion."

Quant aux difficultés qu'aurait rencontrées le rapatriement des familles Candiotes

réfugiées en Grèce, le Cabinet d'Athènes croit pouvoir affirmer que les autorités Helléniques se sont prêtées à toutes les demandes adressées dans ce but. Quatre mille Candiotes sont déjà rentrés dans leur patrie. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce rappelle, qu'au moment même où la rupture était imminente, plus de 200 émigrés Crétois s'embarquaient au Pirée sans rencontrer la moindre opposition.

Les violences dont quelques Candiotes ont été victimes seraient le fait d'autres Candiotes indignés d'une résolution qu'ils considéraient comme impliquant l'abandon de la cause nationale. Ces actes ne sauraient engager la responsabilité du Gouvernement Hellénique. Les coupables ont d'ailleurs été traduits devant les tribunaux Grecs.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce déclare avoir appris avec étonnement par l'ultimatum de la Porte, que des attentats dirigés contre des sujets Ottomans seraient restés impunis. Il repousse énergiquement une accusation que rien, à sa connaissance, ne justifierait si elle portait sur d'autres faits que l'incident survenu à Syra en 1867, et qui fut objet, à cette époque, d'applications que le Gouvernement Turc considéra comme satisfaisantes.

Tel est au fond le différend qui, hier encore, menaçait si gravement la tranquillité en Orient. Le sentiment de ce danger s'imposait aux préoccupations de toutes les Puissances lorsqu'elles se sont entendues pour se réunir en Conférence conformément au vœu pacifique inséré, sur l'initiative du Comte de Clarendon, au vingt-troisième Protocole des Actes du Congrès de Paris.

L'esprit même dans lequel a été conçue et accueillie, à cette époque, la proposition des Plénipotentiaires Britanniques, ne laisse pas de doute sur le rôle assigné à la réunion qui en fait aujourd'hui la première application. La Conférence n'a pas à prendre de décisions de nature à porter atteinte à la liberté d'action des deux Puissances auxquelles elle offre ses bons offices; elle ne peut légitimement qu'examiner les faits, dire ce qui lui paraît être le droit, et présenter les bases d'une réconciliation qu'elle appelle de tous ses vœux. Réduite à ces proportions, sa tâche est encore digne d'elle. Écartant toute arrière pensée personnelle, dégagées de toute préoccupation étrangère à la recherche du droit, les Puissances qu'elle représente constituent non pas un tribunal chargé de rendre un arrêt, mais un Conseil International dont les appréciations ne sauraient engager les parties que par la liberté même qu'elles leur laissent et l'absence complète de toute autre sanction que celle qu'implique nécessairement, dans l'ordre moral, une telle manifestation de l'opinion publique et en quelque sorte de la conscience Européenne.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie n'élève aucune objection contre l'exposé que vient de présenter M. le Président de la Conférence; il fait remarquer que, pour le Gouvernement Ottoman, la question se résume dans les cinq points de l'ultimatum remis au Cabinet d'Athènes, et que la Porte demande à la Grèce des satisfactions pour le passé et des engagements pour l'avenir. On pourrait, ajoute M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie, relire l'ultimatum et examiner successivement chacune des réclamations qui y sont énoncées.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France propose de prendre d'abord les deux premiers points d'ultimatum, et rappelle qu'ils allèguent des faits et affirment des principes. Il prie M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie de vouloir bien faire savoir s'il est en mesure de fournir à la Conférence de nouveaux renseignements sur les points de fait dont elle vient d'entendre l'exposé.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie répond qu'il est en possession de documents qui mettent hors de doute toutes les allégations de son Gouvernement se rapportant à l'état des choses au moment de la remise de l'ultimatum; que pour ce qui existe au moment actuel, la Turquie n'ayant plus de Légation ni de Consuls en Grèce, n'est pas en position d'être complètement et exactement renseignée, mais qu'il est de notoriété que les manifestations hostiles se reproduisent chaque jour. M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie est donc autorisé à dire que la situation s'est aggravée, sans pouvoir préciser si de nouvelles bandes se sont formées et si de nouveaux armements se font dans les ports Helléniques.

M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre objecte que ce sont-là des préparatifs de guerre résultant de la situation créée par l'ultimatum, mais non des faits venant corroborer ceux qui sont énoncés dans l'ultimatum lui-même, et c'est précisément cette situation, beaucoup plus grave que les incidents antérieurs, qui a décidé les Puissances à offrir leurs bons offices pour sauvegarder la paix.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie fait observer qu'un examen détaillé des points de fait serait une tâche bien difficile pour la Conférence, et qu'une telle discussion ne présenterait pas beaucoup d'utilité pratique. La Conférence devrait, à son avis, se borner à examiner et à constater les principes qui doivent servir de règle de conduite pour l'avenir dans les rapports de la Grèce avec la Turquie.

M. le Comte de Stackelberg appuie l'opinion exprimée par M. le Chevalier Nigra et

déclare qu'à ses yeux la définition des principes est même le seul terrain sur lequel la Conférence puisse se placer; il dit que c'est à tort que les documents émanés de la Porte appellent pirates ou corsaires les bâtiments qui s'exposaient aux croisières Turques pour porter des vivres aux Crétois. Il ajoute que le bâtiment pirate est en réalité celui qui parcourt les mers dans un but de pillage; le nom de corsaire est particulièrement attribué par le droit des gens à des bâtiments munis de lettres de marque d'un Gouvernement: et aucune de ces définitions ne s'applique aux bâtiments Helléniques qui ont forcé depuis deux ans le blocus de l'Ile de Crète.

Quelle que soit la qualification appliquée à ces bâtiments, M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie tient à constater que, par les armements faits dans les ports de la Grèce aussi bien que par la formation sur le territoire Hellénique des bandes transportées en Crète, les principes de la loi internationale ont été méconnus.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette a été d'avis qu'il était essentiel de se rendre compte préalablement des faits tels qu'ils résultent des documents produits des deux parts, et c'est par cette raison qu'il a cru devoir avant tout en donner l'exposé; cependant il reconnaît tout l'intérêt qu'il y a à ne point s'engager dans un débat contradictoire sur les détails. Dans l'ultimatum il est question du passé, mais il est question surtout de l'avenir. Le Gouvernement Ottoman ne réclame pas d'indemnités pour les torts qu'il a subis; il se borne à demander que certaines règles de conduite soient établies et deviennent obligatoires pour la Grèce. Dès lors ce qui importe, c'est de s'entendre sur les principes; et si l'interprétation que la Conférence donnera au droit est conforme à l'interprétation de la Turquie, ce fait constituera en lui-même une satisfaction morale d'autant plus grande qu'elle sera l'expression de l'opinion unanime des principales Puissances de l'Europe. La Conférence, d'ailleurs, voudra sans doute présenter sa décision sous la forme la plus propre à en rendre l'acceptation possible pour la Grèce, et les Plénipotentiaires y sont déjà préparés par le caractère même de la tâche qu'ils accomplissent.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche-Hongrie, de Grande Bretagne, d'Italie, de Prusse, et de Russie s'associent entièrement à ces considérations.

M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie déclare que son Gouvernement désire le maintien de la paix aussi sincèrement que les autres Cours, et qu'il l'a prouvé dernièrement encore en acceptant la Conférence proposée par les Puissances sur les bases au sujet desquelles elles sont tombées d'accord; après les gages de modération qu'elle a donnés pendant trois ans d'une patience dans laquelle la Grèce n'a vu qu'un encouragement, la Sublime Porte ne réclame cependant que les satisfactions qui lui sont légitimement dues.

M. le Prince de Metternich est d'avis que le Gouvernement Ottoman peut se contenter d'une Déclaration de la Conférence établissant les principes de droit qui doivent être observés par la Grèce.

M. le Comte de Solms insiste également pour que la Conférence renonce à entrer dans l'examen des faits.

M. le Chevalier Nigra fait remarquer que ce qui importe à la Turquie, c'est d'empêcher pour l'avenir la formation de bandes et d'armements hostiles de la part de la Grèce, et que ce but serait atteint par une Déclaration qui établirait que des faits de ce genre sont contraires aux règles ordinaires de la neutralité et ne doivent pas se renouveler.

Avant de se prononcer à cet égard, M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie aurait besoin de connaître la forme qui sera donnée à la Déclaration collective et la portée qu'il conviendra d'y attribuer.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette répond qu'il appartiendra à la Conférence de décider de la forme de ce document; que, dans tous les cas, il sera consacré soit par le procès-verbal de la séance où il sera adopté, soit par un Protocole spécial. Il aura ainsi la sanction de l'Europe. Dans la pensée de M. le Plénipotentiaire de France, on pourrait commencer par établir que les principes du droit des gens obligent la Grèce, comme toutes les autres nations, à ne pas permettre que des bandes se recrutent sur son territoire ou que des bâtiments s'arment dans ses ports pour attaquer un Etat voisin. On en déduirait que la Grèce devra s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer les actes contraires à cette règle de conduite, ce qui répondrait à la fois au vœu exprimé dans le 5ème point et aux griefs allégués dans les deux premiers. Il y aurait lieu pour la Turquie de renoncer aux mesures annoncées par elle, si la Grèce, dans une communication adressée aux Cabinets, déférait à l'opinion émise par la Conférence.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie demande s'il y aura, dans ce cas, un engagement de la Grèce envers la Turquie.

M. le Chevalier Nigra fait remarquer que d'après les indications données par M. le Marquis de Lavalette, l'engagement de la Grèce aura un caractère encore plus solennel, car il sera contracté envers l'Europe.

M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie, dans la prévision d'une proposition de cette nature,

avait demandé des instructions à son Gouvernement; il répète qu'il doit les attendre pour engager son opinion.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche-Hongrie, de Grande Bretagne, d'Italie, de Prusse, et de Russie se déclarent disposés à adopter entièrement la manière de procéder qui a été indiquée, et ils manifestent le désir que dans la prochaine séance l'on puisse s'entendre en ce qui touche la question de principe sur laquelle seule la Conférence juge utile de se prononcer.

Les Plénipotentiaires échangent ensuite leurs idées sur le 3ème point, relatif aux réfugiés Candiotes.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette propose de prendre acte des déclarations faites à ce sujet par le Cabinet d'Athènes dans ses notes du 9 et du 13 Décembre, en exprimant l'espoir qu'il se prêtera à faciliter autant qu'il dépend de lui le départ des familles Crétoises qui désireraient rentrer dans leur patrie.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de la Turquie, sans élever d'objections contre cette proposition, croit devoir rappeler que les assurances précédemment données par le Cabinet Grec au sujet des Crétois n'ont pas reçu d'exécution, et il invoque à ce sujet le témoignage des Commandants des Forces Navales étrangères dans les eaux de la Grèce, ainsi que celui des Agents Diplomatiques et Consulaires des Puissances.

Quant aux actes d'agression commis en Grèce sur la personne des sujets Turcs, et qui forment l'objet du 4ème point de l'ultimatum Ottoman, la Turquie acceptant la juridiction des Tribunaux Grecs, il suffira, suivant M. le Plénipotentiaire de France, d'établir que le Gouvernement Hellénique devra faire exécuter les lois et faciliter la répression des crimes ou délits qui lui sont signalés.

Les Plénipotentiaires conviennent de rechercher, chacun de son côté, les éléments d'une rédaction communes répondant aux idées émises dans le cours de la délibération. Ils espèrent que M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie recevra incessamment les instructions qu'il attend, et qu'en présence du rapprochement qui se manifeste de plus en plus dans les vues de toutes les Cours, la Conférence pourra promptement achever son œuvre.

M. le Prince de Metternich rappelant les suppositions qui tendaient à accréditer l'opinion que son Gouvernement n'avait pas vu avec déplaisir s'élever le différend entre la Turquie et la Grèce, et chercherait même à susciter des complications en Orient, attache un prix particulier à seconder ces dispositions conciliantes et exprime le vœu que l'entente définitive ne tarde pas davantage à s'établir.

La Conférence s'ajourne à demain, 15 Janvier.

Fait à Paris, le 14 Janvier, 1869.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 153.

Protocol (No. 4) of Conference held at Paris, January 15, 1869.

Présents:

MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche-Hongrie;
" " de France;
" " de la Grande Bretagne;
" " d'Italie;
" " de Prusse et de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord;
" " de Russie;
" " de Turquie;
Le Secrétaire de la Conférence.

M. LE PLENIPOTENTIAIRE DE FRANCE rappelle que les membres de la Conférence en se séparant hier étaient convenus de délibérer dans la séance d'aujourd'hui sur un projet de Déclaration destiné à être communiqué à la Grèce. Il a lui-même indiqué ses idées dans un travail, sans caractère officiel, élaboré uniquement pour servir de thème à la discussion. Il demande que chacun présente les observations auxquelles la rédaction proposée par lui aurait pu donner lieu.

La plupart des Plénipotentiaires déclarent qu'ils n'ont aucune objection à élever sur l'ensemble, et M. le Plénipotentiaire de Prusse propose que le document rédigé par M. le Marquis de Lavalette soit lu paragraphe par paragraphe.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie dit que n'étant pas encore en possession des instructions qu'il attend, il assistera à la discussion faisant ses réserves.

Sur les explications qui lui sont demandées par MM. les Plénipotentiaires de Prusse et de Russie, M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie ajoute que la Déclaration projetée soulève pour lui une question de conduite sur laquelle il a besoin de connaître l'avis préalable de son Gouvernement.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie reconnaît qu'en effet le Représentant de la Porte peut se demander sous quelle forme il devra s'associer à la Déclaration collective; et suivant M. le Chevalier Nigra, il n'est pas nécessaire que M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie appose sa signature à ce document; il signerait simplement le Protocole dans lequel l'adoption de la Déclaration sera constatée.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche-Hongrie croit qu'il est indispensable que le Représentant de la Turquie soit lié par le Protocole, s'il ne croit pas pouvoir s'associer à la Déclaration; et M. le Prince de Metternich fait remarquer au surplus que dans le cas où le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie participerait à la Déclaration, le projet présenté par M. le Marquis de Lavalette devrait être modifié dans plusieurs passages de sa rédaction.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France dit qu'il appartient à M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie d'examiner le parti qu'il lui convient de prendre, soit qu'il désire signer la Déclaration finale ou simplement le Protocole, et les réserves qu'il peut faire à ce sujet n'empêchent pas la discussion sur la Déclaration elle-même.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie donne son assentiment à cette proposition

M. le Marquis de Lavalette lit le premier paragraphe, ainsi conçu, du projet communiqué par lui à ses collègues:—

"Justement préoccupées des dangers qui peuvent naître de la rupture des relations entre la Turquie et la Grèce, les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856 se sont entendues pour apaiser le différend survenu entre les deux Etats, et ont autorisé à cet effet leurs Représentants auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français à se constituer en Conférence.

"Après une étude attentive des documents échangés entre les deux Gouvernements, les Plénipotentiaires sont tombés d'accord pour regretter que, cédant à des entraînements sur lesquels son patriotisme a pu l'égarer, la Grèce ait donné lieu aux griefs articulés par la Porte Ottomane dans l'ultimatum remis le 11 Décembre, 1868, au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes. Il est constant, en effet, que les principes du droit des gens obligent la Grèce, comme toutes les autres nations, à ne pas permettre que des bandes se recrutent sur son territoire, ni que des bâtiments s'arment dans ses ports pour attaquer un Etat voisin."

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie demande incidemment s'il était permis à la Grèce d'agir comme elle l'a fait dans l'affaire de Crète.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France fait observer que la Conférence a jugé à dessein convenable de ne pas s'engager dans l'interprétation des lois Helléniques, et qu'une semblable manière de procéder aurait des inconvénients qui se présentent d'eux-mêmes à l'esprit.

M. le Chevalier Nigra pense qu'il est utile pour la Turquie, sans entrer dans l'examen des lois intérieures qui sont révocables, de se placer sur le terrain du droit des gens qui est permanent.

A la suite de ces observations le premier paragraphe du projet de Déclaration est adopté.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette donne lecture du deuxième paragraphe ci-après:—

"Persuadée d'ailleurs que le Cabinet d'Athènes ne saurait méconnaître la pensée qui inspire cette appréciation aux trois Cours protectrices de la Grèce, comme à toutes les autres Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856, la Conférence déclare que le Gouvernement Hellénique est tenu d'observer dans ses rapports avec la Turquie les règles de conduite communes à tous les Gouvernements, et de satisfaire ainsi aux réclamations formulées par la Sublime Porte pour le passé en la rassurant en même temps pour l'avenir.

"La Grèce devra donc s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer la formation sur son territoire de toute bande armée en vue d'une agression contre la Turquie, et prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour empêcher l'armement dans ses ports de bâtiments destinés à secourir, sous quelque forme que ce soit, toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan."

Sur les observations de plusieurs Plénipotentiaires la seconde partie de ce paragraphe est modifiée ainsi qu'il suit:—

"La Grèce devra donc s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer:

"1. La formation sur son territoire de toute bande armée en vue d'une agression contre la Turquie.

"2. L'armement dans ses ports de bâtiments destinés à secourir, sous quelque forme que ce soit, toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan."

M. le Marquis de Lavalette continue la lecture de son projet et propose la rédaction suivante au sujet du repatriement des Crétois :—

"En ce qui regarde les demandes de la Porte relatives au repatriement des sujets Turcs réfugiés sur le territoire Hellénique, la Conférence prend acte des déclarations faites par le Cabinet d'Athènes dans ses notes des 9 et 13 Décembre, et demeure convaincue qu'il se prêtera à faciliter, autant qu'il dépend de lui, le départ des familles Candiotes qui désireraient rentrer dans leur patrie."

Ce paragraphe est adopté avec la substitution des mots "Crétois émigrés" à ceux de "sujets Turcs."

Le paragraphe suivant est ainsi conçu :—

"Quant aux dommages privés encourus par des sujets Ottomans, le Gouvernement Hellénique ne contestant nullement à la Turquie le droit de faire poursuivre par la voie judiciaire les réparations qui pourraient être dues, et la Turquie acceptant, de son côté, la juridiction des Tribunaux Grecs, les Plénipotentiaires ne croient pas devoir entrer dans l'examen des faits et sont d'avis que le Cabinet d'Athènes ne doit négliger aucune des voies légales pour que l'œuvre de la justice suive son cours régulier."

Cette rédaction n'ayant donné lieu à aucune observation, M. le Plénipotentiaire de France achève en ces termes la lecture de son projet :

"La Conférence ne saurait douter que devant l'expression unanime de l'opinion des Plénipotentiaires sur les questions soumises à leur examen, le Gouvernement Hellénique ne s'empresse de conformer ses actes aux principes qui viennent d'être rappelés, et que les griefs exposés dans l'ultimatum de la Porte ne se trouvent par le fait même définitivement écartés.

"Cette Déclaration sera portée sans délai à la connaissance du Cabinet d'Athènes, et les Plénipotentiaires ont la conviction que la Sublime Porte renoncera à donner suite aux mesures annoncées par elle comme devant être la conséquence de la rupture des relations diplomatiques, si, dans une communication notifiée aux Cabinets, la Grèce défère à l'opinion émise par la Conférence.

"Les Plénipotentiaires faisant dès lors appel aux mêmes sentiments de conciliation et de paix qui animent les Cours dont ils sont les Représentants, expriment l'espoir que les deux Gouvernements n'hésiteront pas à renouer leurs rapports et à effacer ainsi, dans l'intérêt commun de leurs sujets, toute trace du sentiment qui a motivé la réunion de la Conférence."

M. le Prince de Metternich propose qu'un délai soit fixé à la Grèce pour faire connaître si elle s'engage à se conformer à la Déclaration qui lui sera transmise.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France appuie cette proposition, qui lui paraît d'un intérêt égal pour les deux parties, et il pense que le délai, auquel d'ailleurs on devrait s'abstenir avec soin de donner un caractère comminatoire, pourrait courir du jour de la remise de la Déclaration entre les mains du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce.

M. le Chevalier Nigra regarde comme essentiel que la Turquie adhère préalablement à la Déclaration, et elle pourrait le faire en reproduisant les termes de ce document, c'est-à-dire, en affirmant qu'elle renoncera à donner suite aux mesures qu'implique le rejet de son ultimatum si la Grèce défère à l'opinion émise par la Conférence.

M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie exprime l'espoir que si la Grèce prend l'engagement d'observer désormais les prescriptions du droit international, la Porte ne fera pas d'objection au rétablissement des rapports diplomatiques ; mais il ne voit pas la nécessité de faire dès à présent une déclaration à ce sujet.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France constate qu'il ne s'agit plus en ce moment que de déterminer dans quel délai il serait nécessaire que le Gouvernement Hellénique répondît pour que la Porte pût retirer les mesures résultant de son ultimatum.

M. le Chevalier Nigra est d'avis que la Déclaration devrait être portée à la connaissance du Gouvernement Hellénique par une dépêche du Président de la Conférence. Cette dépêche tracerait implicitement au Cabinet d'Athènes sa réponse, qui devrait consister dans une acceptation pure et simple.

M. le Comte de Stackelberg approuve cette manière de procéder ; il pense que la fixation d'un terme dans la Déclaration y donnerait un caractère impératif qu'elle ne doit pas revêtir, et qu'il suffira de mentionner le délai dans la dépêche que le Président adressera au Gouvernement Hellénique au nom de la Conférence, et dont les termes pourraient être discutés et arrêtés d'un commun accord.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette dit qu'il est prêt à se conformer aux intentions de la Conférence.

Au moment où la séance allait être levée, M. le Plénipotentiaire de France reçoit communication d'un document autographié et non signé, portant le titre de "Mémoire sur le Conflit Greco-Turc," et qui lui est transmis par M. le Ministre de Grèce à Paris. Après avoir pris connaissance de cette pièce, ainsi que de ses annexes, et en avoir lu les principaux passages à la Conférence, M. le Marquis de Lavalette propose, pour en faciliter l'étude, d'en faire distribuer des copies à chacun des Plénipotentiaires, qui pourront ainsi en mieux apprécier l'argumentation.

Afin de déférer au vœu unanimement exprimé dans la dernière réunion que les communications de la Grèce soient accueillies avec bienveillance et sérieusement examinées, les Plénipotentiaires décident que le projet de Déclaration sur lequel ils sont tombés d'accord ne sera pas paraphé avant que chacun d'eux ait pu se rendre compte de la valeur du document émané de la Chancellerie Hellénique.

Fait à Paris, le 15 Janvier, 1869.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 153.

Protocol (No. 5) of Conference held at Paris, January 16, 1869.

Présents :

MM. les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche-Hongrie ;
" " de la France ;
" " de la Grande Bretagne ;
" " de l'Italie ;
" " de la Prusse et de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord ;
" " de la Russie ;
" " de la Turquie ;
Le Secrétaire de la Conférence.

M. LE PLENIPOTENTIAIRE DE FRANCE ouvre la délibération en constatant que le document qui lui a été transmis hier par M. le Ministre de Grèce à Paris, a été distribué, ainsi qu'il avait été convenu dans la séance d'hier, et que chacun des Membres de la Conférence a pu s'en rendre compte. M. le Marquis de Lavalette annonce qu'il a reçu aujourd'hui de M. Rangabé l'extrait d'une dépêche de M. Delyanni, datée d'Athènes le 7 Janvier, et qui reproduit les conclusions des différentes notes adressées par le Cabinet Hellénique au Ministre de Turquie en Grèce, en formant une demande reconventionnelle contre le Gouvernement Turc pour les préjudices que les sujets Grecs auraient éprouvés par suite des dernières mesures aussi bien que de l'inobservation des Traités.

Il est donné lecture de cette pièce à la Conférence.

M. le Prince de Metternich déclare qu'après avoir examiné le Mémoire qui a été distribué aux Plénipotentiaires, et entendu celui qui vient d'être porté à leur connaissance, il ne croit pas qu'il y ait lieu de s'écarter des principes ni de modifier la base de la Déclaration discutée dans la séance précédente.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Angleterre dit qu'il a lu avec le plus grand soin le document adressé hier à la Conférence par M. le Ministre de Grèce ; il l'a comparé avec d'autres documents et spécialement avec le projet de Déclaration. Il a en outre écouté avec une très grande attention la lecture de la dépêche de M. Delyanni, et il juge que les arguments développés dans les deux pièces transmises à la Conférence laissent subsister toutes les raisons qui l'ont déterminé à adhérer au projet de Déclaration.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie déclare qu'il a prêté la même attention scrupuleuse à l'examen des documents Grecs ; mais qu'à ses yeux il y a lieu de maintenir des résolutions qui sont fondées sur une juste et équitable appréciation des questions soumises à la Conférence.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Prusse, tout en témoignant de l'intérêt avec lequel il a entendu la lecture de ces documents, est d'avis que les prendre en considération ce serait rentrer dans la discussion des faits que la Conférence a tenu à éviter.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie trouve les documents émanés du Cabinet d'Athènes remplis d'utiles informations, et il en apprécie la forme modérée ; mais il doit reconnaître que les satisfactions proposées par la Grèce ne suffiraient pas à écarter les demandes de la Porte, ni à conjurer les calamités de la guerre. Or, comme le but de la Conférence est

d'aplanir un différend qui menace la paix, et que l'on est tout près de s'entendre sur une Déclaration établissant des principes généraux obligatoires pour la Grèce comme pour les autres Etats, M. le Comte de Stackelberg est d'avis de maintenir la marche adoptée, en approuvant le projet élaboré avant la communication des documents Grecs. Quant aux demandes reconventionnelles de la Grèce, c'est là une question étrangère au programme étroitement limité de la Conférence et dont elle n'est pas appelée à s'occuper.

M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie dit que le premier document mis sous les yeux des Plénipotentiaires n'est qu'une discussion de droit en opposition avec les principes établis au sein de la Conférence. Quant à la dépêche qui vient d'être lue, elle ne se borne pas à une justification du Gouvernement Hellénique; elle accuse le Gouvernement Ottoman. Si ces pièces devaient figurer aux actes de la Conférence et être prises en considération, il se verrait obligé de les passer en revue point par point et d'opposer à chacune des allégations du Cabinet Grec les affirmations contraires du Gouvernement Ottoman.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie résume l'ensemble des raisons qui ont déterminé la Conférence à n'entrer dans aucune controverse au sujet des faits, pour établir les principes destinés à empêcher le retour des actes qui ont motivé les plaintes de la Turquie. Il fait ressortir que les prévisions de la Déclaration s'appliquent à tous les points déjà connus de la contestation, et il écarte les considérations émises dans les nouveaux documents communiqués par la Grèce.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie ne demande pas à la Conférence de revenir sur une de ses décisions et de s'engager dans la discussion des faits, qui a été jugée sans utilité pratique; mais il n'a pas cru devoir laisser passer, sans les relever, les assertions développées dans les communications faites à la Conférence par M. le Ministre de Grèce, et les observations qu'il a présentées n'avaient pas d'autre objet.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette, rappelant les considérations qu'il a déjà développés à ce sujet, dit que la Conférence n'ayant pu avoir la pensée d'ouvrir en Orient une enquête incompatible avec l'indépendance des deux parties intéressés, et voulant cependant se rendre un compte exact des faits, a dû attacher une importance particulière aux documents produits par les deux Gouvernements. Ceux du Cabinet d'Athènes ont été d'autant plus consciencieusement examinés que la Grèce n'était pas représentée dans la Conférence; et l'on peut dire, ajoute M. le Plénipotentiaire de France, que, sous ce rapport, le Gouvernement Hellénique a pu tenir un langage beaucoup plus libre que celui qu'il aurait été autorisé à faire entendre si M. le Ministre de Grèce avait été présent; car M. Rangabé n'aurait pas pu aborder certainement toutes les questions traités dans les notes communiqués par lui. Le Président de la Conférence croit résumer la pensée de tous en ajoutant que ces communications n'ont pas modifié les dispositions manifestés dans la séance d'hier, et les Plénipotentiaires étant à cet égard unanimes, il propose d'arrêter définitivement les termes du projet de Déclaration.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Angleterre présente quelques observations sur le passage du deuxième section, portant que "la Grèce devra s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer (1) la formation sur son territoire de toute bande armée en vue d'une agression contre la Turquie; (2) l'armement dans ses ports de bâtiments destinés à secourir, sous quelque forme que ce soit, toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan."

Sur la demande de Lord Lyons, la rédaction suivante est adoptée:—

"La Grèce devra donc s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer:

"1. La formation sur son territoire de toute bande recrutée en vue d'une agression contre la Turquie;

"2. L'équipement dans ses ports de bâtiments armés, destinés à secourir, sous quelque forme que ce soit, toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan."

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie ne peut personnellement que donner son entière adhésion aux principes exposés dans la Déclaration; il est toutefois sans instructions pour y apposer sa signature, et il se réserve de faire ultérieurement connaître si son Gouvernement consent à adhérer aux conditions qu'elle lui impose à lui-même.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France fait observer que la Déclaration ne saurait être expédiée à Athènes avant que l'assentiment conditionnel de la Porte ait été notifié à la Conférence. Il est nécessaire, en effet, de savoir préalablement que, si la Grèce défère à la décision des Plénipotentiaires, la Turquie renoncera à donner suite aux mesures définies dans son ultimatum.

En outre, M. le Plénipotentiaire de France, dans un sentiment de loyauté et pour prévenir tout malentendu, croit qu'il est indispensable de préciser comment aura lieu la notification de l'assentiment de la Grèce; et il fait remarquer qu'en établissant qu'elle sera

faite aux Cabinets, on décide implicitement qu'elle sera transmise aux différentes Puissances représentées à la Conférence.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie pense qu'on éviterait cette difficulté en décidant que la réponse de la Grèce serait notifiée à la Conférence elle-même, et il fait une proposition dans ce sens.

Après une discussion à laquelle prennent part MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche-Hongrie, de Grande Bretagne, d'Italie, de Prusse, et de Russie, cette proposition est adoptée, et il est convenu que le projet de Déclaration sera modifié sur ce point, dont la rédaction est arrêtée ainsi qu'il suit:—

"Cette Déclaration sera portée sans délai à la connaissance du Cabinet d'Athènes, et les Plénipotentiaires ont la conviction que la Sublime Porte renoncera à donner suite aux mesures annoncées comme devant être la conséquence de la rupture des relations diplomatiques, si, dans une communication notifiée à la Conférence, le Gouvernement Hellénique défère à l'opinion émise par elle."

La discussion étant épuisée au sujet du projet de Déclaration, les Plénipotentiaires tombent d'accord pour le parapher immédiatement *ne varietur*.

La Conférence s'occupe ensuite de la rédaction de la dépêche par laquelle M. le Plénipotentiaire de France fera parvenir à Athènes la Déclaration aussitôt que l'adhésion de la Turquie sera officiellement connue. On convient qu'un projet sera présenté à la prochaine séance; et sur la proposition de M. le Chevalier Nigra, on décide que la communication sera faite directement par M. le Président de la Conférence à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce, et sera appuyée à Athènes par les Représentants de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la Grande Bretagne, de l'Italie, de la Prusse, et de la Russie.

Fait à Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1869.

(Suivent les signatures.)

No. 154.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 28.)

Constantinople, January 14, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a despatch from Mr. Palgrave respecting a request that had been made to him by the Russian Consul-General to take the Greek subjects at Trebizond under his protection in his character of Acting American Vice-Consul.

I also inclose copies of my answer, and of my letter to Mr. Joy Morris, informing him of my inability to allow Mr. Palgrave to accede to the request of the Russian Consul-General.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 154.

Consul Palgrave to Mr. Elliot.

Trebizond, January 7, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, under flying seal, a despatch addressed by myself as Acting Vice-Consul for the United States in these parts, to the American Minister at Constantinople. The subject explains itself.

It seemed to me a duty to take this step in consequence of the request made me so to do by my Russian colleague, M. Machinn, who had received directions from his Embassy at Constantinople to refer the matter to me in character of Acting American Vice-Consul.

At the same time, I acquainted M. Machinn that my position and duties as British Consul must remain entirely foreign to any such communication or its results. Also, that even thus I did not feel myself at liberty to enter into any correspondence on the subject without previously acquainting your Excellency, and leaving the matter open to any decision or modification should you so desire. But to have absolutely refused to

write on the subject would have, it seemed to me, needlessly offended and even embarrassed the Russian Consul-General.

Trusting that your Excellency will not disapprove my conduct in this matter, I have, &c.

(Signed) W. G. PALGRAVE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 154.

Mr. Elliot to Consul Palgrave.

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 14, 1869.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 7th January, inclosing under flying seal a despatch you had addressed to the United States Minister in answer to a communication from the Russian Consul-General, inviting you apparently to assume the protection of the Greek subjects at Trebizond in your character as Acting American Vice-Consul.

The modification of the measure originally announced with respect to the Hellenic subjects makes it probable that no further application will be made to you in this matter.

If, however, it should be repeated, you will state that the protection of Greek subjects forms no part of the duties which Her Majesty's Government are glad you should perform for the convenience of American citizens as Acting Vice-Consul for the United States, and that, consequently, you are not authorized to undertake them.

As the Turkish Government have announced that, during the suspension of the relations of the two countries, the Hellenic subjects who remain must do so under the protection of the laws of the Ottoman Empire, my inability to authorize you to accede to the request of the Russian Consul-General will be productive of no inconvenience.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure 3 in No. 154.

Mr. Elliot to Mr. Morris.

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 14, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which has been forwarded through my hands by Her Majesty's Consul at Trebizond, who had been applied to by the Russian Consul-General to take the Hellenic subjects there under his protection in the character of Acting Consul-General for the United States.

I have informed Mr. Palgrave that the protection of the Greek subjects forming no part of the duties which Her Majesty's Government are glad that he should perform for the convenience of American citizens as Acting Consul for the United States, he is not authorized to assume it.

As the Turkish Government have announced that during the suspension of the relations between the two Governments the Hellenic subjects who remain must do so under the protection of the laws of the Ottoman Empire, I am glad to think that my inability to allow Mr. Palgrave to accede to the request of the Russian Consul-General will be productive of no inconvenience.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 155.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 19, 1869.

BY my despatch of the 22nd ultimo I informed your Lordship that it was supposed that a large number of Greek vessels had obtained Russian papers, and that General Ignatieff had assured me that up to that time only two or three in reality got them.

From the best information I have been able to obtain, the number to which Russian papers have now been granted is between forty and fifty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 156.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.

(No. 33. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 19, 1869.

I AM assured that even since the decision of the Conference the language of General Ignatieff continues to be such as to encourage the Greeks in refusing to give way to the representation that has been addressed to them.

In speaking to a Russian subject who has mentioned the circumstances to me, the latter having observed that in event of war ensuing from the refusal of the Greek Government to give way, the result of it must be the discomfiture of the Greeks, General Ignatieff answered vehemently, "Never; that will not be the result."

His anticipation is, I believe, that a war between Turkey and Greece would bring about a general rising in the Christian provinces, upon a greater scale than the Turks would be able to resist.

Although the Turkish Government seem at their ease upon this head, their accounts from Servia coincide with those furnished to Her Majesty's Government by Mr. Longworth of the efforts that are being made to get up a general movement, and this knowledge inclines them at once to take strong measures.

Aali Pasha's opinion, as confidentially expressed yesterday, in answer to a message I had sent him urging him to avoid all acts of hostility, was to the effect that, although reluctant to commence them, it would be imprudent to remain quiet long enough to afford Greece the time to make her preparations and, in concert with the Russian emissaries, to develop the machinations for creating disturbances among the Christian population in the provinces.

He believes that not only Servia, but also Roumania will be pushed by Russia to assume a hostile attitude towards Turkey, and that to avoid these complications it may be more prudent for the Porte at once to strike a decisive blow before its enemies have matured their projects.

Before, however, resorting to extreme measures, the Porte will consult the friendly Powers.

I have represented to his Highness that a resort to actual hostilities still appeared to me both hazardous and unnecessary; the Cretan insurrection may be regarded as nearly extinct, and with it the main causes of complaint against the Greek Government cease to have a practical importance.

I believed also that the Porte might find themselves mistaken if they imagined that they could at once strike a blow so decisive as to force the Greeks to accept the terms demanded, and that it was far more desirable to endeavour to avoid a war than to begin it on the calculation of being able to make it a short one.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 157.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 19, 1869.

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's telegraphic instructions of the 14th instant, I informed the Grand Vizier that your Lordship was still of opinion that a good effect as regards their own interests would be produced if, after the business of the Conference was concluded, and when no discussion upon it could arise, the Porte were to make the Declaration already suggested by your Lordship, of the favourable disposition of the Sultan towards his Christian subjects.

Aali Pasha hopes that your Lordship will rest assured of his desire to follow any suggestion coming from Her Majesty's Government; but in the present case he feels obliged to decline doing so.

His hesitation did not arise, he said, from a wish to avoid the measures which it may be necessary to take for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects of the Sultan, without distinction of race or creed, for great and important reforms are unquestionably still required for improving the condition of the population.

These, in his opinion, should emanate directly and spontaneously from the Sultan; but Aali Pasha believes, that if a Declaration, such as that suggested by your Lordship, were to be made to the Conference, it would be supposed to have been obtained by the pressure of the foreign Powers; and the Christians of the Empire would attribute to them the concessions which may be made in their favour, and would to some extent regard themselves as being under the protection of Europe, to the manifest detriment of the Sultan's prestige and authority.

Aali Pasha trusts that Her Majesty's Government will appreciate the spirit which dictated the above remarks, and will believe that they do not indicate any intention of hanging back in the measures required for the general interests. The Porte is, on the contrary, resolved to carry out the necessary reforms, but is anxious to have the credit of them, and thus to secure the confidence and sympathies of the people.

Upon receiving the intelligence that the Conference had pronounced upon the questions submitted to it, I again suggested that the time seemed come for making the Declaration; but the Grand Vizier, while repeating that it should be made, appeared resolved to make it rather to the Cabinets than to the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 158.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 16.)
My Lord, *Athens, January* 20, 1869.

YOUR Lordship's two telegrams of the 10th instant, directing me to support the representations which the French Minister at this Court had been instructed to make to the Hellenic Government in the name of the Paris Conference, did not reach me until late at night on the 16th instant.

The instructions to which these telegrams refer were received by Baron Baude on the same day, and were at once communicated by him to M. Delyanni, whilst similar instructions were received by the Prussian, Austrian, and Italian Ministers, and by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, at intervals during the day.

As it is very difficult to see M. Delyanni, I was compelled to acquaint him in writing with the substance of your Lordship's communications; but on Monday the 18th instant, I was able to speak to him and to ascertain the intentions of the Greek Government, with regard to the Conference, when he authorized me to repeat to your Lordship the assurance he had already given me, that nothing would be done by the Greek Government, whilst the Conference was sitting, to provoke a collision with Turkey.

With regard, however, to your Lordship's suggestion that the Greek Minister at Paris should be allowed to take part in the Conference, he regretted that it would be quite impossible for the Greek Government to listen to this advice unless their Representative was admitted in all respects on the same footing as the Turkish Representative.

However disposed the Greek Government might be, he said, to bow to the unanimous decision of a Conference of the Great Powers, the position would be altogether changed if that decision were taken and were to be intimated to Greece, not by those Powers only, but also by Turkey—that is to say, by one of the parties to the very differences which had led to the assembling of a Conference.

I found it quite in vain to argue the point with M. Delyanni, and I may add that every one here with whom I have conversed, appears to be of opinion that Greece has been unfairly treated by the Conference in this matter. M. Delyanni said, however, that he had authorized M. Rangabé to give any explanations which might be asked of him by the Marquis de Lavalette, who was not only the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, but also the President of the Paris Conference; and he seemed to think that this arrangement might possibly enable the Conference to come to a decision even in the absence of a Greek Plenipotentiary.

As I had expected would be the case, the Nomarch of Syra still declines to undertake that the "Enosis" shall not leave port until the close of the legal proceedings now pending; when informed of the written engagement to this effect taken by M. Delyanni, he said that there would appear to have been some mistake on the part of

the officials who had made up the packet of despatches, which certainly did not contain any such instruction as that which M. Delyanni had assured the French Minister would be sent to the Nomarch of Syra. Baron Baude is naturally indignant at all this trifling, and has remonstrated very warmly on the subject with M. Delyanni. He has now again been most positively informed that instructions have been sent to the Nomarch authorizing him to give the assurance required by Hobart Pasha—who will then, I trust, retire from Greek waters—although I heard yesterday that there is some question of the Porte having directed him to remain where he is, unless the Greek Government will promise that the "Enosis" shall not leave Syra until after the close of the Conference at Paris, the previous understanding being, that the "Enosis" should be detained only until the close of the legal proceedings.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter, attributed to one of the King's Aides-de-camp, which is worth perusal. The officer in question is supposed to be M. Pano Colocotroni, who is much trusted by His Hellenic Majesty and who is now in the Peloponnesus raising recruits for the war against Turkey. He states that he is acting in this matter in the name of His Majesty, who is most anxious that the people should seriously prepare for war. From all I hear, however, that wish is not shared to the same extent by the people generally, as I cannot learn that they are contributing either man or money for the purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

P.S. *January* 21.—The French Minister has been good enough to communicate to me the inclosed extract from a letter from the French Consul at Syra respecting the Nomarch's denial that he had received any instructions to promise that the "Enosis" should not leave port during the judicial proceedings now pending, and also the inclosed copy of a letter which he has directed the Consul to address to the Nomarch of Syra on this subject.

By the inclosed extract from a letter from Her Majesty's Consul at Syra, your Lordship will, however, perceive that the Nomarch has at last given the required promise in the most explicit terms, and there is now every reason to suppose that the Turkish squadron has left Syra.

E. M. E.

Inclosure 1 in No. 158.

Extract from "La Grèce" of January 16, 1869.

NOUS publions une circulaire qu'un Sous-Lieutenant d'Artillerie, Officier d'Ordonnance du Roi, vient de lancer de son quartier-général de Tripolizza au peuple du Péloponèse. Il y a des cas où le ridicule tue, il y en a d'autres où l'on est sauvé par le ridicule.

"Mon cher ———, "*Tripolizza, le* 23 *Décembre*, 1868.

"La guerre n'est pas provoquée par nous; elle nous est imposée par les circonstances. Préparons-nous sérieusement à la guerre. Tel est le désir du vrai peuple, telle est la décision de notre Souverain.

"J'entretiens l'opinion, et mon opinion n'admet aucun doute, que le peuple du Péloponèse (et surtout les habitants des districts montagneux), belliqueux dans les périodes critiques, sont aussi en temps de paix amis du travail et de la royauté. Éloigné des querelles politiques, je suis en droit de vous prier tous, sans exception, de vous employer à la formation de bataillons légers de volontaires. Ces bataillons seront organisés en corps réguliers de chasseurs portant l'habillement national; l'engagement sera indéfini et pour autant que dureront les circonstances extraordinaires. La paye sera de 28 drachmes par mois, le pain et l'armement étant fournis par le Gouvernement; avancement rapide jusqu'au grade de sergent, et ensuite, comme dans le reste de l'armée. Voilà des avantages que les corps auxiliaires n'offriront pas, où on n'aura que 20 drachmes seulement.

"Les circonstances sont graves et nous devons comprendre qu'il ne doit exister qu'un seul chef, le Roi. Je recrute au nom de Sa Majesté et je ne suis pas venu ici pour devenir chef de corps. Que notre mot d'ordre soit "le Roi!" Notre but, le bien du pays. Il est temps d'agir et non de parler. Occupez-vous de m'envoyer vite des hommes en vous attachant à la qualité et non à la quantité.

P.S.—J'ai auprès de moi des capitaines, des officiers et quelques sous-officiers de l'infanterie, tous du Péloponèse.

Inclosure 2 in No. 158.

M. Messonier to Baron Baude.

(Extrait.)

SUR ce, nous dimes, mais nous avons cependant reçu avis officiel que le Gouvernement du Roi vous avait autorisé à donner la garantie demandée, et nous sommes porteurs des dépêches qui nous annoncent cette décision. Il nous dit alors avec un embarras visible. Hier soir j'ai reçu une enveloppe dans laquelle ne se trouvait rien; peut-être le Ministère, trop occupé, aura-t-il envoyé par erreur à Corfou (*sic*) l'ordre que vous attendez. S'il en est ainsi je le recevrai demain. La défaite était tellement grossière, surtout dans la bouche d'un homme d'esprit, que nous dimes d'un commun accord, C'est bien étonnant que dans ce moment les dépêches du Gouvernement tardent à vous parvenir.

Inclosure 3 in No. 158.

M. Messonier to M. Dracopoulo.

Syra, le Janvier, 1869.

M. le Préfet,

J'AI rendu compte à M. le Ministre de France de l'entretien que j'ai eu avec vous le 16 courant, au sujet de l'engagement que le Gouvernement du Roi vous a prescrit de prendre, que "l'Enosis" ne sortirait pas de Syra tant qu'elle serait sous jugement. A l'occasion de la réponse évasive qui nous a été donnée, M. le Baron Baude a rappelé à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, qu'il lui avait annoncé deux fois par écrit que vous aviez reçu pour instruction de prendre l'engagement demandé, et M. Delyanni lui a répété Lundi dernier que M. Bulgaris, Président du Conseil et Ministre de l'Intérieur, vous adressait de nouveau l'ordre formel et précis de prendre cet engagement sans délai.

Dans cette situation, M. le Nomarque, je vous prie de vouloir bien me faire connaître si nous pouvons espérer que votre langage sera conforme à celui de votre Gouvernement, et me mettre en mesure de faire savoir à M. le Ministre de France, si les ordres du Gouvernement du Roi qui lui ont été communiqués vont enfin recevoir, de votre part, leur exécution, qui ne serait plus longtemps différée que sous votre responsabilité personnelle.

Recevez, &c.

Inclosure 4 in No. 158.

Consul Lloyd to Mr. Erskine.

Syra, January 17, 1869, 6 P.M.

(Extract.)

I RECEIVED yours of yesterday this morning, and saw the Nomarch who promised me to see the King's Attorney, and give the required certificate of non-departure from Syra of "Enosis" till the judicial proceedings were over. Returning home I went to the Nomarch, who informed me that meeting with obstacles on the part of the King's Attorney, he had taken upon himself to write to me as per inclosed copy, and that having done so, if need be, he would take upon himself to stop the departure of "Enosis" till the end of the proceedings. This letter I shall communicate to Admiral Hobart by "Izzedin" to-morrow morning, and I expect Admiral Hobart will weigh anchor and go away immediately, or so soon as the weather permits.

Inclosure 5 in No. 158.

M. Dracopoulo to Consul Lloyd.

(Translation.)

Syra, January $\frac{5}{17}$, 1869.

Sir,

IN reply to the question you have addressed me on the part of his Excellency the Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha, I beg to acquaint that the "Enosis" will not be allowed to leave Syra before the final settlement of the judicial proceedings against her.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. P. DRACOPOULO,
Nomarch of the Cyclades.

No. 159.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 29.)

Constantinople, January 28, 1869.

(Telegraphic.)

I AM told in confidence by Aali Pasha that the Russian Ambassador has informed him that the King of Greece is entirely in favour of accepting the decision of the Conference; and if the country insists upon rejecting it he will abdicate and leave it to its fate.

No. 160.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

Paris, January 29, 1869.

(No. 135.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of the two documents communicated by the Greek Minister to the President of the Conference, of which one was read at the fifth sitting, and the other at the sixth sitting.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 160.

M. Delyanni to M. Rangabé.

Athènes, le $\frac{25 \text{ Décembre}}{6 \text{ Janvier}}$, 1869.

(Extrait.)

BIEN que j'aie déjà suffisamment répondu à tous les griefs de la Sublime Porte, contenus dans son ultimatum, comme j'apprends que ce document va être l'objet d'une discussion dans la Conférence, je vais recapituler ici la conclusion de mes notes responsives à Photindes Bey, en date du $\frac{27 \text{ Novembre}}{9 \text{ Décembre}}$ et du $\frac{4}{16}$ Décembre. Le premier des griefs de la Porte n'a pas de consistance, puisque le Gouvernement Grec n'a autorisé ni toléré des invasions sur le territoire Ottoman. Il a seulement maintenu et il maintient que ses lois ne l'autorisent pas à empêcher quiconque voudrait aller faire la guerre en Candie,—point qui n'est pas contesté par la Turquie. Quelques bandes ont réussi à se rendre en Candie; ces bandes ont toujours été formées clandestinement sur divers points du royaume par vingtaine ou trentaine en chaque endroit; elles partaient pour Candie soit séparément soit ensemble. Dans l'un comme dans l'autre cas, elles étaient, à cause de la proximité des lieux, lancées en Candie avant que le Gouvernement ait même eu le temps de l'apprendre. C'est de cette manière que la fameuse bande de Petropoulaki s'est rendue dernièrement en Candie. Les partisans s'étaient concentré à Syra, Nauplie, Gythion; un bateau a rapidement fait la tournée; il les a pris et débarqués en Crète. Quelquefois ces projets étaient connus d'avance du Gouvernement, mais la preuve juridique lui faisait défaut. Or, pour prendre des mesures pour disperser ces bandes, pour poursuivre ceux qui en faisaient partie, il n'aurait pas suffi d'établir pour chacun d'eux qu'il avait l'intention de se rendre en Candie, dans le but de prendre part à la guerre, parceque chacun pourrait hautement avouer le projet sans que le Gouvernement pût l'en détourner. Le fait qui aurait pu légitimer l'intervention de l'autorité était l'entente illicite, la connivence, difficile à prouver dans les cas ordinaires, où l'indignation qu'excitent les méfaits vient en aide à la justice; presque impossible

lorsqu'il s'agirait d'actes qui sont applaudis comme œuvres patriotiques. Toutes les fois cependant que le Gouvernement a pu acquérir cette preuve, son intervention n'a point manqué. Ainsi lorsqu'un officier de cavallerie s'étant entendu avec quelques soldats, partit à leur tête pour Candie après avoir enlevé des munitions de guerre, le Gouvernement lança un bateau à sa poursuite, qui l'atteignit, l'arrêta, et le livra aux tribunaux. Deux fois le Gouvernement a dissous des bandes qui s'étaient formées pour faire invasion en Epire et en Thessalie. Ce n'est donc pas sur le principe que les deux Gouvernements ont différé d'opinion, mais sur l'application, et c'est sur ces difficultés pratiques que le Gouvernement Hellénique appuie la remarque, que c'est demander de lui l'impossible que d'exiger de lui qu'aucune bande ne se forme, ou qu'elle soit dispersée si elle est formée, car il arrivera souvent que des bandes se formeront à son insu et qu'elles se rendront en Candie avant qu'il ait pu les en empêcher, ou prendre des mesures contre elles, parceque les preuves lui auront fait défaut. Il a certes le devoir d'intervenir pour faire respecter sa neutralité, toutes les fois qu'il sera en mesure de le faire.

Le second point est tout-à-fait inadmissible. Les bateaux "Crète" et "Panhellénion" ont depuis longtemps cessé leurs voyages en Candie. "L'Enosis" seul le continue, et le Gouvernement Hellénique persiste dans son opinion qu'il n'est nullement un corsaire et moins encore un bateau-pirate; qu'aucun principe du droit des gens, aucune obligation internationale, aucune loi intérieure du pays, n'engage le Gouvernement et ne l'autorise même pas à le désarmer ou à lui interdire l'accès de ses ports. Le Gouvernement Ottoman a seulement le droit de s'en emparer, s'il le surprend en contravention dans les localités bloquées, et cela en se conformant aux règles du droit maritime.

Le troisième point n'est qu'un prétexte mis en avant par le Gouvernement Turc. Jamais le Gouvernement Hellénique ne s'est opposé au départ des familles Crétoises, ni a refusé sa protection à ceux qui voulaient réellement et de leur plein gré et volonté partir. Il en est de même des quatrième et cinquième points, sur lesquels mes notes responsives à Photiades Bey fournissent assez de développement.

Les Représentants des Hautes Puissances s'occuperont de ceux-ci comme des autres griefs, et le Gouvernement du Roi ne doute point que l'opinion qu'ils s'en formeront ne soit en tout point conforme à la justice.

En terminant, le Gouvernement du Roi soumet à l'application impartiale et éclairée des Représentants des Grandes Puissances Européennes ses propres demandes reconventionnelles contre la Turquie:—

1. Il existe entre la Grèce et la Turquie une acte solennel, une Convention conclue et signée entre les deux Etats, pour la première fois le $\frac{25}{6}$ Avril, 1856, ensuite dénoncée par la Turquie en 1861, et renouvelée le 29 Septembre, 1865. L'Article III de cette Convention porte:—

"Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent mutuellement d'employer, chacune de son côté, des troupes regulières pour la garde de leurs provinces limitrophes. Les troupes de chaque Etat doivent être d'une force suffisante, et seront placées sous les ordres d'un commandant supérieur, qui sera tenu de poursuivre activement le brigandage dans toute l'étendue de son ressort."

La Grèce a, dès l'année 1855, exécuté cet Article, mais le Gouvernement Ottoman continue à se refuser de s'y conformer. Ce n'est donc point là une demande vague et indéterminée, comme celle que la Turquie fait concernant l'exécution des Traités, sans dire quels sont ces Traités et en quoi le Gouvernement Hellénique y a contrevenu; mais une stipulation précise que le Gouvernement Hellénique invoque et sur laquelle le repos de ses provinces limitrophes, aussi longtemps qu'elles resteront exposées et ouvertes faute de limites raisonnables, lui commande d'insister et d'en faire une condition de la reprise de ses rapports avec la Turquie.

2. La Turquie, en rompant ses relations avec la Grèce, pour des motifs dont l'inconstance est établie par mes notes responsives, a commis un acte injuste dont elle doit encourir la responsabilité. Cette responsabilité, et la réparation qui est due au Gouvernement Hellénique, doit se mesurer d'après les pertes que les Hellènes résidant en Turquie, navigateurs ou négociants, ont subies, expulsées violemment du territoire Ottoman sans leur accorder un délai suffisant pour liquider leurs intérêts.

3. Les Consuls Helléniques ont été renvoyés brutalement sans aucun égard pour leur caractère. Le sentiment de sa propre considération ne permet pas au Gouvernement Hellénique de les renvoyer à leur poste sans qu'une satisfaction éclatante ne leur soit donnée.

4. Les Protocoles et le Traité de Commerce entre la Grèce et la Turquie garantissent aux Hellènes le traitement des autres sujets les plus favorisés. Dans la pratique cette disposition a été presque anéantie par le mauvais vouloir des autorités locales et par le refus systématique du Gouvernement Ottoman lui-même de faire droit aux justes

réclamations de la Légation Hellénique à Constantinople et de nos Consuls dans tout l'Empire Ottoman. Les préjudices graves qu'ont éprouvés les Hellènes à cause de cette obstination manifeste du Gouvernement et des autorités Ottomanes à violer, par la différence de traitement dans l'application, et les Protocoles et les stipulations de tout Traité spécial, obligent le Gouvernement Hellénique de faire de l'assimilation parfaite, dans la pratique, de ses nationaux à ceux des autres Etats Européens résidant en Turquie, sous la garantie des Légations respectives des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople, l'objet de la 4ème condition qu'il met à la reprise de ses rapports avec le Gouvernement de l'Empire voisin.

(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 160.

M. Delyanni to M. Rangabé.

Athènes, le $\frac{26 \text{ Décembre}}{7 \text{ Janvier}}$ 1869.

(Extrait.)

AU moment où la Conférence se réunit pour délibérer sur des intérêts majeurs en vue de la situation de l'Orient, la Grèce ne saurait se dispenser de faire entendre ses vœux et exprimer son opinion.

Dans l'intérêt de leur mission pacifique les Représentants des Grandes Puissances Européennes doivent s'occuper non seulement des droits du Royaume Hellénique, mais aussi des intérêts et des besoins de toute la race Grecque. Autrement, ils courent le risque de s'arrêter aux effets au lieu de remonter à la source des complications sur lesquelles ils ont à délibérer, ainsi que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous le signaler par mes récentes dépêches, en date du $\frac{13}{25}$ et du $\frac{18}{30}$ Décembre.

En effet, pourvu que l'on réfléchisse avec attention on sera convaincu que le Royaume Hellénique subit plutôt les convulsions qui agitent la race Grecque, et dont la lutte Crétoise est une manifestation, qu'il ne les provoque, ou qu'il n'en est la cause.

Toutes les autres races Chrétiennes qui se trouvent sous la domination Ottomane, autonomes ou non, ont au moins l'avantage de se trouver groupés ensemble et d'avoir le même sort. Ainsi les Serbes ne forment qu'une Principauté; l'Europe a sanctionné la fusion des Principautés Danubiennes; les Bulgares se trouvent sous la même administration. Seule la race Hellénique est partagée en divers grands groupes placés dans des conditions politiques très variées. Outre le Royaume Hellénique il y a Samos, érigée en Principauté semi-autonome; puis Chios et Ypsara, et les îles de l'Archipel, possédant un régime administratif qui n'est pas celui de Samos, et qui diffère de celui des autres provinces de l'Epire, de la Thessalie, et de la Macédoine. Candie elle-même avait des franchises qui lui faisaient une situation distincte.

Le démembrement de la race Hellénique constitue pour elle un état qui pèse trop lourdement sur elle par l'infériorité qu'il lui fait, pour qu'elle ne cherche point à s'en affranchir.

La race Grecque est généralement considérée comme la plus remuante: elle se distingue en effet des autres races par la vivacité de son esprit, par la hardiesse de son intelligence. Malgré cela, son agitation provient plutôt de ce qu'elle n'a pas pu se constituer en commun: du besoin irrésistible qu'elle éprouve d'y parvenir que de l'ambition dont on l'accuse. Qu'on prenne le peuple le plus paisible, qu'on le partage en plusieurs groupes distincts, sous des régimes multiples, et on le verra s'agiter comme la race Grecque, par le besoin qu'il éprouvera de se faire un sort commun.

En remédiant à cet état de choses, en adoptant la réunion de toutes les Provinces Helléniques sous le même régime, ce n'est ni un traitement ni une faveur exceptionnelle qu'on lui accorderait, attendu que toutes les autres populations de l'Empire Ottoman jouissent déjà des bienfaits de cette union. Le démembrement de la race Hellénique et son infériorité politique forment pour elles un titre à l'attention des Grandes Puissances qu'aucun autre peuple en Orient n'a à invoquer.

Le Gouvernement Hellénique n'a que des vœux à former à ce sujet; mais il y insiste, convaincu que cet arrangement est le plus durable, qu'il peut se concilier avec les vrais intérêts de la Turquie et, sous certaines conditions, avec ses droits de suzeraineté.

Si toutefois les Grandes Puissances ne peuvent y aviser actuellement, qu'elles veuillent bien au moins résoudre définitivement la question de Candie, et la rectification des frontières continentales du Royaume Hellénique. Tout autre remède ne serait pas efficace, et menace, nous tenons à le signaler, de perpétuer le conflit entre la Grèce et la Turquie.

En effet, où consiste la difficulté principale du conflit actuel? Un peuple Grec,

homogène et co-religionnaire, un peuple qui a bravement fait son devoir durant la grande et longue lutte Hellénique pour l'indépendance, qui en a partagé tous les malheurs, subi toutes les calamités, qui avait presque reconquis son indépendance, et qui pour des considérations diplomatiques qu'ont regrettées depuis ceux-là même qui les ont faites, aurait été replacé sous le joug Ottoman, s'est révolté, poussé à bout par un traitement insupportable.

Les mesures d'extrême violence auxquelles la Porte a eu immédiatement recours, pour réprimer ses vœux, l'ont exaspéré au point de rompre tout lien avec la Turquie, proclamer de nouveau son indépendance et son annexion à la Grèce. Une lutte d'extermination en est résultée, qui dure depuis deux ans et demi, et dont on connait les épisodes navrants. Le Gouvernement Hellénique peut hardiment en appeler au témoignage de tous ceux qui ont cherché à approfondir l'origine de cette insurrection, que la Grèce ne l'a ni provoquée ni encouragée. Une fois cependant la lutte engagée, il ne pouvait y rester indifférent, que de sacrifices ne lui a-t-elle pas coûtés, que d'embarras et de dangers ne lui a-t-elle pas suscités; et pourtant il devait se resigner aux exigences de sa position, tellement elles étaient impérieuses pour lui.

La Turquie dans des vues d'un intérêt très étroitement entendu, ne voulait pas tenir compte de la situation exceptionnelle dans laquelle se trouvait le Gouvernement Hellénique, et persistait à exiger de lui une absolue neutralité, une inertie complète; en d'autres mots, comme s'il s'était agi d'une lutte indifférente au peuple Grec.

Le Gouvernement Hellénique s'y est conformé autant que possible, mais il ne pouvait pas faire ni plus ni mieux, parcequ'il se trouvait sous la contrainte des sympathies enthousiastes de la nation.

Telles étant les situations respectives et les opinions des deux Gouvernements, le désaccord ne pouvait manquer de se produire entre eux et d'amener une rupture.

Pour établir, donc, les rapports entre les deux Etats d'une manière qui offre des garanties solides, on doit en finir avec la question de Crète, qui en est la source et qui menacerait de troubler de nouveau leurs rapports.

Tant que cette question subsistera, la Turquie maintiendra ses prétentions vis-à-vis de la Grèce, lesquelles, ainsi que le prouve son ultimatum, dépassent la limite de la neutralité, telle qu'elle est définie par le droit des gens, et telle qu'elle peut être applicable dans un pays constitutionnel comme la Grèce. Mais quand même la Turquie se départirait de ce qu'il y a d'exagéré dans les conditions qu'elle veut imposer à la Grèce, la situation ne cesserait pas pour cela d'être dangereuse.

Le Gouvernement Hellénique ne saurait dissimuler que la lutte de Candie a fait naître, et maintient en Grèce, un antagonisme national contre la Turquie. Placé entre les exigences de la Turquie d'une part et l'agitation du pays de l'autre, le Gouvernement Hellénique ne pourrait suivre une autre ligne de conduite que celle de remplir ses devoirs de neutralité, puisque la nécessité lui en était imposée par ses rapports avec la Turquie, mais de les remplir avec modération et d'apporter dans leur pratique les ménagements qui lui étaient commandés par la prudence: car s'il agissait autrement, s'il prenait des mesures d'extrême rigueur, ainsi qu'il aurait pu le faire s'il s'était trouvé en face d'une lutte n'intéressant nullement le peuple Hellénique, il irait à l'encontre du sentiment national et s'y briserait en provoquant un bouleversement national.

Or, ces ménagements imposés au Gouvernement Grec par sa position exceptionnelle vis-à-vis de l'insurrection Crétoise, la Turquie les a constamment interprétés comme étant inspirés par un esprit hostile. Si donc la situation ne vient pas à se modifier, le Gouvernement Hellénique observera la même modération, puisqu'elle lui est dictée par le sentiment de sa propre conservation, la Turquie maintiendra ses réclamations, le désaccord sera inévitable, et de nouvelles complications ne manqueront pas de se produire.

Quant à la manière de résoudre la question, les Grandes Puissances l'ait indiquée il y a deux ans, en engageant la Turquie à se prêter à une enquête qu'elles feraient elles-mêmes pour constater les vœux des populations Crétoises, sauf à les proclamer ensuite et à leur donner leur haute sanction. Leur propre dignité les engage d'y persister après l'impuissance manifeste de la Porte à reprimer l'insurrection et à rétablir l'ordre en Crète.

Mais si, contre toute attente, les Grandes Puissances laissaient subsister le différend Crétois, la Grèce ne pourrait sans doute que regretter, dès à présent, les complications qui ne manqueront pas de surgir dans la suite et déclarer que la responsabilité ne saurait lui incomber.

(Signé) P. DELYANNI.

No. 161.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 30, 1869.*

LETTER from President of the Conference was delivered yesterday. I learn, very confidentially, that the Government persist in their refusal to accept the Declaration, but that the King is prepared, if necessary, to replace them by a Ministry which will be more reasonable.

No. 162.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 26. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, January 30, 1869.

Sir,

THE Plenipotentiary of Russia has so cordially co-operated with his colleagues in the Conference at Paris for the settlement of the difference between Turkey and Greece, that it is out of the question to suppose that the conduct of the Russian Agent in another quarter calculated to defeat such a settlement can meet with the approval of the Imperial Government. Yet, if the late Greek Minister at Constantinople has correctly reported, in the despatches recently published by the Greek Government, the language held to him by the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, it is impossible not to see that there was much in that language to encourage the Greek Government to persist in disregarding the complaints of the Porte, by inspiring it with the conviction that those complaints would not be followed up, as they have been, by measures of a more decided character.

Her Majesty's Government think that they render a good service to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh by instructing you, in the spirit of frankness and sincerity with which they desire to carry on all their intercourse with the Imperial Government, to mention to Prince Gortchakoff the impression which has been produced upon them by the perusal of the Greek Minister's despatches, as well as by other circumstances which have been brought under their notice from various quarters, that the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople has not fully borne in mind the loyal and impartial spirit by which his Government, as shown in the Conference at Paris, is actuated in regard to the present crisis in the East of Europe; but has, on the contrary, encouraged the Greek Government to adopt and to persevere in a policy towards Turkey which has been pronounced, by the present voice of Europe, as being opposed to public morality and international law.

Her Majesty's Government feel assured that their motives will not be misunderstood by the Imperial Government, when they suggest, in a confidential form, how important it is for the peace of the world, in which all Governments have a common interest, that no misapprehension should exist as to the hearty concurrence of the Imperial Government in the policy and principles which the Conference of Paris has sanctioned by its unanimous agreement; and that consequently the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople might be enjoined so to regulate his language and his conduct as to give no occasion for ill-informed persons to cast a doubt on the sincerity of the Imperial Government.

I have to add, that I leave entirely to your discretion the time and manner of bringing this delicate subject to the knowledge of Prince Gortchakoff.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 163.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 16.)

St. Petersburgh, January 25, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAD a long conversation to-day with Prince Gortchakoff, with reference to the proceedings of the Conference on the Turco-Greek difficulty, and his Excellency expressed to me much satisfaction with the language held by your Lordship on the subject to Baron Brunnow, and with the part taken by Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Conference which he felt had greatly contributed to its successf issue. He said that the Declaration which

had been adopted had met with the entire approval of the Emperor; and that he had, therefore, by His Majesty's orders, immediately forwarded telegraphic instructions to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to request an audience of the King, and to express to His Majesty the Emperor's hope that the Greek Government would accept without delay the decision of the Conference, and to warn His Majesty that their hesitating or declining to do so would be attended with serious consequences, and expose Greece to dangers against which it would be impossible for the Emperor to afford her any protection; and that it was essential, lest the Government should be over-ruled ("débordé") by the party of action, that no time should be lost in taking the decision recommended to them.

Prince Gortchakoff said this telegram had been already forwarded from Constantinople, and would be received at Athens before the arrival of M. de Walewsky with the Declaration of the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 164.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, January 25, 1869.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my preceding despatch of this date, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Emperor expressed to me, on the 21st instant, at a ball at the Palace, to which I had the honour of being invited, his anxious hope that the Greek Government would accept the decision of the Conference; and His Majesty observed, that he could not believe they would be mad enough ("assez fou") to reject it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 165.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, January 26, 1869.

My Lord,

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF read to me yesterday some reports from Baron Brunnow of his conversations with your Lordship on the proceedings of the Conference at Paris, and as to the means of communicating the Declaration agreed upon to the Greek Government, the last of which he had received the previous evening by the messenger Ridgway. I therefore asked whether Baron Brunnow had not also reported to him the conversation he had with your Lordship the day before the messenger left, respecting the difficulties of the position of the King of Greece. Prince Gortchakoff said he had received a despatch on that subject. He did not, however, offer to acquaint me with its contents, and I rejoined that your Lordship might not have understood exactly the wishes of the Russian Government as to the means which might be advisable to improve the position of King George, but I would read to him an account (that in your Lordship's despatch of the 19th July), which you had sent to me of the opinions you had expressed to Baron Brunnow as to the inexpediency of foreign Powers interfering in the internal affairs of Greece.

When I had done so, Prince Gortchakoff said he had never intended that the expediency of amending the Greek Constitution should have been discussed in the Conference, and that Baron Brunnow had merely wished to suggest to your Lordship that something might be done confidentially by the three Protecting Powers to bring about that desirable object. I must observe, however, that his Excellency's present statement of his views appears to me to have been influenced by existing circumstances, as he had spoken not only to myself but also to my colleagues, in a way which left no doubt in my mind of his desire, though he was unwilling to make the proposal myself that the Conference or "La Grande Europe," as he expressed himself, should urge upon Greece the necessity of amending her Constitution. However this may be, his Excellency now says that he reminded your Lordship in a late despatch to Baron Brunnow, that before the King's arrival in Greece, he had suggested the expediency of a Constitution being

amended, which he said even the English Minister at that time, Mr. Scarlett, had considered impracticable, and he still thought that something might be done by the influence of the protecting Powers to induce the Greek Government to take the question into consideration.

I said that your Lordship was unwilling, as I had just proved to him from your despatch, to incur even the responsibility of recommending a change of Government at Athens, and he rejoined that there could be no great responsibility in endeavouring to improve a state of things which can hardly be made worse. He said, M. Bulgaris had been following a course disastrous to the country and dangerous to the tranquillity of the East, and it is not improbable, therefore, that when M. Novikoff returns to Athens, which he is about to do, he will avail himself of his friendly relations with the King to point out to his Majesty the danger of continuing to give his confidence to that Minister.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 166.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 22. Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, January 27, 1869.

My Lord,

IN a conversation which I had two days ago with Prince Gortchakoff, his Excellency said that the excitement ("l'état fébril") of Mr. Elliot in defending the conduct of the Porte was not in harmony with the calmness and moderation of your Lordship and Lord Lyons, and I find that his Excellency has also used the same expression to others in speaking of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

The despatches of the Greek Minister, published by his Government, which contain reports made to him by General Ignatieff of his interviews with Mr. Elliot, sufficiently account for the impressions which Prince Gortchakoff appears to entertain of Mr. Elliot's conduct, and I had intended to correct these false impressions by communicating to his Excellency extracts from Mr. Elliot's despatches in my possession; but as I have since learnt that your Lordship is about to publish a Blue Book on the crisis which has lately occurred between Turkey and Greece, the object which I had in view will doubtless be attained by that publication.

Nevertheless I availed myself last night of the presence of M. de Westmann, at a party at the Embassy, to have some conversation with him, in which I expressed my astonishment at Mr. Elliot having been represented as under the influence of an excitement, to my knowledge, so entirely inconsistent with his character, and I said that his correspondence proved the rashness with which General Ignatieff attributed the late proceedings of the Porte to encouragement first from one foreign Power and then from another; and also the incorrect colouring given to Mr. Elliot's language and proceedings by the reports of M. Delyanni, on information which he professes to have received from the Russian Ambassador.

I was surprised to find that M. de Westmann seemed to be still of opinion that the Turkish Government had acted under Austrian influence; and I told him that Mr. Elliot has expressed to your Lordship the strongest conviction that the Austrian Ambassador was as ignorant as himself of the intentions of the Porte until they were notified to the foreign Legations at Constantinople; and I acquainted him, as fully as I could, under the circumstances, with the wise and prudent counsels uniformly given by Mr. Elliot to the Turkish Government, and with the deference which had been paid to them in some instances by Aali Pasha.

I also said it was surprising that General Ignatieff, as he appears to have done, from M. Delyanni's reports, should have expected the Queen's Ambassador to take a different view from Her Majesty's Government of the provocation under which the Porte had acted, and to have called upon them without instructions from your Lordship, to suspend measures which they had a perfect right to adopt, in defence of their own interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 167.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 30, 1869.*

I AM privately informed that a "secret and confidential" agent, named M. Calamatis, was sent from Athens previous to the meeting of the Conference at Paris, with instructions to M. Rangabé to maintain firmly the claim of Greece to be represented in the Conference on an equal footing with Turkey.

M. Calamatis, as I am informed, is further charged by the Greek Government to proceed to America to engage the sympathies of the United States' Government in their cause, and to obtain, if possible, a circumstantial proof of the good-will of America in the shape of a loan. It is probable that this gentleman will have more success in obtaining the former than the latter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 168.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 1, 1869.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency held to Prince Gortchakoff, as reported in your despatch No. 21 of the 26th ultimo, on the subject of the position of the King of Greece, and the Greek Constitution.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 169.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 1, 1869.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by your Excellency to M. de Westmann, as reported in your despatch No. 22, Confidential, of the 27th ultimo, with respect to the course taken by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in the differences which have arisen between the Governments of Turkey and Greece.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 170.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 1, 1869.*

I APPROVE the letter which you addressed to Mr. Consul Palgrave and to Mr. Morris on the 14th ultimo, copies of which are inclosed in your despatch No. 28 of the same date, relative to an application made to Mr. Palgrave by the Russian Consul-General at Trebizond to take Greek subjects resident there under British protection.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 171.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 1, 1869.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the steps taken by your Excellency to avert the commencement of hostilities between Turkey and Greece, as reported in your despatch No. 33 of the 19th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 172.

Consul Dickson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(Separate.)
My Lord, *Canea, Crete, January 11, 1869.*

ADVERTING to my despatch of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that the Hellenic volunteers in question, with their chiefs Leonidas, Petropoulakis, Nitza, &c., have come down to the town of Sphakia, there to await a steamer to convey them back to Greece, as already announced.

Several Members of the late "Provisional Government," and other insurgent native chiefs, namely, Kostaro, Goghonis, Veludakis, Siphakis, Morakis, Manussoyannakis, &c., have written to me and to my colleagues of France and Russia, praying that a foreign ship may be sent to take them out of the island. Their letter is dated from Komitades in Sphakia, 9th instant. I have referred this letter to the Governor-General for his information. There are still about 1,000 insurgents in the eastern districts under Captains Korakas, Sphakianaki, Kokkinis, Lakerda, Trifitzos, &c., scattered over Lasethe, Rhizo, and Mirabello; but I do not expect that these can hold out for any considerable time. Kriaris and Hadgi Mikhalis are also on the mountains.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

No. 173.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 2, 1869, 11·30 A.M.*

M. DE LAVALETTE informs me confidentially that a telegram from the French Minister at Athens dated yesterday, states that the King says he has determined to accept the decision of the Conference, and to appoint a new Ministry if, as he expects, M. Bulgaris resigns.

No. 174.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 2, 1869.*

BARON BRUNNOW read to me this morning a telegram sent from St. Petersburgh on the 5th of January to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, instructing him to send a telegraphic despatch to the Russian Minister at Athens, of which the substance is as follows:—

The Minister was directed to ask an audience of King George, and, in the name of the Emperor, press him to accept the Declaration of the Conference, inasmuch as a refusal to do so would be neither for the interests nor the dignity of Greece, while it would expose her to dangers which Russia would scarcely be in a position to avert.

The Russian Minister was further to point out that if, as was reported, designs were entertained of subverting the King's authority in Greece, the execution of such designs

might possibly, under the plea of sustaining the Royal power, tend to establish a state of things which might be repugnant to the general feelings of the nation.

I told Baron Brunnow that Her Majesty's Government would learn with great satisfaction that the Russian Minister in Greece had been instructed to make to King George a communication so likely to produce the desired result at Athens, while it afforded a proof of the identity of views between the British and Russian Governments.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 175.

Consul Dickson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 3.)

(Separate.)

My Lord, *Canea, Crete, January* 10, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that M. Sacopoulo, Hellenic Consul for this island, has received notice from the Governor-General to take his departure hence by the first available opportunity, in company with all his subordinate officers; his Excellency having further intimated that this measure is in consequence of the rupture of official relations between their respective countries.

M. Sacopoulo will accordingly leave for Syra by the Austrian Lloyd's mail-boat in the course of the present week, having delivered the archives of the Hellenic Consulate in charge of the Acting Russian Consul at Canea.

The Governor-General has just publicly notified that Hellenic subjects resident in Crete, being locally engaged in commercial business and otherwise having private engagements to meet, may continue to remain under the protection of the Turkish authorities pending the renewal of diplomatic intercourse between Greece and Turkey; their nationality, meanwhile, to be in no way affected thereby.

A Commission has been appointed to examine into the merits of the various claims of the Hellenes, and reserves to itself the right of expelling such as it may please. Hellenic ships entering the ports of the island will be subject to the awards of the Commission if these are to remain or not, &c.

All Creto-Hellenes, namely, Cretans being Ottoman subjects who may at any time have acquired the Hellenic nationality, may now return to their former allegiance, or, failing to do so forthwith, they will be expelled from the island within fifteen days from this date.

There are altogether about 600 Hellenes on the Island.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

No. 176.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 3.)

(No. 145. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February* 2, 1869.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith, a certified copy of the Protocol of the sixth sitting of the Conference, which took place on the 20th ultimo.

To this Protocol is annexed a copy of the letter addressed, in the name of the Conference, on the 20th ultimo to the Hellenic Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 176.

Protocol (No. 6) of Conference held at Paris, January 28, 1869.

Présents:

Les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche-Hongrie;
" " de la France;
" " de la Grande Bretagne;
" " de l'Italie;
" " de la Prusse et de la Confédération d'Allemagne du Nord;
" " de la Russie;
" " de la Turquie;

Le Secrétaire de la Conférence.

M. LE PLENIPOTENTIAIRE de France annonce que s'étant mis en communication avec M. le Ministre de Grèce à Paris, il lui a donné connaissance de la Déclaration paraphée dans la séance du 16 Janvier; il lui a même lu le projet de dépêche qui doit être examiné aujourd'hui et qui accompagnera l'envoi de la Déclaration au Cabinet d'Athènes. M. Rangabé se trouve ainsi au courant non seulement des résolutions de la Conférence, mais en quelque sorte de sa pensée et de ses intentions.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette ajoute qu'il a reçu de M. le Ministre de Grèce l'extrait d'une nouvelle dépêche de M. Delyanni, en date du 7 Janvier, ainsi que la précédente. Ne voulant pas se porter juge de ce document, il propose de le soumettre à l'appréciation de la Conférence. Après en avoir entendu la lecture, MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche-Hongrie, de France, de Grande Bretagne, d'Italie, de Prusse, et de Russie sont unanimes pour constater qu'il soulève des questions de territoire dont l'examen est en dehors des limites assignées à la délibération. Sans attendre les observations que M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie se disposait à présenter, la Conférence se déclare incompétente, et décide qu'elle ne saurait donner aucune suite à la communication de M. le Ministre de Grèce.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette demande à résumer les dépêches télégraphiques qui lui sont parvenus seulement dans la journée d'hier en réponse à celles qu'il a adressées au Ministre de France à Athènes dans la matinée du 19 Janvier, conformément aux résolutions prises en commun. Il résulte de ces informations sommaires que le Gouvernement Grec ne croit pas pouvoir revenir sur la détermination de ne point se réunir aux Puissances autrement que sur un pied de complète égalité avec la Turquie. Le Cabinet Hellénique proteste toutefois de son intention de ne rien faire qui soit de nature à rendre plus difficile la tâche des Plénipotentiaires, et ajoute qu'en ce qui le concerne le *statu quo* sera maintenu pendant la durée de leurs travaux.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette s'étant acquitté de toutes les communications qu'il avait à soumettre à ses collègues, insiste sur la nécessité d'arrêter sans nouveaux retards des décisions définitives.

La Conférence, après avoir paraphé le projet de Déclaration délibéré dans les deux séances précédentes, s'était ajournée afin de laisser à M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie le temps nécessaire pour recevoir les instructions qu'il attendait de Constantinople. Djemil Pacha se trouvant en mesure de faire connaître aujourd'hui la résolution de la Sublime Porte, le Président lui donne la parole.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie dit qu'il a transmis à son Gouvernement le texte du projet de Déclaration paraphé dans la dernière séance par MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche-Hongrie, de France, de Grande Bretagne, d'Italie, de Prusse, et de Russie. Il ajoute que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan adhère entièrement à la Déclaration de la Conférence, et que si le Cabinet d'Athènes, par une communication notifiée à la Conférence, fait savoir qu'il adhère lui-même à cet Acte, la Sublime Porte renoncera à mettre à exécution les mesures annoncées comme devant être la conséquence du rejet de son ultimatum.

La Conférence prend acte de la Déclaration de M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie, et reconnaît unanimement qu'elle constitue une adhésion complète et sans réserves. Il est décidé dès lors que sa propre Déclaration sera portée dans le plus bref délai possible à la connaissance du Cabinet d'Athènes.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche-Hongrie, de France, de Grande Bretagne, d'Italie, de Prusse, et de Russie apposent leur signature à ce document, dont les termes demeurent fixés ainsi qu'il suit:—

Déclaration.

"Justement préoccupées des dangers qui peuvent naître de la rupture des relations entre la Turquie et la Grèce, les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856 se sont entendues pour apaiser le différend survenu entre les deux Etats et ont autorisé à cet effet leurs Représentants auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français à se constituer en Conférence.

"Après une étude attentive des documents échangés entre les deux Gouvernements, les Plénipotentiaires sont tombés d'accord pour regretter que, cédant à des entraînements sur lesquels son patriotisme a pu l'égarer, la Grèce ait donné lieu aux griefs articulés par la Porte Ottomane dans l'ultimatum remis le 11 Décembre, 1868, au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes. Il est constant, en effet, que les principes du droit des gens obligent la Grèce, comme toutes les autres nations, à ne pas permettre que des bandes se recrutent sur son territoire, ni que des bâtiments s'arment dans ses ports pour attaquer un Etat voisin.

"Persuadée d'ailleurs que le Cabinet d'Athènes ne saurait méconnaître la pensée qui inspire cette appréciation aux trois Cours Protectrices de la Grèce, comme à toutes les autres Puissances Signataires du Traité de 1856, la Conférence déclare que le Gouvernement Hellénique est tenu d'observer, dans ses rapports avec la Turquie, les règles de conduite communes à tous les Gouvernements et de satisfaire ainsi aux réclamations formulées par la Sublime Porte pour le passé en la rassurant en même temps pour l'avenir.

"La Grèce devra donc s'abstenir désormais de favoriser ou de tolérer—

"1. La formation sur son territoire de toute bande recrutée en vue d'une agression contre la Turquie.

"2. L'équipement dans ses ports de bâtiments armés destinés à secourir, sous quelque forme que ce soit, toute tentative d'insurrection dans les possessions de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

"En ce qui regarde les demandes de la Porte relatives au rapatriement des Crétois émigrés sur le territoire Hellénique, la Conférence prend acte des déclarations faites par le Cabinet d'Athènes, et demeure convaincue qu'il se prêtera à faciliter, autant qu'il dépend de lui, le départ des familles Candiotes qui désireraient rentrer dans leur patrie.

"Quant aux dommages privés encourus par des sujets Ottomans, le Gouvernement Hellénique ne contestant nullement à la Turquie le droit de faire poursuivre par la voie judiciaire les réparations qui pourraient être dues, et la Turquie acceptant de son côté la juridiction des tribunaux Grecs, les Plénipotentiaires ne croient pas devoir entrer dans l'examen des faits et sont d'avis que le Cabinet d'Athènes ne doit négliger aucune des voies légales pour que l'œuvre de la justice suive son cours régulier.

"La Conférence ne saurait douter que, devant l'expression unanime de l'opinion des Plénipotentiaires sur les questions soumises à leur examen, le Gouvernement Hellénique ne s'empresse de conformer ses actes aux principes qui viennent d'être rappelés, et que les griefs exposés dans l'ultimatum de la Porte ne se trouvent par le fait même définitivement écartés.

"Cette Déclaration sera portée sans délai à la connaissance du Cabinet d'Athènes, et les Plénipotentiaires ont la conviction que la Sublime Porte renoncera à donner suite aux mesures annoncées comme devant être la conséquence de la rupture des relations diplomatiques, si dans une communication notifiée à la Conférence le Gouvernement Hellénique défère à l'opinion émise par elle.

"Les Plénipotentiaires, faisant dès lors appel aux mêmes sentiments de conciliation et de paix qui animent les Cours dont ils sont les Représentants, expriment l'espoir que les deux Gouvernements n'hésiteront pas à renouer leurs rapports, et à effacer ainsi, dans l'intérêt commun de leurs sujets, toute trace du dissentiment qui a motivé la réunion de la Conférence."

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie dit qu'il signera le Protocole où doit figurer la Déclaration, mais qu'il s'abstiendra de revêtir de sa signature l'Acte même qui sera présenté au Cabinet d'Athènes. En agissant ainsi, conformément aux instructions qu'il a reçus, il obéit à un sentiment de réserve et de modération qui lui paraît entrer dans la pensée de la Conférence.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette annonce qu'il se propose de faire parvenir la Déclaration à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce par le courrier qui partira de Paris, Vendredi prochain, 22 Janvier.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France signale une préoccupation témoignée par le Gouvernement Ottoman, et dont M. l'Ambassadeur de Turquie l'a entretenu. Disposée à se conformer au vœu formulé dans la Déclaration que les rapports diplomatiques ne demeurent pas plus longtemps interrompus entre les deux pays, la Porte se demande

comment il sera procédé au rétablissement des relations, et elle juge nécessaire que le Gouvernement Hellénique prenne à cet égard l'initiative. M. le Plénipotentiaire de France est d'avis qu'il y aurait intérêt à aplanir cette difficulté afin d'écarter à l'avance tout ce qui peut retarder le rapprochement que l'on s'est proposé pour but. Du moment où la Grèce aurait adhéré à la Déclaration, la Turquie ayant de son côté renoncé sous cette condition à donner suite aux mesures comminatoires indiquées dans l'ultimatum, on pourrait décider que les relations des deux Cabinets se trouveraient rétablies par ce seul fait.

La Conférence prend une résolution en ce sens.

Il est convenu en même temps que la lettre addressée à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce, pour lui faire parvenir la Déclaration signée aujourd'hui, contiendra l'expression du vœu unanimement manifesté à ce sujet par les Plénipotentiaires.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France demande que les termes de cette dépêche soient immédiatement arrêtés. Il donne lecture du projet qu'il a préparé à la suite de l'échange d'idées qui a eu lieu dans la séance précédente. Après avoir été complété conformément à la décision qui vient d'être prise, ce projet est adopté.

Sur la proposition de M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie, on convient que ce document sera annexé au Protocole.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette rappelle que son intention étant d'expédier après-demain la communication qu'il est chargé d'adresser au Cabinet d'Athènes, il est urgent d'en aviser les différentes Cours, et les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche-Hongrie, de la Grande Bretagne, d'Italie, de Prusse, et de Russie s'engagent à en informer leurs Gouvernements afin que les Légations en Grèce soient invitées à prêter leur appui à la démarche du Président de la Conférence.

Fait à Paris le vingt Janvier, mil huit cent soixante-neuf.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Annex to Protocol No. 0, of January 20, 1869.

M. de Lavalette to M. Delyanni.

Paris, le 20 Janvier, 1869.

M. le Ministre,

LES Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856, réunies en Conférence à Paris afin d'examiner dans un esprit de conciliation le différend survenu entre la Grèce et la Turquie, ont profondément regretté que le Gouvernement Hellénique n'ait point cru pouvoir permettre à son Représentant d'assister à leurs travaux, et n'ait pas choisi cette voie pour faire entendre ses explications au sein de la Conférence.

Elles ont jugé néanmoins de leur devoir de poursuivre l'œuvre de médiation bienveillante qu'elles avaient entreprise dans l'intérêt de la paix, en me chargeant, en ma qualité de Président de la Conférence, de faire savoir à M. le Ministre de Grèce à Paris qu'il pouvait entrer en communication avec elle par mon entremise. Je n'ai pas besoin d'ajouter que je me suis empressé, ainsi que les procès-verbaux de la délibération en font foi, de porter les documents qui m'ont été adressés par M. Rangabé à la connaissance des Plénipotentiaires, et les résolutions que la Conférence était appelée à prendre n'ont été définitivement adoptées qu'après un examen attentif de toutes les pièces qui pouvaient éclairer leur conscience.

Cet examen impartial et approfondi a conduit les Puissances à la conviction unanime qu'il y avait lieu de dégager le débat des questions de fait, et de s'attacher bien moins à prononcer sur le passé qu'à rechercher les règles de conduite qui doivent dans l'avenir présider aux rapports entre la Turquie et la Grèce. La Conférence, en un mot, a pensé que le meilleur moyen de prévenir le retour des difficultés actuelles et d'en effacer les traces, était de préciser les principes généraux de droit international sur lesquels les deux Gouvernements étaient en dissentiment, et qui sont ou doivent être la loi commune de toutes les nations.

Je suis chargé par la Conférence de faire connaître à votre Excellence la Déclaration ci-jointe, dans laquelle les Plénipotentiaires ont consigné le résultat de leurs appréciations et leurs vœux.

La Conférence est persuadée que le Gouvernement Hellénique ne saurait méconnaître la pensée bienveillante qui l'a constamment dirigée dans ses travaux, et qu'il ne se refusera pas à accéder à des principes universels qui, je le répète, sont également obligatoires pour tous les Etats, et que la Grèce peut certainement s'approprier sans qu'il en résulte aucune atteinte pour son indépendance et sa dignité.

Pour que sa détermination, toutefois, ait la valeur immédiate que les Cabinets

désirent pouvoir y attacher, il est nécessaire que, dans la semaine qui suivra la remise de la présente Déclaration, le Gouvernement Hellénique réponde en notifiant à la Conférence, par mon entremise, son adhésion pure et simple aux décisions exposées dans cet Acte, et sa résolution d'y conformer dorénavant son attitude.

Ainsi que le constate l'adhésion que, de son côté, M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie a déjà donnée à la Déclaration, et qui est consignée dans les Protocoles, la Porte Ottomane s'engage, à cette condition, à renoncer aux mesures énoncées dans l'ultimatum du 11 Décembre.

Par le fait de l'acquiescement de Sa Majesté Hellénique à la Déclaration, la reprise des rapports diplomatiques entre la Grèce et la Turquie sera considérée comme avenue de plein droit au moment même où cet acquiescement aura été notifié à la Conférence.

Passé le délai indiqué, la Conférence devrait, à son vif et profond regret, regarder comme un refus le silence du Cabinet d'Athènes, et ses propres efforts de conciliation comme épuisés.

Il ne lui resterait plus dès lors qu'à abandonner le Gouvernement Hellénique aux conséquences d'une détermination qui serait en opposition avec le vœu de toutes les Puissances en faveur du maintien de la paix.

No. 177.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 3, 1869, 6:15 P.M.*

A TELEGRAM from the French Minister at Athens, dated last night, states that the King having determined to accept the Declaration, Bulgaris has resigned. The King has sent for Zaimis and Deligeorgis, who have not yet accepted. The French Minister at Athens inquires what answer he should give if the King should ask in consequence for a prolongation of the term fixed by the Conference.

The following telegram has been sent in reply by M. de Lavalette:—

"If, as you think it probable, the King should ask for a delay, you will reply that the Conference cannot consent to one; but I have come to an understanding with my colleagues to give to the expression 'in the week which shall follow, &c.,' the widest interpretation, and thus to extend the term to next Sunday inclusively."

No. 178.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 147. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, February 3, 1869.*

THE Marquis de Lavalette sent for me this afternoon and read to me a telegram dated last night which he had just received from Baron Baude, the French Minister at Athens. In this telegram Baron Baude stated that the King having declared his intention to accept the declaration of the Conference M. Bulgaris had resigned, and M. Zaimis and M. Deligeorgis had been sent for by His Majesty, but had not yet consented to take office. Under these circumstances M. Baude thought it not improbable that the King would ask that the term within which the Conference required the Greek answer to be given should be extended beyond the week specified in the letter of the 20th January to the Hellenic Minister for Foreign Affairs. The telegram stated also that popular manifestations in favour of war had been made in the streets of Athens.

M. de Lavalette said that he thought we should be very far from doing good service to King George if we consented to make any change in the terms of the Declaration or of the letter which accompanied it. The manœuvres of the enemies of peace and order at Athens would no doubt be encouraged by any delay in settling the question, and the King would probably find it easier to overcome the hesitation of those patriotic men whom he might desire to call to the Ministry if he were able to show them that the danger hanging over the country was so imminent that not a moment was to be lost. If the Conference consented to any change in its resolutions, the Greeks would be inclined to demand further concessions which it would be impossible to grant; the critical state of things would be prolonged indefinitely, and the benefits which the present unanimity of the Great Powers ought to secure might be altogether lost. M. de Lavalette thought therefore that a regard not less for the interests of King George and his subjects than

for the dignity of the Powers represented in the Conference required that we should adhere to our decision. It appeared, however, he went on to say, to be held at Athens that as the letter of the Conference was delivered to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs on Thursday last, the delay granted would expire on that day week, that is to say, to-morrow. But the terms of the letter did not necessarily bear that interpretation. The words used were, "Il est nécessaire que dans la semaine qui suivra la remise de la présente Déclaration le Gouvernement Hellénique réponde, &c." This might be taken to mean either that the Greek Government must answer within eight days from the delivery of the Declaration, or that it must answer within the following week, the week being held to begin on Sunday. If the latter interpretation were adopted, the term would not expire until Sunday next, the 7th instant. He thought that, under the circumstances, we could not do less than give to our letter the widest interpretation that the words admitted, and he recommended that a telegram in this sense should be immediately dispatched in answer to the inquiry of Baron Baude.

M. de Lavalette added, that he had already explained the state of things to Djemil Pasha, and had ascertained that his Excellency desired to follow the advice of the other Plenipotentiaries.

M. de Lavalette saw afterwards the Prussian, Russian, Italian, and Austrian Representatives in succession, and made to each a communication similar to that which he had made to me. He subsequently came into a room in which those Plenipotentiaries and I were sitting together, and settled with us that he should send immediately to Baron Baude the following telegram:—

"Dans le cas, selon vous probable, où le Roi vous demanderait un délai, vous répondriez que la Conférence ne saurait y consentir; mais je me suis entendu avec mes collègues pour donner aux expressions de ma communication, 'dans la semaine qui suivra, &c.,' l'interprétation la plus large, et pour étendre ainsi la terme jusqu'à Dimanche prochain inclusivement."

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 179.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4.)

Athens, February 3, 1869.

(Telegraphic.)

THE Government, being unwilling to accept the Declaration of the Conference, have resigned. The formation of a new Cabinet has been entrusted to M. Zaimis, who, however, insists on conditions which the King cannot grant, and his position is becoming very critical.

A short delay is absolutely indispensable.

No. 180.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 4, 5 P.M.)

Paris, February 4, 1869, 3 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

A TELEGRAM from the French Minister at Athens, dated yesterday evening, states that the crisis continues, and that the King, having been unable to come to any understanding with Zaimis, proposes to ask Bulgaris to withdraw his resignation.

No. 181.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 146. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 4, 1869.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 147, Confidential, of yesterday, respecting the resignation of the Greek Ministry, and reporting your communications with M. de Lavalette on the question of granting a further term for the answer of Greece to the Declaration of the Conference; and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having, in concert with the Representa-

tives of Austria, Italy, Russia, and Prussia, concurred in the telegram which has been sent by M. de Lavalette to Baron Baude on this point.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 182.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received Febrary 5.)

(No. 40.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 24, 1869.*

THE Viceroy of Egypt has offered, in the event of war between Turkey and Greece, to put 40,000 or 50,000 men at the service of the Sultan, as well as some ships of war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 183.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 41.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 25, 1869.*

PUBLIC opinion is daily pronouncing itself more strongly in favour of declaring war in the event of the verdict of the Conference being rejected by Greece.

It is believed that nothing short of a severe lesson will suffice to make the Greeks observe their international obligations, and that no opportunity so favourable for it as the present can again be hoped for.

The different Governments of Europe having in Conference unanimously recognized as well-founded the complaints of the Porte, are supposed to have made it impossible for themselves to take an active part in favour of Greece, and the Turks feel a natural confidence in being able to bring to a satisfactory conclusion a war in which they and the Greeks would be left to their respective resources.

If, therefore, the Greek Government refuses its acquiescence, the effect of the Conference will have been to increase the probability of actual hostilities; for, as long as the opinions of the Russian and Prussian Governments upon the differences between the two countries were undeclared, the Porte felt no confidence that they might not come to the assistance of Greece. Regarding those Governments as now too far committed to do so, the Turkish Government, or at all events the Turkish public, is greatly tempted to take the opportunity of obtaining satisfaction for the systematic provocation which has been so long submitted to out of deference to some, or fear of others, of the European Governments.

When the ultimatum was sent to Greece, the rupture of relations, the exclusion of the Greek shipping, and the expulsion of the Hellenic subjects, were generally regarded as all that would be required in the event of its rejection; but now something more is asked for, and the Porte is being urged to adopt such active measures of coercion as to ensure an early settlement before other and more widely-spread complications shall arise.

I feel confident that, in combating these views upon all occasions, I act in accordance no less with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government than with my own convictions.

The perfect right of the Porte to declare war, under the provocation received, may be conceded without its following that such a course would be either necessary or politic, even though the arguments in its favour may be of undoubted weight. The policy of such an act, as far as Turkey is concerned, turns chiefly upon three considerations:—

1st. The magnitude of the object to be obtained; the principal demands of the ultimatum having lost their importance by the progress of the pacification of Crete.

2nd. The probability of a blow being struck so rapidly and decisively as to ensure the re-establishment of peace before the development of the complications which will be fomented on the northern frontier; and

3rd. The neutrality of all European Governments in the conflict.

Whether the confidence felt here upon these last two points is fully justified, appears to me sufficiently open to doubt to call for extreme prudence on the part of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 184.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 42.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 25, 1869.*

THE present Greek Government have maintained that although the steamer "Crete" may have been purchased by their predecessors and handed over to a private Company for the purpose of blockade-running, they are not responsible for it.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I was told yesterday by an English gentleman who had just returned from Syra, that the "Crete" is at this moment under repair upon the Government slips at the Royal dockyard at Poros.

I questioned him closely as to the possibility of his being misinformed, but he persisted in saying that he had it on authority which could leave no room for doubt of the fact.

If it is the case, the responsibility of the present Government would seem fully as great as that of the late Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 185.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 25, 1869.*

IN the month of October last I reported an investigation that was going on into an asserted conspiracy against the Sultan by two persons named Altendji and Condouri, the latter of whom was a Russian subject.

The utmost mystery was observed with regard to it, and the Russian Ambassador, in the presence of whose dragoman the examinations of the Russian prisoner took place, repeatedly assured me that the accusation was of the most puerile description, and altogether unworthy of the smallest attention.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that a plot of some sort did exist, and that its concoctors meant to draw into it Mourad Effendi, the Sultan's nephew and heir apparent, although there is not the slightest evidence of the Prince himself having cognisance of it.

The jealousy and harshness with which the heir to the throne is invariably treated in Turkey made the Turkish Ministers very desirous that the affair should not be brought before His Majesty; and Altendji, the Ottoman subject, was simply exiled to Bagdad.

It would not, however, have been so easy to deal with the Russian subject if there had not been something serious in the accusation; but he also, after being kept some time in confinement, was expelled from the country by the authority of his own Embassy, which was itself greatly compromised by the probably false denunciations of the accused.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 186.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 47.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 27, 1869.*

I REGRET not to be able to forward to your Lordship by the present messenger accurate details respecting the manner in which Greek passports have been granted to Ottoman subjects, nor a Return of the Greek vessels which have been allowed to assume the Russian flag; but I hope in a few days to be able to answer your Lordship's inquiries on both these points.

An investigation upon the former subject is being pursued by the Porte, and as soon as it is sufficiently advanced I will acquaint your Lordship with the result.

The number of Greek vessels that have assumed the Russian flag appears, upon further inquiry, to be far greater than what I had put it at in my last despatch on the subject to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 187.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 48.)
Constantinople, January 27, 1869.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will already have been informed by Her Majesty's Minister at Athens that Admiral Hobart withdrew from Syra with his whole fleet immediately upon receiving from the Nomarch an assurance that the "Enosis" should not be allowed to escape till the charge against her had been investigated and brought to a conclusion.

This result might have been obtained long before if the Greek authorities had acted in a more straightforward manner.

The ground that Admiral Hobart had taken with respect to that vessel was, that she was voyaging on the high seas heavily armed, with a large crew on board, without having a special license, and that, when called upon by a man-of-war, firing blank guns to stop her, she fired with shot into that man-of-war.

He maintains that he was without the limits of the territorial protection allowed to vessels; but he does not admit that, even if this were otherwise, it would materially affect the case, as he considers that a man-of-war may at any time challenge a merchant-ship to account for herself, the captain of the man-of-war rendering himself liable for any lengthened or improper detention.

If he had improperly seized the "Enosis" within Greek waters, the Greek Government would have been entitled to hold the Porte responsible for the act; but the challenged vessel had no right to fire into the man-of-war upon that pretext.

In making known to your Lordship the grounds taken by Admiral Hobart in this matter, I beg to do so without expressing any opinion of my own upon their legal correctness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 188.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 19.)
Athens, January 27, 1869.

My Lord,

I SAW M. Delyanni the day before yesterday, and informed him that your Lordship had directed me by telegraph strongly to recommend the Greek Government to agree to the Declaration of the Conference of Paris, which would shortly be communicated to him by the Marquis de Lavalette. M. Delyanni replied, that until he was in possession of the precise terms of that document, he could of course say nothing as to the course which would be pursued by the Hellenic Government; but his language was so far more moderate than it has hitherto been that I infer that he is already persuaded that Greece cannot do otherwise than submit to the decision of the Conference.

I am told, on good authority, that the King has received a telegraphic communication from the Emperor of Russia, urging His Majesty in the strongest terms to acquiesce in the unanimous verdict of the great Powers; and the opinion of all sensible men in this country is so decidedly in favour of concession that I can scarcely doubt that either this Ministry or some other will eventually be compelled to abandon the aggressive policy which has led to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Turkey.

M. Delyanni observed to me, in speaking of this question, that it would be impossible to resume a good understanding with the Porte until some arrangement should have been come to in regard to the faithful execution of the Convention for the suppression of brigandage on the frontier, and the position of Hellenic subjects in Turkey; but I replied that these were questions of secondary importance, and that I felt confident the Greek Government might count upon the good offices of the great Powers being employed with a view to the satisfactory settlement of these matters, provided the Greek Government would show that they were sincerely desirous henceforth to avoid committing any infraction of international law in their intercourse with Turkey.

It is understood that M. Walewski, who is said to be the bearer of the Declaration of the Conference of Paris, may arrive at Athens either this evening or to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M ERSKINE.

No. 189.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 20.)
Athens, January 28, 1869.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 16 of the 20th instant, reporting that the Nomarch of Syra has at length undertaken to prevent the "Enosis" from leaving port during the judicial proceedings pending against her, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the correspondence which has been exchanged on the subject between Mr. Consul Lloyd and Admiral Hobart.

The whole of the Turkish squadron, with the exception of the "Izzedin," left Syra on the morning of the 21st instant. Subsequently, however, a Turkish frigate arrived at Syra from Suda Bay, with a letter from the Governor-General of Crete, notifying the intended despatch of a further body of volunteers, under the younger Petropoulaki, on board the French steamer "Phocéen;" but this frigate, together with the "Izzedin," finally quitted Syra in the course of the same night.

Mr. Consul Lloyd further reports that, early on the morning of the 23rd instant, the "Phocéen" came into port, accompanied by a Turkish Government steamer, which, however, left again immediately. The "Phocéen" brought about 160 Greek volunteers, including Petropoulaki, Mitza, and most, if not all, the volunteers who had gone to Crete, and also 140 Cretans who have come to Greece to fetch their families.

Even the Cretan Committees here and at Syra have ceased issuing the exaggerated bulletins which they have been in the habit of publishing from time to time in regard to the insurrection; and most persons now admit in conversation that, for the present, at all events, resistance is at an end. A few native Chiefs, such as Corakas, Criari, and Hadji Mikhali, are still at large; but I do not believe that they are accompanied by any considerable bands of followers.

The French Minister and Admiral Moulac are much annoyed at the Nomarch of Syra having addressed the letter, promising to detain the "Enosis," to Mr. Lloyd, and not to either the French Consul or Captain Meyer of the "Forbin," and I understand that Baron Baude is determined that the Nomarch shall either apologize to him, or be dismissed from his post; but the matter may perhaps be compromised by requiring that the Nomarch shall address letters to the other Consuls at Syra identically the same as that which he addressed to Mr. Lloyd.

I have explained to Baron Baude that, as far as Her Majesty's Consul was concerned, there was not the least wish on his part to exercise any exclusive interference in this matter; but that as the Nomarch chose to take the engagement in a letter addressed to Her Majesty's Consul, he did not think that it would have been judicious to risk any further delay upon a mere matter of form.

Baron Baude appeared to be quite satisfied with the explanations I gave him, and exonerated Mr. Lloyd from any intention to put a slight upon his French colleague; but he said that he should not on that account relax in his efforts to obtain satisfaction from the Greek Government, in so far as the Nomarch of Syra was concerned. That gentleman had, he said, behaved most ungratefully and discourteously to the captain of the "Forbin," who had been mainly instrumental in preventing a collision between the "Hellas" and the Turkish squadron, and who had even allowed the Juge d'Instruction to examine Turkish witnesses on board his vessel.

The Greek Government have given out for some time past that they were in treaty for the purchase of two iron-clads built in France; but it is now understood that they have been forestalled in this purchase by the Turkish Government, and M. Bulgaris attributes his failure to the want of patriotism of the Governor of the Bank, who declined to advance the 3,500,000 drachmas which would have been necessary to secure these vessels, until he was compelled to do so by an Ordinance authorizing the issue of inconvertible Government paper money.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 189.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to Consul Lloyd.

"*Mahmoudie*," *off Syra, January* 19, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, inclosing a copy of a letter addressed by the Nomarch of the Cyclades to yourself, dated the 17th instant, in which it is stated that in accordance with my request "the 'Enosis' will not be allowed to leave Syra before the final settlement of the judicial proceedings against her."

Taking this letter of the Nomarch as equivalent to a guarantee on the part of the Hellenic authorities, I still wish to know at what stage the legal proceedings have arrived, and presuming that, as the principal witness against the "Enosis," my attendance, together with that of the captain and engineer of the "Izeddin," will still be required, I should be glad if you would have the goodness to confer with the Procureur du Roi, and having ascertained from him, inform me when he will again require our presence, and also to state at what precise point the judicial proceedings now stand; and as I am desirous of leaving these waters with the least possible delay, I shall feel greatly obliged by your obtaining for me the information I require without further loss of time.

I take this opportunity of thanking you, in the name of the Turkish Government, for the zeal and energy you have displayed while acting as mediator between myself and the authorities of Syra.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. HOBART.

Inclosure 2 in No. 189.

Consul Lloyd to Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha.

Syra, January 20, 1869, 11 A.M.

Sir,

IN compliance with the request contained in your Excellency's letter of yesterday's date, received this day, I have the honour to inform you that I have seen the King's Attorney on the subject of your letter, and that he tells me the proceedings in the matter of the "Enosis" being secret, it is utterly impossible for the King's Attorney to give information of the state of the proceedings at any stage of it, except that, should it be decided there is a case against the "Enosis" to be tried criminally, official notice will be given to all parties concerned wherever they may be, stating the day the trial will commence; it being free to the witnesses for the prosecution who have been already examined, to appear or not. And as the King's Attorney has taken all their depositions on oath, these depositions will be quite as valid as though the parties appeared again in person at the trial. Should there be no trial at all, that is, should the matter terminate here with the preliminary inquiry, the King's Attorney promises to inform me of the fact, and I will of course not fail to inform you as soon as possible. Should there be a trial it will take place at Athens, and be a public one, and the result will be publicly known; and in this latter case I will also take care to inform you as soon as I can learn it.

If I can be of any further use as a medium of communication between your Excellency and the local authorities here, I shall always be most happy to do so, as far as my British Consular duties will permit me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. VINCENT LLOYD.

Inclosure 3 in No. 189.

Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha to Consul Lloyd.

"*Mahmoudie*," *off Syra, January* 21, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, the contents of which I accept from you, as the Consul of one of the Protecting Powers of Greece, as sufficient guarantee that the "Enosis" will not leave this port until the decision of the law has been given on the charges I have brought against her. I propose leaving here with my squadron to-day. The "Izzedin" will remain thirty-six hours

longer, to bring me important despatches which I am expecting from Constantinople. Her staying here, I beg to say, has no reference whatever to the "Enosis."

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. HOBART.

Inclosure 4 in No. 189.

Consul Lloyd to Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha.

Syra, January 21, 1869.

Sir,

IN acknowledging the receipt of your Excellency's letter of this day's date, stating that you accept from me, as Consul of one of the Protecting Powers of Greece, the contents of my letter of yesterday's date as sufficient guarantee that the "Enosis" will not leave this port until the decision of the law has been given on the charges you have brought against her, I beg distinctly to state to your Excellency that I have no authority whatever to take upon myself such a responsibility, or to take any active part whatever in the matter of dispute between the Turkish and Greek Governments which caused the presence in these waters of the Turkish squadron under your command; my sole object in affording lately a medium of communication between your Excellency and the Greek authorities of Syra being to prevent, if possible, any collision or act of violence, which, under the circumstances of the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries, would be the first act of war, and which I could not but consider as most desirable and most important to avoid. I beg further to state that I have informed the Nomarch of your intention that "Izzedin" remain here thirty-six hours longer to bring you important despatches that you are expecting from Constantinople, and that her staying here has no reference whatever to the "Enosis."

I have, &c.
(Signed) ST. VINCENT LLOYD.

No. 190.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 52.)

MyLord,

Vienna, February 1, 1869.

UP to the present time no intelligence has been received by Count Beust, indicating the decision of the Greek Government as to whether they will accept the Declaration of the Conference or not. The last accounts he had received were favourable, and he has read me a despatch addressed to the Austrian Legation at Athens, containing instructions to urge the Government in the strongest manner, and with a view to the interests of the Greek kingdom, to agree to the arrangement proposed by the Great Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 191.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 59.)

My Lord,

Vienna, February 2, 1869.

I HAVE read to Count Beust your Lordship's despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus No. 23 of the 23rd ultimo, explaining your reasons for declining to entertain Count Bismarck's project of sending some ships of the allied Powers to the Greek waters.

I thought it advisable to make this verbal communication to his Excellency, as he had taken the same view as Count Bismarck now appears to do on this point, and had heretofore shown a desire to see the decision of the Conference backed by an armed force, considering such a course would have the effect of setting the question at rest, at all events for a time.

His Excellency seemed now to accept the reasoning in your Lordship's despatch as valid, for he made no attempt to argue against a policy of non-interference as he had done some days previously, when he again alluded to his Programme of 1867, and appeared to think that it contained many things that could be advantageously acted on

in treating the Eastern question. Count Beust, however, appears now inclined to act entirely in the spirit of the Paris Conference, and indisposed to advocate any measure likely to disturb the harmony that prevails amongst the Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 192.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 152. Confidential.)
Paris, February 4, 1869.

My Lord,

THE Marquis de Lavalette asked me this afternoon what I thought we ought to do if King George were to accept the Declaration of the Conference, and to incur personal danger by doing so. For his own part, M. de Lavalette went on to say, he should have no hesitation in employing a French force to defend the person of the young King. He had spoken to the Emperor on the subject, and had found that His Majesty was very averse from the idea of resorting to force, which he considered to be contrary to the principle upon which the Conference had been assembled. Still His Majesty thought that if King George were exposed to personal danger in consequence of following the advice of the great Powers, it would be impossible for those Powers to abandon him.

I said that if the phrase "personal danger" was to be taken literally as meaning what was vulgarly called danger to life or limb, I conceived that there could be no doubt that every possible exertion ought to be, and would be, made to ensure the King's safety. If, however, the phrase was taken to include danger to His Majesty's political authority, the question was one which gave occasion for very grave reflection, and which I could not undertake to answer without instructions from your Lordship. We must consider how far any armed intervention to ward off a danger of this kind might lead us. Suppose, for instance, it should be proposed, as a necessary means of maintaining the Royal authority, that the present Greek Constitution should be suspended or modified. We knew that proposals of this kind had already been put forward. Were our forces to assist actively, or even passively, in the execution of any such measures, I had certainly no authority to consent, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to anything of this kind.

M. de Lavalette observed that I must not take what he had said at all in the light of a formal statement of the views of the French Government. He had spoken incidentally of the matter with the Emperor, but His Majesty had not desired him to enter into communication with foreign Governments, nor indeed given him any definitive orders respecting it. For his own part he had merely suggested the idea, as he thought it well that we should be prepared for a contingency which was perhaps imminent. King George either would or would not accept the Declaration. If His Majesty did not accept it he would incur no present danger, though the gravest perils would probably await him in the future. For these, however, the Powers would not be responsible. If His Majesty should accept the Declaration, he might be exposed to an immediate attack on his person or on his authority, and would feel that he had a strong claim on the protection of the Powers to whose counsels he had deferred. There was certainly a third contingency, which M. de Lavalette hoped, and indeed believed, to be as probable as either of the others. The King might accept the Declaration, and incur no risk by doing so.

M. de Lavalette observed that the three Protecting Powers had not only a moral but a pecuniary interest in Greece; in fact that they stood in a position towards Greece very different from that which they occupied with regard to other countries. France would, perhaps, have less difficulty in interfering, in behalf of King George, than would either England or Russia. The King was nearly allied to the families of the Sovereigns of Great Britain and Russia, while no such tie existed between His Majesty and the French Imperial family. France would therefore be less exposed to the suspicion of other than disinterested motives in coming to the aid of the young King. Still he did not contemplate the possibility of France acting alone.

In the course of conversation M. de Lavalette observed that it was curious that Count Stackelberg, the Russian Ambassador, who during the Conferences had continually dwelt on the perils which we might bring upon King George, would not now admit for a moment that His Majesty would incur the slightest risk by accepting the Declaration.

In conclusion, M. de Lavalette begged me to consider what he had said as merely thrown out confidentially, with a view to learning what your Lordship might think of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 193.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5.)

Constantinople, February 4, 1869.

(Telegraphic.)

LEARNING from Mr. Erskine that the position of the King of Greece made it indispensable to prolong the delay granted for returning an answer to the Declaration of the Conference, I have urged the Grand Vizier not to offer any objection if it should be proposed by the friendly Powers.

His Highness has consequently authorized the Ottoman Ambassador at Paris, without further reference to Constantinople, to adhere to such a proposal if it shall be made, provided the delay does not exceed ten days.

No. 194.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5, 7·30 P.M.)

Athens, February 4, 1869, 10 A.M.

(Telegraphic.)

ALL attempts to form a Ministry which would accept Declaration having failed, the King may, perhaps, apply to M. Conmoundouros, but I do not think that the latter will take office on such terms.

In the event of his refusing, the King will probably start for Paris immediately to explain his position to the Protecting Powers.

No. 195.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 5, 8·53 P.M.)

Athens, February 4, 1869, 5·25 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE King sent this afternoon for the Representatives of the three Protecting Powers, and told us that, with every wish to follow the advice he had received from our respective Governments, he found it impossible to induce any influential set of men to incur the odium of accepting a Declaration which is considered humiliating and unfair to the nation; unless, therefore, the Powers would take some step to extricate him from a position of great peril, he should be compelled to abdicate.

He thinks of starting immediately for Paris to consult Protecting Powers.

No. 196.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

Foreign Office, February 5, 1869, 7·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

MATTERS seem to be in so critical a state at Athens that Her Majesty's Government are disposed to send orders to any British ship of war that may be at the Piræus to receive the King and Queen of Greece on board if requested to do so, in the event of their lives being endangered by a popular tumult. But on the embarkation of their Majesties, the ship would immediately proceed to any foreign port which the King might desire, and should not, by remaining in Greek waters with their Majesties on board, appear to be interfering in the internal affairs of Greece.

Ascertain M. de Lavalette's views on this point, who, if he concurs, will probably send corresponding orders to any French ship of war at the Piræus. Our order will not, however, be sent until we receive your answer.

No. 197.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 151.)
Foreign Office, February 5, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to ascertain M. de Lavalette's opinion as to the propriety of sending contingent instructions to the English and French Naval Commanders at the Piræus for their guidance, in the event of an application being made to them to afford an asylum on board their ships to the King and Queen of Greece, in case their lives should be placed in peril by a popular tumult,—a contingency which, in the excitement which is understood to prevail in the Greek capital, may possibly present itself.

It seems to Her Majesty's Government that in the event of their Hellenic Majesties being received on board a foreign ship of war, it should be distinctly understood that the ship would immediately proceed to any foreign port which the King might designate, inasmuch as the continuance of their Majesties on board a foreign ship of war in the waters of Greece might be construed into an intention on the part of the Power whose flag such ship might bear, to interfere in the internal affairs of the country.

Her Majesty's Government will, however, await your Excellency's report of your conversation with M. de Lavalette on this matter, before sending instructions to the British Naval Commander.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 198.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February 5, 1869, 12·40 P.M.*

M. ZAIMIS has at last succeeded in forming a Ministry which will accept Declaration.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is Theodore Delyanni, a cousin of his predecessor.

No. 199.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February 5, 1869, 3·15 P.M.*

AS a negotiation is still on foot with a view to acceptance of the Declaration, Count Walewski will not leave till Sunday, but the excitement is so great that I am doubtful of its succeeding.

The Ministry are violently opposed to the King's projected journey to Paris, which may consequently not take place.

In the event of His Majesty's personal safety being in danger should I be justified in requesting the senior officer to land a force, in concert with the French and Russian Admirals, to protect the embarkation of His Majesty and the Royal Family?

No. 200.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 156.)
Paris, February 5, 1869.

My Lord,

THE Marquis de Lavalette has received to-day a telegram from the French Minister at Athens, dated yesterday, of which the following is the substance :—

"Le Roi n'a pu déterminer M. Bulgaris à reprendre son portefeuille, et se trouvant jusqu'à présent personne qui est disposé à adhérer à la Déclaration, Sa Majesté se serait décidée à appeler M. Coumoundouros, mais on doute que ce dernier accepte."

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 201.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 6, 1869, 1·10 A.M.*

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs received last night from French Minister at Athens a telegram to the same effect as that from Mr. Erskine to you, dated 6·25 P.M., the day before yesterday.

M. de Lavalette proposes to answer, by telegraph, that the King's idea of coming to Paris is out of the question; that if the Declaration be not signed, Turkey will, *ipso facto*, recover her freedom of action, and the situation will become disastrous for Greece, who will thus place herself beyond the pale of the public law of Europe. The task of the Conference will be at an end, and nothing will remain but to propose its immediate dissolution.

M. de Lavalette is extremely anxious to know, as early as possible to-day, if you concur in this answer.

The Emperor is averse to all idea of an occupation of Greece.

No. 202.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 6, 1869, 4·40 P.M.*

I HAVE spoken to M. de Lavalette on the subject of your Lordship's telegram of 7·30 P.M. yesterday, and Mr. Erskine's of 3·15 P.M. of the same day. He concurs entirely in the views stated in your Lordship's telegram, but, being very anxious that the instructions of the two Governments should be identical, and being quite confident that the naval officers on the spot will, in case of need, do all that is proper for the King's safety, he wishes to defer sending them any instructions until he learns your Lordship's opinion on Mr. Erskine's question respecting landing men from the ships. I do not think M. de Lavalette would desire that they should land for any other purpose than to protect the personal safety of the King and Royal Family on their way to the Piræus and during their embarkation.

I have also communicated to M. de Lavalette Mr. Erskine's telegram dated midnight, announcing Zaimis's acceptance of office. He has in consequence abstained from sending to the French Minister at Athens the proposed telegram mentioned in my telegram of 1·10 A.M. this morning.

No. 203.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 6, 1869.*

THE course you are pursuing, as stated in your despatch No. 41 of the 25th of January, is entirely approved. A declaration of war by Turkey would be equally impolitic and unnecessary. You will particularly insist on the last two points adverted to in your despatch, viz., that the Porte should not rely too confidently on at once striking a decisive blow, or on the neutrality of all European Governments in its contest with Greece.

No. 204.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 6, 1869, 6·45 P.M.*

YOUR four telegrams from 10 A.M. February 4 to 3·15 P.M. of February 5 have been received.

It appears that the Greek Government are opposed to the King's projected journey to Paris; that is a point to be settled between the King and his Ministers, but you may inform His Majesty that your Government think that his coming to Paris would be highly inexpedient and certain to lead to disappointment.

To his Ministers you will point out that if the Declaration of the Conference is not accepted by Greece, Turkey will regain her freedom of action, and the situation will become disastrous for Greece.

The task of the Conference will be at an end, and nothing will remain but to dissolve it.

No. 205.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1869, 7 P.M.

IN reply to your telegram of yesterday afternoon, I have to say that if the personal safety of the King and Queen were in danger, you would be justified in requesting the senior officer of Her Majesty's naval forces, either alone or in concert with the French and Russian naval commanders, to land a sufficient force to protect the embarkation of their Majesties on board of any ship the King might select.

No. 206.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1869, 6·50 P.M.

INFORM M. de Lavalette of the substance of my telegram to Erskine, which is annexed to this.

We think it important not to recognize any distinction as regards matters before the Conference between the King and his Ministers. Erskine may express an opinion as to the inexpediency of the King's journey to Paris, which is opposed by his Ministers; but we cannot advise the King to take any course independently of his Ministers, for we have no wish to incur any responsibility for the consequence of any decision that he may adopt.

We are waiting your answer to the telegram of yesterday respecting refuge to be afforded to the King, if requested, on board of a ship of war.

[Here follows telegram to Mr. Erskine of 6·45 P.M.]

No. 207.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 21.) *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1869.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government have considered the point submitted in your telegram of yesterday, as to interference for the protection of their Hellenic Majesties from a popular tumult by which their lives might be endangered, unless they could obtain refuge on board a ship of war belonging to a friendly Power, and I have to state to you, in reply, that under such circumstances you would be justified if, on the application of the King for personal protection, you should request the commander of any British ship of war at the Piræus to land a sufficient force to protect the embarkation of their Majesties on board a ship of war of any nation which the King might prefer.

The British commander, if time allowed, would naturally ascertain whether the commanders of other nations were disposed to take the same course, and, in that case, would act in concert and co-operation with them for the protection of the Royal Family on their embarkation; but even if foreign commanders felt they should stand aloof, the British commander would be free to act alone for that object.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 208.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 22.) *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1869.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government are informed by your telegram of the 4th and 5th instant that the King of Greece contemplates proceeding to Paris, with the view of explaining to the Protecting Powers the difficulties in which he is placed by reason of the Declaration of the Conference which has been submitted for acceptance by Greece, but that His Majesty's projected journey is vehemently opposed by his Ministers.

Her Majesty's Government do not feel themselves called upon to interfere between the King and his Ministers in regard to that matter; but you are, nevertheless, authorized to say to the King that the projected journey to Paris could not fail to end in disappointment, and in other respects would be highly inexpedient.

Her Majesty's Government think, however, that you should make the Greek Ministers clearly understand what the consequences will be of a refusal of the Declaration.

Such refusal will at once bring the Conference to an end; but it will, at the same time, restore freedom of action to the Porte; and the state of things that will ensue, cannot fail to involve Greece in serious disasters.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 209.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 155.) *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1869.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency will communicate to M. de Lavalette the substance of my despatch to Mr. Erskine, of which I inclose a copy.*

Her Majesty's Government think that it would be very inexpedient to admit any distinction between the King of Greece and his Ministers in regard to the matters submitted to Greece by the Conference. They are not prepared to advise the King to adopt any course of action in opposition to the opinions of his Ministers, since by doing so they would incur responsibility for any consequences which might result from the adoption by the King of their advice, and such responsibility they are not prepared to incur.

All that Her Majesty's Government feel warranted in doing, is to authorize Mr. Erskine to point out to the King that his projected journey to Paris, which, moreover, is understood to be opposed by his Ministers, would be highly inexpedient, and would certainly end in disappointment.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 210.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 49.) *Foreign Office, February* 6, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 41 of the 25th of January, reporting the language which you have held with the view of dissuading the Porte from having recourse to hostilities against Greece; and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your language.

You will continue to point out to the Turkish Minister that a declaration of war against Greece would not only be impolitic, but unnecessary; and you will dissuade the Porte from relying too implicitly on the continued neutrality of other Powers in a war in which it might engage with Greece, or from reckoning too confidently on its ability to bring any such war to an early conclusion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 208.

No. 211.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 165. Confidential.)

Paris, February 6, 1869.

My Lord,

THE Marquis de Lavalette sent for me last night, and communicated to me a telegram which he had received from the French Minister at Athens, and of which the following is the substance:

"*Athènes, le 4 Février, 4·15 soir.*

"Le Roi nous a informés, le Ministre d'Angleterre, le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie, et moi, de l'inutilité des efforts qu'il a faits pour constituer un Cabinet et de l'impossibilité où il se trouve d'y parvenir. Seule en Grèce décidée à ne pas rejeter la Déclaration, Sa Majesté envisage sa situation personnelle comme très grave, et ne voit un moyen d'en sortir que dans son abdication ou dans l'appui des Puissances. Il pense à venir à Paris exposer lui-même sa position devant les Puissances. Nous tenons, mes collègues et moi, à ce que nos Gouvernements sachent que des évènements très sérieux sont peut-être à la veille de s'accomplir en Grèce."

M. de Lavalette said that he had not yet had time to lay this intelligence before the Emperor; but that he had taken His Majesty's orders on the state of things as it appeared before the arrival of this last telegram. The Emperor had, he said, agreed with him that if the Declaration were not accepted within the time fixed, there would be nothing to do but to dissolve the Conference, and abandon Greece to the consequences of her refusal, in conformity with the terms of the last paragraph of the letter to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. de Lavalette had (he told me) proceeded to consider with the Emperor the course that should be pursued, if the King of Greece should accept the Declaration, and should in consequence be exposed to personal danger. The Emperor had appeared to be very anxious to guard the young King from danger; but His Majesty had not thought it right to allow himself to be led away by this feeling so far as to make a false political step. His Majesty conceived that it would undoubtedly be a grave political error to employ the naval or military forces of France to maintain the political authority of King George. The only way in which force could be effectually used for this purpose would be by a military occupation of the country, and the Emperor would be most unwilling to enter upon a course which might lead to such an occupation.

M. de Lavalette went on to say that having thus acquainted me with the views of the Emperor before the arrival of the last telegram, he now wished to consult me on the answer which should be returned to that telegram. The King had, in fact, applied, not to the Powers represented in the Conference, but to the three Protecting Powers, and had declared that if they did not assist in extricating him from his present position, he had no course open to him but to abdicate. M. de Lavalette confessed that he had been a good deal touched by this appeal; but added, that in fact it would not do to be guided in politics by too much sentiment. Did the present state of affairs in Greece alter the position of the Conference? Not at all. We had to deal with the constituted Government of Greece, which was composed of the King and Ministers. If the King was unable to find any Ministers who would accept the Declarations, we could not affect to consider that it had been accepted by the Greek Government. This being the case, we were bound to abide by the engagements recorded in our Protocols, and throw upon Greece the responsibility of setting at nought our earnest endeavours to maintain peace. Could the Government of the Emperor or that of Her Majesty undertake to subvert the institutions (good or bad) of an organized constitutional country such as Greece. Would they be justified in so doing? Would public opinion in France or England tolerate such a proceeding? However much we might feel for the young King, we must take the Government of Greece as we found it. Besides, was it not probable that firmness on our part would be the best service that could be rendered to King George? Was it quite certain that all His Majesty's Counsellors gave him prudent advice? We had reason to know that it had been urged that advantage should be taken of the present crisis to insist upon a reform of the Greek Constitution, by which a larger share of power should be conferred upon the Crown? Might it not be supposed that the difficulty of the present situation was in part the work of Russian Agents, who hoped to drive England and France into a corner, and oblige them to interfere in order to alter the Constitution.

As for King George's idea of coming to Paris to explain his position, M. de Lavalette thought it extremely unwise and unpractical. What were to be the relations between

Turkey and Greece meanwhile? To what would His Majesty's explanations specially refer? To the insufficiency, perhaps, of the prerogatives of the Crown. But if no Minister could be found in Greece to accept a Declaration which asserted no more than that Greece was bound by the rules of public law admitted by other civilized nations, how could we devise a remedy? The King had certainly proved himself on this occasion to be wiser than his subjects; but in what position should we place His Majesty, if we used force to enable him to assert his opinion in opposition to the feelings of his people? It was much to be feared that if His Majesty quitted Greece at this moment, he would never return. It was quite certain that the power of France could never be used to reinstate him by force with augmented prerogatives. All things considered, M. de Lavalette felt sure that the course most consistent with the dignity and good faith of the Powers represented in the Conference, and best calculated readily to strengthen the King's hand, would be to abide by our Declarations. He would, therefore, propose to send, not as President of the Conference, but as French Minister for Foreign Affairs, an answer by telegraph, in substance as follows:—

"L'idée du Roi de se rendre à Paris ne supporte pas l'examen. Si la Déclaration n'était pas acceptée dans les délais fixés, la Turquie par ce fait même reprendrait sa liberté d'action, et la situation deviendrait désastreuse pour la Grèce, qui se placerait ainsi en dehors du droit publique Européen. La tâche de la Conférence se trouverait en même temps épuisée, et il ne resterait plus qu'à en proposer la dissolution immédiate."

M. de Lavalette concluded by saying that he should, without loss of time, take the orders of the Emperor; and that he begged me to obtain as quickly as possible instructions from your Lordship upon the answer to be made to the representation from King George. He reminded me that we were talking late on Friday night, and that the time given to Greece expired on Sunday.

M. de Lavalette came to me this morning, and told me that the Emperor had approved of his answer. I made him acquainted with the substance of Mr. Erskine's telegram, announcing that M. Zaimis had succeeded in forming a Ministry which would accept the Declaration. This telegram had just been received by me, and the intelligence it conveyed had not reached the French Government. M. de Lavalette said he would hasten to go back to the Emperor with it, and take his Majesty's further orders.

I also mentioned to M. de Lavalette the contents of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, and of Mr. Erskine's telegram of the same date, respecting the protection of the King and Royal Family of Greece from personal danger.

I learned from M. de Lavalette in the afternoon, that in consequence of the news I had given him of the formation of a Ministry at Athens, it had been determined not to send the answer which had been prepared to the representations made by King George to the Ministers of the three Powers at Athens.

With regard to the instructions respecting the protection of the King's person to be sent to the Naval Commander in Greece, M. de Lavalette said that he considered it to be of very great importance that those dispatched from London and Paris should be identical. He did not think that any risk would be run by the short delay required to ascertain your Lordship's views; for he was sure that, with or without instructions, the Naval Commanders would, in case of need, do all that could properly be done to insure the personal safety of the King and Royal Family. He agreed entirely with your Lordship that the King, Queen, and Prince Royal of Greece should be received on board an English or French ship of war, if they requested to be taken on board to avoid personal danger. He was also of your Lordship's opinion that any ship having taken them on board should proceed at once to a foreign port, and not linger in the neighbourhood of Greece. He was not so decided as to the answer to be made to Mr. Erskine's question as to the landing of men from the ships to protect the embarkation of the Royal Family. He appeared rather to incline to the opinion that the landing might be permitted, provided nothing more was undertaken than to escort the Royal Family from Athens to the Pireus, and to secure them from molestation during their embarkation.

Although the principal points mentioned in this despatch have already been reported by me to your Lordship by telegraph, I have, nevertheless, deemed it to be my duty to record them in greater detail in writing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 212.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 7, 6 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 7*, 1869, 2·10 P.M.

TWO incursions into Epirus and one into Thessaly have been made by Greek bands of 100 or 150 men who have been repulsed.

The instructions to the Turkish military authorities are to remain on the defensive.

No. 213.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 8*, 1869.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which, as reported in your despatch No. 19 of the 27th ultimo, you held to M. Delyanni, with the view to induce the Greek Government to agree to the Declaration of the Conference of Paris.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 214.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Erskine.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 18*, 1869.

I HAVE to instruct you to inform Mr. Consul Lloyd that Her Majesty's Government approve the letter which he addressed to Vice-Admiral Hobart on the 21st of January, respecting the detention of the "Enosis," of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 20 of the 28th of that month.

Her Majesty's Government also approve your proceedings in this matter as reported in that despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 215.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 29.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 8*, 1869.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch No. 59 of the 2nd instant, and I have to express to you my approval of your conduct in reading to Count Beust my despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, No. 23 of the 23rd ultimo, on the subject of Count Bismarck's proposal that the allied Powers should send ships of war to the Greek waters.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 216.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 158.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 8*, 1869.

THE successive telegrams which reach this country from Athens, while they leave in doubt whether the King has succeeded in forming a new Government, afford unfortunately but little encouragement to hope that, however it may be composed, the result will be the acceptance of the Declaration of the Conference.

The last telegram received from Mr. Erskine bears date of 3·15 P.M. of the 5th instant. It speaks of a negotiation still going on with a view to an acceptance of the Declaration; but Mr. Erskine seems doubtful of its success in consequence of the excited state of public feeling in this city.

Nevertheless, Count Walewski had determined to delay his departure from Athens until yesterday, the 7th, that being the day which, as reported in your despatch No. 147 of the 3rd instant, the Plenipotentiaries had agreed to consider as the termination of the week within which the decision of the Greek Government was to be pronounced.

Her Majesty's Government did not hesitate to approve this construction of the limit of time fixed in the Declaration, being anxious to afford to Greece the utmost latitude consistent with the dignity of the Powers, the fair claims of the Porte to an early decision, and the interests of Greece herself which are certainly not consulted by a prolongation of the present crisis.

Her Majesty's Government will deeply lament if the Government of Greece should allow Count Walewski to leave Athens without obtaining its acquiescence in the principles of international law and of public morality set forth in the Declaration of the Conference; for no other construction could in that case be placed upon the rejection of the demand of the Conference, than that it indicated the intention of Greece to persevere in a violation of those principles, and thereby alienate from herself the respect and goodwill of all the Powers of Europe.

But as it is impossible to disguise that such may be the result of Count Walewski's mission, and as in that case the Conference will have immediately to determine on the course to be adopted, I think it right to prepare your Excellency at once for entering on the subject, by explaining to you the course which Her Majesty's Government are willing that, with the concurrence of the other Powers, your Excellency should pursue.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the Powers have not only their own dignity to consult in dealing with the failure of the efforts made to induce Greece to accept the Declaration of the Conference, but have also to consider what is due to the Porte. The Turkish Government, however reluctantly, has nevertheless frankly placed in abeyance, at the request of the Powers, its right to obtain redress for the wrongs done to it by Greece, and the Powers even no longer appeal to the opinion in regard to good offices recorded in the Protocol of the Conferences of Paris of 1856, as a ground for urging the Porte to defer the measures by which it may expect to replace its relations with Greece on a sound and healthy footing.

The work of the Conference is therefore ended: it has tried mediation, and it has failed in the attempt. It would not be for the advantage of Greece, even if the Porte were willing to admit of further delay, and it would certainly not comport with the dignity of the Powers to extend the time granted to Greece for the acceptance of the Declaration of the Conference. To do so would merely be to encourage the Greek Government to expect from the forbearance of the Conference, as it did from the forbearance of the Porte, that the Powers were not in earnest, and that, by one dilatory plea after another, it might evade the admission which the Conference sought to obtain from it, that in its future conduct towards the Porte it would be guided by the principles of right and justice which all other Powers accept and act upon for themselves.

It may be true that when the Greek Government learns by the dissolution of the Conference on the ground of its recommendations having been set at nought, that Greece is not only cut off from any support from abroad, but has forfeited all claim to the sympathy of other Powers; wiser counsels may prevail at Athens, and due weight be given to the inevitable consequences of a single-handed conflict with the resources of the Turkish Empire; for it will not escape the Greek Government that the Declaration of the Conference denounces in general terms, attempts on the part of Greece to attack or disquiet any possessions of the Porte, and therefore whatever may have been the hopes heretofore possessed of sympathy on the part of any European Power in schemes of Greek aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey, the Declaration of the Conference should extinguish any such hopes for the future.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the Conference, in announcing to the Greek Government, as it probably will think it right to do, the conclusion of its labours, might do well, in friendly and temperate terms, to place these considerations before it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 217.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 8.)

(Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1869.*

RUSSIAN Chargé d'Affaires at Athens is to state that, in case of war, Greece must expect no aid from Russia, and to advise King, should he be driven to abdicate, to declare that the Queen and his son will leave with him.

No. 218.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 9, 2·10 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 9, 1869, 1·30 P.M.*

I BELIEVE that the real date of Erskine's telegram announcing the formation of Zaimis' Ministry is forty minutes after the midnight of the 5th of February, and that, consequently, it is later than that from him dated 3·15 P.M., on the 5th of February. I have been acting all along under this impression, and it is confirmed by a telegram from the French Minister at Athens, dated 6th February, which announces that the formation of the Zaimis Ministry took place on the previous evening.

No. 219.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February 8, 1869.*

COUNT WALEWSKI will leave this without delay, and may reach Paris about Sunday next: he is the bearer of a letter to the President of the Conference complaining of the exclusion of the Greek Representative, but accepting the Declaration in terms sufficiently explicit to leave no doubt as to the sincerity of the adherence. A Proclamation to the people has been issued in the same sense. All excitement has subsided with the fall of the late Ministry; and in about two months the Chamber will be dissolved.

No. 220.

Consul Dickson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(Separate.)
My Lord, *Canea, Crete, January 18, 1869.*

IN further continuation of my despatches of the 4th and 11th instant, I have the honour to report that the Governor-General, seeing that the "Phocéen" did not arrive, and there being no other steamer disposable on the spot, decided on sending on the 14th, in place of the French ship, the "Fevaid," Imperial dispatch-boat, to the port of Sphakia, for the deportation of the Hellenic volunteers and Cretan insurgent Chiefs to the Island of Cerigo.

The "Fevaid" had no sooner left Suda Bay for its destination, than it was compelled to put back from stress of weather.

Fortunately, on the evening of the 15th, the "Phocéen" made its appearance in Suda Bay, and has since been dispatched on its allotted service.

Besides the 130 Hellenic volunteers, there are some 300 Cretans (Chiefs and their subordinates) who have obtained permission to proceed to Greece on leaving ample sureties with Sawas Pasha for their return to this island within a specified term. These will all be transferred to Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha on their arrival at Syra, to be further disposed of in Greece as he may deem it advisable.

A petition was yesterday brought down by a messenger to Hussein Avni Pasha, dated from Omalos and signed by Captains Kriaris, Hadgi Mikhali, Korkidis, Maudakakis, Parthenios, Peridis, Nicholadis, Stamatakis, Skoula, Porakis, and other insurgent leaders from Kissamos and Selinos.

The purport of the document is to move his Excellency to procure a foreign ship for their removal to a Hellenic port.

The Pasha, I understand, declines to comply with this request, on the ground of their being all natives, and not foreign volunteers; and as there is no foreign ship available, he offers to place at their disposal a Turkish steamer to deport them to Greece, on their conforming to certain indispensable conditions for their due return to Crete, such as have been imposed on other late native insurgents who have preferred a similar request. There is every reason to believe that the Chiefs in question will not refuse such an offer, they being convinced moreover, of receiving further lenient treatment at the hands of the Turkish authorities. Many of the insurgents lately in arms declared having suffered severely from exposure and want on the hills, covered, as these now are, with snow, and especially since their supplies from Greece have been cut off by the non-arrival of the blockade-runner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

No. 221.

Consul Dickson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(Separate.)
My Lord, *Canea, Crete, January 22, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Vice-Admiral Hobart Pasha, with the squadron under his command, consisting of the armour-plated frigate "Mahmoudieh," the "Khudavendikiar," "Izzeddin," and "Esseri-Nusret," arrived here this morning from Syra. I understand that before leaving Syra, the Vice-Admiral obtained from the Nomarch and Governor of the Cyclades, a written declaration that the "Enossis," late Hellenic blockade-runner, will not leave Greek waters so long, at least, as the judicial proceedings now pending with reference to that ship shall not have terminated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

P.S.—The Admiral is accompanied by Mr. Harvey, solicitor of Constantinople, as his legal adviser.

C. H. D.

No. 222.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 170.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 9, 1869.*

I HAD, early in the morning on the 7th instant, the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram, dated 6·50 P.M., the previous day, which conveyed to me the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the appeal made by the King of Greece to the Representatives of England, France, and Russia, and to the intention attributed to His Majesty of coming to Paris to explain his position to the three Protecting Powers.

I received at the same time your Lordship's despatch No. 150 of the 6th instant, inclosing a copy of the telegram which your Lordship had addressed on that day to Mr. Erskine in answer to his inquiry whether it would be proper, in case of need, to land a force from Her Majesty's ships to protect the embarkation of the King and Royal Family of Greece.

I lost no time in communicating the substance of both these telegrams to the Marquis de Lavalette. He begged me to let him have in writing a Memorandum of the instructions sent to Mr. Erskine, as he should wish to send similar instructions to Baron Baude.

I sent, accordingly, to M. de Lavalette the Memorandum, of which a copy is inclosed herein. I accompanied it with a private letter, in which I said that I thought it probable that on receiving my telegram of the 6th instant, your Lordship would also instruct Mr. Erskine that any ship on board of which the King of Greece embarked should immediately proceed to whatever foreign port the King might designate, and should not by remaining in Greek waters with His Majesty on board appear to be interfering in the internal affairs of Greece.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 222.

Memorandum.

IT appears from your telegram that the Greek Government are opposed to the King's journey to Paris. Her Majesty's Government consider that this is a matter to be settled between the King and the Greek Ministers; but you may inform the King that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that his coming to Paris would be highly inexpedient and be sure to lead to disappointment. You will point out to the Greek Ministers that if the Declaration be not accepted in due time by Greece, Turkey will regain her freedom of action and the situation become disastrous for Greece—and that the task of the Conference will be at an end, and nothing will remain but to dissolve it.

My answer to your question is, that if the personal safety of the King and Royal Family were in danger, you would be justified in requesting the Commander of Her Majesty's ships, either alone or in concert with the French and Russian Admirals, to land a sufficient force to protect the embarkation of the Royal Family on board of any ship the King might select.

No. 223.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 10, 1869, 11·20 A.M.*

M. DE LAVALETTE sends to tell me that two telegrams have been received to-day from the French Minister at Athens: that the first, dated the 6th, states that the Zaïmis Ministry had not decided in what form to answer the Conference, and that, consequently, M. Walewski would wait till Tuesday, which was, in fact, the day on which the packet sailed; that the second, dated the 9th, states that the Greek Ministers will send to the Conference a simple acceptance; but will dispatch, at the same time, a circular on the subject to its Agents abroad.

No. 224.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 33. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 2, 1869.*

WITH reference to my Confidential despatch No. 22 of the 27th ultimo, on an allusion of Prince Gortchakoff to the proceedings of Her Majesty's Ambassador during the late crisis at Constantinople, I asked his Excellency to-day whether Mr. Westmann had communicated to him my observation on the subject, and, on his answering in the affirmative, I observed nothing was less like excitement or partisanship than Mr. Elliot's conduct as described in his own despatches. Prince Gortchakoff said that of course his impressions had been derived from the correspondence of the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, and I rejoined that the incident was a proof of General Ignatieff's tendency to form rash appreciations of the acts of his colleagues, and that his denunciation first of M. Bourrée, and then of the Austrian Ambassador, as instigators of the late energetic proceedings of the Porte, were probably as unfounded as his representations of Mr. Elliot's attitude at Constantinople. As Prince Gortchakoff answered that he believed there were grounds for General Ignatieff's opinions that the Porte had been encouraged by Austria, I said that Mr. Elliot, who was on the spot, entertained an entirely different conviction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 225.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 2, 1869.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF was good enough to allow me to read this morning the Protocols of the Conference on the Turco-Greek question, and he drew my notice to the language of Lord Lyons in the discussion as to the admission of a Greek Representative to the Conference, which he said was entirely consistent with the conciliatory sentiments which Baron Brunnow had represented your Lordship to entertain on that subject; he observed also, he said, with much satisfaction that on this and on all other points which have been under the consideration of the Powers represented in the Conference, the opinions of the Government of the Emperor have been more frequently shared by the Government of Her Majesty than by any other Power.

His Excellency has not received any intelligence from Athens since the arrival of M. de Walewsky, but he had sent three telegrams to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, of which the last was the most urgent, instructing him to recommend the Greek Government in the strongest terms to accept the Declaration of the Conference, and he said he had received a telegram in reply to them which conveys the grateful acknowledgments of King George for the advice offered to him, and an assurance that it will meet with his serious consideration, though His Majesty is unable to give any formal answer to it, until the Declaration of the Conference has been officially communicated to his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 226.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 51.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January , 1869.*

AALI PASHA states that General Ignatieff has sent to inform him that the Russian Government are exerting themselves to the utmost to persuade the Greek Government to accept the verdict of the Conference, and that King George is in favour of doing so, and will abdicate and leave the country to its fate if it persists in rejecting the decision of the Great Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 227

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 30, 1869, 5·30 P.M.*

THE Porte has received accounts of the surrender of Hudji Michalis, and 150 of his followers.

He was the last Chief of any importance continuing in arms in Crete.

No. 228.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 54.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 2, 1869.*

IT has proved extremely difficult to procure accurate information respecting the number of Greek vessels that have obtained Russian papers since the announcement of the exclusion of the Hellenic flag from the Ottoman waters; and even now the accounts received from different quarters, which ought to be equally trustworthy, differ in an extraordinary degree.

In reply to an inquiry I made of him a few days ago, General Ignatieff informed me

that up to that time the total number that had got Russian papers at Constantinople did not exceed thirteen, and he gave me a copy of the Regulations prescribed for such cases, which he says are strictly adhered to.

I have the honour to inclose copies of the Articles applicable to them.

At the same time the information derived from other sources would lead to the conclusion that the number of vessels was much more considerable than the Russian Ambassador is aware of.

Mr. Pisani, whom I desired to inquire closely into the matter, reports that, upon the first announcement of the intended exclusion of the Hellenic flag, and upon the supposition that the Greek Government was supported by Russia, about 196 applications were made for a transfer of papers at the Russian Consulate-General, which, according to the information received, seems to have promised them very liberally, and thereupon many vessels hoisted Russian colours.

The circumstance attracted notice, and General Ignatieff having called the attention of the Consul-General to the Regulations, the promises were thereupon withdrawn, and the Russian colours again hauled down.

Nevertheless Mr. Pisani states that he has ascertained the number that obtained the Russian flag by means of fictitious papers to be eighty-three in all.

With reference to this subject, I have the honour to inclose the copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at Galatz describing the proceedings that had been going on on the Lower Danube connected with the change of flags.

I have written to inquire upon what grounds he states that the Russian Consul had received instructions to facilitate the transfer of the Greek flag, and from whence these instructions had issued.

Safvet Pasha mentioned to me that the Porte had likewise been informed of above sixty Greek vessels at Galatz and Ibraila having taken Russian colours; but added that accounts had since been received of their having pulled them down again.

From all this it would appear though the zeal of the subordinate Russian agents in favour of the Greeks had at first facilitated such transactions, which were subsequently checked by superior authority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have received from Sir P. Francis a despatch upon the subject of which I inclose a copy.

H. E.

Inclosure 1 in No. 228.

Articles 13, 14, 15, 19, 24, and 25 of the Regulations respecting the Russian Flag.

Article 13. EN cas d'acquisition à l'étranger d'un navire étranger par un sujet Russe, les Consulats de Russie, après avoir passé ou homologué l'acte d'achat du navire, délivrent à l'acheteur un certificat provisoire pour l'autoriser à arborer le pavillon Russe, mais seulement après exhibition par celui-ci des preuves qu'il jouit du droit de navigation sous pavillon Russe en vertu de l'Article 1 du présent Règlement. Ces certificats sont délivrés, pour les navires acquis par des sujets Russes dans les ports étrangers d'Europe, pour un an, et s'ils ont été acquis dans d'autres parties du monde, pour deux ans.

Art. 14. En délivrant un certificat de ce genre, conformément au modèle établi, le Consulat se fait remettre par le propriétaire ou le capitaine du navire une déclaration écrite indiquant le port de l'Empire où le navire devra être porté au tableau, et portant l'engagement de se conformer, dès l'arrivée du navire dans le dit port, à toutes les dispositions prescrites par la loi pour l'inscription du navire au tableau et pour la composition de son équipage, de tout quoi le dit Consulat informe sans délai le Département du Commerce et des Manufactures, ainsi que la douane de port compétente.

Art. 15. Les certificats Consulaires pour la navigation sous pavillon Russe, de même que les déclarations des propriétaires ou capitaine de navire pour obtenir ces certificats, doivent péremptoirement porter la mention que le navire qui dans le délai porté au certificat ne sera pas entré dans un port Russe pour y être légalement inscrit au tableau et recevoir la patente prescrite, perdra tout droit à continuer de naviguer sous pavillon Russe.

Art. 19. Les papiers de bord indispensables à chaque navire de mer sont:—1. L'acte

de propriété du navire; 2. La patente de navigation sous pavillon Russe; 3. Son rôle d'équipage; et 4. Son passeport de douane.

Art. 24. Tout sujet Russe qui vendra son navire dans un port étranger, à l'insu du Consul Russe, et sans présenter ses papiers de bord au Consul Russe le plus proche, sera soumis de ce chef à une amende qui ne dépassera pas 300 roubles.

Art. 25. Sera passible des peines portées aux Articles 1264, 1265, et suivants du Code Pénal, tout individu qui aura présenté de faux documents pour se faire délivrer une patente de navigation sous pavillon Russe, ou qui aura navigué sous pavillon Russe avec une fausse patente.

Inclosure 2 in No. 228.

Consul Ward to Mr. Elliot.

Galatz, January 9, 1869.

Sir,

THE threatened rupture between Turkey and Greece has naturally caused great excitement amongst the Greeks here and at the other ports of the Danube between Ibraila and Sulina. Many Greek families have already come over from the Turkish side and others would follow, but it appears that Suleyman Pasha, of Toultcha, will not allow them now to cross the river, but compels them to take the circuitous and difficult route by way of Kustendje.

It must be said that although these people have the greatest possible interest in the maintenance of peace, their livelihood being dependent on the free exercise of their trade and nautical avocations on the river, they do not desire, nor do they expect their Government to submit to the demands of the Porte; so, in anticipation of actual hostilities, those Greeks who have property in ships on the river, are hastening to place them under neutral flags.

Several owners of steam-tugs and schleppes (large iron barges) have consulted me on the subject, and I have told them plainly that a neutral flag obtained by means of a fictitious transfer would be no protection whatever against seizure by a belligerent, and I strongly advised the applicants not to expose their property to condemnation by resorting to that device. There was no question, of course, of the use, or rather the abuse, of the British flag.

Notwithstanding this caution, I see that the Russian and Italian colours are gradually replacing the Greek flag on board of the ships in this port; and I have to-day been informed on the best authority, that about sixty Greek ships and craft collected at Ismail, have all obtained Russian papers.

This wholesale transformation deserves special notice, as well on account of the readiness with which the Russian flag is lent to cover foreign property as on account of the implicit faith in which that flag is accepted as a protection by the Greeks.

It is well known that a large proportion of the ships navigating the Levant under the Russian flag are foreign property. During the last forty years, foreigners have been encouraged to sail their ships under Russian colours, and the Greeks, more than any other people, have availed of the facility with which that flag can be obtained, and of the protection which it enjoys: a protection fully equal to that accorded to *bonâ fide* Russian-owned ships. Moreover, these Greco-Russian ships have hitherto been treated in Turkey and everywhere else, as Russian ships; at all events I am not aware of the *bona fides* of the flag having ever been questioned, although the real nationality of the property has often been notorious.

It is, therefore, not surprising that under present circumstances, the Russian Consular authorities should simply continue a practice sanctioned by their Government, under express rules and regulations; nor that the Greeks, who are experienced in the value of the flag, should now hoist it with the most entire confidence in its power to protect the property it covers. But in order that it should be perfectly understood that the Russian flag is at this moment given to Greek ships for the purpose of placing them under Russian protection in the prevision of war, the Russian Consuls have received instructions to facilitate the transfers of Greek ships. Whether this proceeding be or be not consonant with the principles of international law is not doubtful, though the parties to the transaction believe it to be perfectly legitimate, so long as war is not declared.

The action of the Italian Consulate is not, like the Russian, based upon precedent, and is therefore the less excusable. More care is taken to conceal the real nature of the transaction in making out the papers, which are so drawn up as to vest the property in the most absolute manner in the pretended Italian owner. So in case of necessity it will

he sought to protect the ship by documentary evidence of *bonâ fide* Italian ownership. Whereas the Russian considers the flag more than the papers to be the ship's protection.

The effect of this abuse of national flags has been to convince the Greeks that Russia has openly declared in favour of Greece, and that Italy is well disposed to do the same. If this was the effect intended, it has entirely succeeded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GEORGE B. WARD.

Inclosure 3 in No. 228.

Sir P. Francis to Mr. Elliot.

Sir, *Supreme Consular Court, Constantinople, February 2*, 1869.

WITH respect to your Excellency's request to furnish you with information respecting the mode in which Greek vessels have lately obtained nationality, I regret to say that I have not been able, with any accuracy, to ascertain the facts. The parties, official and other, interested in these transactions, being naturally anxious not to disclose them. But at the first rupture between Greece and Turkey, my attention was called to reports of an extraordinary number of transfers going on at the Russian Consular Chancery, and my Chief Clerk being at that Consulate on business, informed me that the place was crowded by Greek captains, many of whom he knew personally, as having been Ionian citizens and belonging to our Consulate. From these he heard the object of their attendance was to get the Russian flag. He tells me there were no less than forty of them on this errand on that day. The clerks had been hard at work from early morning till late in the evening preparing the papers. This last fact I have had corroborated from another source.

For a day or two the ships lying at Couroutcheshmeh (a place filled with Greek ships) and those lying in the harbour were observed to be hoisting the Russian flag in great numbers.

This was observed on all hands, and I mentioned to your Excellency what I had heard, but I found you were already aware of the circumstances, and I began to take some steps to find out what was really going on, when for some reasons which I can only guess at, the active movements of the Russian Chancery ceased, and it was stated that nothing but strict proceedings in the matter of transfers of ships would be allowed.

I cannot tell the number of Greek ships which have changed their flag, because, of course, they are leaving the port continually, and most of the Greek craft are of small burden, and attract no particular attention.

If the wholesale transfer had been continued, I could have got some evidence, but I can get none that I can rely on now.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. FRANCIS,
Judge and Consul-General.

No. 220.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 55.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February 2*, 1869.

ACCORDING to the best information I have been able to obtain, and which, I am assured, is derived from authentic and reliable sources, the number of passports delivered by the Hellenic Consulate to Ottoman subjects at Constantinople alone amounts to above 21,000 from the year 1853 to 1868.

The price varied from two to fifteen Turkish liras (*i.e.*, 1*l*. 16*s*. to 13*l*. 13*s*.) or even more, according to the supposed means of the applicant.

The same system prevailed in the provinces, but no accurate returns of them have been received.

Although the number given above is not obtained from an official source, the persons who furnished it had ample means of ascertaining its accuracy.

I have, &c
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 230.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 25.)
My Lord, *Athens, February 3*, 1869.

AS M. Bulgaris and the majority of his colleagues persisted in advising the King to reject the Declaration of the Paris Conference, His Majesty sent, the day before yesterday, for several of the leading politicians, and other persons of note, to consult them as to the course it would be advisable to pursue. Amongst those to whom His Majesty had recourse were General Sir Richard Church, Admiral Canaris, Messrs. Deligeorges, Zaïmis, Christides, Sotiropulos, Miraïtinis, and Drossos; and your Lordship will find an account of what is said to have passed between His Hellenic Majesty and those gentlemen in the inclosed extract from a paper called the "Palingenesea."

His Majesty being thus at issue with his Ministers, M. Bulgaris sent in his own resignation, and that of his colleagues, yesterday afternoon; it being understood, however, that Messrs. Valaorites and Spiro Milios were of opinion that the Cabinet should accept the declaration of the Conference before quitting office.

In the course of the evening the King sent for Messrs. Deligeorges and Zaïmes, and proposed to them the formation of a new Cabinet. The former appears to have taken offence at not being consulted alone, and told His Majesty that as he felt persuaded that Greece was perfectly justified in the course she had pursued, he could not be a party to the acceptance of the Paris Declaration, and withdrew. The King then charged M. Zaïmis with the formation of a Ministry, and it was agreed that he should submit a list of names to His Majesty at half-past 1 o'clock this afternoon.

This list, I understand, comprises the name of M. Petzali, as Minister of Finance, a man whose reputation is so questionable that it would be impossible for His Majesty to acquiesce in his appointment. M. Zaïmis further requires that the right shall be conceded to him of dissolving the Chamber immediately, a condition to which His Majesty is not disposed to assent. I fear, therefore, that the attempt will fail.

M. Coumoundouros has hitherto not been sent for by His Majesty, and nearly all the political parties in the country are now united against the Crown. By the inclosed translations of incendiary placards against the King, which were circulated last night and this morning, your Lordship will perceive that there is a strong feeling in the town against His Majesty personally, and I am afraid that things have come to such a pass that unless the Protecting Powers are prepared to afford His Majesty their vigorous support, he is in imminent danger of losing his Throne.

Both M. Bulgaris and M. Coumoundouros are most unscrupulous when thwarted, and there is no military force at hand which could be relied upon to prevent a popular demonstration provoked by either of these politicians from degenerating into a revolution. His Majesty is, I have reason to believe, determined to adhere to the Declaration of the Conference; but, under the circumstances I have mentioned, it will obviously be impossible for the Greek Government to intimate their formal acceptance of that document within the time specified, and it is to be hoped, therefore, that the Powers will consent to some short further delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

P.S.—Since this despatch was written I have ascertained that the list delivered to His Majesty by M. Zaïmis is:—

M. Zaïmis, President and Minister of the Interior.
M. Theodore Delyanni, Foreign Affairs.
M. Petzali, Finance.
M. Charles Soutzo, War.
M. Trinchetta, Marine.
M. Sarava, Justice.
M. Avgerinos, Public Instruction.

I may add that M. Trinchetta must be classed with M. Petzali as one of those persons who are, even at Athens, considered disqualified by their antecedents from a seat in any Ministry.

M. Zaïmis has further stipulated:—

1. That he shall have the right of dissolving the Chamber whenever it may suit him to do so.

2. That the Ministry shall have complete "liberty of action."

3. That their acceptance of the Declaration shall be accompanied by a Memorandum declaratory of what is termed the "rights of the Greek nation;" and

4. That a Proclamation shall be addressed to the people explaining the grounds on which the Ministry have been compelled to accept the Paris Declaration.

His Majesty, I am assured, is much dissatified with several of the names submitted to him by M. Zaïmis; and he objects so strongly to the two first of these conditions that he will probably decline to acquiesce in them. A further attempt will, therefore, be made to form a Provisional Ministry under Admiral Canaris, or some such person.

E. M. E.

Inclosure 1 in No. 230.

Extract from the "Regeneration" of February 2, 1869.

(Translation.)

YESTERDAY we announced that the King had sent for MM. C. Canaris, Th. Zaïmis, E. Deligeorges, D. Chrestidès, S. Sotiropoulos, D. Drossos, and A. Moraïtini, to consult them upon the present state of affairs.

The King wished to hear the opinion of other political men, and also what their thoughts were in regard to the present state of things, and whether it was in the interest of Greece to reject or to accept the decision of the Powers.

M. Canaris did not present himself, for reasons either of old age or of illness.

M. Zaïmis presented himself. The King spoke to him about affairs, and showed him letters from the French and Russian Emperors and M. Lavalette's despatch, by which the King was advised to acquiesce in the decision of the Powers; and was, after this, asked to give his opinion on the subject and point out what could best be done. M. Zaïmis read these papers and made a speech, examining our affairs since the entry into office of the Bulgaris Cabinet; bitterly censured M. Bulgaris and his colleagues, because they, by the Petropoulaki demonstration, had given rise to the Turkish ultimatum and brought things to their present condition. M. Zaïmis, after having strongly stigmatized the course followed by the Bulgaris Cabinet and proved their bad administration of affairs both at home and abroad, asked the King if Government had made any preparations, and of what kind. The King replied that they had made none. Then M. Zaïmis plainly and clearly expressed the opinion that we must acquiesce, seeing that the Cabinet, though they possessed all the means and had had ample time, had prepared nothing, but, on the contrary, had left the nation deprived of all requisites and of allies.

M. Deligeorges having also read the Imperial letters and been asked his opinion, stated that he could give no opinion to the King, as he ignored the intentions of the Cabinet, their preparations, their relations, and their misunderstandings with others. He, as a Deputy, had often stated his opinion and made known his principles from the tribune. He only observed to the King that he must uphold the honour of the nation, and that he was not in a position to express any opinion, either in favour of war or of peace. M. Deligeorges, having had occasion, said many things against the policy of Government and of their acts, and uttered upon them bitter censures and disapprobation, and that they, the Government, alone were responsible for the present state of things.

M. Chrestides, on being asked his opinion, said that the nation must not submit, but go to war; that means were requisite, and he supposed that the Government had them. When the King replied that Ministers had nothing prepared, M. Chrestides answered that the honour of the nation requires that we should persist, and that the details belong to the Ministers, who are in a position to know the strength of the nation, the means and the requirements for war.

M. Sotiropoulos said that the honour of the nation imposed upon us a negative answer; but have we money, have we arms, cannons, ships, were we properly prepared? The King said, no. In such a case, replied M. Sotiropoulos, all discussion is superfluous, and our interest requires that we should accept the propositions of the Powers.

M. Drossos, on being asked, said that we must go to war, even as we are, and God will help us.

M. Moraïtini—we do not know what he answered. We heard, however, that he gave no clear opinion, as he considered himself incompetent, and ignored the means and policy of Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 230.

Placard.

(Translation.)

DARE not sign an engagement so dishonourable for Greece, as death will fall upon your heads; but leave him alone to settle these difficulties who has brought them to such a point that he must at once go where Otho or the Prince of Servia went.

Let him who finds this publish it.

(Follow 300 signatures.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 230.

Extraordinary Supplement of the "Justice."

Much suffering people of Greece!

OUR country is passing through most critical times. The independence of the nation, threatened by infamous treachery, is exposed now to extreme danger. Fellow-citizens! let us come together in public meetings, in accordance with the right conferred on us by the Constitution, and let us take counsel together for the salvation of our country, to drive away the dangers that threaten it.

Let us trample under foot the unworthy head of this treachery; let us show the world that Greece has life in herself; that she feels humiliation and dishonour; that she is not so wrapt in stupor, nor so contemptible as the Rodostami and Kourkomeli, and the other chamberlains and servants of the British Commissioners, would make her.

Fellow-citizens!

The Ministry of Bulgaris has resigned. It would not carry out to the full the direction of the national dishonour and humiliation, because, although it has governed senselessly and unconstitutionally, it was still composed of Greeks, such as they were. Well, who are now the men who will dare to undertake the direction of the national dishonour and humiliation? Can it be possible that the city of Harmodius and Aristogeiton contains the traitors within its bosom?

Let us form meetings at once; and let the best men take the initiative in calling together the constitutional gatherings of the people.

Athens, $\frac{\text{January 27}}{\text{February 8}}$, 1869.

(Signed) N. G. DIANEZI.

No. 231.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February 12.*)

(No. 27.)

Athens, February 3, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship, copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Patras, relative to the destitute condition of the Cretan refugees now in Greece.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 228.

Consul Ongley to Mr. Erskine.

Patras, February 1, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, inclosed, a Patras paper of the 18th of January, in which is an article relative to the Cretans, of which I also send a translation.

Now that the Cretan affair is over, the Greeks seem disposed to refuse assistance to the poor Cretans who are in Greece. It is easy to say they must work, but there are poor women and young children whose husbands and fathers are away to find work.

If the Greeks had not opposed their departure weeks ago, many of them would now have been in Crete.

In the Greek Athenian paper, the "Regeneration," you may perhaps have seen that the Editor, in his remarks on the decision of the Conference, says that the Great Powers

themselves, by bringing the Cretans from Crete to Greece, were guilty of a breach of neutrality, and thereby encouraged Greece in the course she has pursued.

Mr. March tells me that the brigands in Acarnania have been committing great atrocities.

Small parties of troops are being sent on towards the frontier by the Greek steamers that leave this for Sta. Maura.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. ONGLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 231.

Extract from the "Germanos."

(Translation.)

THE Cretans resident here have given us to-day another example of their ingratitude, in exchange for the many sacrifices we have made for three years for their maintenance. Neglecting to procure the necessaries of life by labour, and not taking into consideration the pecuniary embarrassment in which the municipality and private persons find themselves in the present critical moment, but, on the contrary, thinking that we shall always be obliged to give food to the lazy, they assembled in George's Square, demanding by demonstration that rations be given to them. As they cried out against the Government, and against Greece in general, the police, acting properly, arrested the ringleaders, imprisoned some, and ordered the rest to disperse, with continued threats. They are worthy of sympathy for their expatriation, but their demands exceed our means; and in the general misfortune they ought to seek their bread by their sweat and their labour, since affairs have come to such an end that our endeavours, after so many sacrifices, have been rendered vain, and Europe has allied itself with Turkey.

The Government must take measures for the return of these men to their homes, that they may leave us alone to bewail our misfortunes.

No. 232

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 30. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Athens, February* 4, 1869.

AT the King's request I went to the Palace this afternoon at 2 o'clock, and there met the French Minister and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who had likewise been summoned to attend His Hellenic Majesty.

On being admitted to His Majesty's presence, he told us that, as the term within which he was expected to reply to the Declaration of the Conference was on the eve of expiring, he wished to explain to us how he was situated in this matter.

He had, he said, exhausted every argument that occurred to him to persuade the Ministry of M. Bulgaris to accept the Declaration, to which His Majesty personally had no objection, and to which he was fully prepared to adhere; but he regretted to say that his late Ministers could not be induced to take the same view, and had at length given in their resignation; the utmost that he could obtain being that two of them, viz., MM. Valaorites and Spiro Milios, had placed on record their opinion that it would be advisable for their successors to acquiesce in a course which circumstances had prevented them from following.

His Majesty then sent for Sir R. Church, Admiral Canaris, and MM. Deligeorges, Zaïmis, Drossos, Moraitinis, and other persons of high political standing, some of whom were loud in their condemnation of the late Government, and of the embarrassment into which their injudicious acts had thrown the country; but not one of these gentlemen would accept office and incur the odium of giving effect to the Declaration of Paris.

On the refusal of M. Moraitinis (who shed tears at having to disappoint His Majesty) the King sent for MM. Deligeorges and Zaïmis, the result of whose interview I have already reported to your Lordship; but it may be worth while to mention that His Majesty expressed a very strong objection to making Ministers of such men as MM. Petzali and Trinchetta, especially on the conditions stipulated by M. Zaïmis, viz., that he should be empowered to dissolve the Chamber whenever it might happen to suit his purpose, and that the Government were to have complete "liberté d'action," which might mean, he said, that these men could discharge His Majesty's cook if they were so

minded. Besides, added His Majesty, they insisted that the acceptance of the Declaration should be accompanied by a Memorandum defining the "rights of the nation," which, for all His Majesty knew, might be looked upon by the Conference as a practical repudiation of the Declaration itself.

On the failure, therefore, of this negotiation, His Majesty again saw M. Bulgaris, who continued inexorable; and M. Valaorites then undertook to try whether whether he could not form a Ministry, but was compelled to abandon the attempt after receiving the most unqualified refusals to join him from Messrs. Botzaris, Sotiropoulos, and Pappazaphiropoulos. In short, continued His Majesty, I am the only man in Greece who is willing to accept the Declaration "pure et simple."

I ventured to ask His Majesty why he did not apply to M. Commoundouros; he replied that, in the first place, he is not a Deputy, and that he is still under the effects of a judicial process for seditious acts done by him in Lakonia a few months ago. But that even were he to expose himself to the humiliation, he well knew that it would be useless, as, when applied to by M. Zaïmis for his support, M. Commoundouros had distinctly declined to have anything to do with the Declaration.

His Majesty then went on to say that he was determined, as far as was in his power, to act upon the advice which had been given him by our respective Governments, and that rather than carry out the policy which would be implied by the rejection of the Declaration, he would abdicate and retire from the country. If, therefore, the Protecting Powers were desirous that he should remain on the Throne, they must come forward and afford him effectual assistance. He did not, I think, distinctly allude to an occupation; and on my pressing him to say what he expected the Powers to do, he replied that they might perhaps modify the Declaration in some such way as would make it less unpalatable than it now is to the Greek nation. That is to say, the Declaration is looked upon here as pledging Greece in no future contingency to make war on Turkey, whilst the Porte will always have it in its power to prevent foreign interference, and put a stop to the aggressive intentions of Greece by appealing to the terms of the Paris Declaration.

Both Baron Baude and I reminded His Majesty that the Declaration was merely an authoritative statement of certain principles recognized by the Great Powers as part of the international law of Europe, and His Majesty assured us that he had repeatedly held this language to his Ministers and others with whom he had occasion to converse; adding even that, now that the insurrection in Crete was completely at an end, there would be no pretext for again having recourse to such acts as those which had been condemned by the Conference. But all His Majesty's arguments were in vain, and every one in Greece persisted in speaking of the Declaration as a national humiliation.

Baron Baude and I frequently took part in this conversation by asking His Majesty questions or by making suggestions; but Prince Gagarine did not, as far as I can recollect, make a single remark of any sort, except that he believed M. Calliga to be a respectable man, which I have no doubt he is.

Finally, the King informed us that if we could give him no hope of assistance, he should perhaps be compelled to make a short journey to Paris to lay the whole matter before the Powers more immediately concerned in this question. He had not, he said, finally made up his mind on the subject, and I imagine that His Majesty is still considering what may be the effect of such a step on the position of the Queen and the Prince their son; but he seems so completely disheartened by the present state of affairs and by his whole position in Greece, that I think it will be a relief to him even to be told that the Powers can do nothing to support him, when he will feel justified in abandoning an impracticable task.

If the three Protecting Powers could and would agree upon an occupation of Greece for a term of years, and if His Majesty were encouraged to make an appeal to the nation justifying the abrogation of the present Constitution, the King would, I am confident, have no difficulty in putting a stop to the excitement which has brought things to their present pass, and some real improvement of the country might be hoped for; but unless an interference on this scale is feasible, it would be far better to leave the King to carry out his intention and allow the Greeks to adopt whatever form of government they choose, it being well understood that in the event of their violating public law in their intercourse with Turkey, they must take the consequences whatever they may be.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 233.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 65.)
My Lord,

Vienna, February 9, 1869.

THE last time I saw Count Beust he was very desirous for news from Athens, and seemed fearful, notwithstanding the good disposition of the King of the Hellenes, that His Majesty might be unable to get a Ministry that would have the courage to face the unpopularity of accepting the Paris Declaration. The best counsel, he said, had been given His Majesty from all sides, and the Turkish Government had evinced a spirit of conciliation; but the suggestions of the Conference had not yet been attended to, and he was naturally anxious to know what course would be followed if they were to be disregarded. I told him I could supply no information as to the future in the Greek question; but I thought we need not yet despair—the King was well disposed, and so were many of his subjects in and out of the kingdom; and it therefore appeared to me that the Powers had to remain united and firm to the Declaration: in time, an amicable arrangement would probably be effected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 234.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 178.)
My Lord,

Paris, February 11, 1869.

THE Marquis de Lavalette and I compared yesterday the intelligence which we had each received from Athens, and agreed that it gave us reason to hope that the endeavours of the Conference to restore friendly relations between Turkey and Greece would not prove to have been fruitless.

M. de Lavalette did not fail to observe the statement in Mr. Erskine's telegram, that the Greek acceptance of our Declaration would be accompanied by a complaint of the exclusion of a Greek Plenipotentiary from the Conference. He did not, however, apprehend that this circumstance would be of any material importance. He felt sure, that if only the adherence of Greece to our decision was so distinct as to warrant us in declaring relations to be re-established between the two Powers, none of the Plenipotentiaries would be disposed to take exception to the terms in which it might be conveyed.

M. de Lavalette went on to say that, as I well knew, he had been from the first aware, that to establish even a nominal distinction between the positions of Turkey and Greece in the Conference, would be to expose ourselves to misconception and misinterpretation. The Government of the Emperor had, he observed, been no less willing and desirous that that of Her Majesty to admit Greece on equal terms with Turkey. But it did not follow that because a thing was desirable, it was, therefore, possible. He had found himself placed between the alternative of leaving Turkey to prosecute coercive measures against Greece, and that of consenting to the establishment of a nominal distinction between the positions of Turkey and Greece at the Conference table. He had found the Porte to be extremely averse to all idea of a Conference. The language of the Ottoman Ambassador here, and the reports of the Emperor's Representative at Constantinople showed that the Turkish Government considered that a Conference would be extremely detrimental to their interests, and conceived that honour and expediency alike required that they should be left to deal with the Greeks in their own way. M. de Lavalette did not consider this feeling on the part of the Turks to be wise; but there could be no doubt of the strength and pertinacity with which it was entertained by them. To those who had only a superficial knowledge of Turkey, it might appear that the influence of the Great Powers would be strong enough to overcome the resolution of the Porte; but those who understood the Turks well, knew that the deference to foreign counsels and conciliation which they manifested on ordinary occasions, covered deep feelings of pride. M. de Lavalette had been himself Ambassador at Constantinople, so had I. We were both acquainted with the Turks generally, and with the men now in power particularly. We knew how determined they were, how difficult to move when once driven to stand at bay. What was to be done? The urgency of the case was extreme: in a few days the Porte would resort to coercive measures which could not fail to cause misery to thousands immediately, and to lead eventually to actual hostilities. Were all attempts to preserve peace to be abandoned? M. de Lavalette had not thought so. He had exerted

himself to reassure the Porte, to remove its doubts and suspicions, to calm its fears. He had used all the influence of France; he had even appealed to the personal confidence felt in him by the Grand Vizier, and he had at last succeeded in inducing the Ottoman Government to accept on certain conditions the principle of a Conference, during the sitting of which the *status quo* between Turkey and Greece should be maintained. But the Porte absolutely refused to agree to any Conference not composed exclusively of Powers which were Parties to the Treaty of Paris. In this emergency, M. de Lavalette had with infinite pains effected an arrangement by which Greece would have in practice all the advantages of a seat in the Conference, while the scruples of Turkey would be overcome by a distinction which, except as a matter of punctilio, was merely nominal. He had brought Turkey, as well as the other six Powers, to agree that a Greek Representative might sit at the Conference table with a "voix consultative," though not with a "voix délibérative." The technical difference between the two was that a member with a "voix consultative" had the right to speak and take a full share in debate, but had not the right to vote, while a member with a "voix délibérative" had the power to vote as well as to speak. The distinction was of course extremely important in an ordinary legislative assembly, in which questions were decided by a majority of votes; but in a Conference, such as was proposed, of independent Powers, it vanished. In such a Conference, neither the minority nor even a single dissenting member was bound by the opinion of the majority. In this particular Conference, less than in any other, could there be any notion of deciding by a majority of votes. No active measure was contemplated, no Treaty was to be signed, no steps were to be taken to enforce the resolutions which might be come to. All that was proposed was that friendly counsels should be given, with a view to reconciling Turkey and Greece; counsels which each of them would remain at liberty to accept or reject.

But though the distinction did not place Greece at any practical disadvantage in the Conference, it was regarded by the Turks as essential to the maintenance of principles of vital importance to them. They insisted that no Power should be admitted as a substantive member of the Conference which was not bound, as the parties to the Treaty of Paris were, to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to abstain from interference between the Sultan and his subjects. They objected especially to the establishment of any precedent for the admission to future Conferences on matters affecting the Ottoman Empire, of a Power like Greece, which was avowedly hostile to the principles established by the Treaty. They particularly urged that no countenance should be given to the doctrine that, by fomenting troubles and aiding revolt in the Ottoman Empire, a State acquired the right of sitting upon equal terms in deliberation with the Great Powers of Europe. M. de Lavalette did not consider it necessary to examine the validity of the objections thus asserted by Turkey. It was enough that the Porte held so strongly to them, that it could not have been induced to suspend the threatened measures against Greece unless they had been taken into account.

M. de Lavalette then found himself in this situation, either he must give up the Conference altogether, and allow Turkey to act forthwith against Greece, or he must have recourse to some compromise between his own desire to admit Greece as a regular member of the Conference, and the absolute refusal of the Ottoman Government to hear of a Conference in which she should be so represented. Not a moment was to be lost, as the delay granted by the Porte to Greece was on the point of expiring. He succeeded in obtaining the assent of the six Powers and of Turkey to the admission of Greece "à titre consultatif." He had every reason to believe that the Greek Government also assented. The Emperor's Minister at Athens had communicated the proposal to that Government on the 2nd of January, and had been informed by them that they would, according to circumstances, be represented either by the King's Minister for Foreign Affairs or by His Majesty's ordinary Minister at Paris; not a word had been said to him of any objection to the "voix consultative." Seven days after the communication to the Greek Government, M. de Lavalette had summoned the Conference, in the full persuasion that the Greek Minister would accept the invitation to take a seat at the Board. It was not until the Plenipotentiaries were actually assembled that he was informed that the Minister was instructed to refuse to attend, unless on precisely the same footing as the Plenipotentiary of Turkey. The Conference urged the Greek Government to reconsider its decision, and gave it ample time to do so. As it did not consent, we had no course open to us but to proceed in the absence of a Greek Plenipotentiary. In this course the Greek Government had acquiesced. Its Minister had, in obedience to its instructions, made written communications to the Conference, and the Plenipotentiaries had, through their President, conferred with that Minister on various parts of their proceedings. M. de Lavalette had in common with me, and other Members, exerted himself to supply the void occasioned by the absence

of a Representative of Greece. The Protocols of the Conferences, and especially the final Declaration and the letter with which it was transmitted to the Greek Government, bore on the face of them ample evidence of our scrupulous regard for the dignity and even the susceptibility of Greece. In point of fact, Greece had in all probability gained rather than lost by the absence of her Representative. Certainly, statements were made and arguments used in the papers put in by the Greek Minister which the limits assigned to our discussions would not have permitted his bringing forward orally; and we could hardly have dealt so tenderly with Greece had a controversial discussion taken place at the Board between a Greek and Turkish Plenipotentiary. Still M. de Lavalette would have admitted a Greek Plenipotentiary, "à titre délibératif," if it had depended upon him to do so. He could not, however, regret that, this being impossible, he had nevertheless proceeded to hold the Conference. We had now every reason to hope that the acceptance of our Declaration, which was on the way to us, would be satisfactory. In that case, we should have saved Greece from a great and imminent danger, and he should certainly prefer this to having sacrificed her vital interests in order to gratify her on a question of punctilio. We might, he said, in conclusion, listen with equanimity to any complaint she might make, so long as we felt that we had in truth done all in our power to deserve her gratitude.

I observed to M. de Lavalette, that we had, during the whole course of these transactions, so unreservedly communicated to each other the information we had received, that it was hardly necessary for me to remind him that the reports of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople fully confirmed the conclusions to which he had come respecting the sentiments of the Porte. He was, I said, well aware of the decided opinion of Her Majesty's Government in favour of the admission of a Greek Representative to the Conference, and he knew how strongly I had myself felt on the subject. Her Majesty's Government would certainly not have yielded the point had they not been thoroughly convinced that the only alternative was to abandon Greece to the coercive measures of Turkey, and give up all hope of averting the disasters and dangers which were impending over the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 235.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 39.) *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Prince Gortchakoff, as reported in your despatch No. 39, Confidential, of the 2nd instant, with reference to his Excellency's remarks on Mr. Elliot's proceedings during the late crisis at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 236.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 14, 1869, 1·30 P.M.

THE Cretan Chiefs mentioned in Consul Dickson's despatch No. 10 of the 6th instant as still in arms have made their submission, and will leave the island. The insurrection being thus at an end, orders have been sent to remove the blockade.

No. 237.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon —(Received February 14.)

(No. 35.) *Athens, February* 6, 1869.

My Lord,

AFTER the very painful interview between His Hellenic Majesty and the Representatives of the three Protecting Powers, which forms the subject of my despatch No. 30

of the 4th instant, His Majesty consulted his Ministers as to the expediency of his going to Paris for the purpose of making a direct appeal to the three Powers; but it would appear that M. Bulgaris and his colleagues were so averse to the proposal that His Majesty was compelled to abandon it, and to make some further attempt to form a Cabinet which would assent to the Declaration of the Conference of Paris.

After again meeting with refusals to take office from all the public men to whom he addressed himself, His Majesty at length applied a second time to M. Zaïmis, and with some difficulty induced him so far to modify his Cabinet that M. Petzalis (to whom, as Finance Minister, His Majesty felt an insuperable objection) was transferred to the Department of Justice, and the new Ministry, constituted as follows, was sworn in this day:—

M. Zaïmis, President of the Council and Minister of the Interior.
M. Theodore Delyanni, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
M. Avgerinos, Minister of Finance.
General Charles Soutzo, Minister of War.
M. Petzalis, Minister of Justice.
M. Trinchetta, Minister of Marine.
M. Saravas, Minister of Public Instruction.

M. Zaïmis is a man of some political standing in the country, and is looked upon as a highly honourable and estimable person; but he is thought to be weak as a politician.

M. Theodore Delyanni is a cousin of the former Minister of the same name, but he does not in any way resemble him, and they have always been on bad terms. He has occupied the same post on several previous occasions, and was more recently Greek Minister at Paris.

M. Avgerinos is not a man of much reputation as a politician, but he is said to be honest, which is a particularly desirable quality at the Finance Department.

General Soutzo was formerly Maréchal de la Cour of King George, and at one time enjoyed a large share in the confidence of His Majesty. He is undoubtedly a clever, resolute man, and I cannot doubt that he will maintain internal order, which is at this moment the principal point to be considered.

The less that is said about the three last on the list the better.

I have seen M. Theodore Delyanni, who speaks very fairly as to the intentions of the new Cabinet, and as to the terms in which they are disposed to intimate their acceptance of the Declaration. He thinks of preparing a short document by which the Greek Government adhere, without restriction of any sort, to the decision of the Conference, and to forward this formal acceptance in a letter addressed to the Marquis de Lavalette, setting forth the views and expectations of the Greek nation, and recommending the fate of the Cretan people to the protection and good offices of the Great Powers; but M. Delyanni assured me that care would be taken to avoid the use of any expression which could imply the least idea of not abiding by the engagement involved in the acceptance of the Declaration.

I learn from Baron Baude that he has been authorized by M. de Lavalette to detain Count Walewski for a few days to give the Greek Government time to draw up their answer; and as soon as it is ready, Count Walewski will proceed to Syra in the "Forbin," and there embark for Marseilles by the steamer of the Messageries Impériales.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

No. 238.

Mr. Thornton to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 27.) *Washington, February* 1, 1869.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose three printed copies of a Message of the President of the United States to the Senate, inclosing some correspondence which had taken place with regard to the Resolution of Congress of July 20, 1867, "declaring sympathy with the suffering people of Crete."

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

Inclosure in No. 238.

SENATE.

40th Congress, 3rd Session.—Ex. Doc. No. 12.

Message of the President of the United States, transmitting a Report from the Secretary of State in relation to the Resolution of Congress, approved July 20, 1867, "declaring sympathy with the suffering People of Crete."

January 7, 1869.—Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate of the United States:

I TRANSMIT to the Senate a Report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying papers, in relation to the Resolution of Congress, approved July 20, 1867, "declaring sympathy with the suffering people of Crete."

(Signed) ANDREW JOHNSON.

Washington, January 4, 1869.

Department of State, Washington, December 31, 1868.

The Secretary of State has the honour to report to the President that in an instruction dated July 22, 1867, of which a copy is herewith sent, he transmitted to Mr. E. Joy Morris, Minister Resident of the United States at Constantinople, a transcript of the Resolution of Congress, approved July 20, 1867, "declaring sympathy with the suffering people of Crete." Conformably to this instruction, Mr. Morris brought the Resolution to the attention of the Turkish Government. A copy of his despatch upon the subject is herewith appended.

In this connection the Secretary of State has the honour also to lay before the President a transcript in translation of a Decree of the Hellenic Parliament, passed on the 24th of October last, expressing its appreciation of the humane and sympathetic words uttered in behalf of Crete by the two Houses of Congress, together with a copy of the correspondence upon the subject which passed between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and the Minister Resident of the United States at Athens, and which has been communicated by the latter to the Department of State.

Respectfully submitted;

(Signed) WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

The President.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Morris.

Department of State, Washington, July 22, 1867.

(No. 151.)

Sir,

Herewith I inclose a transcript of a Resolution of the Congress of the United States, declaring sympathy with the suffering people of Crete. Upon its receipt you are instructed to seek an interview with the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to read to him the Resolution. You are also instructed to leave with him a copy of the same, if he shall desire it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

E. Joy Morris, Esq.,
&c. &c. Constantinople.

Mr. Morris to Mr. Seward.

Legation of the United States of America, Constantinople, August 1867.

(No. 224.)

Sir,

In conformity with the instructions of despatch No. 151, I have brought to the attention of the Turkish Government the Resolution of sympathy for the suffering people of Crete, adopted by the Congress of the United States. The Minister of Foreign Affairs being absent on a special mission to the Emperor of Russia in the Crimea, I read

the Resolution to his Highness Aali Pasha, Grand Vizier, and, at his request, I left with him a translated copy in French. His Highness, while apparently surprised at the character of the Resolution, and the order of Congress for its communication to the Turkish Government, made no comments whatever on its subject-matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. JOY MORRIS.

Hon. William H. Seward,
Secretary of State.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Tuckerman, Minister Resident of the United States of North America.

(Translation.)

Athens, November $\frac{9}{21}$, 1868.

Mr. Minister,

The Chamber of Deputies, on the last day of its regular session, passed a Decree by which it expresses to the Senate, House of Representatives, and the people of the United States, the most profound sentiments of acknowledgment for their generous solicitude for the Greek nation.

I have the honour to transmit herewith in original the above-mentioned Decree, also the translation of the letter in which the President of the Legislative Body communicates to me the Decree in question.

You will notice, Mr. Minister, the unanimous applause with which this Decree was greeted by the Representatives of the nation.

The Government of the King, animated by the same sentiments as those of the Representatives, esteems itself happy to reiterate this assurance on this occasion.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) P. DELYANNI.

The President of the Chamber of Deputies to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Athens, October 25, 1868.

(Translation.)

The Chamber of Deputies, inspired by a national duty, voted at its eighty-fourth sitting on yesterday, a Decree by which it expressed, in the midst of the warmest applause, its profound acknowledgment to the Senate, House of Representatives, and people of the United States of America for the generous and benevolent sentiments which the great Republic has at all times manifested toward the Hellenic nation, and especially in regard to the cause of Candia, and it has requested me to be the interpreter of this national decision.

In fulfilling with pleasure this mission, I have the honour to transmit herewith official copy of the above-mentioned Decree, with the request that you will properly communicate the same.

(Signed) TH. LAZARETOS, *President.*

(Signed) A. MONASTIRIOTIS, THEOD. ANASTASSOPOULE, } *Secretaries.*

Copy of Decree.

The Hellenic Parliament, in consideration of the generous sentiment which the Republic of the United States of America has always manifested for the Greek nation, and moved by the humane and sympathetic words which have been uttered in behalf of Crete by the two Houses of Congress, expresses to these Bodies, and through them to the magnanimous people of America, its profound gratitude, and confides to the President of the Hellenic Chamber the duty of transmitting this national resolution.

Mr. Tuckerman to M. Delyanni.

Legation of the United States, Athens, November $\frac{13}{25}$, 1868.

Mr. Minister,

I have the honour to acknowledge the reception of your communication of the $\frac{9}{21}$ instant, in which you inform me that the Chamber of Deputies, on the last day of its

regular session, passed unanimously, and with enthusiastic applause, a decree of thanks to the Senate, House of Representatives, and people of the United States for "their generous solicitude for the Hellenic nation." You also hand me, in original, a copy of this Decree, accompanied by a copy of the letter in which the President of the Chamber transmits it to you, and you assure me that the Government of His Majesty the King is animated by the same sentiments which are expressed by the national Representatives.

I thank you, Mr. Minister, and through you the honourable gentlemen of the Chamber of Deputies for this renewed assurance of international sympathy, as well as for the complimentary manner in which it is communicated through me to my countrymen.

The expressions of interest on the part of the people of the United States for the struggling Christians of Crete are but the utterances of those who would be faithless to the principles which made and preserved them a nation, did they refuse to extend the right hand of fellowship to others, wherever gathered on the earth's surface, who contend for the inestimable right to choose their own rulers.

The people of the United States will consider it a happy circumstance for all the people of Eastern Europe when the policy adopted towards them shall be in conformity with that sentiment which English statesmen have themselves admitted to be a political axiom, namely, that Treaties can never unite populations which are dissevered by sympathies. Until this principle is recognized peace may be maintained by expedients, but can never be secured.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES K. TUCKERMAN.

M. P. Delyanni,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

No. 239.

Musurus Pasha to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

Ambassade Impériale Ottomane, le 14 Février, 1869.

My Lord,

JE m'empresse de transmettre à votre Excellence, ci-jointe en copie, une dépêche télégraphique de Constantinople annonçant la soumission de quelques autres Chefs de l'insurrection Crétoise.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) MUSURUS.

Inclosure in No. 239.

Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha.

Constantinople, le 13 Février, 1869.

(Télégraphique.)

D'APRES les dernières nouvelles de Crète, les Chefs Koraka, Criari, Lueada, Sfakaniaki, ont tous fait leur soumission, et l'île jouit d'une pleine et entière tranquillité.

No. 240.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, February 9, 1869.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I had yesterday with Prince Gortchakoff, after expressing to his Excellency the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government with the steps taken at Athens by the Government of the Emperor to promote an arrangement of the Turco-Greek dispute, I said to his Excellency that the disclosures in the Greek Blue Book had, as I anticipated, produced a very different impression in London as to the proceedings of General Ignatieff. Prince Gortchakoff answered, He was aware of Mr. Elliot's being much displeased with the language attributed to him in M. Delyanni's despatches, but he could not have read these Reports of the Greek Minister with more dissatisfaction than they caused to General Ignatieff, who, without accusing M. Delyanni of premeditated misrepresentations, denied that the despatches published by the Greek Government correctly reported the language which he had held to him during the crisis at Constantinople. I said that, however that might be, the despatches must have encouraged the Greek Government to resist the just demands of the Porte, and the part which they represent General Ignatieff to have taken in the question had caused much surprise and regret to Her Majesty's Government, which your Lordship had expressed to me in a confidential despatch which I would read to him, as, in my opinion, the most satisfactory way of using a discretion, which your Lordship had left to me, as to the time and manner of communicating to him the feelings of Her Majesty's Government on the subject.

I then read to him your Lordship's despatch No. 26 of the 30th ultimo. He appeared to be gratified by those passages in it which give credit to the Russian Government for loyalty and sincerity in the late negotiations; and he made no remark, until I had finished, on your Lordship's animadversions on the alleged conduct of the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

He then said that as General Ignatieff had denied having used the language attributed to him, he could not blame him for it. It was not impossible, however, he said, that General Ignatieff had been imprudent in his conversations with the Greek Minister, and that the latter, carried away by passion and excitement, had exaggerated and erroneously appreciated the observations made to him in reporting them to Athens.

He would, however, communicate to me General Ignatieff's own explanation of the matter; and he read to me a despatch which contains them.

It began with irrelevant observations on the impropriety of the Greek Government publishing despatches during the progress of a negotiation, and of the inconvenience of holding any communication with Greek Ministers, if their Government are habitually to publish what might be said to their Agents in confidence by third parties—and he then endeavoured to show that his observations had been misrepresented. In doing so he made a distinction between the language he held before the Turkish Government had spoken of coercive measures, when, he says, he had been led to believe that menaces on their part would increase the difficulty of inducing the Greek Government to give the satisfaction required of them, and the efforts which he made, after measures of coercion were threatened by the Porte, to impress upon the Cabinet of Athens the necessity of granting the demands which had been made upon them.

Prince Gortchakoff acknowledged, in reading these explanations, that they were feeble, and he seemed also to consider that a statement showing that M. Delyanni was mistaken as to the place and circumstances under which a conversation took place between General Ignatieff and the British and French Ambassadors, was not quite as convincing a proof as General Ignatieff represented it to be; that the Greek Minister had been equally mistaken as to the purport of the conversations which General Ignatieff had reported to him.

Prince Gortchakoff read the despatch to me so very quickly that I cannot remember its exact expression; but, I believe, I have correctly reported its substance to your Lordship. When he had finished, I said that I would communicate to him Mr. Elliot's observations on the subject; and I read to him, with some slight omissions, the concluding paragraphs of Mr. Elliot's despatch No. 26 of the 13th ultimo, beginning with, "When I am enabled to transmit copies of these papers." I said also that I had heard from so many quarters that General Ignatieff looked to the cession of Crete to Greece as a means of promoting his own future advancement in the world, that I could quite understand his having acted under the influence of passion when he saw circumstances arising which were likely to prevent the attainment of that object.

Prince Gortchakoff here observed that, as to Crete, he himself considered its annexation to Greece as merely a question of time, and that Aali Pasha had, two years ago, almost invited a little coercion on the part of Europe in order to enable him to let it go as a "fait accompli," and that both France and England had at times been favourable to such an arrangement.

I said that we had only, however, to deal with the present; and as the Porte would never willingly make a cession which it considered would be an encouragement to insurrection in its other European provinces, General Ignatieff would do well to give up looking for such an eventuality.

His Excellency then read to me a despatch from General Ignatieff to Prince Gagarin, developing the instructions conveyed to him in the telegram referred to in your Lordship's despatch No. 31 of the 2nd instant, but though it urged the expediency of submission, Prince Gortchakoff passed quickly over some passages in it which appeared to me to indicate that the alleged grievances of Greece against Turkey would not be in any way effected by the acceptance of the decision of the Conference, but would remain open for future discussion.

The conversation then ended by Prince Gortchakoff stating that he impressed upon all his Diplomatic Agents that he is ready to receive their appreciations of questions which may arise, and to correct his own opinions by theirs when they appear to be just; but that when he had once intimated to them the views of the Government, he expected them to be carried out, and would not hesitate to recall any Ambassador or Minister who did not act in the spirit of his instructions. If General Ignatieff, however, he said, had erred on the present occasion, he believed that he had merely been imprudent had "trop bavardé" and been "trop jeune" in his proceedings, which, I presume, means inconsiderate and inexperienced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 241.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 39.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 9, 1869.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 31 of the 2nd instant, I have mentioned to Prince Gortchakoff that you had expressed to Baron Brunnow the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government would learn that the Russian Minister in Greece had been instructed to make a communication to King George, so likely to promote the acceptance at Athens of the Declaration of the Conference, as that reported in a telegram which Baron Brunnow had communicated to your Lordship on the day on which your despatch was written, I said that I had reason to believe that, if the confident expectation of Her Majesty's Government as to the Declaration being accepted is realized, they will attribute the result in a great measure to the language held by the Russian Minister at Athens, and to the identity of views it has proved to exist between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor.

Prince Gortchakoff, who was apparently much pleased with your Lordship's observations to Baron Brunnow, assured me that the uniformity of views with which the two Governments are acting, is as satisfactory to him as I had represented it to be to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 242.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 40. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 9, 1869.*

I CALLED yesterday upon Prince Gortchakoff, having previously heard that his Excellency had received very unsatisfactory intelligence from Greece, and he was good enough to read to me several telegrams from Paris and Athens, from which it appeared that, upon the evening of the 4th instant, King George had not succeeded in forming a Ministry disposed to accept the Declaration of the Conference. His Excellency said that under these circumstances he had repeated his instructions to Prince Gagarin, to warn the Statesmen of Greece, in the most urgent manner, of the dangers to which the country would be exposed if the King was not supported in forming a Government that would accept the Declaration of the Conference; and he had desired him to say that after the dignity of the King and the country had been so fully protected by the Great Powers, Greece must expect no countenance or assistance from Russia in the event of her engaging in a war with Turkey, which could not fail to be disastrous. His Excellency also acquainted me with the substance of a telegram, reporting that the King had sent for the Representatives of the Protecting Powers, and that His Majesty, in informing them of his inability to find any Statesmen willing to support him, had spoken of abdication; and his Excellency said that he had, therefore, sent instructions to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to advise the King, in the event of his making such a threat to the Greek nation, to declare that, if he considered it necessary to abdicate, the Queen and the infant Prince would leave the country with him—a menace which Prince Gortchakoff hoped would even under the worst circumstances induce some of the more moderate and prudent Greek politicians to rally round the Throne, and to protect

that country from the evils of revolution, and the many disastrous consequences which would immediately follow the King's departure.

Prince Gortchakoff also spoke to me of the question which appears to have been addressed by M. de Lavalette to General Stackelberg and Lord Lyons, as to the expediency of adopting measures to support the King; and his Excellency evidently does not wish that a corps of occupation should be sent to Greece.

I said that the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on that point might be judged by your Lordship's answer to Count Bismarck's proposal, that an allied squadron in the waters of Greece should enforce the decision of the Conference; and I read to him your answer, as it is reported in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, No. 23 of the 23rd ultimo.

His Excellency said, that he had also disapproved of Count Bismarck's proposal, and had refused his assent to it, on the ground that it would be inconsistent with the dignity of the Emperor to be represented in the proposed squadron by the Russian vessels at present in the Mediterranean, and some months would elapse before they could be reinforced from Cronstadt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 243.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 42.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1869.*

AS a proof of the general apprehension here that the Turco-Greek dispute might have led to a more or less armed intervention on the part of Russia, the Stock of the Russian Steam Navigation Company fell 6 per cent., and has only recently begun to recover.

The Company receive a considerable subvention from the Government, on the condition that their vessels shall afford assistance to the Empire in time of war; but no terms have yet been arranged as to the remuneration which they would receive for carrying troops and stores.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 244.

The Earl of Clarendon to Musurus Pasha.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, February 15, 1869.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge, with thanks, your Excellency's note of the 14th instant, inclosing a copy of a telegraphic despatch received from Constantinople, from which Her Majesty's Government are gratified to learn that the Island of Crete may now be considered tranquil.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 245.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 15, 1869.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has arrived at Marseilles, and is expected at Paris to-morrow, Tuesday evening.

No. 246.

Consul Dickson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 16.)

(Separate.) *Canea, Crete, January 31, 1869.*

My Lord,

ADVERTING to my despatch of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that the late insurgent Chiefs, Kriaris, Hadji Mikhali, Mavroyennis, Mandakakis, Korkidis, Peridis, &c., having all made their submission, have returned to their homes, without previously being allowed to visit Greece. Hadji Mikhali, Parthenios, and a few others, are now staying at Canea for a short time.

The few remaining insurgents in Retimo Province, Captains Kchaya and Demiros, with about twenty of their followers, have also laid down their arms, and presented themselves to the Turkish authorities.

The Governor-General left for Candia the day before yesterday, in order to superintend matters in that quarter. A division of troops under Mehmet Ali Pasha, has been advancing towards Lasethe; but the late severe weather has retarded operations in that mountainous district, as well as that of Mirabello, where some straggling insurgent bands are still making a feeble resistance. The only two Cretan leaders on the island, of whose submission no account has yet been received, namely, the veteran Koukas and Sphakianaki; these are represented to have recently escaped in a sailing-boat to Greece.

My belief is, that they are still in the eastern districts, and that their surrender is a mere question of time, and that a very short one.

Tranquillity prevails throughout the rest of the island.

Her Majesty's ship "Antelope" sailed for Malta on the 29th instant, having been relieved by the "Triuculo," arrived from the Pireus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

No. 247.

M. T. Delyanni to M. de Lavalette.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, February 17.)

Athènes, le 4 Janvier / 23 Février 1869.

M. le Ministre,

MON prédécesseur, M. Delyanni, m'a remis la lettre que vous avez bien voulu lui adresser, le 20 Janvier, ainsi que la Déclaration y annexée, en copie, des Plénipotentiaires des six Grandes Puissances Européennes, réunis en Conférence à Paris, afin d'examiner, dans un esprit de conciliation, le différend survenu entre la Grèce et la Turquie.

Le résultat des délibérations de la Conférence a été accueilli, je ne saurais vous le dissimuler, M. le Ministre, avec un sentiment de pénible émotion par le peuple Hellène tout entier, et la crise Ministérielle s'étant prolongée plusieurs jours a fait qu'une réponse n'a pu être donnée, dans cet intervalle, à la lettre de votre Excellence. Le Cabinet dont j'ai l'honneur de faire partie s'est fait un devoir, aussitôt constitué, de prendre en sérieuse considération le contenu de la Déclaration et de votre communication.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a vu, avec regret, que le Ministre de Sa Majesté à Paris n'a pu prendre part aux travaux de la Conférence, par suite de la position d'infériorité qui lui a été faite vis-à-vis du Plénipotentiaire de la Turquie.

En présence de l'unanimité des six Grandes Puissances Européennes, et de votre déclaration que leurs Plénipotentiaires, en dégageant le débat des questions de fait, n'ont eu vue que de chercher les règles de conduite qui doivent présider aux rapports entre la Grèce et la Turquie, je m'empresse de vous informer que le Gouvernement du Roi adhère aux principes généraux de jurisprudence internationale contenus dans la Déclaration de la Conférence, et qu'il est décidé d'y conformer son attitude.

En priant votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter cette adhésion à la connaissance de la Conférence, j'aime à espérer que les six Grandes Puissances, appréciant les difficultés de la situation, tiendront compte à la Grèce de sa résolution de déférer à leurs vœux et de contribuer, pour sa part, au maintien du repos général.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) THEODORE DELYANNI.

No. 248.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 190.) *Paris, February 16, 1869.*

My Lord,

COUNT STACKELBERG, the Russian Ambassador, called upon me the day before yesterday, and spoke to me of reports which had appeared in the newspapers that a circular had been sent to the Russian Representatives abroad on the affairs of Greece, in which the Conference and its proceedings were spoken of in disparaging terms.

M. de Stackelberg said that there was no foundation whatever for these rumours, and that no circular of the kind had ever existed. So far from disapproving of the Conference, the Russian Government had, in fact, been the first to suggest that one should be held; and the result had been entirely satisfactory to that Government.

The Marquis de Lavalette told me this afternoon that M. de Stackelberg had also come to him to contradict the reports about the circular, and had suggested that they should be contradicted on authority. M. de Lavalette had accordingly caused a contradiction to be inserted in the "Journal Officiel." The following paragraph has accordingly appeared in the "Journal Officiel" of this morning:—

"Quelques journaux ont parlé d'une circulaire que le Gouvernement Russe aurait adressée à ses Agents Diplomatiques au sujet des affaires de Grèce. Les Représentants de la Russie à l'étranger n'ont reçu du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg aucune communication de cette nature."

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 249.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 40.) *Foreign Office, February 16, 1869.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatches Nos. 38, 39, and 40, of the 9th instant, and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Prince Gortchakoff, as reported in those despatches, with reference to the difference between Turkey and Greece, which Her Majesty's Government hope may now be considered to be ended.

You will say to Prince Gortchakoff that it has afforded great satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to find themselves in regard to that matter, in such cordial agreement with His Highness, and that they highly appreciate the value of his co-operation in the work on which the Conference at Paris has lately been engaged.

It is always a matter of lively satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to act in strict concert with the Government of Russia for the maintenance of the general peace; and Prince Gortchakoff may rely on their readiness to do full justice to the friendly feelings of His Highness towards this country, which are as sincerely entertained by them for Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 250.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 16, 1869, 11·35 P.M.*

THE Greek answer appears to M. Lavalette and me to be one that can be accepted by the Conference. It is long, but states that the Greek Government adheres to the general principles of international jurisprudence contained in the Declaration of the Conference, and is decided to conform its attitude to them. M. de Lavalette telegraphs it *in extenso* to the French Ambassador, with orders to send you a copy immediately.

No. 251.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 194.) *Paris, February 17, 1869.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of the answer of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the letter with which the Marquis de Lavalette, as President, communicated to the Greek Government the Declaration of the Conference.

M. de Lavalette proposes to hold a Conference to-morrow to take this answer into consideration. He is confident that it will be accepted by the Plenipotentiaries as sufficient, and he trusts that the Conference will be able to declare friendly relations between Turkey and Greece to be re-established, and that no further sittings will be necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 251.

M. T. Delyanni to M. de Lavalette, January 31/February 12, 1869

[See No. 247.]

No. 252.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 18, 1869, 5·25 P.M.*

THE Conference has accepted the Greek answer and dissolved itself.

The Greek Minister was informed of the sitting of the Conference, but abstained advisedly from delivering a note sent to him by his Government for communication to each Plenipotentiary.

No. 253.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 62.) *Constantinople, February 7, 1869.*

My Lord,

ACCOUNTS have been received of the inroads of two Greek bands into Epirus, and of one into Thessaly, each of them numbering from 100 to 150 men, which had been dispersed by the Turkish forces without, as far as I can learn, having been pursued into the Greek territory.

I have urgently pressed the Porte to send distinct orders to their authorities on the frontier to abstain from every act which might tend still further to inflame the excitement of the Greek people, and might render untenable the already critical position of the King.

I am told that their orders already are to remain on the defensive, but they will vigorously repel all attacks; and whether this moderation would be persisted in if an invasion in any considerable strength were attempted, is more than I would venture to answer for.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 254.

Mr. Erskine to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 38.) *Athens, February 10, 1869.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies, in French, of a Proclamation which has been issued by the new Greek Ministry on taking office. It begins by recapitulating the events which have led to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Turkey; and, after

mentioning the decision of the Paris Conference, it states that no preparation whatever having been made to carry on a war, which would have been the consequence of its rejection, the present Government has no option but to adhere to the Declaration. They add, however, that painful as the step must be to the national sentiment, it does not necessarily bind Greece as to the future, or stifle the aspirations of her people.

The Proclamation, as far as I can judge, has already produced a most favourable effect throughout the country, and a general feeling of relief appears to prevail at the cessation of the sterile agitation which has so long disturbed the public mind.

The Greek Government have applied to the French Minister to induce the Turkish authorities in Crete to consent to the departure of Corakas, Sphakianaki, and a few other insurgents, who are still in arms in the eastern portion of Crete. Admiral Moulac has consequently sent the "Salamandre" to Crete; and it is hoped that Housseyn Pasha will readily avail himself of this opportunity of getting rid of the few Chiefs who still hold out.

The Government are no less desirous to make arrangements for the departure of the great bulk of the refugees in this country; but they express a strong wish that, should the Porte ultimately determine to transport these persons at his own charge, foreign vessels may be chartered for the purpose, as was the case before the rupture, and that Turkish ships of war should not be employed on this duty.

The two reserve corps of the army have already been dismissed, and everything now denotes that the Government are sincerely endeavouring to abandon the aggressive policy of their predecessors.

Parliament it is thought, will be dissolved in about two months, and the Government promise, as usual, that the most scrupulous impartiality will be observed by the authorities during the elections.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. M. ERSKINE.

Inclosure in No. 254.

Proclamation.

Concitoyens,

AYANT été appelés par la confiance de Sa Majesté au Gouvernement du pays dans un moment où votre représentation est absente, nous nous adressons directement à vous pour exposer les circonstances dans lesquelles nous avons accepté cette mission et la situation dans laquelle nous trouvons les affaires de l'Etat.

La voix d'un peuple-frère faisait battre pendant trois années le cœur de tout Hellène, et ne pouvait que retentir dans les âmes de tous ceux qui ont successivement dirigé les destinées de notre patrie. C'est pour la même raison que vous avez accouru tous, en même temps que nos compatriotes établis à l'étranger, au secours de ceux qui vous demandaient aide et assistance, et que des vœux en leur faveur ont été diversement et itérativement manifestés par ceux qui étaient à la tête des affaires.

Ces faits ont fait naître dans le passé des plaintes d'un Etat voisin contre la Grèce, qui était accusée de violer par tolérance ou par des actes la neutralité qui lui était imposée; mais ces plaintes, réfutées chaque fois, n'avaient obtenu pendant longtemps aucun appui sérieux. C'est dernièrement seulement que le Gouvernement Ottoman a cru devoir interrompre à cause de ces événements ses relations avec la Grèce, et pendant que le 4 Décembre dernier le Ministre de la Sublime Porte demandait ses passeports pour quitter notre capitale, la ville la plus commerçante de la Grèce voyait devant elle le Contre-Amiral Ottoman Hobart, poursuivant, à la tête d'une escadre de guerre, des navires de commerce qui ravitaillaient Candie, et bloquant ce port afin d'empêcher leur départ et forcer ainsi par la famine l'île insurgée à se soumettre.

Le blocus du port de Syra s'est ainsi effectué, les bateaux de commerce qui ravitaillaient Candie à leurs risques et périls n'ont pu partir, Candie est restée sans vivres, et la voix de ce peuple-frère qui faisait battre depuis trois ans les cœurs des Hellènes a cessé de se faire entendre. Quelque grand que soit l'enthousiasme qui règne dans l'âme de ce peuple, quelque grande que soit la douleur qui le domine, sa voix a commencé à faiblir, et dans le moment où nous sommes appelés à la direction des affaires elle se fait à peine entendre.

Ainsi, le territoire Hellénique a été violé et la nation entière s'en est ressentie; car la Grèce n'avait par les moyens de repousser cette violation et de venger son honneur.

C'est avec sincérité, concitoyens, que nous vous rendons compte de ces faits, sous le

poids d'une grande douleur et en nourrissant l'espoir que notre sincérité fera développer dans l'avenir la prévoyance de nos gouvernants et de tous les citoyens.

Nous comptons, en effet, trente-six ans depuis la fondation de la première Dynastie, et pourtant le Gouvernement Hellénique s'est trouvé dans la pénible situation de subir, faute de moyens, une violation du territoire Hellénique.

Pendant que ces faits se passaient en Grèce, toute l'Europe manifestait son désir de conserver la paix Européenne; et les trois Puissances bienfaitrices de la Grèce, conjointement avec les trois autres Cours co-signataires du Traité du 1856, ont été saisies de l'examen du différend, et sont tombées d'accord sur une décision qui admet une partie des griefs de la Turquie comme fondés, qui attribue la conduite de la Grèce à une exagération de patriotisme, et qui nous impose l'obligation de garder à l'avenir des règles que la Conférence considère comme communes à tous les Gouvernements. Ces règles sont les suivantes: Que la Grèce doit s'abstenir de favoriser ou de tolérer (1) la formation sur son territoire de bandes formées dans le but d'attaquer la Turquie, et (2) l'armement dans les ports Helléniques de navires armés et destinés à favoriser une tentative quelconque d'insurrection en Turquie.

Cette décision de la Conférence a été communiquée au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Grèce par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France, qui présidait cette réunion diplomatique, et la Grèce a été invitée à faire connaître dans la semaine qui suivrait la remise de ce message son adhésion pure et simple à la Déclaration de la Conférence et son intention de la respecter.

Par cette même dépêche, le Président de la Conférence faisait connaître au Gouvernement Hellénique que s'il envoyait son adhésion aux Résolutions de la Conférence et son intention de les respecter, la Turquie s'engageait à retirer les mesures contenus dans son ultimatum, et la reprise des relations entre les deux Etats serait considérée comme accomplie *ipso facto*; mais que dans le cas où le Gouvernement Hellénique refuserait son adhésion, la Conférence l'abandonnait aux conséquences de son refus.

En même temps, des conseils venant de tous les côtés, et par les Souverains et par les Gouvernements, et adressés soit directement au Gouvernement soit aux Représentants de Sa Majesté près les différentes Cours de l'Europe, ont été transmis pour recommander à la Grèce l'acceptation des Résolutions de la Conférence et pour représenter clairement les grands dangers qui le menaçaient en cas de refus.

Dans ces circonstances, une crise ministérielle a éclaté quatre jours après la réception de ces dépêches. Cette crise s'est terminée aujourd'hui par notre appel aux affaires, et demain c'est le dernier jour du délai indiqué par le Président de la Conférence.

Ayant donné plus haut un résumé exact des Résolutions de la Conférence de Paris, nous ne pouvons omettre que, quelque douloureuse que soit pour la Grèce l'acceptation des deux conditions susmentionnées, elle ne lie pas son avenir et ne combat pas ses aspirations. D'ailleurs, si nous refusons à adhérer aux Résolutions de la Conférence, il ne nous restait plus qu'à faire la guerre à la Turquie; mais malheureusement, en même temps que nous manquons des forces navales nécessaires, nous trouvons la nation non-préparée sur terre.

Nous comptons présenter à la représentation du pays qui sera formée par des élections véritablement libres et sans aucune action licite ou illicite du Gouvernement, des états détaillés de tout le matériel de guerre que nous avons trouvé dans les magasins de l'Etat et des renseignements exacts sur la situation de notre armée de terre et de mer, ainsi que sur nos autres moyens de guerre. Nous nous bornons pour le moment à déclarer que, d'après notre avis, nous aurions trahi les intérêts de notre chère patrie si éprouvée, si nous l'aurions exposé à une guerre dans un moment où l'armée se trouve incomplète et non-préparée, et la nation ne pourrait s'armer faute de moyens, et l'Europe entière se montre hostile à toute entreprise qui troublerait la paix.

Notre opinion et notre action ne pouvaient donc être douteuses. En présence de dangers aussi imminents et aussi inévitables, nous ne pouvions hésiter à faire connaître notre adhésion aux résolutions de la Conférence de Paris.

Notre devoir envers la patrie nous a obligés d'accepter, au milieu de circonstances extrêmement difficiles, la mission dont nous avons été chargés par le Roi. Notre devoir envers la patrie nous impose de répondre ainsi à la Conférence de Paris, qu'elle que soit la douleur que cette réponse fait éprouver à nos âmes. Le même devoir exige que nous accompagnions notre réponse d'un exposé des droits et des réclamations de la Grèce, et nous ne saurions manquer à ce devoir.

Mettant notre confiance sur le Souverain qui a été élu par les libres suffrages des Hellènes, qui respecte leurs libertés et attache le plus grand prix à la gloire et à la grandeur de notre patrie, implorons tous l'assistance du Tout-Puissant en faveur de la

Grèce et faisons des vœux pour que les maux présents deviennent des enseignements pour l'avenir.

Athènes, le 25 Janvier, 1860, v.s.

(Signé) TH. A. ZAIMI, *Président*.
THEODORE DELYANNI.
A. PETSALIS.
D. SARAVAS.
A. AUGERINOS.
S. SOUTZO.
D. TRIGHETAS.

No. 255.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 201.)

Paris, February 18, 1860.

My Lord,

THE Plenipotentiaries assembled this afternoon at the Foreign Office, at 3 o'clock, to take into consideration the answer of His Hellenic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs to the letter and Declaration addressed to the Greek Government on the 28th ultimo, by the Marquis de Lavalette, on behalf of the Conference.

A conversation of some importance took place among the Plenipotentiaries before they went into Conference.

M. de Lavalette showed to those of the Plenipotentiaries who had not yet seen it, the Proclamation which was issued at Athens on the 26th January/6th February by the Zaimis Ministry, which had reached Paris on the previous evening. A copy of it is inclosed in Mr. Erskine's despatch No. 38 of the 10th instant, which I forwarded to your Lordship to-night.

M. de Lavalette observed, that as this Proclamation had not been communicated to the Conference we were not called upon to take formal cognizance of it. He thought it very open to criticism: but still he was willing to make great allowances for the difficult position in which the Ministry of M. Zaimis found itself. It did not, he said, in his opinion, weaken the formal adherence to the principles laid down by the Conference which was expressed in the letter from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. He did not, therefore, consider that it ought to interfere with our deliberation upon that letter.

M. de Lavalette went on to say that M. Rangabé had informed him yesterday that he had received a note from his Government, to be communicated to each Plenipotentiary. M. de Lavalette had, he told us, replied that he could not consent that there should be any trifling with the Conference. If the note contained anything in derogation of the adherence of the Greek Government to the Declaration, he must, for his part, decline to allow Greece to reap the benefit of that adherence. He had, he said, proceeded to give M. Rangabé notice that the Conference was to hold a sitting which would in all probability be the last, at 3 o'clock to-day; and had added that M. Rangabé would find him at the Foreign Office at 1 o'clock, if he desired to communicate the note to him; that he must leave M. Rangabé to decide what course his instructions and the interests of his country required him to take.

M. de Lavalette concluded by observing that it was now more than two hours since 1 o'clock, but that M. Rangabé had neither presented himself, nor sent any verbal message or written communication.

Count de Stackelberg, the Russian Ambassador, said that he had seen M. Rangabé, and had been charged by him to tell us that he had advisedly abstained from communicating the note either to M. de Lavalette or any other Plenipotentiary. M. de Stackelberg added that it appeared, from the account M. Rangabé had given him of the note, that it did not detract anything from the adherence to the Declaration, but that it treated of matters similar to those contained in the previous papers put in by M. Rangabé, which the Conference had declared itself to be incompetent to discuss.

After this conversation the Plenipotentiaries passed into the Conference room, and the sitting was declared to be opened.

The answer of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs had been communicated to the several Plenipotentiaries the morning before. It was now read, and the question put whether it contained a sufficient adherence to the Declaration of the Conference.

Mention having been made of the Proclamation and note which had been spoken of in the previous conversation, I asked whether we could record as established facts that notice of the sitting of the Conference had been given to the Representative of the

Greek Government, that ample opportunity to communicate the note previously to the sitting had been afforded him, and that he had advisedly abstained from doing so.

M. de Lavalette and M. de Stackelberg answered decidedly in the affirmative; and I said that this being the case I was ready to consider the letter from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Conference without further hesitation.

Each of the Plenipotentiaries declared this letter to contain a sufficient adherence to the Proclamation.

At the request of the Marquis de Lavalette the Ottoman Plenipotentiary repeated, in the name of his Government, the assurance that the emigrants from Crete to Greece would not, on returning to their country, be in any way prosecuted or molested on account of the past insurrection.

A Resolution expressing in warm terms the gratitude of the Conference to its President, was proposed by the Austrian Plenipotentiary, seconded by me, and eagerly agreed to by the other Plenipotentiaries.

A vote of thanks to M. Desprez, the Secretary of the Conference, was passed unanimously.

It was decided that the obligation to secrecy assumed by the Plenipotentiaries should be no longer binding.

Finally, the Conference declared itself dissolved.

A summary of the proceedings was drawn up and sent immediately *en clair* by telegraph from the Foreign Office by each Plenipotentiary to his Government.

This telegram will have informed your Lordship of the steps taken with regard to the renewal of relations between Turkey and Greece. I subjoin a copy of it:—

"Dans la séance d'aujourd'hui, la Conférence, après avoir entendu la lecture de la réponse du Gouvernement Grec à la Déclaration du 20 Janvier, a pris acte de son adhésion aux principes énoncés dans ce document.

"Elle a chargé son Président de remercier les Cours de Constantinople et d'Athènes de la déférence dont elles ont fait preuve pour ses conseils.

"Elle a en même temps déclaré les rapports diplomatiques rétablis *ipso facto* entre les deux Gouvernements, et confié au Président le soin de fixer le jour du départ des Légations respectives après avoir pressenti la Porte et le Cabinet d'Athènes.

"La Conférence s'est ensuite déclarée dissoute."

M. de Lavalette promised to dispatch the same telegram immediately to Baron Baude, to be communicated to the Greek Government, and to send a copy of it at once to M. Rangabé.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 256.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 62.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1869.

HER Majesty's Government approve the advice which, as reported in your despatch No. 62 of the 7th instant, your Excellency has given to the Porte with respect to the orders which under existing circumstances should be addressed to the Turkish authorities on the Greek frontier.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 257.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 20.)

(No 202.)
My Lord, *Paris, February* 19, 1869.

I LEARN from the Marquis de Lavalette that M. Rangabé delivered to him this morning the note sent by his Government for communication to each of the Plenipotentiaries who signed the Declaration of the late Conference. The inclosed copy of it has been put into my hand by M. de Lavalette. His Excellency and I having read it over together, are both of opinion that the contents of it would not have made us hesitate to accept as sufficient the adherence of the Greek Government to our Declaration, if they had been communicated to us before the dissolution of the Conference. That does not admit of my making any further comment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 257.

M. T. Delyanni to M. Rangabé.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le* 7 Janvier / 19 Février 1869.

J'AI l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint en copie la lettre par laquelle M. le Marquis de Lavalette a fait parvenir à mon prédécesseur M. Delyanni le texte de la Déclaration de la Conférence, ainsi que la réponse que j'ai adressée à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté l'Empereur pour lui faire connaître l'adhésion pure et simple, conformément à son désir, du Gouvernement du Roi aux conclusions des dix Grandes Puissances Européennes.

Les Membres qui composent le Cabinet actuel, appréciant la gravité des circonstances, n'ont pas reculé devant la responsabilité de l'adhésion aux conclusions de la Conférence, adhésion imposée par la force des événements. Ils ont pensé en outre que la Grèce, quelles que fussent ses convictions sur sa conduite durant l'insurrection de Candie, quelle que fut la légitimité de ses sympathies pour le peuple Crétois, ne pouvait que déférer aux vœux unanimement exprimés par les Grandes Puissances Européennes, lorsque surtout parmi ces Puissances il y avait trois qui l'avaient, dans le temps, puissamment aidé à conquérir son indépendance.

Mais je ne saurais vous dissimuler, M. le Ministre, que mes collègues et moi avons partagé dans toute son étendue la pénible impression que l'œuvre de la Conférence avait produite sur les esprits de tous les Hellènes. Il n'a fallu rien moins que notre dévouement au Souverain et la conviction de servir les intérêts du pays pour nous décider à conformer notre marche aux suggestions des grands Cabinets Européens.

En lisant la Déclaration de la Conférence, on est frappé du silence gardé sur les procédés de l'Amiral Turc, Hobart Pacha, à Syra, qui y a commis une violation manifeste du droit des gens.

On n'en est pas moins surpris de voir que la Conférence n'a pas voulu examiner les causes mêmes du différend survenu entre la Grèce et la Turquie, à savoir, la condition et les griefs du peuple Crétois, et qu'elle semble admettre en principe certaines réclamations de la Porte Ottomane qui, après les explications contenues dans la réponse du Gouvernement du Roi à l'ultimatum Turc, auraient dû être rejetées comme dénuées de toute consistance. D'ailleurs la manière vague dont ces réclamations ont été énoncées auraient dû fixer l'attention de la Conférence. La Turquie a prétendu que plusieurs sujets Ottomans civils et militaires avaient été maltraités, massacrés même en Grèce, sans que les coupables fussent poursuivis; elle a mis en avant une demande d'indemnité pour les victimes, mais elle a évité de rien préciser à ce sujet, ni au moment de la rupture, ni au sein de la Conférence. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Roi a établi d'une manière incontestable que tous ces faits se réduisaient au meurtre d'un Albanais Musulman par un autre Albanais Chrétien, tous deux sujets Ottomans de passage à Syra, et que le meurtrier fait l'objet d'une active poursuite de la part de la justice. Il résulte même de renseignements transmis après le départ de Photiades Bey par les autorités de Syra au Gouvernement du Roi que le malfaiteur en question y avait été arrêté, mis en jugement, et condamné par la Cour d'Assises à plusieurs années de réclusion.

Il est évident que la Turquie a cherché par des accusations de cette nature à surprendre la conscience des Grandes Puissances, mais l'impartialité commandait de la mettre en demeure de prouver ses allégations.

Le Gouvernement du Roi ayant adhéré aux principes de conduite internationale posés par la Conférence de Paris, je crois inutile de démontrer ici que la Grèce n'a pas violé ces principes, en tant qu'ils concernent ses obligations comme Etat. Si les arguments et les faits produits par mes prédécesseurs dans le long cours de la lutte Crétoise n'ont pu former l'opinion des Grands Cabinets Européens à ce sujet, une discussion de ma part dans ce moment-ci serait inopportune et stérile. Je ne puis, toutefois, m'empêcher, M. le Ministre, de faire une réflexion qui, en l'état, ne saurait plus avoir qu'une portée théorique, bien qu'elle soit suggérée par la pratique de tous temps. Il en est des règles du droit des gens comme de celles du droit privé. Quelquefois leur observation absolue est aussi injuste et dangereuse que leur violation même. C'est ce qui peut expliquer comment les différentes nations se sont vues obligées de temps à autre de

transgresser certaines règles internationales qu'elles n'entendaient nullement abolir ni méconnaître, et qu'elles ont invoquées depuis. Aussi, entre autres, il est admis en principe qu'un Etat ne doit pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures d'un autre Etat, et que les neutres doivent respecter les blocus des belligérants. Cependant il est constant que ces règles générales ne sont pas sans exceptions, qu'il y a des cas où l'intervention et la violation des blocus pour les Etats neutres sont justifiées; et l'on a vu que toutes les fois que les exceptions ont été faites pour le bien général, qu'elles étaient dictées par des considérations d'humanité, qu'elles étaient, en un mot, conformes au droit naturel, elles n'ont pas manqué d'obtenir l'approbation de l'opinion publique et de l'histoire. Il est évident qu'en méconnaissant ces principes, qui ont surtout trouvé leur application dans les temps modernes et qui se lient intimement aux progrès de la science et de la civilisation, on froissérait le sentiment général, tout aussi bien qu'en érigeant en doctrine la violation de toute règle plus ou moins restrictive du droit des gens.

Il est d'autant plus regrettable que la Conférence ne se soit pas occupée de la question Crétoise, qui pourrait, en se renouvelant dans un temps plus ou moins rapproché, produire les mêmes effets que les Grandes Puissances, à l'exception de la Grande Bretagne, ont cru devoir peser en 1867 sur la Porte Ottomane pour la déterminer à consentir à un examen des vœux des Crétois. Ces Puissances, intéressées visiblement au sort de ces derniers, n'ont pas hésité, dans cette même année, à joindre les actes aux paroles en violant dans un but humanitaire le blocus de la Crète et en faisant transporter en Grèce par leurs escadres 60,000 réfugiés.

Le Gouvernement du Roi, comptant sur les dispositions des six Grandes Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856 en faveur des Chrétiens de l'Empire Ottoman, se flatte que ces Puissances voudrait bien employer leur puissante influence, afin que le sort des Crétois et de tous ces Chrétiens nos coreligionnaires soit sérieusement amélioré. Les circonstances exceptionnelles où le peuple Crétois se trouve, ses sacrifices et ses souffrances dans une lutte inégale de deux ans et demi, le recommandent particulièrement à leur attention bienveillante.

En effet, un peuple Chrétien qui, par son patriotisme et son héroïque résistance, a excité les sympathies du monde civilisé, dont le territoire a été le théâtre d'une guerre d'extermination qui se débat dans une affreuse misère, et qui, après tant d'efforts, voit s'évanouir des espérances les plus chères, va être à la merci des vainqueurs. Il serait digne des Grandes Puissances Européennes d'aviser de nouveau au moyen d'améliorer les conditions de ce malheureux peuple. Une semblable décision de leur part, en même temps qu'elle sera un acte d'humanité, produira un heureux effet sur les Chrétiens d'Orient, qui y verront un témoignage de la sollicitude de ces Puissances pour leur sort.

La Grèce, se rappelant qu'elle est le seul Etat indépendant Chrétien en Orient, et que des liens de religion, d'origine, de souffrance, et de luttes communes l'unissent à toutes ces populations, qui attendent leur affranchissement, ou, au moins, une amélioration sensible de leurs conditions d'existence, croit avoir le droit et le devoir d'élever la voix en leur faveur, et de faire appel aux sentiments des Puissances signataires du Traité de 1856.

Je vous invite à donner lecture de la présente à son Excellence M. le Marquis de Lavalette, comme Plénipotentiaire de France et Président de la Conférence, ainsi qu'aux Plénipotentiaires des cinq autres Grandes Puissances, et de leur en laisser copie.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) THEODORE DELYANNI.

No. 258.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.**

Foreign Office, February 20, 1869, 3·10 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

YOU will express to the Porte the great satisfaction felt by Her Majesty's Government at the result of the Conference, and their earnest hope that hereafter the relations between Turkey and Greece may be maintained on a friendly footing. With a view to this end Her Majesty's Government cannot too strongly urge both Governments to adopt without delay or hesitation the closing recommendation of the Conference, and to renew immediately diplomatic intercourse with each other.

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* A similar telegram was sent to Mr. Erskine.

No. 259.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.**

(No. 65.)

Foreign Office, February 20, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency, as I have already done by telegraph, to express to the Porte the great satisfaction felt by Her Majesty's Government at the result of the Conference, and their earnest hope that hereafter the relations between Turkey and Greece may be maintained on a friendly footing. With a view to this end Her Majesty's Government cannot too strongly urge both Governments to adopt without delay or hesitation the closing recommendation of the Conference, and to renew immediately diplomatic intercourse with each other.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 260.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Lyons.

(No. 199.)

Foreign Office, February 20, 1869.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED in the evening of the 18th instant your telegram reporting that the Conference had accepted as satisfactory the answer of the Greek Government, announcing that it adhered to the Declaration of which Count Walewski was the bearer, and that thereupon the Conference had declared that it was dissolved.

Yesterday morning I received your despatch No. 201, giving an account in detail of what had passed with reference to the Greek answer both before and in the Conference.

The business on which your Excellency has been engaged being thus concluded, I have great satisfaction in conveying to you Her Majesty's entire approval of your conduct, and of the zeal and ability that you have shown in the execution of the instructions which it has been my duty, in obedience to the Queen's commands, from time to time to convey to you

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 261.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 21.)

No. 206.)

Paris, February 20, 1869.

My Lord,

M. RANGABE, the Greek Minister, called upon me this afternoon and placed in my hands a copy of the note sent to him by his Government for communication to each of the Plenipotentiaries who signed the Declaration of the late Conference. A copy of it was inclosed in my despatch to your Lordship No. 202 of yesterday.

M. Rangabé told me that, after mature reflection, he had determined not to communicate the note to the Plenipotentiaries until after the dissolution of the Conference. It did not, of course, contain anything to invalidate the adherence *pure et simple* of the Greek Government to the Declaration; but he had thought that, if read at the Conference table, at which the Representative of Turkey would be seated with the other Plenipotentiaries, it might give occasion to comments which might interfere with the smooth and speedy progress of business in the last sitting.

M. Rangabé begged me to direct the particular attention of Her Majesty's Government to the parts referring to the future government of the Cretans.

The note is, as your Lordship will have perceived, in the form of a despatch from His Hellenic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Rangabé, dated 25th January/6th February.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

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* A similar despatch was addressed to Mr. Erskine.

No. 262.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 21, *night.*)

Pera, February 21, 1869, 9·20 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE communicated to the Porte your telegram of yesterday.

Aali Pasha says that, three days ago, he telegraphed to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris to inform the Conference that the Porte was prepared at once to resume diplomatic relations with Greece as soon as the latter was ready to do the same.

Instructions were also sent yesterday by telegraph to the Turkish Governors of the sea-ports stating, that the rupture with Greece being at an end, Hellenic vessels may enter as before.

No. 263.

Consul Dickson to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 22.)

Canea, Crete, February 6, 1869.

(Separate.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a letter addressed to me by the Vice-Consul at Candia, reporting that an expeditionary force had set out for the insurgent district of Mirabello, without, however, encountering any resistance. The Governor-General, during his late visit to Candia, had issued a notification offering a reward of 500 Turkish pounds for the head of each of the unsubdued insurgent chiefs, Korakas, Sphakianaki, Lakerda, Trifitzos, and Kakkinis, and that any property they may possess shall be confiscated, if they do not surrender within the fixed term, being the 8th instant. Captain Kriaris, whom the Governor-General expected would have come down to Canea along with his late companions in arms, Hadgi Mikhalis, &c., after having signed the petition alluded to in my despatch of the 18th ultimo, effected his escape, and ever since lay concealed in a cave near Rogdia, in Ennea-Khoria valley, watching for an opportunity to escape to Greece. The authorities, meanwhile, offered 300*l.* for his head. Yesterday a Turkish patrol, having discovered the place of his concealment, attacked him and three of his followers present; Kriaris fell wounded in the thigh, but, it appears, not before he had shot a zaptieh. He is now in jail, awaiting the order for his removal to Canea.

The condition of the island being satisfactory, with every prospect of peace being speedily restored to every part of it, the authorities have decided on gradually reducing the army strong of fifty-seven battalions, or equal to about 45,000 men, by one-half or a little less. The duty of garrisoning the blockhouses will devolve principally upon irregular Albanian troops.

Accordingly the "Mary Constance," British steamer, which had brought supplies for the army from Constantinople, took away early this week 1,300 redif. The "Taléa," Imperial despatch-boat, carried about the same time 600 Albanian irregulars from Salonica to Suda Bay.

Several Cretan refugee families, roughly estimated at 180, have returned to the island, partly by the last Austrian Lloyd's boat, partly by sailing-boats.

Her Majesty's gunboat "Wizard" having arrived from Malta, in order to resume its station in these waters, the "Trinculo" sailed for the Piræus on the morning of the 4th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. H. DICKSON.

Inclosure in No. 263.

Vice-Consul Calocherino to Consul Dickson.

Canea, Crete, February 1, 1869.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to state that eight battalions of Imperial troops under the command of Adil Pasha (the Commander-in-chief Mehmet Ali Pasha being unwell) advanced to Mirabello without any resistance from insurgents.

The inhabitants have not left their houses as they did before, but continued their agricultural occupations when the troops arrived. Many of the said villagers who were

in arms with the insurgents before the arrival of the troops are stated to have remained quietly in their villages.

His Excellency Costaki Adossides Pasha returned into this town last night from Mirabello, and brought here also some armed insurgents who will serve the Imperial Government, as it is stated. The insurgent Chiefs, Korakas, Trifitsos, Lakerdas, Sphakianakis, are stated either to have left Crete, or to have take refuge in caverns. I hear also that his Excellency Costaki Pasha having suddenly arrived in Neonchorion of Mirabello, where was another insurgent Chief, Kokinis; the latter fled on the mountains, and left his horse in the possession of the troops.

His Excellency Hussein Pasha arrived here the day before yesterday, and a Proclamation was issued by the local authorities, stating that as the Provinces of Canea, Sphakia, and Retimo have been submitted, and there remain only a few insurgents in Lasethe and Candia Provinces under five Chiefs; the latter must also tender their submission to the local authorities within the 8th instant, otherwise after that date their properties will be confiscated, and 500 Turkish lira are offered by the authorities for each head of the said five insurgent Chiefs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYSIMACHUS A. CALOCHERINO.

No. 264.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 26.)

Paris, February 23, 1869.

(No. 212.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a certified copy of the Protocol of the sitting of the 18th instant, which was the seventh and last sitting of the Conference on the Turco-Greek difference.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 264.

Protocol (*No.* 7) *of Conference held at Paris, February* 18, 1869.

Présents:

Les Plénipotentiaires de l'Autriche-Hongrie;
" " de la France;
" " de la Grande Bretagne;
" " de l'Italie;
" " de la Prusse et de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord;
" " de la Russie;
" " de la Turquie;

Le Secrétaire de la Conférence.

LE Président de la Conférence ayant reçu la réponse du Gouvernement Hellénique à la communication qu'il avait été chargé de lui faire, en vertu des décisions adoptées en commun, les Plénipotentiaires se sont réunis aujourd'hui pour prendre connaissance de ce document.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette ouvre la séance en donnant lecture de la lettre du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes en date du 28 Janvier / 9 Février. Il ajoute que le Ministre de France à Athènes lui a fait parvenir une Proclamation au peuple Grec par laquelle le nouveau Cabinet explique sa résolution d'accéder à la Déclaration de la Conférence. M. le Marquis de Lavalette a été également instruit par M. le Ministre de Grèce à Paris de l'existence d'une circulaire adressée aux Agents Helléniques au dehors, et dont M. Rangabé avait manifesté l'intention de donner connaissance à chacun des Plénipotentiaires. Cette communication n'ayant pas été faite jusqu'à l'heure présente, M. le Plénipotentiaire de France ne pense pas qu'il y ait lieu de s'en préoccuper. Il ne croit pas non plus que l'on doive entrer dans l'examen de la Proclamation, qui n'a pas été transmise par le Cabinet Hellénique. La Conférence a

donc à délibérer uniquement sur la réponse du Cabinet d'Athènes et à décider si ce document peut être considéré comme constituant une adhésion complète à la Déclaration du 20 Janvier et comme propre à mettre fin au différend entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de l'Autriche-Hongrie dit qu'il aurait désiré savoir que la circulaire ne renferme pas de réserves de nature à modifier l'opinion des Puissances sur la réponse de la Grèce. Si cependant cette circulaire est conçue dans le même esprit que la Proclamation, et ne contient que l'expression de regrets, M. le Prince de Metternich ne voit aucune raison d'en tenir compte ; car elle ne pourrait exercer aucune influence sur le jugement que la Conférence est appelée à porter.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie constate qu'en fait la circulaire dont il s'agit n'a pas été communiquée en temps opportun pour être l'objet d'une délibération, et il en tire la conclusion que M. le Ministre de Grèce n'y aura pas lui-même attaché une valeur pratique.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Angleterre demande si l'on peut regarder comme établi que le Représentant de la Grèce a été averti de la réunion de la Conférence, et qu'il a été mis en mesure de faire sa communication avant la séance ; en un mot si l'on peut croire qu'il s'est abstenu sciemment de donner suite à sa pensée première.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires de France et de Russie répondent affirmativement.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Angleterre dit que la Conférence doit dès lors se borner à rechercher si la lettre de M. Delyanni à M. le Marquis de Lavalette est conforme ou non au vœu émis dans la Déclaration collective.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette est d'avis que si M. le Ministre de Grèce avait cru devoir faire la communication qu'il avait annoncée, les Plénipotentiaires auraient dû eux-mêmes l'examiner pour se conformer à la règle qu'ils avaient suivie jusqu'ici, sauf à écarter toute discussion sur les questions laissées en dehors des limites de leur compétence. M. le Plénipotentiaire de France en avait fait l'observation à M. Rangabé, et avait appelé toute son attention sur les difficultés qu'il créerait pour la Grèce si, produisant un document nouveau après la réponse de M. Delyanni, il donnait à la Cour d'Athènes l'apparence de vouloir retirer d'une main ce qu'elle accordait de l'autre. La Conférence, de son côté, ajoute M. le Marquis de Lavalette, n'a pas intérêt à demander la production d'une pièce qui pourrait faire renaître des discussions sans issue. Elle a voulu écarter les incidents qui inquiétaient dans le présent les amis de la paix en Orient. Renfermés dans cette limite par l'accord de leurs Cabinets, les Plénipotentiaires ont atteint leur but, et ils peuvent légitimement se flatter d'avoir rendu un important service à la Grèce. La proclamation du Ministère Hellénique en offre la preuve en quelque sorte à chaque ligne, car elle atteste d'une manière plus saisissante qu'aucune Puissance n'eût osé le dire à quel point les Grecs étaient hors d'état de soutenir la guerre avec la Turquie. M. le Plénipotentiaire de France voit en même temps dans la situation de la Grèce telle qu'elle est représentée par la Proclamation un témoignage de la modération et de la sagesse dont la Porte Ottomane s'est montrée animée en abandonnant la pensée de poursuivre elle-même ses griefs par la force et en déférant aux conseils pacifiques des Puissances. Devant cet exposé de l'état du Royaume Hellénique, on doit rendre également justice aux nouveaux Ministres qui ont su, en acceptant la Déclaration, détourner les périls qui menaçaient leur pays si une lutte armée avait dû s'engager. Sans s'arrêter aux regrets dont ils ont entouré leur résolution, la Conférence, suivant M. le Marquis de Lavalette, doit envisager la résolution elle-même, et il se plaît, pour sa part, à y voir un gage sérieux de l'apaisement qui s'est fait dans les esprits en Grèce.

M. le Comte de Stackelberg ajoute que Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes a montré beaucoup d'énergie dans ces dernières circonstances, et que sa fermeté est aussi une garantie de la loyauté avec laquelle la Grèce se conformera aux engagements qu'elle a pris.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France déclare que Sa Majesté le Roi Georges s'est en effet conduit avec décision, ne se laissant ni décourager par les difficultés qu'il a rencontrées pour trouver de nouveaux Ministres ni intimider par les manifestations au moyen desquelles on avait espéré l'entraîner dans la voie de la résistance aux vœux de l'Europe. M. le Marquis de Lavalette s'associe donc entièrement au sentiment exprimé par M. le Plénipotentiaire de Russie et à l'espoir qu'il fonde pour l'avenir sur l'attitude calme et ferme de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes dans cette crise. M. le Plénipotentiaire de France croit trouver en outre un symptôme de l'affermissement des idées de prévoyance et de sagesse à Athènes dans la responsabilité que M. le Ministre de Grèce a assumé de ne pas faire la communication qu'il avait d'abord annoncée.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie dit qu'après les explications qui viennent d'être données il ne reste plus qu'à prendre une détermination au sujet de la réponse du Gouvernement Hellénique, seul document dont la Conférence soit saisie, et à décider si cette réponse satisfait aux conditions qu'elle devait remplir.

Tous les Plénipotentiaires sont d'accord pour reconnaître qu'elle ne donne lieu à aucune observation particulière.

En conséquence, sur la proposition de M. le Chevalier Nigra, la Conférence prend acte de l'adhésion de la Grèce aux principes énoncés dans la Déclaration du 20 Janvier, 1859.

Il est convenu que la lettre de M. Delyanni à M. le Marquis de Lavalette datée du $\frac{28 \text{ Janvier}}{9 \text{ Février}}$ sera annexée au Protocole.

La Conférence charge en même temps son Président de remercier les Cours de Constantinople et d'Athènes de la preuve de déférence qu'elles ont donnée en écoutant les conseils qui leur étaient adressés.

Conformément aux termes de la dépêche de M. le Marquis de Lavalette au Gouvernement Hellénique, la Conférence décide enfin que les rapports diplomatiques sont rétablis *ipso jure* entre la Turquie et la Grèce par l'adhésion, maintenant constatée, du Cabinet d'Athènes.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France demande à M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie s'il croit que la Porte serait disposé à accepter pour le rétablissement de fait des Légations le principe de la simultanéité et à prendre l'engagement d'envoyer son Ministre à Athènes dès qu'elle saurait, par l'entremise de l'Ambassade de France, que l'Agent Hellénique se rend lui-même à Constantinople.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie répond qu'il a informé son Gouvernement de la suggestion déjà faite dans des entretiens antérieurs par M. le Marquis de Lavalette à ce sujet, mais qu'il n'a pas encore reçu les instructions qu'il attend.

M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Italie dit que la Conférence rendrait un nouveau service à la Turquie et à la Grèce si elle employait ses bons offices pour faciliter l'aplanissement de toute difficulté sur ce dernier point, et il propose de charger M. le Plénipotentiaire de France de pressentir les deux Cours de Constantinople et d'Athènes à l'effet de déterminer, de concert avec elles, le jour où les Ministres respectifs partiraient pour se rendre à leur poste.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette déclare qu'il est prêt à seconder le vœu de la Conférence, et qu'il invitera sans perte de temps les Agents Diplomatiques de l'Empereur en Turquie et en Grèce à appuyer la combinaison dont il s'agit et à en faciliter l'exécution.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette donne ensuite connaissance d'une démarche faite auprès du Ministre de France en Grèce par une députation des principaux Crétois réfugiés à Athènes. Ces délégués de l'émigration étaient chargés d'attester le vœu unanime de leurs compatriotes de rentrer en Crète, pourvu qu'ils eussent la certitude de ne pas être molestés à leur retour. M. le Plénipotentiaire de France dit qu'il n'a aucun doute sur les dispositions bienveillantes de la Porte en ce qui concerne le traitement réservé aux familles Candiotes. Il désirerait toutefois recevoir de M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie l'assurance que les émigrés Crétois ne seront pas recherchés ou menacés pour leur participation aux événements de Candie. Il fait observer d'ailleurs que cette question n'implique aucune pensée d'immixtion dans les rapports du Sultan avec ses sujets. Le but de la Conférence, ajoute M. le Marquis de Lavalette, est uniquement de savoir d'une manière certaine qu'elle n'expose pas au danger de poursuites et de vexations de la part des autorités Ottomanes les familles dont elle demande que le repatriement soit facilité et qu'elle encourage ainsi à retourner en Crète.

Djemil Pacha répond que jamais aucun des réfugiés déjà rentrés en Crète n'a été inquiété ; que la Porte elle-même s'efforce de hâter le repatriement ; qu'elle n'a que des sentiments de commisération pour les malheureuses familles qui se sont éloignés de leur pays pendant l'insurrection ; et qu'autorisées par ce qui s'est passé pour celles qui ont déjà quitté la Grèce, elles peuvent compter à leur retour sur toute sécurité pour leurs personnes et pour leurs biens.

La Conférence prend acte de la déclaration faite par M. le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France demande à Djemil Pacha si la Porte est prêt à recommencer les opérations du repatriement, et si elle se trouvera prochainement en état de recevoir dans les ports de la Grèce les familles qui désirent dès à présent effectuer leur retour en Crète.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de Turquie rappelle, qu'avant la rupture des relations avec la Grèce, le Gouvernement Ottoman avait nolisé des bâtiments destinés à opérer à ses frais le transport des émigrés Candiotes, et que ces mesures n'avaient été différées que par suite de la suspension des rapports diplomatiques. Il ajoute qu'il a transmis à Constantinople la question que M. le Plénipotentiaire de France lui avait déjà posée à ce sujet, et qu'il ne doute pas que la Porte ne s'empresse d'employer au repatriement tous les moyens dont elle dispose.

La discussion étant épuisée sur tous les points mis en délibération, M. le Prince de Metternich demande la parole pour remercier le Président au nom de la Conférence de la façon éclairée et loyale dont il a dirigé ses travaux, et ajoute que le succès obtenu doit lui être en grande partie attribué. M. le Plénipotentiaire d'Autriche-Hongrie se félicite personnellement d'avoir participé à une réunion qui s'est distinguée par une unité constante et remarquable de principes et d'intentions pacifiques, et il manifeste l'espoir que cette Conférence servira de précédent salutaire.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne, de l'Italie, de la Prusse, de la Russie, et de la Turquie, joignent leurs remercîments à ceux de M. le Prince de Metternich, et se plaisent à constater l'esprit de conciliation et les vues élevées que M. le Plénipotentiaire de France a apportés dans cette négociation.

MM. les Plénipotentiaires expriment en même temps leur satisfaction pour la manière dont le Secrétaire de la Conférence, chargé de la rédaction des Protocoles, s'est acquitté de cette tâche.

M. le Marquis de Lavalette témoigne sa vive reconnaissance pour les appréciations bienveillantes de ses collègues et pour l'appui qu'il a trouvé auprès d'eux dans la poursuite du but commun. Si les travaux de la Conférence, ajoute-t-il, ont eu une issue favorable, on le devra principalement aux dispositions conciliantes qui se sont manifestées de toutes parts.

M. le Plénipotentiaire de France ne veut pas exagérer les résultats auxquels la Conférence est arrivée. Il croit cependant qu'on ne saurait équitablement en contester la valeur, car les Cabinets représentés dans cette réunion sont parvenus à prévenir le conflit qui était près d'éclater en Orient, et à écarter ainsi une cause de complications pour l'Europe. M. le Marquis de Lavalette espère en outre, avec M. le Prince de Metternich, que l'exemple donné par la Conférence ne sera pas perdu, et que l'œuvre pacifique accomplie en vertu et dans l'esprit du Protocole du 14 Avril, 1856, restera comme un précédent qui sera de plus en plus invoqué dans les dissentiments qu'une délibération commune peut aplanir.

Tous les Plénipotentiaires sont unanimes pour exprimer ce vœu, et la Conférence ayant atteint le but de sa mission se déclare dissoute.

Fait à Paris, le dix-huit Février, mil-huit cent soixante-neuf.

(Suivent les signatures.)

Annex to Protocol No. 7 of February 18, 1869.

M. T. Delyanni to M. de Lavalette.

Athènes, le $\frac{25 \text{ Janvier}}{6 \text{ Février}}$, 1869.

M. le Ministre,

MON prédécesseur, M. P. Delyanni, m'a remis la lettre que vous avez bien voulu lui adresser le 20 Janvier, ainsi que la Déclaration y annexée en copie des Plénipotentiaires des six grandes Puissances Européennes réunis en Conférence à Paris afin d'examiner, dans un esprit de conciliation, le différend survenu entre la Grèce et la Turquie.

Le résultat des délibérations de la Conférence a été accueilli, je ne saurais vous le dissimuler, M. le Ministre, avec un sentiment de pénible émotion par le peuple Hellène tout entier, et la crise ministérielle s'étant prolongée pendant plusieurs jours, a fait qu'une réponse n'a pu être donnée dans cet intervalle à la lettre de votre Excellence. Le Cabinet dont j'ai l'honneur de faire partie s'est fait un devoir, aussitôt constitué, de prendre en sérieuse considération le contenu de la Déclaration et de votre communication.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a vu avec regret que le Ministre de Sa Majesté à Paris n'a pu prendre part aux travaux de la Conférence par suite de la position d'infériorité qui lui a été faite vis-à-vis du Plénipotentiaire de Turquie.

En présence de l'unanimité des six grandes Puissances Européennes et de votre déclaration que leurs Plénipotentiaires, en dégageant le débat des questions de fait, n'ont eu en vue que de rechercher les régles de conduite qui doivent présider aux rapports entre la Grèce et la Turquie, je m'empresse de vous informer que le Gouvernement du Roi adhère aux principes généraux de jurisprudence internationale contenus dans la Déclaration de la Conférence, et qu'il est décidé d'y conformer son attitude.

En priant votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter cette adhésion à la connaissance de la Conférence, j'aime à espérer que les six grandes Puissances, appréciant les difficultés

de la situation, tiendront compte à la Grèce de sa résolution de déférer à leurs vœux et de contribuer pour sa part au maintien du repos général.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) THEODORE P. DELYANNI.

No. 265.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 213.) *Paris, February 23, 1869.*

My Lord,

MENTION was made at the last sitting of the Conference of the Proclamation of the Greek Council of Ministers to the people, and of a note which was known to have been sent to the Greek Minister at Paris, to be communicated to the several Plenipotentiaries who signed the Declaration of the Conference.

The Greek Minister advisedly withheld the note until after the dissolution of the Conference. As I have already had the honour to report to your Lordship he has, since the dissolution, communicated it to the Marquis de Lavalette, and to the several diplomatists who represented Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Prussia, and Russia in the Conference.

An examination of this document will show that it contains nothing which would have made the Conference hesitate to accept the Greek adherence to its decision, and to declare diplomatic relations to be re-established between Turkey and Greece. In fact, the note distinctly states that the object of the letter from His Hellenic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Conference was to convey the adhesion *pure et simple* of the Greek Government to the decision of the Plenipotentiaries.

Such being the case, the further observations made by the Greek Minister in this note on the proceedings of the Conference do not require much comment.

The measures adopted by Hobart Pasha to prevent the departure of the "Enosis" from Syra were posterior to the events which formed the subject of the Turkish ultimatum, and consequently did not fall within the scope of the Conference. A discussion of these measures and of the provocation which led to them could hardly have failed to exercise an unfavourable effect on the deliberations, and to increase the difficulty of coming to a decision acceptable to both parties.

An inquiry into the condition of the Cretans and the causes of the insurrection would have been equally foreign to the limits prescribed to the Conference. To have entered upon these subjects would certainly have prevented the attainment of the objects in view—the suspension of coercive measures by the Porte, and the speedy restoration of friendly relations between Turkey and Greece.

With regard to alleged acts of violence committed in Greece against Ottoman subjects, and claims for indemnity for such acts, the Conference decided, with the consent of the Ottoman Plenipotentiary, that they should be left to the jurisdiction of the Greek Tribunals, and prosecuted in the ordinary legal form before those Tribunals.

It is not easy to see in what way greater consideration could have been manifested for the dignity and independence of Greece.

The Greek Minister wisely abstains from discussing afresh the question as to how far the requirements of international law were in fact observed by Greece during the Cretan insurrection. His argument that in certain cases the strict observance of the rules of international law is as unjust and as dangerous as the violation of them is hardly worthy of serious notice. Nor am I called upon to inquire whether the proceedings of some of the great Powers, with regard to the late insurrection, were or were not incompatible with international law. Great Britain took no part in those proceedings, and certainly events appear to have proved that in this case at least the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in strictly adhering to the principles of international law was alike wise and humane.

The appeal of Greece to the solicitude of the great Powers of Europe in favour of the Christians in the East I should be loath to criticise. I must, however, in justice to the Porte, observe that, independently of the formal assurance given to the Conference by the Ottoman Plenipotentiary, the past conduct of the Turkish authorities may well inspire confidence that those Cretans who have returned to their allegiance have no reason to apprehend that they will be prosecuted or molested on account of the part taken by them in the insurrection.

The gist of the Proclamation to the people of Greece appears to be an announcement that however disagreeable it may be to the Greeks to observe the rules of international law, their Government had only two alternatives between which to decide. They were obliged either to adhere immediately to the Declaration of the Conference, or to engage in a hopeless war with Turkey.

On comparing the defenceless state of Greece as described in this Proclamation with the forces at the disposal of her adversary and the readiness of the Porte to use them, all well-wishers to Greece must be thankful to the King and his present Ministers for availing themselves of the means provided by the Conference for saving their country from so terrible a danger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.